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….les verres deformants qui interposent entre notre 
conscience et le monde extérnel…
…distorting mirrors stand between our consciousness and 
the external world…
—Octave Mirbeau1
Il y a plusieurs types juifs, mais malgré les croisements et les 
mélanges, on peut soutenir, contre Renan, que la pérennité de 
ces types est incontestable. Si, donc nous rectifions l’idée que 
philo et antisémites se font de la race juive, on peut dire que 
l’identité des origines, constitue déjà un lien entre les juifs.
There are many kinds of Jews, but despite all the crossings 
and mixtures, it is possible to argue, against Renan, that the 
perenity of these kinds is incontestable. If, then, we correct 
the idea that the philo- and anti-Semites make about the 
Jewish race, we can say that the identity of their origins 
constitutes already a connection between Jews.
—Bernard Lazare2
1 Cited by Pierre Michel and Jean-François Nivet, eds., Octave Mirbeau, Combats esthétiques, I, 1877-
1892 (Paris: Séguier, 1990), Introduction: “Mirbeau Critique d’Art,” 32.
2 Bernard Lazre, Le nationaliosme juif. Publications du “KadimaH” No. 1 (Paris: Associations des 
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What you are about to read is the first of several new book-length 
studies of Alfred Dreyfus. This first in the series clears the ground of 
many assumptions, guesses set out as facts, and interesting ideas that 
have not been followed through to their logical conclusions. What are 
new are not so much facts as two new factors: to begin with, my concern 
is much less about the Dreyfus Affair than it is about the man’s life 
and personality, along with that of his wife, Lucie, and of their closest 
relatives and friends. But my book is neither a biography of the Dreyfus 
family and its association with the Hadamards, Lucie’s family, nor a 
social or intellectual history of the fin de siècle in France, the setting of 
the Affair. This is because of the second new factor, my concern with the 
intellectual, emotional and spiritual qualities of the man Alfred Dreyfus 
as evidenced in his writings—his letters to Lucie and hers to him, his 
several journals, and his prison workbooks composed on Devil’s Island, 
approximately half of which have been saved from destruction. In other 
words, I am presenting a book about Dreyfus as a late nineteenth-
century writer, a thinker, a scientist and a poet, a critic and a historian, 
and, not least, as a Jew. 
The essential approach to Dreyfus’s achievements I take is similar to 
the parameters established by Vincenso Calfa, the translator of Jules 
Michelet’s The Bible of Humanity:
The circumscribed frame of the narrative is broken....
history becomes a poem, and even when he keeps within 
the limits of pure narrative, his vivid imagination is not 
slackened. The images are so lively, the manner so rapid, 
the quick invention so happy and so wild that the objects 
appear to be born again with all their colors, motions, 
and forms, and pass before our eyes as a phantasmagoria 
of luminous pictures.1
1  Vincenso Calfa, “Life and Works of Michelet” in Jules Michelet. The Bible of Humanity (1864), 




Though Calfa’s remarks deal specifically with Michelet’s style of 
writing, as much in his historical studies as in his more adventurous 
books on aspects of nature and people, there are at least two reasons 
why it is appropriate to cite them in regard to the life of Alfred Dreyfus. 
First, because Dreyfus describes what happened to him during the 
period from 1894 to 1906 as a phantasmagoria; and second, because 
Michelet is one of the writers he singles out as most influential to 
the nineteenth century and by implication to himself. In addition, 
when the love letters written by Lucie and Alfred to one another are 
carefully studied for the dynamics of their energy, intimacy and implied 
creation of a mystical relationship, and also when we examine closely 
the three-fold phenomena of his fifteen surviving cahiers—the essays 
and commentaries on a variety of historical, scientific, aesthetic and 
moral issues; the formulae and equations of mathematics and physics 
he works out; and the thousands of strange drawings that fill up scores 
of pages—there seems no better word to describe the results than 
phantasmagoria. Finally, his biography itself, with all of its starts and 
interruptions, its periods of seeming ordinariness, its outbreaks of 
nightmarish pain and humiliation, and its many disturbing blank spots, 
may also be appropriately designated by this same term.
In the second volume of this projected series, I will examine more 
closely the letters, journals and workbooks to see how they stabilize the 
now standard view of Alfred Dreyfus. Rather than being out of the picture 
as an individual of no particular intellectual merits and achievements, 
he will be shown to be a remarkable man who, under the extreme 
constraints of his imprisonment—exile, solitary confinement, and 
physical torture—prevented himself from going mad by discovering in 
his own mind a rational and critical consolidation of nineteenth-century 
philosophy and aesthetics. He was not an advanced author, but he was 
a deep thinker. He was also not a practicing Jew but he was a Jewish 
thinker. In other words, as his writings define him, instead of the rather 
middle-class conformist and technician most historians have assumed 
him to be, if they spent any time at all on his personality and feelings 
during the long ordeal he went through, close reading of his epistles and 
cahiers reveal an interesting man who was anything but ordinary. 
In the third volume in this series, there will be a study of Alfred 




unexpected aspects of his personality will then be set in the context 
of his favourite European authors, not merely the figures of William 
Shakespeare and Michel de Montaigne, who historians have claimed were 
the sources of his thought, but the four writers he repeatedly cited and 
claimed as his key influences—Jules Michelet, Hippolyte Taine, Ernest 
Renan and Paul Bourget. Interestingly, Dreyfus hardly mentions any of 
the authors who emerged during the Affair to be his chief supporters, 
such as Emile Zola, Bernard Lévy and Marcel Proust. Moreover, thanks 
to his wife Lucie’s influence and the circle of relations and friends on 
her side, the Hadamards, Alfred knew what was happening in the arts, 
music and literature, although his tastes were not for the avant garde, 
and his standards stemmed from the rabbinical culture of Alsace where 
his family had its roots. The mystery remains, however: why, given the 
great range of writing displayed in the prison cahiers and the meticulous 
record of his struggle for complete rehabilitation, does Alfred Dreyfus 
virtually fade from view after 1906, with only a few appearances in public 
until his death in 1935? From the time he was restored to his service 
in the Army and awarded the Legion d’honneur, we know more about 
his wife Lucie and their children Jeanne and Pierre than we do about 
Alfred. What can explain this? Was he a broken man, too exhausted by 
his ordeal, too depressed by his failures, to receive the full recognition 
he felt he deserved, and therefore unable or unwilling to speak in public, 








Part 1: DIffraCtIOn Of LIght rays
L’Objet d’Histoire, objet mnésique, contient un amalgame de 
faits établis scientifiquement et de rumeurs fascinantes et 
non fondées. Ces attentes entre le vrai et le faux vont provo-
quer une mise en veille de la rationalité, voire une fascina-
tion trouble sur le réel qui tend à se dérober.
—Robert Liris1
We don’t see as much of the world as we think we see . . . . We 
focus our attention on a few things that we want to see and 
the result of that is that we have to filter out things that we 
don’t care about. And we sometimes also filter out things that 
we might care about. This is known as inattentional blindness.
—Daniel Simons2
A few words before I start. Actually, I have already started. You can 
see that by the various little citations preceding the beginning of my 
text. Although I will explain the whole method in due course, from 
chapter to chapter, if you need to be prepared to follow the argument, 
already the main themes should be evident. Things in this world and 
in the world of experience that Alfred Dreyfus, his wife, other mem-
bers of his family, and his closest friends and associates underwent 
were not always as they seemed—or as they seem to us when we try 
1 Robert Liris, “La Tour foudroyée: Image factuelle ou Object d’Histoire” Mentalities/Mentalités 
25:1–2 (2011), “The historical object, the mnemonic object, consists of an amalgam of scientifically 
established facts and fascinating and unfounded rumors. The tensions between the true and the 
false set off a wake-up call from rationality, and that in itself stirs up a troubling fascination inside 
reality which then tends to scurry away in darkness.”
2 Cited in an interview between Alok Juha and Daniel Simons, “Gorillas in our midst—but they’re 
easily missed: A famous study has forced us to question how our brains see the world around 
us,” published on the Perspectives page of The New Zealand Herald (4 August 2010), based on 
The Invisible Gorilla and Other Ways Our Intuitions Deceive Us by Daniel Simons and Christopher 




to read the documents of the period.
There are many reasons for these discrepancies, which this book will 
address often indirectly rather than directly because I don’t see how they 
can be addressed effectively in any other way. Part of the reason is that 
everyone in Western and Central Europe in the final years of the nine-
teenth century and the early decades of the twentieth was undergoing 
an epistemological change in the way they could feel, see, think about, 
imagine, and write about themselves and the world they lived in. Some 
of the changes were relatively minor and due to technological transfor-
mations—from telegraphy to railroads and steamboats, photography 
and urban architecture; some were more profound, more deeply embed-
ded in the very affective and cognitive mechanisms of perception and 
articulation—from aesthetics to physics and psychology. Some were 
even more hidden in the shadows of history and the blinding brightness 
of new social relationships, changes a long time brewing and beginning 
to emerge to consciousness in a series of traumatic shocks in political 
events, wars, and personal crises.
The Dreyfus Affair was one of those occurrences that seem suddenly 
to bring to light what had been unnoticed and that called for ways of 
seeing, speaking, writing, and acting that would have been unthinkable 
and unimaginable before.
Things before Words
Utilize as best you can the transformations of the universe 
into a local section; use the process by which time is canned 
and called a newspaper. The world has become uglier since 
it began to look into a mirror every day; so let us settle for 
the mirror and do without an inspection of the original. It is 
uplifting to lose one’s faith in a reality which looks the way it 
is described in a newspaper. He who sleeps away half a day 
has won half a life.
—Karl Kraus3
3 Karl Kraus, “In Praise of a Topsy-Turvy Life-Style” in In These Great Times: A Karl Kraus Reader, 
ed. Harry Zohn, trans. Joseph Fabry, Max Knighty, Karl F. Ross, and Harry Zohn (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984 [1976]), 37.
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This section contains a rough summary of received opinions. After I 
set forth this narrative of events, I will put the words and the beliefs 
through a prism to see what patterns of light and darkness the rays 
break up into. Now we see through a glass or mirror only in enigmatic 
reasons and concepts; then we shall start to see more clearly the various 
midrashic faces or facets of the man, the milieu and the mentality.
The Dreyfus Affair, one of the shaping events of the modern age, oc-
curred over a twelve-year period, from 1894 to 1906. This event began 
in France twenty years before the outbreak of World War I, but came 
to involve the rest of Europe and North America, with repercussions as 
far away as Australia and New Zealand. The affair that bears his name 
concerned a young artillery officer in the French Army named Alfred 
Dreyfus.
He was in his early thirties, comfortably married with two children, 
and at the beginning of a brilliant military career. Everything fell apart 
one morning, however, when Dreyfus was summoned to his office in the 
Intelligence Department and accused of offering to sell military secrets 
to the German embassy in Paris. With virtually no proof at all—and 
what little evidence was at first adduced and then used covertly at his 
court-martial a few months later proved to be either irrelevant, ambig-
uous, or forged—Dreyfus was found guilty of treason, stripped of his 
rank as a captain, and sent to perpetual incarceration in solitary con-
finement on Devil’s Island, a former leper colony and an unpopulated 
outcrop of rock near the French colony of Cayenne or French Guiana on 
the northeastern coast of South America.
The morning he was arrested, it was as though he had been lifted up 
out of his normal life and suddenly found himself in a five-year-long 
nightmare, an absurd and grotesque dream—or a mad and fantastic si-
lent film, of the type which was just beginning to be made at exactly 
the same time by men like Georges Méliès. In other words, a theatre of 
grotesque illusions, a horror movie, a nightmare.
But this event was no simple phantasmagoria. It was all very real, all 
too real. Alfred Dreyfus had been set up, framed, and scapegoated be-
cause he was a Jew. Although he was a dashing young officer who rode 
his horse every morning before going to the office at military headquar-
ters, although he was a comfortably middle-class husband married to a 
rich and educated wife, although he seemed to be a normal Frenchman 




ugly stage Jew with a hooked nose and disgusting habits, and he was 
caricatured almost daily in the press and on posters as a dangerous non-
Aryan monster4 who could never fit in and who threatened Christian 
France. He was hated by screaming mobs in the streets, who called out, 
“Down with the traitor! Death to Dreyfus! Death to the Jews!”5
At first, only his wife, immediate family, and a few close friends be-
lieved that there had been a miscarriage of justice, a mistake, an error 
in the procedures of the court-martial. Most people in France, includ-
ing most French Jews, simply accepted the verdict of the military tri-
bunal. But Edouard Drumont and the anti-Semitic press and a political 
opposition made up of an unholy alliance of Boulangists or disgruntled 
monarchists, angry Jesuits and fearful Catholic priests, and all sorts of 
jingoistic patriots began to whip up strong feelings both in the streets 
and in the chambers of the French parliament.
From 1894 through 1897, not many people inside or outside the 
Jewish community of France seemed to care—except Alfred’s wife, Lu-
cie, and older brother, Mathieu Dreyfus, and their extended families, 
along with just one or two other allies. Again, as is now widely known, 
this early inner circle of Dreyfusards pledged their time, their for-
tunes, and their lives to the cause of proving Alfred Dreyfus innocent 
and bringing him back from Devil’s Island for a revision of the verdict 
against him. Most of the Jewish community in France, it seems, did 
not believe, or did not want to believe, that he was innocent, because 
to do so would question their loyalty to the French Republic. Many 
feared, as too often happens even today, that taking a public stand 
would draw too much attention to themselves as Jews. A few prob-
ably also considered themselves more French than Jewish or not even 
really Jewish at all, and to protect their own status and to prove in 
public their separation from the organized synagogues and rabbinical 
institutions, they even spoke out as anti-Dreyfusards. Some of them 
perhaps honestly believed that whether he was innocent or not, the 
best course for France was to accept the verdict of the military courts 
4 Although this Germanic terminology was not used often in France, the label Semite was applied 
regularly to Jews, and the Semite is always implicitly contrasted to the Aryan or whatever is 
currently fashionable for the nationalist racial ideal. Gobineau was not cited often in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century.
5 Romain Rolland: “Just look at your old Dreyfus affair. You shouted loud enough: ‘Death! Blood! 
Slaughter!’ . . . Oh! you Gascons! Spittle and ink! But how many drops of blood?’” (Jean Christophe, 
vol. III, 228).
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and to respect the opinions of the men in government.
Yet gradually, through the second half of the 1890s, the truth began 
to emerge—that there was a strong possibility that Dreyfus had been 
framed by a small clique of envious officers, that the real spy and traitor 
was a rather unsavoury character of Hungarian descent named Charles 
Marie Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy, that the officers in the French high 
command were lying and forging documents to protect one another, 
and that this corruption went right up into the offices of cabinet minis-
ters and even, it seemed, to the president of the republic. So by 1898, a 
great wave of reaction had began to form, calling for, on the one hand, 
a revision of Dreyfus’s verdict from the court-martial and, on the other, 
for a radical change in government and a separation of church and state 
in France.
Despite the emergence of a new class or category of people, the intel-
lectuals, who spoke out for Dreyfus and signed their names to petitions,6 
the military, the government, and the clergy tried to bluff it out, us-
ing all the means at their disposal—not only newspapers and books 
but new media as well, such as motion pictures, illustrated postcards, 
wax museums, vaudeville shows, and street parades. Matters reached 
a head, however, when the most popular and important novelist of the 
day, Emile Zola, published a scathing attack on the whole of the estab-
lishment. In a full-page open letter in the press, Zola’s J’Accuse (I Ac-
cuse) forced the issue into the public arena. In the following days, weeks, 
and months, a new kind of group came into being—the intellectuals. 
Students and professors, doctors and lawyers, and writers and artists 
signed petitions almost every day in the newspapers, calling for a revi-
sion of the original verdict.
But while there were also mobs screaming in the streets for the death 
of the traitor Dreyfus, the Jew, and all the Jews, there also seemed to be 
professional men and women, cultural leaders, and university-trained 
people, also intellectuals, arguing that the honour of the army must pre-
cede that of an individual, that the ideals of France were worth more 
6 Romain Rolland: “There were famous men among them men who had been wrenched away from 
their stylistic labors and plunged into public meetings by the Dreyfus affair . . . . There was now 
a mob of writing men all engrossed in politics, and claiming to control the affairs of the State. 
On the slightest excuse they would form societies, issue manifestoes, save the Capitol. After the 
intellectuals of the advance guard came the intellectuals of the rear: they were very much of a 
muchness. Each of the two parties regarded the other as intellectual and themselves as intelligent” 




than simple justice, and that if Dreyfus were found innocent, then the 
whole of the military leadership and most of the government would 
have to resign—something untenable.
Several other related trials took place in the 1890s, all part of the 
Dreyfus Affair—that of Emil Zola, the novelist who had spoken out 
so bravely; of Colonel Georges Picquart, the military officer whose in-
vestigations had confirmed Dreyfus’s innocence; and of the infamous 
Esterhazy, the real culprit, all against the Dreyfusards—until a second 
court-martial for Dreyfus took place. Each trial resulted in victory not 
for the Dreyfusards but for the anti-Dreyfusards. Even Colonel Henry’s 
suicide7 raised more sympathy for the case against Dreyfus, rather than 
undercutting it.
In 1898, in the provincial city of Rennes, for a second time, to the 
dismay of the intellectuals and of liberal, progressive men and wom-
en around the world, Alfred Dreyfus was found guilty again—but this 
time, adding insult to injury, with what was called extenuating circum-
stances. Picquart was found guilty in his trial, and Esterhazy was de-
clared innocent in his. As for Alfred, twice condemned by military tri-
bunals, even after the civilian court of appeals had found the evidence 
insufficient to accept the original verdict and thus set the stage for the 
second Rennes trial, the offer of a pardon was too good to be turned 
down on principle: his family and friends were convinced that his health 
and sanity could not be risked again. How could they allow him to be 
sent back to Devil’s Island for another day, let alone another five or ten 
years? Thankfully, there was by then a new, more liberal government in 
Paris embarrassed by the whole affair, and so a few days later, Dreyfus 
was indeed pardoned. Yet the struggle for his exoneration carried on 
for several more years until 1906, and eventually he was brought back 
into the army, promoted, and given the Legion d’honneur. Yet none of 
those responsible for the crimes of perjury, deception, and worse were 
7 A documentary film by Jean Cherasse made in 1975, Dreyfus: L’Intolerable vérité (rereleased in 
2006 for the centenary of Alfred Dreyfus’s rehabilitation on DVD by Janus Diffusion and available 
at http://www.horsfilm.com), alludes to questions raised about the veracity of this culprit’s death 
as self-inflicted, not least because the colonel’s corpse was never subjected to a postmortem 
examination. Like the accidental death of Emile Zola by asphyxiation due to a malfunctioning gas 
heater in his home or the failure of police to apprehend the would-be assassin of Dreyfus’s lawyer 
during the Rennes trial, this is one of the still-unsolved mysteries associated with the affair. (On 
the theory that Zola was murdered by an anti-Dreyfusard workman, see Frederick Brown, Zola: A 
Life [New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996]).
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brought to account, except for a few who committed suicide.
In hindsight, we can see that justice was not done, peace was not 
restored, and the truth was not fully known or given its proper due. The 
great paradox of the affair, then and now, is that while Dreyfus and the 
Dreyfusards wrestled with the monsters in their nightmare as though 
the enigma of his persecution still lay in an unresolved distortion of 
justice—the judicial error and the mystery of why the powers-that-be 
still suspected him of treason—the anti-Dreyfusards and the old Drey-
fusards who grew weary of his whining and moaning did know the truth: 
it was because Alfred belonged to the Jews—that unassimilable, annoy-
ing, untrustworthy other.
The narrative of the Case
This is not a book. A book, even a bad book, is a serious affair. 
A phrase that might be excellent in the fourth chapter would 
be all wrong in the second, and it’s not everybody who knows 
the trick.
—Paul Gauguin8
One definition of a myth is “what everyone says.” The ancient Greeks 
and Romans did not use this term because what we see as mythos in the 
sense of lies or false stories or fantastic explanations for things they 
could not otherwise understand, they called histories, in other words 
what everybody says and consequently believes. They are not books or 
formal, rational arguments, logoi. The argument I am making here is 
only a book in a superficial sense: it is a way of playing with the words of 
the narrative everyone says they know and believe. I am not trying to 
say it is false, but that this so-called history of Alfred Dreyfus and the 
affair that bears his name is not “the truth, the whole truth, and noth-
ing but the truth.” Much if not most of what is found in history books 
is true today. However, not all the truth appears in them, and there are 
some untruths mixed up in the official narrative. Most of all, what is left 
out in Dreyfus’s history is Alfred Dreyfus himself, the man, as well as 
8 Paul Gauguin, The Intimate Journals (London, Boston, Sydney, and Henley: KPI/Pacific Basin 
Books, 1985 [1983]; orig. trans. 1923; orig. French 1903), 1. Then a few pages later, he adds, 




his wife Lucie, and how they formed a new milieu in writing for them-
selves, and how this milieu, as we shall see, is a midrashic one. To begin 
with, as I have already begun to do, my words and processes will seem 
to come less out of Jewish techniques of reading and more out of the 
shifts in optics and aesthetics occurring in the nineteenth century. The 
other thing left out is more than just that Dreyfus was a Jew, but that he 
was Jewish. Though he thought of himself as an assimilated Frenchman 
and tried to dismiss the anti-Semites howling out on the streets as irrel-
evant fools, he thought and felt like a Jew, guided more and more by his 
wife Lucie in her letters. Whatever he may have believed about himself, 
the Jew-haters saw him as Jewish and thus absolutely unassimilable. 
They read the clues in his actions and words, and so we have to take 
their interpretations seriously because their bigotry and ignorance was 
in response to qualities in his personality, his milieu, and his mental-
ity, which was different, alien, special. Drumont and his colleagues were 
wrong about Dreyfus being a spy, part of a conspiracy by the enemies of 
France, and a figure of evil, but they were right about him being Jewish. 
In due course, my book will address the questions about what it meant 
to be Jewish in France at the end of the nineteenth century and what 
traditional resources of rabbinical knowledge and analysis Alfred could 
have drawn on, even if he did not know he was doing so. 
As I said above, one of the shaping events of the modern age occurred 
over a twelve-year period, from 1894 to 1906. To know what a “shaping 
event” is, we need to pass the received opinions (which the midrashic 
rabbis called pshat) through a number of epistemological and aesthetic 
filters, that is, to diffract the light rays—to break them up through a 
moral filter, so as to reveal what has not been noticed before, or what 
could not even be seen because of the shadows out there in archival re-
ality and inside the mind of the participants in these events. This mo-
mentous set of events did indeed begin in France twenty years before 
the outbreak of World War I, and come to involve the rest of Europe and 
North America, and even Australia and New Zealand. The life of a prom-
ising young artillery officer and family man began to fall apart upon the 
accusation that he had offered to sell military secrets to the German em-
bassy in Paris. As everyone now knows or thinks they know, despite the 
extraordinarily weak and falsified case against him, Dreyfus was found 
guilty of treason and punished: stripped of his rank as a captain and sent 
to perpetual incarceration in solitary confinement on Devil’s Island. His 
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arrest seemed to remove Dreyfus from his normal life and into a world 
of insanity, reminiscent of the worlds men like Georges Méliès were just 
beginning to create in cinema with the new instruments in the world’s 
techological toolbox. Dreyfus did not know about these technological 
advances in optics, but he sensed in his deepest soul that something had 
changed and that he could no longer trust his own perceptions or his 
mind to make sense of what he was experiencing. 
But although Dreyfus himself later used the word phantasmagoria to 
describe the experience, it did not fit that definition in truth. It is clear 
that he was set up, framed, and scapegoated because, despite his profes-
sion, despite his behavior, and despite his lack of religious conviction, to 
France’s anti-Semites he remained a Jew, wearing an ugly mask with the 
features anti-Semites throughout recent history have given to members 
of his class. 
The absurdity of all this resonates close to home now for us. In late 
October 2011, another Jew, also a Frenchman, a soldier, and an inno-
cent young man, was released from five years of imprisonment, five 
years of torture and solitary confinement, five years kept out of the sun-
shine, with no contact with the outside world. When he was released, he 
looked emaciated, weak, confused, hardly able to stand erect, fumbling 
in his speech. In many ways this young Israeli, Gilad Shalit, is like Alfred 
Dreyfus. There are, of course, many important differences, but a cen-
tral similarity is the fact that Gilad, like Alfred, was transported from 
normal life to a nightmare existence. The differences mainly serve to 
remind us about what was unique in Dreyfus’s case—that the young Is-
raeli was not left alone by his nation and that his plight did not split the 
intellectuals from the ordinary citizens of France. The modern instance 
also alerts us to the fact that for a Jew, while certain specific circum-
stances shift and reconfigure themselves through the books of history, 
there is also something unique in the experience of hatred in the world, 
as though that world of prejudice and cruelty could at least temporarily 
override rationality and justice.
How so?
Because the military tribunal, made up of respected French mili-
tary officers, produced a unanimous verdict, it was at first difficult to 
persuade any members of society at all that it had been in error. As Eli 
Wiesel, one of the leading moralists and witnesses to the Holocaust in 




pyschological, contagion that goes from cell to cell, person to person, 
and nation to nation, and no cynical or hard-headed economic or mate-
rialistic explanations can explain what it is or why it happens. 
In 1898, when the second court martial was at last held, Alfred Drey-
fus was shockingly found guilty again, with “extenuating circumstanc-
es.” The main extenuating circumstance, as his supporters could clearly 
see, was that Dreyfus was innocent. It was a joke, a shock, an abuse of 
logic, a perversion of justice.
These flagrant distortions of the truth could not be accepted, and 
yet they were and by many, for they were believed to belong to a higher 
truth, that of reasons of state, the honour of the Army, the glory of 
France, and the integrity of the Church,  The culture shock, the abuse of 
reason, flabberghasts us only in retrospect, although many Dreyfusards, 
like Emile Gallé the art nouveau glass-maker, believed the world was 
coming to an end. 
Words before Things
Someone must have been telling lies about Joseph K., for 
without having done anything wrong he was arrested one 
fine morning.
—Franz Kafka, The Trial9
Hundreds, if not thousands, of books concerning the Dreyfus Affair al-
ready exist—many of them quite thorough and up-to-date. Such books 
deal with history, sociology, law, politics, aesthetics, and morality. In 
what is an example of a collective scale of “inattentional blindness,”10 
these academic historians, their publishers, editors, reviewers, and gen-
eral readers tend not to see what is most significant about the affair. 
This would include not only what the mobs in the streets of the big cities 
and towns of France during the late 1890s considered central, and the 
popular anti-Semitic press screamed day after day in their headlines and 
editorials—the fact that Dreyfus was a Jew and the treason he was as-
9 Franz Kafka, The Trial, definitive edition, with an epilogue by Max Brod, trans. Willa and Edwin 
Muir (London: Secker and Warburg, 1950); Der Prozess (Berlin: Verlag die Schmiede, 1925), 7.
10 This is a term coined by Daniel Simons and Christopher Chabris in the late 1990s after a series of 
experiments in which a gorilla passed unseen through a room of students concentrating on tasks 
that they thought was the point of the experiment; to be discussed later in this book.
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sumed to have committed was part of an age-old rabbinical conspiracy, 
and also that Alfred Dreyfus and his family, as well as the family of his 
wife, Lucie, were wrenched out of their normal lives and forced by cir-
cumstances to reinvent themselves. This process that was only partly 
typical of how other educated, middle-class, assimilated Jewish families 
in Western Europe had to conduct themselves in public and at home—
and in their own most private, intimate moments. Exactly what was 
the normal life of Captain and Madame Dreyfus before his arrest? How 
Jewish were they? How aware and concerned were they about the mat-
ters Alfred chose to write about in his prison notebooks of 1898, such 
as contemporary psychology, aesthetic theory, historiography, imperial 
and colonial developments, and political economy, for instance? Have 
they and we missed the gorilla standing in the middle of the scene?
The Dreyfus Affair as a political phenomenon, to be sure, grew out 
of attitudes and opinions that were already in the process of changing 
by the final decade of the nineteenth century—and these attitudes and 
opinions had been part of people’s minds and were ordinary everyday 
ways of seeing the world11 and were reflected as well in the more refined 
perceptions and feelings of the arts, the sciences, and the philosophies 
of the period. The affair also did concern the issues that the Dreyfusards 
believed were under threat—liberty, equality, and fraternity, along with 
justice and secularism and scientific reason. On the other hand, did it 
not also deal with the issues the anti-Dreyfusards believed in—the tra-
ditional values of rural France, the dignity of the army as the backbone 
of the nation, the spiritual power of the Catholic Church and its insti-
tutions, the threats made by modernity, not least the industrial revo-
lution, the transformation of the economy from agriculture to urban 
productivity, and the breakdown of the family and the community? It 
would be egregious to dismiss all the opponents of Dreyfus as ignorant, 
fanatical lunatics, just as it would be to idealize the Dreyfusards all as 
sincere, intellectual, and tolerant citizens. There were fools and cynics 
on both sides.
One phrase in the lectures of Jakob Burckhardt clears the air by blow-
11 Here is what John Rewald says in an analogous situation: “Thus the new phase in the history of 
art inaugurated by the impressionist exhibition of 1874 was not a sudden outbreak of iconoclastic 
tendencies; it was the culmination of a slow and consistent evolution” (“Introduction,” The History 
of Impressionism, 4th rev. ed. [New York: The Museum of Modern Art/Boston: New York Graphic 




ing away the smoke and the mists of illusion that fill the places where the 
Dreyfus Affair is still discussed. The nineteenth-century Swiss historian 
says, almost in passing, that after 1870, the French, even France itself, 
became afraid of its own shadow.12 The shadow represents the illusions 
and impressions that hovered over the realities of life itself so that this 
is a way of saying that France became fearful of itself. The nature of the 
fear was the terror of modernity, and behind it still further is the anxi-
ety of the fin de siècle. Was the image of Alfred Dreyfus the scapegoat for 
the shadow of France? Was the Dreyfus Affair a phantasmagoria dis-
played when the magic lantern of his story—his arrest, his condemna-
tion, his exile, his long years on Devil’s Island, his return for a revision 
of his trial, and the defeats again and again of his fight for honour—was 
projected on those smoky clouds in the darkness of the 1890s? Can we 
say that the whole experience of his ordeal was not so much a tragedy by 
Racine or Corneille or even his beloved Shakespeare, nor even a philo-
sophical novel or allegorical tale of rationality and justice versus obscu-
rantism and demagoguery, but more like the bizarre and grotesque films 
of Georges Méliès, a pioneering French cinematographer who portrayed 
fantastic journeys to the moon, visions of men whose heads explode, 
and choreographed pictures of dancing musical notes played by half-
clad young women? These shadowy mechanized pictures are always in 
motion, shadows scattering and colliding into one another like atoms, 
creating the impression of a reality undermined by its power of fantasy.
This book will try to engage with many of these changes in the so-
cial and intellectual milieu in the processes of transformation of those 
mentalities that constitute the national consciousness and its imagina-
tion, as they push and pull, influence, and reshape each other. This book 
demonstrates that midrash is at once an analytical tool we can use to 
discuss the Dreyfus Affair and the people involved in it, as well as an 
epistemological stratagem used by Jews, consciously or not, to survive 
in a non-Jewish and often anti-Jewish world. It will consequently also 
be a book about the isolated life imposed on Dreyfus by the military and 
prison authorities or rather projected on to him by all of French society, 
while he bravely tried to maintain his inner dignity and sanity, and how, 
through his love for his wife, Lucie, and her active efforts on his behalf, 
12 Burkhardt, Jacob, Force and Freedom: Reflections on History, ed. James Hastings Nichols (Boston, 
MA: Beacon Press, 1964 [Pantheon Books, 1943]).
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he generated a whole new moral dimension of reality for the both of 
them.13 Their mutual efforts form part of the midrashic transformation 
of their milieu, through acts of tikkun ha’olam and tikkun ha’nefesh, the 
repair or correction of the world and of their souls.
Man: L’Humanité
By extension, the term “children” can designate something 
born of the mind, like opinions (GP, I:7, p. 32). The “children” 
who will bear the brunt of God’s wrath are now identified 
with a facet of Jacob’s personality. Jacob’s thought processes 
and intellectual maturity will be frustrated to some extent 
by the natural progression of history as represented by the 
four kingdoms.
—James Arthur Diamond14
Although this book is neither a history nor a biography, it is about Al-
fred Dreyfus the man15—the military officer, the husband, the father, 
the son, the man of his time, and the Jew—and so it is an anthropology 
in the old sense of a study of man as a moral being, a mensch. Instead of 
bearing the sexist burden of terms like macho and patriarchal, this sense 
of mankind stands proudly in the domain of humanity and humanism. 
The analysis here follows the kind shown by Diamond in his analysis 
of the interpretative techniques and strategies used by Maimonides in 
his monumental Guide of the Perplexed. These methods of analysis and 
midrashing are also central to my own way of understanding the Drey-
fus Affair and the way in which I read the statements and actions that 
constitute it. For instance, right here, I am modelling my argument on 
13 Unlike the Proust family, in which Jeanne née Weil seems not to have practiced the Judaism 
of her family and ensured that her sons, Marcel and Robert, were brought up with knowledge 
of Catholicism, the families of Alfred and particularly Lucie were still observant, at least to the 
point of being married by a rabbi, celebrating the main Jewish holidays of the year, and teaching 
their children the basic forms of worship. Cf. Evelyne Bloch-Dono, Madame Proust (Paris: Grasset, 
2004), 15.
14 James Arthur Diamond, Maimonides and the Hermeneutic of Concealment: Deciphering Scripture 
and Midrash in The Guide of the Perplexed (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 128. In Diamond’s 
statement, GP stands for The Guide of the Perplexed.
15 A year before this book appeared, some booksellers were already advertising it online, and I found 
one of them had included it in their “masculine” titles, which I came to discover meant it had 




what the Rambam (that is, Maimonides) does with the figure of the su-
lam (ladder) and semel (statue), both spelled the same in Hebrew as SML.
This type of wordplay seems to be best suited for plumb-
ing the depths of cryptic visual objects that are encoded 
with secrets or matters pertaining to ma’asseh ber’eshit 
[the narrative of the creation recounted in the opening 
chapters of Genesis] and merkavah [the elaborate apoca-
lyptic image of the chariot of God described in Ezekiel].16
In fact, in order to plumb the depths of the Dreyfus Affair, it becomes 
necessary to treat words and phrases, as well as imagery and rhetorical 
tropes, in ways quite dissimilar to those usually used by social scien-
tists and deconstructionists. Gradually, through our midrashic reading 
of the relevant documents, it will be possible to see how Alfred Dreyfus 
worked within the paradigm of melitza, rabbinical rhetoric and poetics, 
what José Faur calls “horizontal dialectics.”17
So, in one sense, I will be using a lot of old words, or familiar words in 
their older senses. However, I will be going out of my way to avoid con-
temporary usages, jargons, and neologisms because their inaccuracy is 
part of what I see as a disastrous loss of historical sensibility and knowl-
edge, a shameful lack of sensitivity in thinking and feeling, and a ter-
rible loss of great areas of what used to be common human experiences, 
the very places in the life of the man—and of the mankind, humanity, 
humanité—Dreyfus cared about and suffered for. For instance, when he 
writes about morals, he means not simply sexual habits and attitudes, 
but instead, as it used to mean, a concept that includes psychology, pub-
lic ethics, and private self-control and integrity. Morals are thus closely 
related to the anthropology first mentioned, part of the experience of 
and the value in humanité. It is these now virtually unfamiliar and dis-
paraged concepts from which arises another old word, honour, with the 
dignity, integrity, sense of loyalty, duty, and pride that it embodies.
I also try to avoid the incomplete passive structures of sentences. This 
way of forming syntax removes active, responsible human agents from 
the world and replaces them with allegorical personifications of abstract 
16 Diamond, Maimionides and the Hermeneutics of Concealment, 87.
17 Faur, The Horizontal Society, section IV, introductory remarks.
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and linguistic constructs. Thus, instead of arguments and struggles be-
tween individuals and groups representing living interests, even when 
much of what is at stake is unconscious or poorly misunderstood, the 
universe is conceived by this postmodernist discourse as merely para-
digm shifting and “societal” powers wrestling with one another in an 
endless and quite meaningless tussle. Again, the consequence of such 
malformations creates something beyond the awkwardness, weakness, 
or infelicity of style that would occur if it were merely an occasional 
lapse; as a persistent and pervasive feature of the current scholarly lan-
guage, it marks out huge areas of what Alfred Dreyfus saw to be l’inanité, 
la déraison humaine, cette légende imbécile, une pretendue bonne foi . . .18
Milieu: The ambient World
On n’a peut-être pas assez remarqué que, bien avant 1914 
et alors qu’elle n’avait aucun sens de la gravité de l’heure, la 
société française ne connaissait plus l’ironie.
—Julien Benda19
The study will have at its centre less the Affair Dreyfus than l’homme 
Dreyfus, the man Alfred Dreyfus—one who is not only elusive but also 
often effectively absent from many accounts, which at best take him as a 
symbol or a cipher, whereas he was instead a person of flesh and blood, a 
man of intellect and emotions, a son, a father, a brother, and a husband, 
and he was a part of a family, a community, a nation: a secular Jew and 
a patriotic Frenchman, a soldier, an engineer, an intellectual, and a man 
of his period. Indeed, Dreyfus was very much a man with a history and 
a place.
Ironic? The newspapers, even those somewhat inclined at first to 
hesitate at proclaiming his guilt, called him “the zinc man” in the press, 
and even after he returned home from Devil’s Island for the revision of 
his trial, alluding to what they thought was his lack of feeling, his fail-
18 These phrases are taken almost at random from the pages of Dreyfus’s carnets of 1899–1907, 
volumes which are to be discussed at greater length further into this book.
19 Julien Benda, Belphegor: Essai sur l’esthétique de la présente société française, 2eme éd. (Paris: Emile-
Paul Frères, 1924), 130–131. “Perhaps it hadn’t been noticed enough but well before 1914 and 





ure to display the passions of a true-born Frenchman, they blamed him 
for not breaking through the icy hatred of his accusers and judges. For 
those who didn’t know him, Dreyfus was aloof, taciturn, and stiff in a 
military way. But even for those in his family and the allies who began 
to study his case, Dreyfus was not a warm, emotionally expressive man. 
He was a friend to few, and yet, as we will come to see him, extrapolating 
from his own writings during his imprisonment back to the more care-
free days of his early marriage, a man with wide tastes in books and art.
During the affair and especially afterwards, to be sure, Alfred Drey-
fus changed—how could he not? His circle of acquaintances grew, his 
view of the world matured, and his inner world went through a trans-
formation. But these changes were not known to most people outside 
his family, even as it expanded to include those who had rallied to his 
cause and those whose children married his own. What he exposed to 
the outside world was unspeakable: for amongst these Dreyfusards 
were many former supporters who, following his acceptance of the par-
don, could see no reason to remain loyal to a man who seemed to betray 
their cause. Their goals were ideological and political in ways that did 
not fit with a military man, a believer in moral values, and a Jew. These 
socialists, anarchists, and progressives saw in Dreyfus’s personal cam-
paign for total rehabilitation something better kept private because 
otherwise it would just prove annoying, if not downright dangerous to 
their new cause in government.
Though often categorized as a loner, a solitary, unsocial being, Drey-
fus was very much a social being—son, brother, husband, father—and 
his solitary self was a protective screen, while his unsociableness was an 
illusion, a mask of a person isolated within himself almost to the point 
of autism which he was forced to wear by circumstances, by the pres-
sure of the press, and by the trick of the anti-Semites. Like the man in 
Méliès’s film whose head grows larger and larger until it at last explodes, 
Dreyfus’s autistic image is an illusion, and he was seen, because he was 
expected to be seen, wearing this and related masks.
While he balked at accepting the pardon offered in 1899 following 
the second condemnation at Rennes, he did in the end accept it, to the 
chagrin of those supporters who wanted him to remain the victim and 
the martyr, to wear the mask of the drama they wished to keep produc-
ing to their own political ends, while he took the role offered on the 
understanding that, no matter how it was hidden from the spectators, 
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he would keep up the fight for his dignity and his good name.
These changing masks and the changeable qualities they projected 
and hid together constitute his milieu or the matrix in which he lived—
and may be termed, in the sense in which Dreyfus came to use the term 
in regard to his life, artistic. To outsiders, Dreyfus, the zinc marionette, 
whether they actually knew him in person or not, was a symbol and a 
cipher, and it is important to analyse those roles carefully. The symbol 
was a sign of issues in politics and philosophy that were swirling around 
society in the long aftermath of the disastrous Franco-Prussian War of 
1870 and the lead-up to the Great War of 1914–1918, la der des der.20 
The was being a less clear and more dreamlike indicator of the anxie-
ties and other stresses that haunted the fin du siècle, that first period 
between wars, what Léon Daudet called l’entre-deux-guerres.21 This was 
not a one-man show at all, although sometimes it seemed like a no-man 
show—the affair without Dreyfus—but a complex interactive perfor-
mance wherein multiple mentalities, with their fluid imaginations and 
shifting, dynamic ideologies played off against one another.
Mentalités
The Dreyfus Affair left him [Daniel Halévy] very much 
changed, subject to spells of amnesia and melancholia.
—Mina Curtiss22
But this book is perhaps more interested in two other things, although 
it does not leave aside completely the question of milieu. Like Daniel 
Halévy, many, if not most, Frenchmen and women were morally ill, 
mentally disturbed by the affair, although as we have said—and will ex-
plain in due course—they projected their disease onto one man on a 
faraway Devil’s Island. One of the matters we push to the fore of the mi-
lieu is the mentality, or rather mentalities, which made the Dreyfus Af-
20 The War to End All Wars, la dernière des dernières; cf. Robert Liris, L’Ordinaire de Vichy. 1940–1942 
(Bellerive sur Allier: Privately Published, 2010), 67.
21 Léon Daudet, L’entre-deux-guerres: souvenirs (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1915). This 
confused and degenerated generation between 1870 and 1914 is not to be confused with the 
interwar period from 1919 to 1939.
22 Daniel Halévy, My Friend Degas, trans. and ed. Mina Curtiss (Middletown, CT: Wesley University 





fair possible. The affair was more than an isolated instance of a “judicial 
error” or a localized grievance lodged by his family and friends. It was 
something that gave historical shape and substance to an era—the peo-
ple, the events, and the ideas current during a given period of histori-
cal and existential time—and was an organizing concept in an ideology, 
sometimes virtually a vivid narrative in the sense of a myth, and thus a 
suite of intertwining affective and cognitive tensions that wound over 
more than a dozen years from 1894 to 1906, playing itself out through 
that kind of intelligence we have called elsewhere mentalities. In other 
words, they may be envisioned as subatomic particles constituted of en-
ergy, mass, and antimatter described metaphorically as the spoken and 
the unspeakable, the seen and the unseeable, the conceivable and the 
inconceivable, the imagined and the unimaginable, and the experienced 
and the unconscious.
The expression “intelligence” is to be taken in a dynamic sense, as it 
was used by one of Dreyfus’s favourite authors, Hippolyte Taine. In On 
Intelligence, Taine defines the seen, the conceivable and the imagined 
as “a true hallucination”; in other words, what the mind comes to know 
it has to reconstruct from the confused sensations of experience and 
the stock of memory sensations it brings up at such a point of sensory 
arousal. Yet this mental image or hallucination is unseeable, inconceiv-
able and unimaginable outside the mind—as are the more fantastic hal-
lucinations created by the mind, unless somehow they are confirmed 
by other persons and tested against external objects and forces. Unlike 
Plato, who would consequently banish poets from his ideal City because 
they compounded the hallucinatory effect of unreliable imitations of 
vague impressions of ideas, or Kant, who could find no reliable means of 
confirming the unreliability of sensory experience, Taine offers an En-
lightenment solution, at least a practical working proposition through 
scientific and rational training of the mind. Dreyfus, who had had un-
questioned faith in the methods of science and technology, comes to 
doubt the reality of what is happening to him, and seeks, partly through 
acts of the imagination, partly through love-driven dialectical conversa-
tions with his wife Lucie, and partly through an intellectual ordering of 
his mind, including, as we shall show in a further study, the reiteration 
of variations on particular doodles or row on row of drawings that are 
related but never the same, to maintain his sanity, his emotions, and his 
sense of faith in Truth and Justice. Intelligence combines for Dreyfus, as 
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it does for Taine, both poetry and science, creative thought and rational 
proofs.
Thus, it is not so much the world of feelings and ideas (a world pic-
ture or Weltanchauung) as it is the realm where feelings and ideas come 
in and out of existence and awareness. This is the mentality in which 
the affair can only be spoken about, thought about, and imagined pre-
cisely in relation to textual gaps and silences, historical surrogates, and 
mistakes, in philosophical fringes and thus heard, read, and perceived 
between the lines, as well as in denials and misunderstandings. But how 
does one write about such things?
Midrash
I staggered through a world whose signs remained as inscru-
table to me as Etruscan script. Unlike the tourist, for whom 
such things may be a piquant form of alienation, I was de-
pendent on this world full of riddles.
—Jean Améry 23
From Dreyfus’s point of view the world had turned upside 
down, and it proved too much for him to endure. He went 
temporarily mad, screaming his innocence and banging his 
head against the walls of his cell until it was bloody.
—Michael Kurland24
What does it mean to be in a wonderland of riddles and nightmares, 
where nothing seems to make sense at all and where interpretations 
are violent and bloody? Is this midrash or mishmash or mishigas?25 Here 
23 Jean Amery, At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities, trans. 
Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1980; 1977), 47.
24 Michael Kurland, “An Account of the Ordeal of Alfred Dreyfus,” Knol (13 September 2008), 10 
online at http://knol.google.com/k/michael-kurland/dreyfu[alfred/1m3ftpwcv6va/3.
25 In contemporary usage, midrash has almost come to replace aggadah as the term for a rabbinical 
story or riddle or poem that helps to explicate a sacred passage, indicate how a law may be applied, 
or demonstrate the process of analysis needed to engage with a revealed message. It is also usual 
to define aggadah in relation to halachah, the legal explication or application itself, in the sense 
that whatever is not halachah is aggadah and vice versa. This kind of ambiguous and relatively 
open-ended definition, however, does not help us move to the term midrash outside the strict 




where the sense is deeply implicated in specific historical examples of 
rabbinical exegeses, I am concerned mostly with how the term midrash 
developed. Scholars have noted evidence of the midrash being under-
stood as both the thing produced and the techniques of analysis, inter-
pretation, and application found already in Hebrew scriptures, as well as 
in legal and homiletic books outside the strictly authorized documents 
of the Oral Torah. Hence, it can be extrapolated without too much effort 
to be a verb—to midrash, to be midrashed, that is—a process of acting in 
the world both psychologically and politically.
Though related to the classical Greek and Roman and Christian legal 
discourses of allegory, parable, metaphor, metonymy, and so forth—the 
figures of thought and speech that constitute the colours of rhetoric—
the midrash is more dynamic, fluid, witty, ingenious, and radical. Alpha-
betic letters (their shapes, their sizes, and their actual placements on 
the page), lexical units or words (sounded, seen, and organized in rela-
tion to one another), syntax and grammar (logically, historically, and 
wittily conceived), and allusiveness (near and far-fetched, adjusted and 
re-created) are in a midrash fissured, scattered, reassembled, but also 
turned upside down, inside out, and backwards, so that the meaning is 
as much a hallucination as the reality is a counterhallucination.
The midrash, turned from noun (a historical and specifically rabbini-
cal mode of exegesis or discourse, a genre) to a verb (a transformation 
of the world and of the self ’s place in it), in regard to the Dreyfus Affair 
and to Alfred Dreyfus the man or the mensch, is a way of using a very 
a verb to indicate how the mentality of rabbinical exegesis in this poetic, speculative, and creative 
sense can be seen in social and individual actions. Another drawback in the use of the aggadah-
halachah pairing can be shown to be historical and culture-specific. As David Shasha puts it, 
introducing Leon Wieseltier’s review of Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz’s now completed translation into 
modern Hebrew of the Talmud, “There is no evidence in the Ashkenazi tradition between Halakha 
and Aggada because both of them serve to express the Divine truth in a literal way.” He then 
adds, by way of contrast—and he is again exaggerating for the sake of a polemical argument, 
or at least one hopes he is—“In the Maimonidean tradition—rejected by the Ashkenazim—
Halakha is binding after the ruling of the Sage or rabbinical court while Aggada is a more open-
ended creative process.” From my perspective, this kind of mutually exclusive thinking may 
perhaps be temporarily true in regard to certain hard-line conservative elements in the Orthodox 
branch of Ashkenazi Judaism but does not square with the more inclusive and longer historical 
perspective. Even Shasha himself also often complains that contemporary Sephardim, especially 
the subcategory of Arabic-speaking Syrian Jews to which he belongs, have allowed themselves 
to give away their own ancient traditions centered on Maimonides and other wise men. David 
Shasha, “SHU Classic Article Revisited: Leon Wieseltier on the Steinsaltz Talmud” (1989) available 
through davidsha@googlegroups.com (11 November 2010). A mishmash is a mixed-up thing, a 
balagan, as they say in Hebrew, and a mishigas is a crazy thing.
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Jewish word for a very Jewish experience and a common type of mod-
ern Jew, and because of that, this book takes very seriously the role that 
anti-Semitism played in causing, giving shape and substance to, and 
providing the continuing influence for the affair, for midrash is not only 
a historical phenomenon, an ancient rabbinical artefact, a way of inter-
preting scripture and shaping the law; it may be the term we have come 
to use for an insidious, counterintuitive, uncreating way of imagining 
Jews living in and experiencing the non-Jewish or anti-Jewish world of 
the late nineteenth century in France and elsewhere in Europe.
Since so much scholarship on the Dreyfus Affair tends to denominate 
the Jewish background, placing it in the margins of history and concep-
tual thought, treating it as a nasty and annoying background noise to 
the reality of the events and the personages that constitute the events 
and ideas they want to deal with,26 this book will have to dwell on the 
anti-Semitism.27 We have to ask more than who were its proponents or 
why they believed that Jews had invaded France and were ruining its 
traditional values and institutions, but also how these false perceptions 
were generated and maintained for generation after generation, and 
what were the epistemological and aesthetic consequences of these dis-
tortions. Such recurrent anti-Jewish prejudices can be used to explain 
partly why justice was traduced in the affair, in trial after trial, for there 
were many; why documents were forged; why witnesses perjured them-
selves; why otherwise normal and orderly people rioted in the streets; 
and why old friends and relations—artists and intellectuals both—split 
apart over the affair, but they won’t explain why these distorted and 
insane ideas took hold and seemed convincing and rational.
How were the Dreyfusards and the anti-Dreyfusards convinced by 
the same apparent evidence either to act or not to act—almost everyone 
had a point of view, but not everyone wrote letters to the paper, signed 
petitions, joined a league, contributed money, or marched in the boule-
vards—and how did they attempt to persuade others that Jews were or 
were not an alien presence to be removed by all necessary means from 
the heart of the nation? Indeed, what was the heart and what was the 
nation? And did all that hullabaloo mean that the two sides in the great 
26 How much of this “wanting” can be measured will be discussed later in this book, where we deal 
with the limitations of the current critical imagination.
27 Including a cloying and equally distorting philo-Judaism to be found in many booklets, pamphlets, 




conflict between the Dreyfusards and the anti-Dreyfusards divided 
along a pattern of Jews and their allies on one side against Judeophobes 
and their ignorant dupes on the other, good guys against bad guys, and 
progressive intellectuals against reactionary fools? This book looks at a 
much more dynamic and unstable field of activity wherein the people 
and the issues become more complicated and confused. Part of my argu-
ment will be, as another of Dreyfus’s favourite authors, Gabriel Tarde, 
put it, that each party imitated the other so that their intelligences and 
mentalities were entangled by an interpsychic experience. This book 
will therefore also attempt to show that the best way to understand this 
kind of complexity is that of the midrash.
Midrash, as we shall show at greater length later in the course of this 
book, developed in the period when the books of scripture were being 
redacted and rewritten for inclusion in the formally collected national 
archives or library, the morasha. The ancient collections of oral tradi-
tions, written documents, and commentaries were put together in the 
sense of proclaiming them as sources of the law, historical justifications 
and authorizations of the applied interpretations of such law, and ancil-
lary discussions and exemplifications of these practical readings.
In a sense, then, the very constitutive attribution of national status 
and legal acceptance by the representatives of the community made the 
formulation of scripture a political event: the formation of nationality 
at the moment of the giving and the reception of the law at Sinai and its 
acclamation by the people assembled, and then later, with the destruc-
tion of the temple and the permission to set up a constitutional assem-
bly, as it were, with the eventual formulation of a nation in exile. This 
conceptual development precedes the institutionalization of a canon in 
the years following the destruction of the Jewish political state, the loss 
of the temple in Jerusalem as a site of cultic practice, and the pillaging 
and burning of the morasha itself as a depository and clearinghouse of 
authoritatively copied documents. Midrash, as the process of formula-
tion, constitutes these very stages in production: (a) transcription and 
collection of traditional oral and written materials of national-historical 
importance regarding the functioning of the kingdom and the temple, 
including supplemental traditions needed to understand, interpret, and 
formulate additional texts; (b) direction for constant redaction, annota-
tion, and correction or adjustment of texts put together to ensure co-
herence, consistency, and correctness of texts presented for discussion 
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and debate by various scholarly, judicial, political, and spiritual groups; 
(c) the recording of such dialogues and debates, decisions made, and 
questions left unanswered.28
In another sense, the midrash represents the collections of rabbinical 
texts produced and promulgated subsequent to the loss of the political-
juridical state, the priestly temple, and the national archives. The mid-
rashic process is therefore separated from the dynamic production of 
primary documents, now assumed to be in another category of author-
ity, as a canon takes shape, a process that comes to its conclusion when 
the Masoretic schools establish the final forms of the Tanakh. Further 
enhancements, internal questionings, and discussions of meaning and 
application constitute a body of work deemed in a state of orality—that 
is, open to continuous development. In particular, amongst all these 
rabbinical writings, midrash is identified with only one generic type. It 
is partly designated by what it is not: midrash per se is not Mishnah, Ge-
marah, Talmud, and so forth, even though in these kinds of debates, po-
etic enhancements, or philosophical speculations, midrashic exercises 
may be found. The word midrash designates both particular procedures 
of exegetical discussion and narrative or lyrical development and the 
corpus of such works produced under rabbinical authority and practice.
In this book, as in others I have written,29 midrash is used in the sense 
of a process of thought, of imagination, and of action in the real world. 
In other words, (a) it is a way of thinking about religious and secular 
texts; social, political, and psychological ideas; scientific or art-concep-
tual problems; and other intellectual matters; (b) a creative mode of re-
visioning the world of existential experience and speculative evaluation 
of nature and history; and (c) a set of practical and ironic strategies for 
acting as an individual or group in a society or civilization that is no 
longer aware of or in agreement with Jewish legal or moral values, his-
torical traditions, and social relationships.
28 One might add that on the one hand, the law is, in José Faur’s term, “the hyperspace where God’s 
revelation unfolds” and Heinrich Heine’s aperçu that the Torah is the “portable homeland of the 
Jews.” Putting these together, we can see how Alfred Dreyfus in the thousands of pages of letters, 
journal entries, and workbook folios created a unique Promised Land of Truth and Justice for 
himself and Lucie over the long years of the affair from 1894 to 1906.




Part 2: the Dreyfus texts
For him [Paul Bourget] . . . the Will is . . . a state of final 
consciousness which results from the co-ordination, more 
or less complex, of a group of conscious, subconscious or un-
conscious states, which in combination translate themselves 
by an action or an inhibition; a state of consciousness which 
causes nothing; which establishes a situation, but does not 
constitute it.
—Anatole France30
Le rôle du commentaire n’est pas d’expliciter un texte, mais 
de le construire. Le rapport du commentaire avec le texte 
n’est alors évidemment pas celui d’une déduction.
—Marc-Alain Ouaknin31
Alfred Dreyfus has left us three categories of document for analysis: let-
ters, journals, and workbooks. Lucie Dreyfus has also left us many let-
ters, some of which were not edited and published until very recently, 
and some of them form themselves into suites of what can be called a 
virtual journal; her writings also require careful analysis. Above all, the 
relationship between these various letters, journals, workbooks, and 
other writings has to be seen in itself as a mode of composition, one not 
always intended or recognized by the writer and his or her immediate 
audience.
While many of the thousands of books written about the affair barely 
touch on the man at the centre of the controversy, the best way to get 
in touch with who he was and what he became during the long ordeal 
he underwent lies in a close reading of the documents produced dur-
ing his imprisonment and, to a lesser extent, in the years following. Al-
fred Dreyfus was not a man of letters and certainly not a literary figure, 
whether as a writer of essays or fiction or as a critic and commentator; 
by profession he was a captain of artillery. Yet as the written evidence 
30 Anatole France, “Science and Morals” (an essay on Paul Bourget’s La disciple), Of Life and Letters, 
third series, trans. Bernard Miall (London: John Lane, The Bodley Head Ltd., 1924), 72.
31 “The role of the commentary is not to explain a text but to construct it. The relationship of the 
commentary with a text, then, is evidently not that of a deduction.” Marc-Alain Ouaknin, Lire aux 
éclats: éloge de la caresse, 3eme ed. (Paris: Quai Voltaire, 1992), x.
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discloses—sometimes quite surprisingly, given all that has been said 
about him for more than a hundred years—he was well-read; studied 
literary, historical, and moral (in the older sense that combines our 
modern notion of private ethical concerns and psychology) books; and 
had quite definite opinions about these texts. He often expressed the 
view, too, that art and history were primary sources of knowledge and 
moral guidance, at the same time as he valued science, technology, and 
mathematics.
There is a further surprise in what he read and how he responded to 
the authors he studied, and that is that although he does not seem to 
be interested in the novels, poets, dramatists, and essayists of the fin de 
siècle, he was aware of up-to-date critical and psychological issues and 
arguments. His knowledge of the fine arts—painting, sculpture, music, 
dance, and so on—seems virtually nonexistent, and yet he declares him-
self a lover of aesthetics and the artistic temperament. Even more than 
that, considering how in this book we stress the centrality of Judaism 
and anti-Semitism in the events and the conceptualization of the affair, 
he virtually never speaks of himself as a Jew, directly or indirectly, and 
seems not to recognize that the charges against him and the opposition 
to his figurative role in the Europe-wide debates stemmed from the rise 
in anti-Semitism as a pseudoscience, a political ideology, and social ex-
clusionary principle, and yet examining the various documents he wrote 
and occasionally edited—except, of course, those he removed from the 
public record and thus kept from publication—through a midrashic lens, 
we can discern patterns of thought, points of historical convergence and 
allusive lines of “magnetic” influence that do indeed mark him out as a 
Jew and establish his role in what was still mythically conceivable: the 
affair as an all-Jewish phenomenon. More scientifically, the explanatory 
figure has to do with light rays passing through prismatic lenses, each 
ray being diffracted through the other and thus exposing the constitu-
ent bands of light, not only those usually visible as in Newton’s model 
of colours, but the normally unseen range, from the ultraviolet and in-
frared at each end of the prism to the energetic powers of x-rays, the 
discovery of which fascinated Dreyfus.
First of all, he wrote a large number of letters to family and friends, 
the bulk of which is correspondence to his wife, Lucie, from the time of 
his arrest in 1894 right through until his release on a pardon in 1898. 




accessible form. Thus, we have to see the epistolary exchange as pre-
cisely that, a process of double creation and mutual support through 
love and loyalty. Yet, without detracting from their intrinsic value as 
domestic, intimate, highly personal expressions of feeling between a 
wife and her husband, the letters, set against any number of more “nor-
mal” affectionate relationships in historical or fictional circumstances, 
take on a very distinct characteristic. In part, they have to be registered 
and filtered through the critical gaze of historical research, following 
the various editorial schemes through which they have been collected, 
selected, and annotated as suites of communication.
Thus, to begin with, these letters should be read in two forms: one, 
in their original form, with all their rough edges and incompleteness, 
as they have more recently been published; or two, in the context of 
various selected editions, with and without the comments of Dreyfus 
himself or different external hands, some of them participants in the af-
fair, and some more modern editors. However, whether read as an epis-
tolary sequence along a trajectory of narrative development, albeit with 
many gaps and repetitions occasioned by frustration and the desire to 
rearticulate key words and concepts by either or both of the writers, or 
as a series of discrete, separate, and occasional moments of experience, 
the letters cannot be fully appreciated outside of a larger context, a con-
sideration, that is, of how they swerve away from traditional love let-
ters, prison writings, and diaries or journals of despair and/or defiance.
From almost the very first letters sent before Alfred was shipped 
to Devil’s Island, the letters of the man and his wife have a different 
tone, content, and function than what would have been expected from 
them—or anyone under similar conditions. As we shall see later in this 
book, these conditions include an awareness of constant surveillance 
and censorship, a need for each of the pair to withhold vital aspects of 
their own situation and understanding—or lack of understanding—of 
what was going on. There is a felt need to assume, presume, or intuit 
circumstances and attitudes in the other’s situation so as to shape the 
words of one’s own epistle and thus to affirm, confirm and induce nec-
essary responses, and then, not least or last, to attain to a sensitivity 
perhaps as unconscious/conscious of deeper Jewish values, aspirations, 
and traditional modes of entering into zman cherusenu, the time of our 
remembrance. This last matter of time and memory will be shown to be 
analogous to aesthetic and psychological strategies undertaken by Mar-
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cel Proust in his A la recherche du temps perdu.
Even more, the reading of the letters between Alfred and Lucie has to 
be undertaken within a frame of reference that understands the epistles 
as only part of their textual relationship. In a general sort of way, schol-
ars have been aware of this, in the sense that they know that Alfred did 
more than write letters to Lucie: he kept a journal of his acts, thoughts, 
and feelings while he was separated from his wife and as he prepared 
to rehabilitate his name and the honour of his family after his return 
to France and the disaster of the second court-martial in Rennes, and 
Alfred also undertook some of the editorial work of preparing those let-
ters and journals for publication—that is, he helped to select letters, 
write explanatory and polemical introductions, and provide annota-
tions. Only recently have historians and editors sought to see that the 
cahiers (workbooks) and carnets (journals) do more than amplify or sup-
plement the letters. These notebooks and workbooks contain in them-
selves a variety of forms of expression, some of them verbal texts, some 
nonverbal mathematical equations and chemical formulae, and some of 
them drawings of a number of kinds from geometrical shapes, to itera-
tive doodles and playful design-making.
The second category of documentation may be found in the journals 
(carnets) kept by Dreyfus during and after his imprisonment on Devil’s 
Island. These also have been edited and annotated by the author him-
self, members of his family, and later scholarly commentators. Most of 
this material has either disappeared altogether, is hinted at in reports 
made by various prison and government officials charged with monitor-
ing Dreyfus’s activities while in exile,32 or is contained in fragments and 
as trial sketches in the cahiers, in the same way as there may be found a 
few sentences or outlines of letters to be written to Lucie, other family 
members, or political officials in Paris.
The third kind of evidence is found in the extant cahiers or work-
books brought back from his years in exile in the French penal colony in 
Cayenne, South America. Most were either lost or destroyed by Dreyfus 
himself and have only recently been made available in a selected, part-
32 Faur: “Jews were the first (and only) people going into Galut (‘Exile’) that introduced a new 
doctrine in international law and diplomacy: a nation is not extinguished by the fiat of sword and 
banishment. A vanquished nation, ejected from its territory could preserve its political identity 
as long as it administers its internal affairs according to its own legal and political institutions” (The 




facsimile and part-transcribed format. These fifteen surviving manu-
script texts are the most interesting now because they are the last to 
be made public in an accessible form. Unfortunately, the latest editors, 
while transcribing the verbal texts and numerical exercises, do not re-
produce all the pages filled with Dreyfus’s doodles—either in the open-
ing section devoted to photo-reproduction of the original documents 
or the transcribed and printed version of the workbooks. The editors 
do indicate where the drawings are placed in relation to the essays and 
mathematical ciphers, and so we can imagine to a greater degree than 
ever the total impression the books have as physical objects and arte-
facts of Dreyfus’s last two years on Devil’s Island.
Allowing for these gaps in our knowledge, it is now possible to at-
tempt a new reading of the whole body of evidence in its various forms 
and to show it to be, not so much a Gesamtkunstwerk, a collective and 
synthetic work of art, even if it’s more like a satura or confused hodge-
podge than an aesthetically conceived or logically organized whole, as 
what Dreyfus hints at and once actually designates une fantasmagorie, a 
phantasmagoria. It can also be approached as a kind of social dance of 
reason, a mazurka of mentalities.
reading, analysis, and Interpretation
En effet dans les premières Tables il est dit: Zakhor ét yom 
hachabbat; dans les Secondes, Zakhor est remplacé par 
Chamor “garde” au lieu de “souviens-toi!”
—Marc-Alain Ouaknin33
While the early historians of religion in the nineteenth century were 
busy discovering that Hebrews had once been like their surrounding 
neighbours in regard to archaic rituals of bloody sacrifice, temple pros-
titution, and other forms of ceremonial violence, they tended to do so, 
if they were Christians, out of a duty to exalt the religion of Jesus and 
depict the early Church as justly leaving the Jews either behind in the 
cellars of history, or in the shadows of modernity, where they could only 
33 “In effect, in the first Tables [of the Law] it is said Zakhor ét yom hachabbat [Remember the 
Day of the Sabbath]; in the second, Zakhor is replaced by Chamor ‘guard’ in place of ‘thou shalt 
remember!’”: Ouaknin, Lire aux éclats, 100.
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survive by becoming less and less Jewish in their minds, hearts, and 
souls. And if they were Jews, as indeed many were when the century 
came to a close, they sought to prove that Judaism had now cleansed 
itself of all such ancient detritus and could stand tall as a purified, moral 
system, ready to support the modern world and share in its progress.
Yet at the same time, outside of the arena of these new anthropologi-
cal and sociological arguments, in the real world of modern life, Jews 
in the Western nations, such as France, Germany, and even Italy were 
doing what their ancestors had always done: engaging with the ideas 
and the institutions of the peoples they lived amongst in such a way as 
to keep developing their Jewish beliefs and practices and carefully ac-
cepting and modifying “the knowledge of the nations”—and nowhere 
more clearly than amongst those assimilated and more or less occulted 
or veiled Jews whose achievements in the arts, literature, theatre, and 
music, as well as in the sciences and technologies of psychology, archi-
tecture, medicine, mathematics, physics, astronomy, and mechanics, 
enhanced the entire spectrum of twentieth-century culture and society. 
This means that the studies of Israel Bédarride, Franz Cumont, Theodor 
Reinach, Marie Joseph Lagrange, Ernest Renan, and a host of others 
could at best be seen as opening the eyes of modern men and women—
ordinary middle-class educated folk, as well as those with more literary 
or aesthetic sensibilities—to the way in which there was a continuum of 
relations and developments from the archaic Semitic civilizations of the 
Near and Middle East through the great prophetic and mystical reforms 
in proximity of time and space to the classical cultures of ancient Greece 
and Rome, the constant refinements and variations in late antiquity, the 
Middle Ages, and the Renaissance and into the Enlightenment and the 
Romantic periods.
Simultaneously, however, and usually completely outside the schol-
arly intentions or conception of the writers themselves, these same 
tomes by Jewish and non-Jewish authors provided grist for the mill of 
the new forms of anti-Semitism, which seized open the paradigms of 
evolution and the struggle for existence to build up myths of exclusive 
and progressive nationalism, racial classifications of humanity, and no-
tions of moral degeneration, the dangers of biological impurities in lan-
guage and ideas, and the pernicious operation of unseen organisms and 
organizations.




tory of Judaism form, to a large degree, the matrix in which the Dreyfus 
Affair came into being and then played itself out. Nevertheless, insofar 
as a Jewish perspective may be found through which to view the major 
players, events, and ideas of this set of phenomena—this kaleidoscope 
of ideas, this phantasmagoria of illusions, and this swirling mazurka of 
social relationships—we have to explain what a midrash is and how it 
functions. And to do that, it is needful to set out a scheme of Jewish cul-
tural development somewhat different from the Christian patterns of 
spiritual triumphalism or condescending tolerance normally applied.34
Judaism was constituted out of archaic rituals and ancient beliefs by 
refocusing all its efforts on the law and its interpretation, which meant 
on the study and analysis of texts. While the word became central to the 
exercise and practice of the new constitution for the nation of Israel, the 
primary text, received in the revelation of Sinai by Moses our teacher 
and handed on to the elders, sages, and rabbis of the great tradition, was 
not to be taken as a fixed, immutable thing, an idol, for not only were 
there two luchot ha-brit, two tables of the law, but two versions of the 
tables, one inscribed by the hand of God and then broken by Moses in 
his righteous indignation against the idolatrous worship of the golden 
calf and one written as he took dictation from the voice of God. The frag-
ments and the dust of the broken tables were collected and stored in the 
moveable Ark of the Covenant and then in the Holy of Holies of the two 
temples in Jerusalem.
Simultaneous with the donation of the stone tablets on which the 
primary words of Torah were written, there was another ongoing oral 
revelation of the Torah, that which continues in all discussions, debates, 
and public readings of the law. Combining the written Torah with the 
oral Torah creates the Talmud, and there were two versions developed, 
one for the land of Israel called Yerushalmi, the Talmud of Jerusalem, 
and one for the Diaspora or Exile, called Bavli, the Talmud of Babylo-
nia. All of these texts form into a multilayered, intertextual machine for 
thinking—a complex lens to see through, a mechanism for generating 
ideas and mental images, and a continuously flowing river of interpreta-
tion through conversation, debate, and questioning.
34 Faur: “In my view, given that we are all endowed with the image of God within, it would be 
sacrilegious to presume that anyone has the right to impose his sense of sacrality on anyone else. 
God alone, who sees into the hearts of men, can know who is righteous (see 1Sam 16:7, cf. MT 
Teshuba 3:2),” The Horizontal Society, Section II, 25.
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Several important clues as to how texts are created, transmitted, dis-
cussed, and reproduced in Jewish tradition need to be teased out from 
this overly condensed scheme. Texts are, to begin with, actual physi-
cal objects, generated in specific historical times and places, and then, 
though they are reproduced, the secondary—mishnaic, deuteronomic35—
objects do not totally replace the originals, for the originals, even if bro-
ken, annihilated, or hidden, remain intact in memory, a memory that 
includes the original time and place but includes them in such a way that 
they continue to draw into themselves, through reading and interpreta-
tion, those who hear, see, and understand these texts, meaning that the 
original time-place textuality is always expanding from its moment and 
space of creation. By continuous doubling, something quite distinct from 
the platonic horror of mimetic diminution occurs, for whereas Socrates, 
through his textualizing student Plato, fears that writing as an art(ifice) 
fixes the original dynamic idea of reality into a flat, virtually dead copy, 
withdrawn from its original social signification, destroying the mind’s 
ability to encompass and transcend the mere moment of transcription, 
the rabbis and their predecessors experience and envision textualization 
as a creative and consequently divine action, with those primary energies 
and meanings flowing outwards and expanding to embrace ever more 
time and space, the moments and places embodied, and the individuals 
who participate in the explosive act.
Reading, study, argument, and application therefore form an ongo-
ing dialectical process, moving forward towards as yet unachieved in-
stants in history and backwards to the first and continuing explosion 
of creative energies. Variations and variations within variations spill 
forth, generating ever-renewing and transforming contexts for all that 
had preceded them, so that there can be no fixed eternal interpreta-
tion—that would be idolatrous and soul destroying. It is not, however, 
that every meaning is equivalent to all others, but that even small or er-
roneous interpretations are part of a cumulative, self-correcting whole, 
determined not by a secret and single truth hidden in the mystery of 
35 Each term contains a sense of repetition, doubleness, duplication, reiteration, supplementariness, 
complementariness, and implemental repetition. Like the term twin in English, which can mean 
at once to have two versions of the same person or thing or one person or thing divided into two 
or a situation where the object or being is more than the sum of its part, that is, a wholly new 
kind of phenomenon distinct from whatever it was that doubled itself or split into two units, 
so too the learning that is mishna-ed is made into shnay, two, and the law (nomos) repeated by 




the created beginning but freely expanded and guided by its dynamism 
and dialectical connections to the existing traditions of logic, loyalty, 
and love.
a Mutual admiration society36
Every two or three weeks the jailer had brought me a let-
ter from some of my family. It was previously submitted to 
the Commission and most roughly handled, as was too evi-
dent by the number of ERASURES in the blackest ink which 
appeared throughout. One day, however, instead of merely 
striking out a few passages, they drew the black line over the 
entire letter, with the exception of the words, “My DEAREST 
SILVIO,” at the beginning, and the parting salutation at the 
close, “ALL UNITE IN KINDEST LOVE TO YOU.”
—Silvio Pellico37
What Lucie and Alfred write to each other over the nearly five years of 
the captain’s imprisonment and while he resided in at least three sepa-
rate jails is, from a cold, almost cynical perspective, not much; their let-
ters are repetitive, full of clichés, and superficial. However, what they 
say is not of great importance; there are elsewhere in the nineteenth 
century and earlier great and passionate love letters, soul-searching 
epistles from men in prison or exile, and well-crafted expressions of 
all kinds. What is significant in the letters lies in a number of factors 
emerging into focus only after repeated readings and intense scrutiny. 
One of these factors is how gradually and almost unconsciously each of 
the correspondents picks up clues from the other and repeats or antici-
pates the other’s words, phrases and sentiments, reinforcing their mu-
tual commitment to the main themes that underlie their relationship. A 
second factor is how, again gradually and without deliberate planning, 
they each come to realize the conditions under which the epistolary ex-
change has to be carried out—the censorious interference by various 
36 The title of a 1956 song made by popular by Teresa Brewer, with words and music by Matt Dubey 
and Harold Karr.
37 Silvio Pellico, My Ten Years’ Imprisonment (1833), trans. Thomas Roscoe (London: Cassell & Co., 
1886) Chapter XXXII, 40. This was a book that the guards on Devil’s Island were afraid Dreyfus 
would read.
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prison and governmental officials; the delays in passing letters on so 
that there are gaps, clusters, and out-of-sequence arrivals; and the dif-
ferent degrees of epistemological repression and confusion between 
husband and wife, the one trying to hide the specifics of his discomfort 
and despair, the other forced to avoid revealing information forbidden 
by order of the men in charge of passing on the letters, since that would 
end the permission to write altogether and perhaps cause greater pun-
ishments, and also attempting to conceal as much as possible her own 
private anxieties and anguish.
One result of these factors is that time is annihilated since there 
is no real narrative of change or development to be recounted, other 
than expressions of pain caused by the seemingly hopeless and endless 
ordeal or remarks on how their two children, Pierre and Jeanne, are 
growing up, reacting to their own changed and confusing conditions. 
Similarly, though in a somewhat different sense of literalness and exis-
tential understanding, space is conflated and transformed for the pair 
of separated spouses. They each confess to feeling what the other does 
and consequently offer to inhabit a new imaginary realm of experience 
created by the words they exchange in letters, with these written words 
being transformed into sounds of imagined speech, and these imagi-
nary conversations being contextualized by more tactile fantasies of 
being together again in a mixture of memories and anticipated resto-
ration of normality, the words on the pages, the handwriting of the 
other seen and felt—until the censors realize this and try to stop the 
process of transformation by having the actual letters recopied before 
passing them on—and then in dreams of embraces and unification of 
their persons.
It is possible to see some of these transformations if we compare 
the words inscribed by one and then the other writer to a fictional 
conversation between two lovers in Ludovic Halévy’s short romantic 
novel L’Abbé Constantine, published more than a decade before Lucie 
and Alfred began writing to one another.38 In this fictional account set 
in 1881, a young Canadian woman, Mrs. Susie Scott, comes to France 
with her sister, Miss Bettina Percival, both having inherited an enor-
mous amount of wealth from their father. At first, when they arrive 
in Paris, the older married sister and her younger single sister quickly 




become the talk and the toast of the town, thanks to their good looks, 
exotic oddity as free and vivacious American women, and the lure of 
their great fortunes. The younger sister, especially, attracts suitors of 
all sorts, mostly men with titles but little money, seeking to gain both 
a trophy wife and her untold millions of francs. But when the sisters 
decide to move to the country and buy up a series of farms, houses, and 
tenants once constituting a whole aristocratic estate, they also meet 
the old parish curate and his godson, Jean Reynaud, a young artillery 
officer of relatively humble origin.
Both sisters, seeking to ingratiate themselves with the abbé, show 
themselves to be generous, genial, and eager to fit into the community. 
The young Canadienne, Bettina, finds herself emotionally drawn to the 
handsome officer, finding him a welcome relief from the pretentious, 
snobbish, and gold-digging dandies of Paris and the various princes and 
lords who tried to win her hand and purse. In the climactic scene be-
fore the romantic ending to the novel, the lovers find themselves in an 
awkward, untoward impasse: the rich young woman fears that the man 
she loves will be too embarrassed to risk marrying her because it would 
humiliate him to be thought an adventurer just after her money, and she 
is also sure that he would be unwilling to enter the world of high society, 
in which he would have to play roles totally unsuited to his character. 
Jean, on his part, wishing to remain loyal to his military career, is afraid 
that the woman he loves would not want or should not live the life of 
an army wife, having to exist not only on his modest income but in a 
relatively unstable way, travelling from one posting to another, often 
to isolated and insalubrious parts of France or elsewhere in the world. 
While each is sure of his or her own love for the other, they cannot be 
sure of the other’s commitment—nor whether it would be fair to force 
the other to give up their friends, ambitions, and cultural pleasures.
Only with the aid of the curé is the moral impasse broken. By the 
parish priest’s gentle prodding, each one confesses to loving the other, 
and then, remarkably, gives the reasons for not wishing to harm the 
other’s way of life. It is in this conversation, hardly realistic in its tones 
or execution, that the young woman states her willingness to enter into 
the humble conditions of an artillery officer’s wife, her desire to support 
him in all his endeavours, and lack of any regrets for the gay lights of 
Paris and the artificialities of the high life. As she feels there can be an 
accommodation as well to her personal fortune insofar as she and he 
—————————————————— 2. The Dreyfus Texts ——————————————————
 
— 47 —
can live comfortably enough, perform together acts of Christian charity, 
and bring up any children without the snobbish artificialities they both 
dislike, a marriage is quickly agreed to and then occurs.
What is striking is how closely the words, phrases, and postures of 
these fictional lovers in Halevy’s novel are echoed in the letters writ-
ten by Lucie and Alfred Dreyfus. This remarkable similarity highlights 
the very different contexts and functions of the words themselves. For 
instance, the following lines from the novel describing Jean Reynaud’s 
feelings before going away on military manoeuvres foreshadow words 
Dreyfus and his wife used:
Jean is no longer tranquil; Jean is no longer happy. He 
sees approach with impatience, and at the same time 
with terror, the moment of his departure. With impa-
tience—for he suffers an absolute martyrdom, he longs 
to escape from it; with terror—for to pass twenty days 
without seeing her, without speaking to her, without her 
in a word—what will become of him? Her! It is Bettina: 
he adores her!39
Even more surprising are the words spoken by Bettina during the 
scene in which the priest guides the lovers towards an understanding 
and commitment to one another.
“Jean, I know what you are, I know to what I should bind 
myself in marrying you, and I should be for you not only 
the loving and tender woman, but the courageous and 
constant wife. I know your entire life; your godfather 
[the Abbé Constantin] has related it to me. I know why 
you became a soldier; I know what duties, what sacrific-
es, the future may demand from you. Jean, do not sup-
pose that I shall turn you from any of these sacrifices. If 
I could be disappointed with you for anything, it would 
be, perhaps, for this thought—oh, you must have had 
it—! That I should wish you free, and quite my own, that 
I should ask you to abandon your career. Never! Never! 




Understand well, I shall never ask such a thing of you.”40
A short while after, Bettina makes another statement, one resonant 
with echoes from the book of Ruth, where the young Moabite new wid-
ow, returning with her mother-in-law, declares her commitment to be 
from then on a good and faithful Jewish daughter-in-law,41 thus provid-
ing an indication of the allusive power inherent in Lucie Dreyfus’s oath 
of loyalty to her husband:
“When I can follow you, I will follow you; wherever you 
are will I be [and do] my duty, wherever you are will be 
my happiness. And if the day comes when you cannot 
take me, the day when you just go alone, well! Jean, on 
that day, I promise you to be brave, and not take your 
courage from you.”42
It is uncanny how prescient these speeches are, although Halévy 
could have no inkling of what would happen to Alfred Dreyfus and his 
wife, nor what kind of letters they would write. The prescience extends 
to the language of military loyalty as a code for marital love and duty, as 
well as to the general pattern of development of the events Alfred and 
Lucie would be tested through.
refuge in the Cauchemar
Alfred Dreyfus was very affected by the affair but he avoided 
showing his feelings. He was criticized for his attitude but it 
was a pure product of his generation. He was secular, ration-
alist and when he became the victim of injustice he thought 
that the truth would impose itself naturally.
—Pascal Ory43
40 Halévy, The Abbé Constantin, Ch. IX, “The Reward of Tender Courage,” 83.
41 Ruth becomes the ancestor of King David and thus of the messianic line in ancient Israel. Her 
conversion has no other ritual than her promise to Naomi.
42 Halévy, The Abbé Constantin, Ch. IX, “The Reward of Tender Courage,” 83.
43 Pascal Ory, in an interview with Shiri Sitbon, “Historian: ‘French Jewry was Falsely Accused of 
Abandoning Dreyfus,” online at http://ej[ress.org/printversion.aspx?idd=10064 (updated 4 
August 2006) (read 19 May 2009).
—————————————————— 2. The Dreyfus Texts ——————————————————
 
— 49 —
One of the most frustrating aspects of reading Alfred Dreyfus’s jour-
nals and carnets is the lengths to which he seems to go to avoid having 
to recognize that when all other hostilities against him are taken into 
consideration, the commonest feature—and the common denominator 
between his manifest enemies and many of his non-Jewish support-
ers—is anti-Semitism. Whether it is in his allowing to pass by without 
any notice the comment by Georges Clemenceau that Dreyfus is—like 
all other Semites, of which he is so typical—a bothersome annoyance, 
or his own annoyance at a police officer who comes to warn him of a 
suspected plot by a band of rabid Jew-haters to kidnap him on the 
street and probably spirit him away to be murdered, it is only by going 
to the modern footnotes appended to the edition of his carnets that 
we discover who these dangerous criminals are, as Dreyfus merely calls 
them nationalists.
Whereas in the letters to Lucie, as we have seen, the constant threat 
of censorship and thus the need to maintain a vigilance against any hint 
at their Jewishness44 may justify the absence of any but the most subtle 
and covert hints of their religion and culture, the journals and the carnets 
emerge from a different set of circumstances altogether, and the strong 
sense of denial has to be found elsewhere than in what Pascal Ory calls 
“a pure product of his generation.” Even in the prison notebooks, to be 
examined later in this book, the reasons for a similar silence and invis-
ibility in regard to Dreyfus’s religious heritage and spiritual or ethical 
concerns cannot be brushed aside as a consequence of his and his age’s 
“secularism” or his own philosophical positivism, scientific rationalism, 
and indifference to Judaism. Without midrashing the texts we have, any 
interpretations would seem forced and against the grain.
fourteen Prison Cahiers
Mirabeau always carried around within him the pains of his 
past; he had the glory but never the esteem and confidence 
[that should have gone with it] However, in the midst of 
all the disorder [of the late eighteenth century], Mirabeau 
44 It was not that everyone did not know that Lucie and Alfred were Jews, but that both of them 
attempted, as much as possible, to keep from calling attention to that fact, as any reference to 
holidays, customs, ritual objects, or Hebrew or Yiddish words would have been leaped on as 




worked hard and educated himself; the three years that he 
spent in the dungeon of Vincennes were fertile years of study 
and meditation. It was at Vincennes that he wrote the fa-
mous Letters to Sophie, a kind of journal of his heart and 
intelligence, with a profundity, penetration and marvellous 
passion. When the Revolution began, Mirabeau was ready; 
his previous studies would serve [him in good stead], but it 
was not only as a great orator that this was revealed; it was 
as a statesman, endowed with a rare gift, as much for great 
things as for great words.
—Alfred Dreyfus, Cahier 14, Folio 4
In the last of the fourteen extant notebooks written while he was on 
Devil’s Island, which is dated from 11 to 29 April, 1899, shortly before 
he finally returned to France to have his long-awaited second court-
martial in Rennes, Dreyfus writes one of his many little essays on the 
leaders of the French Revolution, drawing from his favourite histori-
ans, such as Michelet and Thiers. In this brief meditation on Gabriel 
de Mirabeau (1749–1791), Dreyfus spends a full paragraph discussing 
his transformation into a great revolutionary orator, giving credit for 
this rise in character and rhetorical skills to the three years he spent 
in prison in the town of Vincennes, a period which he spent in intense 
study and meditation. Although Dreyfus does not detail what books and 
authors the Comte de Mirabeau focused on during those three years, 
what is implied mostly is that, like this famous historical figure who rec-
reated himself as a revolutionary hero through his own efforts, Dreyfus 
was preparing for his own future by an analogous regimen of reading 
and meditation.
When we read this fourteenth cahier and the thirteen that precede it, 
we become aware of Dreyfus’s rather complex regimen of self-education, 
as well as a sustained exercise in maintaining his sanity and emotional 
stability. He imagines himself to be not only in a kind of intellectual 
conversation with himself, on the one hand, but in a conversation with 
all the writers and books he was commenting on his notebooks on the 
other. His intellectual conversation with himself was in preparation for 
that hoped-for eventual return to France and normality, at which time 
he would have to speak and write on behalf of the principles for which 
he was being unjustly punished, although at this point he was not aware 
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of the deep impact his case was making on the educated classes in the 
metropolis. The conversation with the other writers, as we shall make 
more clear as we proceed in our discussion, not only kept him in touch 
with and more worthy of being so involved with thinkers who provided 
the matrix of French civilization, but also allowed him to engage in a 
form of secularised adaptation of rabbinical discourse. This second as-
pect of his notebooks—with their puzzling mixture of brief commentar-
ies, complex mathematical and scientific annotations and exercises, and 
strangely mesmerizing and ever-varying proliferation of drawings—is 
what we are calling by the neologism of midrashing—that is, turning the 
Talmudic Hebrew word midrash into a verb, to midrash.
Before the notebooks from the final year of his imprisonment on 
Devil’s Island became available, it was thought that Dreyfus was a man 
of rather narrow learning, his mind formed by the military school he 
attended to make him an officer in the engineering corps. Scholars have 
presumed, because of his taciturn behaviour in court at his two trials, 
that he was not a cultured man able to express—or perhaps even to 
have—very deep thoughts or to engage with the wide range of ideas in 
literature, philosophy, and the arts flourishing at the end of the nine-
teenth century. But these cahiers from the years 1898 and 1899 put paid 
to such notions, as they reveal a Dreyfus far more sensitive, critical, and 
learned that previously envisaged.
In these surviving notebooks—those from the previous three or 
four years of his imprisonment were destroyed by Dreyfus himself—we 
see discussions of not only a very long list of Latin and Greek authors 
from the classical period and a range of French poets, dramatists, es-
sayists, and novelists from the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth 
centuries, but also representative thinkers from elsewhere in Europe, 
references to painters, musicians and sculptors, and, of course, histo-
rians, political theorists, and psychologists. I say “of course” because 
this latter list underlies the ideas and opinions expressed in Dreyfus’s 
subsequent journals, which were composed as part of the campaign to 
clear his name after the pardon granted at Rennes and, though these 
individuals are not mentioned by name, they are clearly alluded to, indi-
rectly and directly.45
Although Dreyfus was a well-educated man with wide interests, there 




were limits to these interests and to his own scholarly skills. The prison 
workbooks, as we have noted several times, were prepared under trying 
circumstances and serve several functions other than those of intellec-
tual note-taking or literary and philosophical musing on ideas impor-
tant to their author. In my attempt to translate what the fifteen remain-
ing notebooks contain, it quickly became clear that Dreyfus would lose 
track of his train of argument, repeat himself, seem to stutter, and re-
turn at long intervals to the same book, author, or idea to try to correct 
his understanding. In other words, just as it would be wrong to measure 
the value of these jottings in terms of any subsequent career in scholar-
ship or creative literature—there is no such career in Dreyfus’s life aside 
from his polemical and apologetic letters and journals meant to further 
his cause after the pardon and in a generally ad hoc manner—it would 
also be wrong to dismiss them as of merely passing interest and as a wit-
ness to his suffering in the tropical hell of Devil’s Island. These books are 
of the essence in coming to an understanding of the man.
These cahiers seem at first glance to contain a miscellaneous series of 
reading notes and short commentaries on the various books he has been 
perusing while confined to his cell and with no one to converse with. 
However, as we shall see, we have to do more than enumerate, classi-
fy, and evaluate these authors and the ideas they generate in Dreyfus’s 
mind as evidenced by his explicit comments. Putting aside short, incom-
plete fragments of trial letters to his wife, Lucie, and outlines of appeals 
to the commandant of the prison he is incarcerated in or to ministers 
back in Paris, for the most part Dreyfus writes about ideas, history, and 
scientific or aesthetic principles. Yet from time to time something else 
emerges which is of far greater significance for our understanding of the 
man and his place in the affair.
Occasionally, when he criticises one of the authors, he reveals an at-
titude quite distinct from that usually attributed to him, such as in his 
suggestion that the artistic personality and the work of art should be 
more than just factored into the history of eras and nations but taken as 
central matters. It also happens that he starts to discuss one particular 
author or book and then seems to slide inadvertently to another, and 
thus establishes new ideas, new contexts, and new perspectives, per-
spectives that moreover spring from memories of childhood, deeply 
personal tastes in the arts, and unexpected attitudes towards people, 
places, and historical events.
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In his recently-published Prison Notebooks for 1898, Alfred Dreyfus 
obsessively writes his response to Ernst Renan’s comment that in the 
future, literary history will effectively replace direct reading of great 
works of literature. Dreyfus finds himself forced to disagree with the re-
nowned historian and critic, stating that direct reading—that is, direct 
contact and engagement with the masterworks of world literature—of-
fers a profound access to the themes and experiences of human genius. 
Several important ideas emerge as we see Dreyfus, in his fifth year of 
imprisonment, exile, humiliation, and torture grappling with this seem-
ingly abstract and purely intellectual problem. First, in coming back 
again and again, never really getting beyond the few points noted here, 
Dreyfus indicates how significant the idea is for him, representing not 
so much a problem in literary history or critical theory as a point around 
which his own shocking confrontation with history keeps running 
against a major impasse. Second, in finding himself forced to disagree 
with one of the truly pivotal figures of critical thinking in nineteenth-
century France, Dreyfus indicates, probably without being fully aware of 
the implications of the blockage, that conventional middle-class think-
ing, as taught in schools and institutionalized elsewhere in the national 
consciousness, does not answer to his own transformed circumstances 
and thus serves as a sign, at least by hindsight to readers like ourselves, 
that there has been an existential shift in the paradigms of knowledge 
and imagination. Third, insofar as Dreyfus, normally a man of science 
and technology, a military practitioner in engineering and mathemat-
ics, now reads and rereads literature, literary history, philosophy, and 
the philosophy of history, he attempts to put himself on the side of crea-
tive, speculative, and aesthetic thinking.
Above all, what he comes back to again and again, in many forms, are 
the key themes of justice and truth, in Hebrew Daat v’Emet. Rather than 
appealing to the fundamental principles of the French Revolution and 
the republic (i.e., Liberté, Egalité et Fraternité), Alfred Dreyfus returns 
to these two key words, concepts, and values.46 From time to time, he 
does speak of liberty, believes in the equality of peoples, and seeks to 
promote the notions of mutuality, charity, and tolerance. However, his 
46 At this point, in a personal communication, Norbert Col wrote: “Most challenging this. Maurras 
would have agreed. His late disciple, Pierre Boutang, has a few fascinating remarks about this side 





whole value system, insofar as we can piece it together from his writ-
ings, does not lean towards modern liberal principles as they have come 
to be understood in terms of socialism and anarchism, the conceptually 
leftist movements in his own time, which for the most part backed up 
his or rather his family and friends’ efforts to have him released from 
imprisonment, his verdict revised and reversed, and his status in the 
army and his honour in the public eye restored.
On the one hand, perhaps most ironically, his own moral ideals were 
more akin to those of the intellectual anti-Dreyfusards, the traditional-
ists who believed in the importance of the state, the church, and the 
army, and who also favoured rule by intellectual and moral elites but 
not, of course, those who were bigoted, superstitious, and irrational. On 
the other hand, most surprisingly, his strong conviction in the power 
and rightness of justice and truth place him within the conceptual world 
of rabbinical or Talmudic Judaism, surprisingly because this source of 
values is the one he seems most determined not to speak about explic-
itly. In Judaism, these two great principles of the law are called Daat and 
Emet, and they resonate through liturgy, legal discussions and mysti-
cal speculations. In my close readings of the Dreyfus letters and cahiers, 
I hope to show that they are deeply and implicitly embedded in those 
documents as well.
equations, formulae, and Kabbalastic signs
Il y aurait une très curieuse étude à faire sur le fantastique, 
sur l’irréel que dégage ce prodigieux ensemble de lignes, de 
formes et de couleurs, si magnifiquement réel, si mathéma-
tiquement coordonnés. Le fantastique n’est qu’une ques-
tion de géométrie; voila ce qu’il faudrait prouver et ce que 
l’Exposition démontre.
—Octave Mirbeau47
Although Octave Mirbeau—novelist, art critic, and Dreyfusard48—was 
47 “There is a very interesting study to be done on the fantastic, on the unreal which may be drawn 
out of the prodigious assembly of lines, forms and colors, utterly magnificent and mathematically 
coordinated. The fantastic is only a question of geometry; and there it is, that which ought to be 
proved, and that which the Exposition demonstrates.” Octave Mirbeau, 372.
48 According to Norbert Col (in personal communications during December 2010), in France, 
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writing about the Universal Exhibition of 1889, which he saw very much 
as a “tumult of joy” or what we have called elsewhere generically a “Festi-
val of Laughter,” he can also be describing—and his modern editors see 
him very much as an accurate prophet of what is coming in the next few 
decades—the phantasmagoria of Alfred Dreyfus’s prison notebooks. 
These fourteen cahiers, with their mixture—including pages of alter-
nating sequences and overlapping presentations—of numerical equa-
tions and formulae, kabbalistic or arabesque doodles, and brief essays 
and commentaries on literature, historiography, philosophy, aesthetics, 
and science, are a new form of fantasia, a coordination of mathematics, 
technology, art, and morality. But although Mirbeau mockingly assesses 
the role of the exposition, with its wonders of modern technology and 
architecture, such as the Eiffel Tower and its surging crowds of drinking, 
eating, laughing, and babbling people, he takes no account of the real 
transformations occurring in the imagination and the subversive role 
played in such changes by the gradual leaking into the current of French 
history of Jewish ideas, attitudes, aspirations, anxieties, and ways of 
perceiving and evaluating reality.
Along with many of his compatriots on either side of the divide that 
yawns open so conspicuously during the Dreyfus Affair, Mirbeau is an 
anti-Semite. Not that he is a raging fanatic like Drumont, Maurras, or 
the crowds out on the streets in a riot of mockery and hatred, but he, 
like Degas and other intellectuals—even amongst those who temporarily 
and for politically strategic reasons joined the Dreyfusard cause—finds 
the Jews an annoying people. In fact, after Dreyfus’s return to France, 
the second trial at Rennes, and the granting of a pardon, when his firm 
supporter Georges Clemenceau was approached to continue to help the 
captain gain full rehabilitation of his name, rank, and salary, he dismissed 
this annoying Jew, sick and tired of his whining and complaints.
Jews? an annoying People!
Nouveau refus. Lebon m’explique, en termes plus embarras-
sés, qu’il lit toute la correspondance de D., mais qu’il n’est pas 
arguments still rage about whether or not Mirbeau was really an anti-Semite throughout his 
career or only in his early years, and whether or not the author came into his own during the time 
of the affair or not. Pierre Michel and Samuel Lair, young specialists, are now disputing these 




le seul à lire, qu’elle est soumise au ministère de la Guerre 
dont il se défi, où l’on bavarde, qu’elle est lue ensuite par le 
personnel pénitentiaire de la Guyane, dont il se défie encore 
plus, que, par conséquent, ma lettre risquerait d’être con-
nue, et que, cela pourrait être pour moi, Sémite, une cause 
d’ennuis.
—Alfred Dreyfus49
This is one of the very few instances when Alfred Dreyfus or anyone 
calling him- or herself a supporter mentions the fact that the captain 
was a Jew and that much of the opposition, if not the vast majority of 
opposition, derived from anti-Semitic hatred. Here, capturing in the 
rhythms of his own syntax the pattern of deceit and duplicity ranged 
against him, Dreyfus writes how he was treated in André Lebon’s min-
isterial office in 1899, soon after his pardon, when he had gathered 
enough strength of mind and will to begin the campaign for a more 
complete vindication of his innocence. Dreyfus wants to have all his 
letters, books, and papers from Devil’s Island returned to him. “Anoth-
er refusal,” he starts off. “Lebon explained to me in embarrassing terms 
that he had read all of D.’s correspondence, and that he was not the only 
one to read it, that it was sent to the Minister of War who rubbished it, 
since it was blithering nonsense, and that it was also read by the offi-
cials of the Guiana Penal Colony who also rejected it, and consequently 
my letter risked being known and that would be, for me, a Semite, an 
annoying thing.”
It is important here to watch the way Lebon dismisses Dreyfus’s ap-
peal to have his documents returned to him. Although many of the let-
ters had already been published as part of the build-up to his second 
trial in Rennes and in order to garner support from a wider public based 
on his personal sufferings on Devil’s Island for five years, as far as the 
government was concerned—from the Ministry in Paris to the colonial 
officials in Guiana—it was all blather and nonsense, bavarde. Then, con-
tinuing the condescending tone and the condescension due to a mere 
Jew, Lebon warns Dreyfus to watch out because all his efforts will just 
be ennuis, vexatious, bothersome, annoying to him and to the govern-
ment, to the army, to France—to real and true Frenchmen.
49 Alfred Dreyfus, Carnets (1899–1907), ed. Philippe Oriol (Paris: Calmann-Lévy. 1998), 56.
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When the aged Senator Auguste Scheurer-Kestner, a convinced Drey-
fusard, appealed to Lebon, he replied “that he would not be cast in the 
role of a jailer, which disgusts him,” and yet, since “if you who are not a 
Semite” (vous qui n’etes pas sémite), insist, then he will pass the request 
on, but . . . and he goes on speaking of how tedious, annoying and vexa-
tious the whole affair is.50 In his report on what transpired in this en-
counter with the minister, the ancient and respected politician goes on 
citing this conversation with the Minister of Colonies:
“Je l’ai dû: ah! Mon métier me dégoût!” Puis, pour soulager 
sa conscience, il me dit qu’il ne croît pas à l’innocence de D. 
Qu’il a lu toutes ses letters et qu’elles ne l’ont pas ému, que 
c’est toujours la même chose, et dans les mêmes termes! “Et 
que voulez-vous donc que cela soit?”51
“I was forced to do that: ah! My profession disgusts me!” 
Then, to assuage his conscience, he told me that he did 
not believe in D’s innocence. That he had read all his let-
ters and that he was not moved by them, that it was al-
ways the same thing and in the same terms! “And what 
do you want me to do about that?”
Nothing about Dreyfus rouses Lebon’s sympathies, and look what 
an annoying situation he has been put in by this troublemaker of a Yid. 
Reading the letters between Lucie and Alfred, which we will analyze at 
length to show how truly moving they are and how important they are 
for understanding the character of the man wrongly accused of treason, 
the mean-spirited little apparatchik cannot see anything in them but 
boring repetitions of puerile complaints. However, in correspondence 
with Joseph Reinach, Scheurer-Kestner shows a different way a non-Jew 
could respond to the same evidence. When the aged senator was told 
about the long period Dreyfus was kept in irons, he exclaimed, “C’est 
hideux! Je suis étonné . . .”52 That was the way a mensch should react to 
the torture inflicted upon a loyal French officer. That was the way an en-
50 Dreyfus, Carnets, 57.
51 Dreyfus, Carnets, 58.




lightened Frenchman of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
responded to the Dreyfus case. But what about those others, like Lebon?
Jews are, if you go by the comments of the government and judi-
cial officials Dreyfus appealed to after his pardon, often explicitly called 
an annoying people. How so? The Semite asks too many questions. He 
doesn’t accept words on the mere authority of the speaker but wants 
reasons. He is never satisfied. He should go home, be quiet, stay with his 
wife and children, and be satisfied with what he has. But this Semite and 
his brother keep badgering us. The Jew is therefore a troublemaker. He 
demands truth and justice. He is not like us; he is not part of the team 
which pulls together to protect the institution and each of us. Semites, 
the people in power complain, do not take words at face value. Words 
escape them in the sense that common associations, tonalities, and his-
torical resonance are different to different kinds of people. It is not the 
words themselves but the social dynamic, the historical matrix, and the 
epistemological technologies that shape the flow of communication, the 
impasses, and the static that replaces understanding. The Dreyfus Affair 
occurred along the long and jagged fault line between these different 
modalities of thought, feeling, and experience.
Which Words escape Them?
The reason why we need to remember the Dreyfus Affair 
now is that we failed to remember it the first time. We, the 
citizens of the world, did not pay attention to what was 
happening to the Jews in Nazi Germany because we were 
convinced that nothing so atrocious could really happen in 
the modern world. Our faith in the press and our ability to 
communicate almost instantaneously across vast distances 
led us to imagine that no large-scale injustice could go unde-
tected for so long.
—Sioucho53
For Jews, assimilated and practicing their ancestral customs, words are 
phenomena quite different from what they are for their Christian com-
53 Sioucho, “‘I’m not a Man: I’m a Cause’—The Story of Alfred Dreyfus in J’Accuse” (1 July 2001) 
Epinions.com (18 November 2010).
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patriots in France and the rest of Western Europe. For the Jew, words 
are objects in which meanings are stored, but the meanings are active 
processes, particles of energy emanating from revealed truth and yet 
now confused by diverse interests and emotional states of being. The 
words are processes of meaning-creation, which have historical trajec-
tories as well as unclear and confused explosions of irrational fear and 
desire, cries of pain and anxiety, soothing noises, and temporizing argu-
ments. Words therefore cannot be totally detached from the occasions 
in which they are used or from the people and the institutions that use 
or abuse them; they are fragments of rhetorical discourse and shards of 
explanations that have shattered in the course of time. More urgently, 
words are sounds and appearances, open to etymological connotations 
and semantic slides and able to be fractured and reassembled by parono-
masia and letter manipulation and other witty, ironic, and cynical inver-
sions and reconfigurations.
truth: Emet
The notion that the goal of Talmud is truth is un-Talmudic 
in spirit. It promises a finality, a definitiveness, a certainty, 
that the Talmud mocks on every page . . . . The objective of 
Talmud is not truth but thought.
—Leon Wieseltier
Like a refrain, in his appeals for a revision of the second court-martial at 
Rennes and those of his supporters for the first revision of the original 
military tribunal, the two words that appear throughout are truth and 
justice. But what does a Jew mean by the truth? In one sense, the truth is 
what is real and verifiable, what is not a lie or a distortion of what really 
happened. In another sense, it is what is in accord with the principles 
of the law and the patterns of history, putting aside as accidents and 
contingencies that which belongs only to the moment. Yet it is neither 
an absolute idea upon which all else is measured as real or valid nor an 
unreal manifestation of wish projected by the rich and powerful into the 
matrix of changeable, unsteady, and immeasurable events and experi-
ences. Truth is certainly an ideal of just and compassionate probability 
in a world in which human reason cannot reach perfection.




for all or available ab initio and eternally revealed to those who know where 
and how to look for it. Rather, and this is the essence of a traditional Jew-
ish approach, it is something dynamic and always renewing itself. For 
this reason, as Leon Wieseltier points out, the Talmud does not teach the 
truth but how to think, and, through thinking, to create the truth appro-
priate for this time and this place, which is not the same as for all times 
and all places. Yet that does not make a Jewish version of emet something 
relative or arbitrary—there are rules of logic, processes of argumentation, 
and a rhetoric of discourse with which to wrestle with the angel.
Even further, as will be opened up gradually like the facets of a pre-
cious stone, emitting its flashes of light in all directions, rabbinical 
melitza, or horizontal dialectics is, in Faur’s words,
a humanistic eloquence which springs from the He-
brew doctrine that every human being is created in 
God’s image . . . . The essential meliṣa is a dialectic in 
which neither side must necessarily be wrong; or con-
versely that both sides may be indeed uttering “the 
words of the Living God.54
Justice: Daat
What does the Jew mean by justice?55 He or she says it is an ideal of 
the law and of law but then doesn’t treat it as an absolute abstraction, 
a general idea, a distant goal of perfection, but as an eternal idea to be 
realized in practice without being perfect for all times and places but for 
specific occasions and persons. In one construction of the term, justice 
is what is right and fair, what is commensurate and balances out differ-
54 Faur. The Horizontal Society, Section IV, Introductory Remarks.
55 If we were to ask, on the other hand, what was the official line on “justice” during most of the 
affair, we could do worse than turn to one of Anatole France’s so-called profitable tales, that of 
“Crainquebille,” wherein a magistrate explains his meaning of the word: “Justice is the sanction 
of established injustice. Was justice ever seen to oppose conquerors and usurpers? When an 
unlawful power arises, justice has only to recognize it and it becomes lawful. Form is everything” 
(in Crainquebille Putois, Riquet and other Profitable Tales, trans. Winifred Stephens [London: John 
Lane/The Bodley head, 1916, 1905], 29). A few lines later, the parody of the Dreyfus Affair is 
even more pungent: “Such would have doubtless been the words of President Bourriche, for he 
has a judicial mind and he knows what a magistrate owes to society. With order and regularity, he 
defends social principles. Justice is social. Only wrong-headed persons would make justice out to 
be human and reasonable” (30).
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ent desires and objections, what is measured, and so what can be made 
most fitting to maintain peace and harmony between individuals and 
groups. In another construction, justice is what is lawful when the law 
confronts complicated and confused circumstances, different versions 
of reality, and thus adjusts itself for the moment to what is most ben-
eficial for all in their various conditions. Still more, justice is the term 
used for decisions reached thoughtfully, deliberately, after dispassion-
ate consideration, when most irrelevant interests have been put aside, 
but when the consequences of the decision are also thought through so 
as to avoid undue pain or suffering to parties not directly involved and 
without leading to even more disturbing disruptions to the good run-
ning of families and communities. Thus, although it would be cynical to 
define justice as merely the application of the wishes of the most power-
ful over those who have less influence or wealth, it also cannot be tipped 
totally on the side of mercy or compassion, although the judgement 
should avoid undue harshness and not over-reward persons or groups 
who are merely technically in the right.
Thus, both the concepts and processes of emet and daat are at once 
the matrix in which thought operates, the process of rational argumen-
tation and analysis, and the rhetorical construct or figure of thought in 
which the interpretation and the application are for the time being real-
ized. In brief, like the Talmud in its widest acceptance as Torah—from 
a specific word or passage in a text to an argument rehearsed in a witty 
and mutually respectful manner regarding the performance of wise and 
saintly deeds—it is a lens through which to see, a kaleidoscope to keep 
adjusting to the swirls of history and social revolution, and a moral ma-
zurka, a dance of reason. Or to cite Franz Liszt in his remarks on Frie-
drich Chopin, following George Sand,56 again one of those citations we 
56 Taken from George Sand’s Lucrezia Floriani. According to James Huneker’s Chopin: The Man and 
his Music, Mr. A. B. Walkley, the English dramatic critic, after declaring that he would rather have 
lived during the Balzac epoch in Paris, continues in this entertaining vein: 
And then one might have had a chance of seeing George Sand in the thick of 
her amours. For my part I would certainly rather have met her than Pontius 
Pilate . . . . But, to my mind, the most fascinating chapter in this part of 
her history is the Chopin chapter, covering the next decade, or, roughly 
speaking, the ‘forties’. She has revealed something of this time—naturally 
from her own point of view—in “Lucrezia Floriana” (1847). For it is, of 
course, one of the most notorious characteristics of George Sand that she 




make only to keep adjusting the lens and focusing in a different way on 
the subject of our choice:
His [Chopin’s, but here read the Jew’s] imagination [in 
the sense of a creative, midrashic process of thought] so 
filled with exquisite beauty [i.e., the beauty of the Law, 
in all its rational splendor and mystical power], seemed 
as it were holding a monologue [make that now a dia-
logue or a conversation or even an argument] with God 
himself; and when upon the radiant prism, in the con-
templation of which he forgot everything else [instead 
of this mystical loss of self and rationality, read here: in 
which the Jews remember deeply, creatively and wittily], 
the phantasmagoria of the world [the great contraption 
that spews forth the claptrap of anti-Semitism and fool-
ish ideas] cast even its disturbing shadow he [like Alfred 
Dreyfus confronted with the machinations of arrogance 
and racial hatred] was deeply pained, as if in the midst 
of a classical concert a shrieking old woman, in shrill and 
broken tones, should blend her vulgar musical motive 
with the divine thoughts of the great masters.57
Peace: Shalom, Tikkun
These concepts, as we have been showing, come close to, sometimes 
overlaps with, but are never exactly the same as, their Christian or secu-
lar, enlightened brethren. Peace, familiar in the greeting, and farewell 
(shalom aleichem), “Peace be unto you!” does not mean primarily a state 
ink in this lady’s composition is surely one of the most curious blends ever 
offered to the palate of the epicure.
57 Liszt, The Life of Chopin, 208–209. The original French is somewhat different and therefore 
deserves its own midrashic interpretation: “Il semblait noyer son imagination si exquise et, si belle 
dans un monologue avec Dieu même, et si parfois, sur le prisme radiaux où il s’oubliait, quelque incident 
faisait passer la petite lanterne magique du monde, il sentait un affreux malaise, comme si, au milieu d’un 
concert sublime, une vielle criarde venait mêler ses sons aigus et un motif musical vulgaire aux pensées 
divines des grands maîtres” (chapter VII). It is not just the substitution of a magic lantern for the 
phantasmagoria, but the sublime rather than the classical concert the old woman interrupts with 
her shrieking. Broadhouse’s translation draws out the implications of the figurative language we 
have interpreted in a new context and given a new Jewish accentuation.
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of nonviolence and harmony with others, including states as well as 
individuals, but a harmonious, just, and equitable relationship, free of 
threats and constraints, drawing on the same root sh-l-m שלם that ap-
plies to paying a bill or a fair wage—to balance out a situation of tempo-
rary inequality, disequilibrium, or debt.
The opposite of war is justice, and justice is achieved when order is re-
stored. This restoration, repair, and correction of an incongruity is called 
tikkun, deriving from the kabbalistic myth of the contraction of time and 
space (tsimtsum), the breaking of primary vessels of creative force, and 
their scattering like sparks; tikkun which consists of gathering up the 
hidden sparks, putting them back into an orderly flow of creativity, and 
reconciling the seemingly hostile and violent relationship between the 
infinite and the finite, brings about the conditions of shalom.
Part 3: the Myth Of the 
unthInKabLe anD the IMPOssIbLe
They are the quintessence of what I detest most, people like 
her and her father. They are the incarnation of the modern 
world, in which there is nothing more despicable than these 
cosmopolitan adventurers, who play the grand seigneur with 
the millions filibustered in some stroke or other on the Bourse.
—Paul Bourget, Cosmopolis58
What happened to Alfred Dreyfus from the moment he was told of his 
arrest was impossible to believe, something unthinkable, and, as we can 
see in his reactions over the first few days when he raged in his cell, 
58 Paul Bourget, Cosmopolis (1892), no trans. (Doylestown, PA: Wildside Press, 2010), 24. The 
speaker here is the Marquis Claude-François de Montfanon, a notorious aristocratic bigot, and 
he is speaking of Baron Justus Hafner and his daughter, “a young girl of almost sublime beauty 
. . . Her profile, of an Oriental purity . . . so much on the order of the Jewish type that it left 
scarcely a doubt as to the Hebrew origin of the creature . . .” (20–21). As Norbert Col remarked 
on reading this book in manuscript, Bourget, like others, from Walter Scott in Ivanhoe—but 
even before him in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice with Shylock’s daughter Jessica—temper 
their presentation of grotesque Jewish men with a titillating fascination for young Jewish girls. 
By the way, Col also points out that although he was an anti-Dreyfusard, Bourget was not a rabid 
bigot but came down on the side of the army because he could not believe French officers would 
deliberately lie or manipulate evidence. Unlike others, he did not equate Dreyfus’s Jewishness 
with prima facie evidence of his treason. This matter is further discussed in relation to the essay 




threw himself against the walls, and cried out in inarticulate despair, it 
was unspeakable. Such traumatic occasions are thankfully rare in life, 
even more so when they occur to a group of people, a whole community, 
or a nation. Gradually, as the news of what happened to Captain Drey-
fus spread from his family through the Jewish community to the whole 
of France and then the rest of Europe and other parts of the so-called 
modern world, the trauma became general. It was moreover an increas-
ing, cumulative trauma, only beginning with the shock of the arrest of 
a quiet, middle-class, assimilated Jew in Paris at the end of the nine-
teenth century and became more unbearable and unbelievable at each 
new turning point: his condemnation at the first court-martial, his deg-
radation in public, his exile to Devil’s Island, his solitary confinement 
and shackling to a bed, and his second condemnation at Rennes—and 
these are only the most salient events.
What began as a personal or family tragedy, seemingly based on a 
judicial error, soon re-formed into a national and international scandal 
as more and more evidence began to emerge of a conspiracy amongst 
Dreyfus’s fellow officers and some members of the government until it 
reached into the highest echelons of the army and the leading members 
of the National Assembly and strained the loyalty and faith of the whole 
population in the ideals of the republic, in the integrity of the state, the 
church, and, yes, of the truth.
What does it feel like when the impossible happens, when the un-
speakable has to be spoken, when the unimaginable is put into pic-
tures, and when the inconceivable fits into the normative paradigms of 
thought and of rationality itself? Some of us have had such experiences, 
perhaps even more than once in our lives. Take the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the rapid collapse of the Soviet Empire. I was teaching on an 
exchange agreement at the University of Ottawa at the time. There was 
to be a conference of various leaders from the countries of the Warsaw 
Pact in a building around the corner from the university, so I made sure 
to take a detour to pass by, coming and going, each day. I could not keep 
my eyes off the flags, all of them with the old hammer and sickle em-
blem either cut away or sewn over. It was unbelievable. My whole life, 
I had grown up on the paradigm of the Cold War, and whether one felt 
sympathy or not for the ideals of Communism, no one of my generation 
or that of my parents could have escaped the power of the conflict and 
the influence of the Iron Curtain that cut across Europe and the world.
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I would come into the classroom trembling at what was happening a 
few hundred metres away, as the Warsaw Pact states disentangled them-
selves from the Soviet bloc and prepared to reenter history and Euro-
pean life. But the students, mostly young, middle-class Canadian kids 
from Ontario and Quebec—the University of Ottawa was a bilingual 
institution and still had structural memories of its recent transforma-
tion from a Catholic to a provincial college—seemed quite uninterested. 
These comfortable, smug young people, for all their supposed intelli-
gence and imagination, could not see the big deal. They sniggered at my 
remarks about how these were days that were transforming the world, 
how we viewed history, what politics and economics could mean from 
now on, and where the truth of the past nearly ninety years would be 
found. It was therefore impossible for me to explain to them how deeply 
the ideas of the division between East and West had gone into every 
part of my consciousness and even, I am sure, unconsciousness; and 
how, although people had speculated on the eventual demise of what 
Ronald Reagan termed “the Evil Empire” and had spoken about possible 
scenarios over the next hundred years, basically most of the men and 
women I knew could not really believe that such an eventuality would 
happen in our lifetimes, if ever.
Or take another example, what happened on 11 September 2001. 
This was far more traumatic than the assassination of John F. Kennedy 
or the accidental death of Princess Di, events to which others have com-
pared it, in the sense that for many people such dates are marked by 
everyone comparing where they were and what they were doing when 
they heard the news. The so-called 9/11 phenomenon digs deeper into 
the consciousness and the unconsciousness because it transformed—as 
some news broadcasters were able to say within hours of the terrorist 
attacks in New York City, Washington DC, and a lonely field in Penn-
sylvania—the way many of us think and feel about reality. If it didn’t 
transform the thoughts and emotional reality of our lives, because 
those changes occur over a longer period of time, it was the moment 
that exposed the processes of change and made it impossible to use the 
previous discourses of rationality in history, politics, or aesthetics. I say 
this even though with each passing year—and I merely have to point 
to young students in my classes since then to demonstrate this—the 
trauma has been papered over by those who wish to deny that anything 




and have already repressed it so deeply that they are angry and offended 
if you merely suggest it to them.
In a sense, what the several terrorist attacks revealed on that memo-
rable day was what one could have—perhaps should have—made articu-
late a few months earlier in the ironically entitled 2001 “Anti-Racism” UN 
Conference held in Durban, South Africa. This festival of racial hatred, 
and especially vicious slandering of Israel and the United States by a wide 
range of nongovernmental organizations and national representatives to 
the United Nations, manifested the same declaration of war against what 
is known as the Judeo-Christian value system of the Western World, was 
a celebration of superstition, demagoguery, and envy—and led directly 
to the hijacked airliners that flew into the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon and might have targeted the White House itself. It revealed the 
new distortion of all the language of human rights, democracy, and ra-
cial harmony that was responsible for the subsequent terrorist attacks in 
London, Madrid, Bali, and Mumbai. The bizarre alliance of Islamacist fa-
naticism, Marxist ideology separated from its old class analysis of dialec-
tical materialism, anti-globalism, and other politically correct ideologies, 
all wrapped up in a Palestinian scarf, makes a nonsense of the traditional 
language and activities of liberalism in the West. It is now impossible to 
talk sensibly using any of the words and concepts that used to be filled 
with and resonate morality and responsibility.
I learned of the 9/11 attacks in the middle of the night, since I live 
in New Zealand, and realized that my wife was somewhere in the air en 
route to New York City, and so I had first to overcome a personal panic. 
I spent most of the night using the telephone and internet trying to 
locate members of my family and transmit messages from persons who, 
though near each other geographically, were cut off from news about 
each other’s whereabouts and conditions. By the next morning, when 
I had to go to the university to teach, I was exhausted but somehow 
buoyed up by the adrenalin of panic.
There were two reactions that met me when I drove in that next 
morning. On the one hand, there was the deaf silence of most of my col-
leagues and students, who neither knew nor cared what had happened, 
and who treated the event when they bothered to find out about it—
most never read newspapers, listened to the news on radio or television, 
or used the internet as a source of current events—as unimportant. Not 
one ventured to ask how my family in New York City was, where my wife 
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was, or what I was feeling at the moment, although I was clearly shaken 
and upset. On the other hand, the politically aware minority, to a man, 
all expressed anti-American sentiments, smiled, and congratulated one 
another on the fact that “the big bully got a bloody nose” and “now they 
know how it feels.” No sympathy for three thousand murder victims. No 
understanding of how deeply the event had shaken Americans’ long-last-
ing confidence in the safety of their nation from foreign attack or inva-
sion—that not since the war of 1812 had the Continental United States 
been hit by such an attack. Not even a recognition that that confidence 
has been built up since the late 1980s, with the sense that the Cold War 
was over and the world was safe from any major conflicts again.
But more than these political or military actions that shattered the 
myth of Fortress America, there was the other, deeper trauma of a total 
destabilization of our concept of reality. This might be a variation on 
Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” or some notion of “the end of his-
tory.” It was a trauma that meant that the Enlightenment was over and 
that the whole history of rationality, science, and secularism was teeter-
ing of collapse.
I do not mean to say, however, that the shocks experienced at the 
Fall of the Soviet Union or the terrorist attacks of 9/11 could be con-
sidered the most shattering experiences of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries and thus equivalent to that most enormous of 
all traumas, the Holocaust or Shoah. No more could, at least for a Jew, 
the episodes surrounding the Dreyfus Affair and then soon after the 
Mendel Beylis case in Czarist Russia be so considered. For many, to be 
sure, the outbreak of World War I was in itself the opening up of a deep 
abyss between the relative security and comfort of the nineteenth cen-
tury and the seemingly endless violence of the twentieth. What we are 
talking about here are moments in existential history when individuals 
and groups of smaller or larger size pass through a liminal event that at 
once seems to bring to an end not so much the institutions and para-
digms of one form of noetic universe or Weltanschauung as the realiza-
tion that those organized and collective paradigms of knowledge can no 
longer be trusted; in fact, at such a moment, the vast inner dimensions 
of what had hitherto been unquestioned, usually unexpressed dimen-
sions of truth and reality come to the surface and reveal themselves to 
be inconsistent, incoherent, and riddled with contradictions.




gins to play itself across the consciousness of a community, a nation, or 
even a whole civilization, there is another realization crystallizing into 
awareness and seeking to take charge of how knowledge is generated, 
taught, preserved, and transformed into art and philosophy—the reali-
zation that already for a long time, perhaps even a generation or more, 
other paradigms have been created, new ways of seeing and feeling have 
been articulated, in both popular and elite cultures, and seemingly radi-
cal and rash modes of social relationship have started to stabilize them-
selves into patterns of normality and hence of acceptability. Yet since 
generations overlap, as Proust shows throughout À la recherche du temps 
perdu, individual and collective memories crisscross over each other, dif-
ferent memories inform various individuals and groups in asymmetrical 
ways, and denial and misprision often dominate over acceptance and 
clarity of perception.
For the narrator, Marcel, in Proust’s A la recherche de temps perdu, the 
moments of realization burst forth unexpectedly and change the way in 
which he sees others, himself, and the world in which he lives, so that 
he can feel himself alive in many times and places at once, sometimes 
riding in a horse and carriage, sometimes driving in an automobile, en-
countering an aeroplane for the first time, walking through Paris during 
an aerial bombardment, sending messages with a servant, using a tele-
graph, writing a note for the pneumatic post, or using the telephone. Not 
that the accumulation of technological advances by itself can account 
for the transformation in the imagination and rationality of an age, but 
that such inventions are markers of more dynamic shifts occurring in 
the minds, the memories, the milieu, and the mentalities of the society.
scattering sparks of Memory
The artist expresses specifically what all our dreams tend to 
express in more fragmentary form, through symbolism rath-
er than words. This symbolism is both highly personal and, 
at a deeper level, universal . . . This unconscious realm is the 
meeting place of aesthetics and psychological or biological 
inquiry, and symbolism is its means of delineation.
—Milton L. Miller59
59 Milton L. Miller, Nostalgia: A Psychoanalytic Study of Marcel Proust (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin 
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It is clear, of course, that Dreyfus was no artist and his tendencies were 
always towards the more scientific, positivistic philosophies of the late 
nineteenth century. Nevertheless, when the prisoner on Devil’s Island 
comments on the authors he approves of, he does so with provisos, ob-
jections, and modifications, most of them expressing a recognition of 
the importance of the aesthetic perspective and the artist’s role in soci-
ety and history. Moreover, as should become more and more evident in 
this book, when we examine the full range of his thoughts in his various 
letters, notebooks, and journals, Dreyfus does not fully adhere to his 
own stated principles. This is not only because he knows that whatever 
he writes, even in personal, intimate letters to his wife, there is a mani-
fest censorship by prison and other officials going on, making any allu-
sion to radical ideas—and this could be as much a statement of antig-
overnment opinions as a hint at Jewish adherence to the Law of Moses 
as a guide to moral and ethical views, let alone to suspect anarchist ten-
dencies in the aesthetic manifestos of the period—dangerous, at least 
in the sense of interfering with his search for a revision of his case in the 
military courts and in the parliamentary process but also because he is 
himself fearful of letting uncontrolled and uncontrollable thoughts and 
feelings emerge, and thus sliding into the despair and madness his situ-
ation could all too easily create.
Whereas Proust seems to have found both consolation and trans-
formative power in his literary art, thus avoiding the threats of physi-
cal and psychological annihilation he so dreaded, Dreyfus struggled to 
make rational sense of what had happened to him and to maintain a 
sanity that would protect his wife and children along with his own hon-
our. He knew that any concession to the savage rage and melancholia 
deep within himself—in what Jewish mystical tradition would call the 
sitra achra, the demonic other side—could be taken as a mark of guilt 
and stigmatize his family and himself with all the calumnies published 
in the anti-Semitic press.
Although I will consequently seem to wind the life experiences of 
Marcel Proust around those of Alfred Dreyfus, along with their families 
and circle of friends and acquaintances, it is not my intention to suggest 
that these men and their accomplishments are to be considered inter-




changeable—or that in any way they had more than the most tangential 
relationship with one another. At best, Proust was aware of Dreyfus’s 
plight, sympathized with the cause of his revision, and helped collect 
signatures on a petition for the revision of the first court-martial’s de-
cision. Rather, I want to show—and in a very special way, the way of 
midrash which will be explained over the whole course of this book, oc-
casionally in a theoretical discussion but more usually through applica-
tion and demonstration—that both Proust’s literary achievement and 
Dreyfus’s ordeal are part of the way in which the impossible came to be 
possible. Once we know through our own experiences that the impossi-
ble can happen—because it has happened again and again, as suggested 
in my thumbnail sketches of how I came to understand the traumatic 
and shocking nature of liminal events, such as the Fall of the Berlin Wall 
or the breaking out of the War on Terror in the place where the Cold War 
had been—then we can try to unpack the levels of textuality and follow 
the threads of memory in the midrash of Alfred Dreyfus’s life and the 
specific ordeal of his case.
an age of boredom and anxiety
These two peoples, always in presence of each other, and liv-
ing within the same walls, still had almost nothing in com-
mon . . . . They were two peoples that did not even under-
stand each other, not having—so to speak—common ide-
as. . . . They reproached each other with injustice: each was 
just according to his own principles, and unjust according to 
the principles and beliefs of the other . . . . And yet there was 
something which formed a tie between these two peoples.
—Fustel de Coulanges60
Many writers say or at least imply that the last decades of the nineteenth 
century and the first thirteen years of the new century were marked by 
a great boredom and melancholy amongst the bourgeoisie, with the so-
called Gay Nineties or Age of Salons and Banquets a misreading of the 
60 Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City: A Study on the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of 
Greece and Rome (1864), trans. Willard Small (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956; 
orig. trans. 1873), 296–297.
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period. It would seem by such an assertion that, out of nowhere, at least 
in France, the Dreyfus Affair appeared, and suddenly in 1894 one peo-
ple became divided, the Dreyfusards versus the anti-Dreyfusards. And 
then just as suddenly in 1906 all went silent again, the lights dimmed, 
and France drifted along as if in a dream until the Great War shattered 
everything once and for all. But this is, of course, a specious assertion. 
Even if we discount the suddenness of the affair or the shattering qual-
ity it had on French society, the fin de siècle was not all a Belle Epoque, a 
time when Paris, France, Europe, or the world deluded itself into think-
ing these were the best of times, that all was well, and that as many new 
inventions and discoveries as one could ever think of had been invented 
and discovered. Such a statement or vision or wish is untenable.
Any authors who speak like that seem to treat the society of the late 
nineteenth century as one in which life was staid, repressed, and smug, 
something like the Vienna of Stefan Zweig’s lengthy autobiographical es-
say. However, judging by the innovations in the arts and sciences, the ad-
vances in technology and popular entertainment, and the radical twists 
and turns in literature, this was anything but a prim Victorian period. 
The question nevertheless remains: why in the midst of so much change 
and confusion, innovation, and struggle to assert traditional or mythical 
values and institutions, did so many people feel themselves to be men 
and women without qualities, individuals lost in the power of crowds and 
mobs, adults trapped in the memories of an abused childhood?
Stefan Zweig wrote a thesis entitled “Die Philosophie des Hippolyte 
Taine,” pointing out in this way the direction in which we need to track 
down some of the paths through which mentalities travelled in the lives 
and events we are talking about in this book. Although thinkers like 
Hippolyte Taine and Ernest Renan have faded from the centres of at-
tention of those who write about the Dreyfus Affair, they form part of 
the constellation of writers who created the matrix of ideas in which the 
mentalities and the imaginations that made the clash of personalities, 
institutions, and paradigms possible, and whose explosion and disinte-
gration are the playing field where the affair was fought out. It is in the 
work of the forgotten writers, and often in the neglected books and es-
says of the authors we still care about, that the games and battles were 
contested—not in the works that are important to us, who come after 





Le premier devoir de l’homme sincère est de ne pas influer 
sur ses propres opinions, de laisser la réalité se refléter en lui 
comme en la chambre noire de photographe, et d’assister en 
spectateur aux batailles intérieures que se livrent les idées au 
fond de sa conscience.
—Ernest Renan61
Lorsque seul, dans le silence, demi-couche dans un fauteuil, 
je me laisse aller à la rêverie, et que, par l’effacement des 
sensations ordinaires, la fantasmagorie interne devient in-
tense, si le sommeil approche, mes images précises finissent 
par provoquer des hallucinations véritables.
—Hippolyte Taine62
During the months that followed our interviews and in which 
the book took shape, not only did I live completely involved in 
Proust, thanks to the voice I had been listening to, but I also 
saw and heard him in a way that at times was almost hallu-
cinatory. Not once did I doubt that this was the real Proust.
—Georges Belmont63
61 Ernest Renan, “Examen de conscience philosophique” (September 1888) in Souvenirs d’enfance 
et de jeunesse, ed. Laudice Retat (Paris: GF Flammarion, 1973), 283. “The first duty of an honest 
man is not to be influenced by his own opinions, but to let reality be reflected in him as in a 
photographer’s darkroom, and to observe passively and objectively the interior battles of ideas 
rising from the bottom of his consciousness” (my translation).
62 Hippolyte Taine, De l’Intelligence, volume 2 (Paris: Hachette, 1870); facsimile édition Lexington, 
KY: Biblibazaar, 2010), 35. “Alone and in silence, half-asleep in an easy chair, I let myself float 
into reverie and when, by the fading away of all normal sensations, the internal phantasmagoria 
becomes intense, if sleep approaches, my precise images end up by provoking veritable 
hallucinations” (my translation).
63 Georges Belmont, “Introduction” to Céleste Albaret, Monsieur Proust, trans. Barbara Bray (New 
York, NY: New York Review Books, 2003), xvi-xvii. Belmont recorded the interview with Alberet, 
who had been Proust’s servant and confidant for seventeen years. She had an uncanny memory for 
details and tones of voice in the conversations she had with the great writer. Although she lacked 
a formal education, Albaret was extremely intelligent and intuitive and she could hold her own 
in discussions of Proust’s book with the author and his artistic friends. Belmont’s comment sets 
the stage for a double way of reading the character and the writings of Alfred Dreyfus undertaken 
in this book: first, close attention to specific details, an attempt to grasp the nuances of his style 
and tone, and a contextualizing of his emotional and intellectual documents within the creative 
and scientific writers of his time, and second, a midrashic enhancement of the text by various 
rabbinical techniques of exegesis explained over the course of this book.
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There are two broad and distinct ways to look at truth, reality, memory, 
and history. In one, it is possible to imagine our minds as photographic 
lenses through which the facts of the outside world pass with minimal 
distortions and then register objectively on the screen or chemical plate 
of our minds as memory—things that can be recalled and discussed as 
accurate and truthful records of the past, our own and those of people; 
ideas; and institutions outside of us. The other way, more creative, po-
etic, and subjective, is to recognize that our experience of the world is 
always in flux, subject to transformations, distorted by conscious and 
unconscious pressures, our own and those of society around us, already 
limited and censored by language, culture, and political ideologies (in-
cluding religion and aesthetic theories)—and to take this second vision 
as not always having a negative effect that at best leads to scepticism 
and at worst to cynicism and hedonistic behaviour, but also sometimes 
leads to something positive, that allows for artistic re-creation, scien-
tific innovation, philosophical refinement, and other innovative and 
critical acts and dreams.64
The assumption usually is that even in dreamlike states, whether in 
hypnotic trances or private reverie, such as Taine imagines for himself, 
the images created are hallucinatory distortions of reality, anything, 
that is, but accurate and detailed depictions of reality so that while 
speculative interpretations of the natural world and human history are 
based on such false memories, they have at best a heuristic or aesthetic 
value and at worst a dangerous, insane influence on our lives. However, 
certainly by the 1890s, following the radical shifts in perception brought 
about by the impressionist painters and initiated by the advanced psy-
chologism of Tarde, Bergson, and Freud, it was possible to conceive of 
an approach to memory, history, and poetry that avoided the incongrui-
ties and mutual exclusiveness of these two earlier perspectives, either 
truth or distortion, reality or madness, objectivity or interference.
Even Marcel Proust, who in A la recherche du temps perdu seems to 
dismiss the new cinematography as another form of photography, was 
64 This is not the kind of argument that can be refuted as Dr. Johnson thought he did with Bishop 
Berkley by kicking a stone to prove that the outside world did exist; this kind of practical cynicism 
appears in ancient satires too where, for instance, Plato’s thesis of the ideal of love is undercut by 
a husband and wife team of kyniks writhing in ecstasy on the floor in front of his students. Logic 




merely a passive recorder of facts and so a distorter of the dynamic 
fluidity of lived experience, and yet this rejection of the technology of 
motion pictures misses the points where cinema can enhance, advance, 
and interpret finely the insights of his own concepts of time, reality, 
memory, and art. Proust took a negative stand against photography, 
which he identified with a positivist realism; he saw photographs as ba-
nal and bourgeois. But Méliès the magician promoted a more dynamic, 
playful sense with his moving pictures. They are illusions to be sure, 
but they take artificial reproduction of reality to a higher, more artistic 
reality. Two things happened when Daguerre found a way to fix fleeting 
images on metal plates to make what we call photographs. First, art-
ists and philosophers realized that the pictures produced were different 
from artistic paintings or drawings, insofar as they could not repro-
duce nuances of colour or texture and did not distinguish between the 
significant and the insignificant elements in an image or the reality it 
supposedly reproduced, and yet they revealed details and aspects of the 
scene or object that had not been noticed before. Therefore, second, the 
camera could be more than just an aid to the artist in recalling persons, 
places or things for him or her to later reproduce as an aesthetic ob-
ject: it could itself be a way of manipulating the memory of the reality 
experienced, revealing what had not been noticed, exploring the sub-
tleties and interstices between shadows and light or colours—indeed, 
the shadows were themselves aspects of light and colour. For all his 
opposition, Proust actually worked in a cinematic way in both his nar-
rative structures and in his exploration of the nuances of character and 
social reactions. Dreyfus was fascinated by the technology of photogra-
phy and also of x-rays, and saw in the optical mechanics of transferring 
fleeting and seemingly confusing light and shades to fixed pictures a 
way of coming to terms with the phantasmagoria of his plight and the 
enigma of his arrest and guilty verdict. 
Despite these theoretical speculations and the advances in every-
thing from cosmology and psychiatric medicine to quantum physics 
and hypnotic techniques,65 today most historians still approach the 
Dreyfus Affair through a lens of mid-nineteenth-century positivism, 
65 This was precisely the period when spectacular advances were published in Einstein’s essays on 
relativity, and related topics or Henri Bergson and Sigmund Freud were making their advances in 
two kinds of depth psychology.
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taking the words, images, and events of the period as transparent, ac-
curate, and true, and the result is that like those thinkers who were 
against Dreyfus and who we now know were deluded, hysterical, and 
delirious, they are still mistaking the ideological misperceptions of the 
popular press as reality.66
What I have found through a close reading of the recently published 
notebooks that Dreyfus kept during the years he was imprisoned on 
Devil’s Island is that he was himself wrestling with the received ideas—
because for all his faith in the republican values of reason, justice, and 
freedom, his existential reality could not sustain the consequences of 
that faith. He was reading a wide range of books, commenting on them 
critically, and posing new questions. To be sure, this initial reading of 
his notebooks cannot mark Dreyfus as a major innovative thinker of 
the period; he was, it seems, uninterested in many of those we today see 
as the avant-garde painters, musicians, novelists, and philosophers of 
the late nineteenth century, and he often expressed distaste for the aes-
thetic theories or political ideologies he was aware of. Nevertheless, he 
did not accept what he was reading—he made objections, he provided 
additional details to create new contexts, and he suggested other ideas 
and processes to apply. In a certain way, he played out the roles of the 
underground man, the man without qualities, the Kafkaesque victim of 
bureaucracy gone mad, the artist manqué . . .
Meditated on more soberly, however, Dreyfus was none of these—
neither autistic nor artistic—and yet, as we shall argue throughout this 
book, he found himself both cast out of normality and cast into the 
role of anti-hero in a national theatre of the absurd, an externalized 
phantasmagorie.67
66 Which is not to call these historians of the last twenty-five years anti-Semitic or belonging to the 
various political ideologies that in the later phases of the affair, after supporting Dreyfus for their 
own strategic purposes, turned against him, but to say that the inability or refusal to interpret 
documents and actions in a more dynamic way, recognizing all the techniques in psychoanalysis 
or in Leo Strauss’s modes of deciphering messages written during persecution, yields variants on 
the old canards about Dreyfus’s character being dull and conventional or about the tediousness 
of his letters to Lucie. Worse are those who still write hundreds and thousands of pages about 
the juridical procedures and the political implications of the struggle for Alfred Dreyfus’s 
rehabilitation and lament the “fact” that there is little or nothing to say about his personality.
67 Romain Rolland speaking of Russian revolutionaries but giving a sense of the matrix in which 
the affair was fought out in France: “It is not treachery so much as versatility, and it is thoroughly 
disinterested. There are so many men of action to whom action is a theater into which they bring 
their talents as comedians, quite honestly prepared at any moment to change their part!” (Jean 




My book Is a Midrash
Midrash, as “witty” poetry, possesses malleability not avail-
able with doctrinaire teachings in the realm of Jewish law 
(halakhah). For this reason it is a suitable candidate for the 
kind of liberal and ambiguous usage Maimonides employs in 
the labyrinthine undertaking that constitutes the Guide of 
the Perplexed.
—James Arthur Diamond68
The way in which I midrash this study of Dreyfus is in truth four dif-
ferent ways, some overlapping, some alternating, some conflated, and 
some hinted at. While it is evident from previous discussions of what 
a traditional Jewish midrash was and how it works as a generic, episte-
mological tool, my own performance in this book about Alfred Dreyfus 
and the Dreyfus Affair is more restricted and is also modified to meet 
with the particular circumstances prevalent at the historical period of 
the captain’s and the French nation’s ordeal, as well as with the nature of 
the crises through which we went in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, a hundred years later.
These midrashing techniques will be applied to the following kinds of 
texts: (a) books, letters, journals, memoirs, and essays by Alfred Dreyfus, 
other members of his family, and close associates or participants in the 
affair; (b) documents referred to, hinted at, or implicit in the writings 
of Alfred Dreyfus and Marcel Proust and other authors and artists who 
took aspects of the affair as major or minor subjects of their work; (c) 
historians, reporters, and analysts of the affair, especially those within 
the first ten to twenty years of its occurring—that is, from about 1894 
to 1924; and (d) books, articles, essays, and other works by and about 
the anti-Semitists involved in or inspired by the affair.
First, the texts of written documents and the articulated memories 
of events are described in and of themselves. The exercise involves a se-
ries of close, etymological and cultural studies of the words, references, 
allusions, and echoes in the texts written by Dreyfus and his support-
ers. Words and phrases have to be seen not only in the specific contexts 
68 Diamond, Maimonides and the Hermeneutics of Concealment, 3.
——————————— 3. The Myth of the Unthinkable and the Impossible ———————————
 
— 77 —
of their normal usage by these writers and their contemporaries, but 
also in wider and deeper contexts, so that implications and significance 
can be ascertained. They also have to be measured in their literal and 
figurative senses, perceived in patterns—what words they are normal-
ly associated with, and what words they stand related to as antonyms 
and variants in regard to tone, nuance, and hint. Thus, what may seem 
like casual, passing, or insignificant words and phrases can be charged 
with an electrical or magnetic energy that reconfigures the texts we are 
studying and hence the dramatization, memorial quality, and probative 
value of the man, the milieu, and the mentality of Alfred Dreyfus.
Next the study approaches the relationship of text to countertext 
(where there are two or more competing versions of the same supposed 
reality or subjective experiences), text to antitext (where the validation 
of one text does more than undermine the truth content in full or in part 
of its competitors but designates a different sort of reality that excludes 
the reality of the others by sheer rhetorical force, political censorship, or 
some deeper epistemological technique), or text and nontext (where the 
power of one textual experience invalidates, undermines, and consumes 
to the point of obliterating the memory, traces, and conceptual space of 
the others). Juxtapositions of these kinds of textual networks are made 
using the range of documents and authors mentioned by and comment-
ed upon by Dreyfus and his supporters. At first sight, many of these 
juxtapositions seem outrageous and far-fetched, but as we explore their 
analogies, often by intricate and witty discussions, aspects of the mean-
ings not fully appreciated or even missed out upon completely should 
begin to surface and register in light of the larger picture emerging in 
this book. It is in this way that this book forces the reader to examine 
from new angles, new filters, and new measuring devices the matrix of 
the man and the affair.
Third, rather than setting two or more texts next to one another in 
order to see what is precipitated, crystallized, or destroyed by the epis-
temological phenomenon, we attempt a series of new contextualiza-
tions of passages and events from the books and authors mentioned 
by Dreyfus and his supporters. Much like the juxtapositions, the relo-
cation brings new angles of appreciation and unexpected perspectives 
into focus, even creating paradigms of connectivity, analogy, and con-
trast that illuminate the pictures and arguments in the text. Normal, 




are thus challenged by the new angles of vision, the new connectivities 
established, and the annihilation of previously assumed relationships 
and historical signs.
Most radical and shocking of all will be the fourth midrashic mode, 
which is a series of rhetorical conversations that undermine the ap-
parent conventional integrity of the texts, especially the discourses of 
scholarship—history, psychology, and philosophy—in order to develop 
new perspectives. These dialogues may at times seem irrelevant, triv-
ial, or transgressive. Although they are indeed made up, they provide 
a number of tools to shatter entrenched truisms and unquestioned as-
sumptions about Dreyfus and the affair. Their value is therefore less in 
their literal development inside this book than in their probing, discom-
bobulating, and destabilizing faculties. They invite the historian and lit-
erary critic to participate in the formation of a more powerful conversa-
tion about the topics at the heart of this book.
A further word is also needed on what we mean by hints, oblique 
allusions, echoes, and similar techniques of inadequation. Alfred and 
Lucie Dreyfus, for instance, knew that when they wrote to each other, 
whatever they put into words in their letters would be subject to censor-
ship, but they only learned through harsh experience what the conse-
quences of mistakes, casual or unconscious, would be, and hence need-
ed to work out—without direct communication and certainly without 
having previously agreed upon codes, signals, and experience—various 
ways of reassuring one another, of their complete love, loyalty, and trust 
in one another. While their correspondence was not perfect and was 
often fraught with frustrations, in the long run, over the five years in 
which they sent epistles to one another, they reproduced, totally with-
out forethought or formal recognition, methods of writing that were 
firmly rooted in Jewish experience, particularly amongst those men and 
women caught up in contraptions such as the Inquisition. It is unlikely 
that either would have read books, such as Maimonides’s Guide of the 
Perplexed, in which much of this tradition was discussed and analysed, 
although Maimonides too composed his book using these techniques 
to exemplify exactly what this mode of hiding knowledge and teaching 
students would entail.
My argument, tentative as it must perforce be, is that Marcel Proust 
became aware of this way of writing through his family background—
the conversations he had and overheard with his mother, his grandfa-
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ther, and their Jewish friends—and the books he read as he moved from 
preparatory short stories towards his major novel; and if Proust could 
absorb and modulate these techniques in the same period as the Drey-
fus Affair was unfolding, so too could the Dreyfuses have become aware 
of them, albeit through less systematic means—partly from Lucie’s par-
ents and relatives, who were more attached to Jewish traditions than 
her husband’s family and friends, and partly from hints he had picked 
up but not needed to think about before the shock of his arrest and the 
nightmare of his imprisonment.
This knowledge and skill in Dreyfus cannot be traced to specific mo-
ments or texts in his experience, however, and we are left with only two 
modes of proof: one is in the fact of what he did write in concord with 
Lucie—in other words, the proof is in the pudding; and the other is in 
the similarities between what this couple did in their letters and what 
the husband wrote alone in his notebooks, workbooks, and journals, 
and what Maimonides recommended and hundreds of Marrano, Cryp-
to-Jewish, and Sephardic individuals and families did over the course of 
more than four hundred years when they had to keep their true iden-
tities a secret from church spies, inquisitorial officials, and suspicious 
relatives, friends, and neighbours. That these techniques were more or 
less suspected, if not always exposed and confirmed, can be seen in the 
responses of non-Jewish commentators, not least of whom were the 
prison guards and administrators who observed Dreyfus in captivity, 
searched his writings for criminal ideas, and reported regularly to their 
political masters in Paris.
I thus justify my own way of writing this book on the grounds that it 
is only by such imitation that the reader can properly grasp the phenom-
ena we are studying and, even more, that it is only through this shat-
tering of literary and scholarly conventions that the truth of Dreyfus’s 
experience and the meaning of the affair can be understood, and thus, 
justice in a Jewish sense served.
In each of these four midrashings, but especially the second and third 
modalities, I will put into play the words, images, themes, and concep-
tions of anti-Semitism. Although usually dismissed as delusionary rav-
ings or deliberate distortions of historical reality, such discourses and 
imaginations nevertheless are valuable both as markers of the hateful 
currents of the times, at times only partly audible or visible to the main 




and feelings, as well as of seeing and articulating the existential truths of 
private and collective experiences—fears, anxieties, hopes, aspirations, 
desires, and so on. We show in this book that not all opponents of Drey-
fus were raving maniacs or fanatics; many were intellectuals, and indeed 
some were themselves Jewish, or at least claimed Jewish relatives in 
their close family histories, formed part of the educated, professional 
elite, and were sometimes recognized leaders in the arts, sciences, and 
political movements of their time, and in most other ways of speaking, 
writing, and picturing the world were quite sane, perceptive, and sensi-
tive. The manifestation of Judeophobia—something that also could be 
measured at various degrees of intensity at various stages of their lives 
or in different social or political venues—does, therefore, form part of 
the complex existential reality of the period.
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Chapter Two: Bodies of Evidence
ParT 1: an OrChEsTraTEd LiTany Of LiEs1
A crowd scarcely distinguishes between the subjective and 
the objective. It accepts as real the images evoked in the 
mind, though they most often have only a very distant rela-
tion with the observed fact.
—Gustave Le Bon2
The whole Dreyfus Affair can, from one perspective, be seen as a long 
debate about the nature of evidence and thus about real and false docu-
ments, shredded papers glued together, and forgeries, interfered-with 
letters, secret and nonexistent pieces of paper, handwriting experts, and 
discrediting of testimony—about what does and what does not consti-
tute the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. From another 
perspective, sometimes that of hindsight and sometimes that of denial 
and wilful self-blindness and -deafness, it is about anti-Semitism, about 
the way the prosecutors in the drawn-out controversy do all they can to 
prove Dreyfus the Jew guilty because Jews must by virtue of their being 
Jews be traitors and liars. Most of the Dreyfusards do all they can to 
avoid dealing with this issue of anti-Semitism and to claim instead that 
the affair is about truth and justice, about the honour of individuals and 
1  Justice Peter Mahon, Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Erebus Disaster (27 April 1981), examining 
the cover-ups used to protect Air New Zealand from full responsibility for the crash of a chartered 
tourist flight over Antarctica. As in the Dreyfus Affair, the arrogance of power came fully into play 
in a conspiracy of silence, duplicity, and pressure from both the New Zealand government and 
its national airlines. Amidst the claims and counterclaims, there were denials, calls for further 
investigations, and resignations. For instance, “Air New Zealand asked for their judicial review 
of the Inquiry’s allegations and findings to be heard in the Court of Appeal rather than the High 
Court. Their request was initially rejected, but later accepted because of ‘the magnitude of the 
disaster,’ ‘the public importance of the issues’ and ‘the conduct of an inquiry held by a high court 
judge.’” Similarly, “Justice Mahon resigned from the bench of the High Court in January 1982.” 
See, for instance, “Court action following Erebus disaster inquiry: Cabinet accepts Judge Mahon’s 
resignation,” online at http://NZHistory.net.nz/media/photo/ongoing-debate-about-erebus-
disaster (seen 21 October 2010).
2 Le Bon, The Crowd, 41.
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the honour of the republic, the army, and the church.3 Some people on 
both sides, perhaps exhausted by those arguments, when it came time 
to fight for Dreyfus’s rehabilitation, decided the honour of the army and 
the security of the republic were more important than the honour or 
welfare of a single man, so that it did not matter at all whether he were 
guilty or innocent—due to expediency and reasons of state.
The more we examine the body of evidence adduced during the two 
courts martial against Alfred Dreyfus, the more it appears that Peter 
Mahon’s expression is an apt way to describe the whole Dreyfus Affair: 
an orchestrated litany of lies. Almost all the books dealing with the af-
fair are concerned with political and judicial questions, about the truth 
content of various documents and testimonies.4 This book is also about 
evidence in a larger sense; about the nature of documents, testimony, 
and thus truth that can be articulated in a court of law and in the public 
media—that is, about the ways in which lawyers and judges, newspaper 
reporters and editors, construct illusions of truth in their arguments 
and, consequently, about the ways in which such spoken and written 
speeches are heard and understood by juries, other agents of the judicial 
and political systems, the readers of newspapers, and the spectators at 
various modes of conveying secondary reproductions of the courtroom 
drama on the stage, in films, printed on postcards, modelled into wax 
museums—in brief: a whole industry of propaganda developing at the 
time of the Dreyfus Affair.
Still another kind of evidence comes into focus in this book about Al-
fred Dreyfus, the man and the milieu, and the mentality and the midrash, 
for this study I have undertaken is not an attempt at biography or social 
history. It is primarily an examination of the surviving texts, especially 
those written at various times and under various conditions in his life 
during and after the affair by Alfred Dreyfus himself and by his wife. The 
examination uses the techniques of the history of mentalities and psy-
chohistory but is not strictly or exclusively an exercise in either of those 
disciplines. I also examine Dreyfus’s letters, journals, carnets, and cahiers 
3 Romain Rolland: “Christophe asked Olivier: ‘You have been lifted to the stars and hurled down to 
the depths of hell by your Dreyfus affair. Where is the poet in whose soul the height and depth of 
it were felt?’” (Jean Christophe, vol. II, 325).
4 Edmond Jabès wrote in Du Désert au livre (Paris: Belfond, 1980): “Le Juif ne se pose pas seulement 
des questions; il est lui-même devenu question” (The Jew not only asks questions; he himself becomes 
a question) cited by Ouaknin, Le livre brûlé, 262, n. 9.
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as though they were texts of midrash and the midrashing of experience in 
themselves, and at the same time, I conduct the examination as though I 
were myself writing a midrash on Alfred Dreyfus.
In this last kind of study, there are three constitutive bodies of evi-
dence that were composed by Captain Dreyfus during his years of im-
prisonment, exile, and forced isolation and silence and the twelve years 
that followed, during which he fought for his complete exoneration and 
the restoration of his good name. First, there are the personal letters, 
written between Alfred and Lucie Dreyfus for the most part, although 
there are occasional epistles between Alfred and his brother and the 
close allies he knew about before he was packed off into the oblivion of 
the French prison islands off the coast of northeastern South America. 
These letters shade off into printed collections, including edited versions 
of the original epistles, introductory remarks by the intimate parties, 
their relatives, their political supporters, and eventually academic stu-
dents of the affair. Second, Alfred also kept workbooks or cahiers while 
he was in prison and journalistic notebooks or carnets during the second 
phase of his struggle when he returned to France.
As we shall see, he seems never to have intended the cahiers for any-
one to see but himself, and actually destroyed at least half of them 
himself; they are remarkable therefore for two reasons: (a) because 
they are physical imprints of his experiences in isolation over an ex-
tended period of time; and (b) because they were read and reported 
on by his prison guards and political officials back in Paris. Third, the 
journals are evidence of a somewhat different kind, although they form 
an edited version of his feelings and opinions during the period of time 
they were written and, as reflected in later years, they can be seen as 
much more than a running record of his daily affairs, his immediate 
thoughts concerning the fight to rehabilitate his name after the second 
court-martial in Rennes, and the pardon he felt forced to accept be-
cause of his frail physical and psychological condition, along with cop-
ies of letters and conversations he and others had in that long period 
from 1899 to 1906.
Twelve years of Lost Time
Cette animosité se dissimulait communément et cependant 
le juif intelligent la perçoit. Il sent une résistance devant lui, 
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il a l’impression d’un mur que des adversaires ont dressé en-
tre lui et ceux au milieu desquels il vit.
—Bernard Lazare5
In most of their lives before the affair and especially the five years of 
their marriage prior to that fateful Saturday morning in 1894, Lucie and 
Alfred Dreyfus pretended to themselves that they were assimilated, part 
of French society, and that anti-Semitism was something that did not 
impinge on their lives.6 They refused to see the wall that had been set up 
between them and the rest of society, and when it was too late, they lost 
five years of their lives trying to find a way to dismantle that wall to free 
Alfred, and another seven to get him rehabilitated. Or so it would seem.7 
This book makes a somewhat different point. I argue that for the hor-
rors of the incarceration, the shame of imprisonment, and the tortures, 
physical and psychological, that the couple endured, the wall never really 
came down. Yet, because of the false accusations, the judicial errors, the 
forgeries, and the purged testimonies, Alfred and Lucie in their letters 
to one another and in the journals that Alfred kept created something 
very important, and discovered and invented new aspects in themselves 
and their relationship. To a certain very limited degree, Lucie was able to 
start drawing out the reticent and shy young man who courted and then 
married her. As Michael Burns puts it, commenting on the first letters 
5 “This animosity usually dissimulates itself and yet the intelligent Jew sees it. He senses a resistance 
before him, he has the impression of a wall that his adversaries have constructed between himself 
and those others in among whom he lives”: Bernard Lazare, “Le nouveau ghetto,” La Justice (17 
November 1894), cited in Bloch-Dano, Madame Proust, 302.
6 As Eveylne Bloch-Dano says of Jeanne Proust, Marcel’s mother, “Comme des parents, elle est et 
restera une israélit, parfaitement intégrée à la société qui, autrefois accueillit ses ancêtres” (Like her 
relatives she was and would remain an Israelite, perfectly integrated into the society which formerly 
had welcomes her ancestors), Madame Proust, 21. Jeanne never converted, and her husband, Dr. 
Adrien Proust, never demanded that she do so; the family Marcel grew up in what was nominally a 
Christian household, but he freely visited with his Jewish relatives and felt, particularly at the time 
of the Dreyfus Affair, a loyalty to the Jews (29). Like the Dreyfus family, the Weils had come from 
Alsace (32), but they had not only enriched themselves in Paris; as we see in Jeanne’s life, they 
intermarried with the Christian political, professional, and intellectual elite (38), whereas Alfred 
and Lucie’s background was more restricted to the comfortable manufacturing and professional 
Jewish community. Thanks to the affair, however, their two children, Pierre and Jeanne, moved 
into the circle of intellectuals, such as the Reinach brothers.
7 That even supposedly tolerant Frenchmen and women, supposedly supporters of the wrongly 
accused Dreyfus, could harbor anti-Semitic prejudices may be seen in regard, for instance, to 
Emile Zola’s wife, who noted the predominance of Jews on the stock market and considered many 
professions as specifically Jewish (Bloch-Dano, Madame Proust, 60). Later in this book, I shall 
discuss different kinds and degrees of Judeophobia and their implications.
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Alfred wrote to his intended while on manoeuvres:
Lucie discovered her fiancé’s mercurial moods, the 
abrupt shifts from lighthearted descriptions of standing 
watch on a frigid night with a horse whose whole pur-
pose in life was “to return to the stable” to his obsession 
with work and a relentless perfectionism that made him 
appear selfish and insensitive. He admitted that it had 
always been difficult for him to share his private feel-
ings, to “open up,” and he agreed that Lucie had a right 
to know more about the man to whom she was “entrust-
ing” her life.8
Foreshadowing the way they would learn to communicate in a kind 
of group therapeutical dialogue, Alfred responds to her questions and 
challenges, perhaps most of them implied by his own imagining of how 
she must see his flaws rather than actually present in her own cautious 
address to the older man she was soon to marry.
He would try to express himself and to break his “dis-
astrous habit: of taking everything seriously. But he 
pleaded with her not to interpret his reserved manner 
as insensitivity: “Surface insensitivity . . . I grant you,” 
he wrote, using the vous, the formal address of a proper 
young suitor. “The real thing, no!” “I hope you’ll come to 
realize,” he added, “that however retiring I may be, I love 
you deeply.”9
Then, a year later, in the spring of 1890, using one of those most 
prescient figures of speech that we will have to come back to deal with 
in the next volume, where we shall discuss Dreyfus’s place in the artistic 
culture of the late nineteenth century, he tells Lucie,
For two instruments to produce a harmonious sound to-
8 Burns, Dreyfus: A Family Affair, 83. It is a further frustration to realize that there are so many 
letters written between Lucie and Alfred from before his imprisonment that have yet to be 
transcribed, edited, and published.
9 Burns, Dreyfus: A Family Affair, 83.
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gether, they must be in tune, as in music. In physics, it’s 
called “synchronic vibrations.”10
There is no complete edition of all the letters written between Alfred 
and Lucie Dreyfus nor between Alfred and other members of his fam-
ily and allies before or during his period of imprisonment, and none 
between Lucie and her family, friends, and government officials. Each 
book containing letters has a different, overlapping selection, and each 
is set in a different context with its own polemical or scholarly purpose. 
Nevertheless, given these constraints, I believe it is possible to analyze 
these letters and to draw a number of—one need not say preliminary 
but at least new kinds of—conclusions about the husband and the wife 
and their relationship to each other during the five years of separation 
between 1894 and 1899.
In 1901, already back in France and now pardoned, Dreyfus pub-
lished Cinq années de ma vie,11 a book dedicated to his children, in which 
he sets forth his ordeal as an unjustifiably accused and condemned 
Frenchman in order to establish his ethical (moral) credentials, seeks 
to evoke sympathy from any in the not-yet-convinced general pub-
lic ready to support his cause, and appeals to his allies for their help 
in gaining full rehabilitation of his honour and rank. The letters are 
meshed into a text that includes an apologetic account of his life and 
the polemical argument for his innocence. At no point does he plead 
for mercy or pity, call attention to himself as an object of anti-Semitic 
prejudice, or cast aspersions on the army, the government, or the na-
tion. What he does say is that he suffers physically and morally and has 
to make a special effort to avoid sliding into the depths of despair. He 
draws pictures of the island prison where he was sent into exile12 and 
the hut, with its palisade blocking the sea, which kept him in solitary 
confinement and under the constant surveillance of guards who were 
under strict orders not to communicate with him.13 This regimen of 
silence and isolation, along with poor food, sanitary conditions, and 
10 Burns, Dreyfus: A Family Affair, 83.
11 Alfred Dreyfus, Cinq années de ma vie (1894–1899), with an introductory essay by Pierre Vidal-
Naquet and an afterward by Jean-Louis Lévy (Paris: Editions la Découverte, 1994; this edition 
first published by Editions Francois Maspero, 1982).
12 Cinq années de ma vie, 100.
13 Cinq années de ma vie, 102.
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insalubrious weather, increasingly wore him down.
He also inserts a journal that he kept for the first two years (1895 
and 1896) to be sent eventually to his wife Lucie. Thus we know that 
on Sunday, 14 April, 1895, he wrote: “Je commence aujourd’hui le journal 
de ma triste et épouvantable vie” (Today I begin the journal of my sad 
and horrible life).14 What he is concerned with is the tediousness and 
discomfort of his life in exile, his silence which keeps him at best in con-
versation with himself, and the failure of letters to arrive, the paucity of 
paper with which to write, and the lack of reading material.
Several little points come up, however, that seem to test his Jewish 
character and tastes. One, which Dreyfus makes no especial note of, is 
the fact that he was called in to confront the charge of treason on 13 
October, 1894, barely two weeks after beginning his service in the Sta-
tistics Department (i.e., Intelligence Bureau) of the army in Paris; that 
day was a Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, or shabat.15 Although he as an 
assimilated Jew may have normally worked on this holy day, his accus-
ers would have been aware of the irony—and the deliberate insult they 
were paying to this unwanted Semite in their midst. Dreyfus, however, 
does not react.
Day by day, week by week, Dreyfus notes in his prison journal and 
in his letters to Lucie sketchy, vague details of his feelings, very little 
of what is actually happening—there is no narrative in his life to be re-
corded—and, at most, only tantalizing hints of what he thinks about.16 
At times, both Alfred and Lucie refer to the ordeal as martyrdom or a 
calvary, using these very Christian reference words in a general, secular-
ized form.17 “Days are lugubrious. Everything is forbidden to me, the 
perpetual tête-à-tête with my own thoughts” (8 March, 1896).18 He finds 
14 Cinq années de ma vie, 103.
15 Cinq années de ma vie, page 51 at the start of his chapter 2.
16 It will be evident soon enough how the writing of such hints (remez, as the rabbis call them) are 
important, especially when they appear on the page inadvertently.
17 Or at least in a neutral sense. Ambiguity occasionally creeps in, though, as when Lucie reports that 
she and the children have gone to her family for dinner at Pâques, a term normally used for the 
Christian celebration of Easter, sometimes for Passover, but then usually presented as “the Jewish 
Pâcque” in the singular. Because it is more than likely that the family gathered for a Passover 
seder, not a vague and indeterminate Easter-holiday meal, those historians who translate the 
expression as “Passover meal” are correct up to a point, the point being that Lucie, like Alfred, 
aware of censorship, sought to avoid any direct indications of their Jewishness. Much later, Lucie 
makes reference to the eight days of Hanukkah, with the children happy as kings and excited with 
their presents (Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 393).
18 “Journées lugubres. Tout m’est interdit, le tête-à-tête perpétuel avec mes pensées” Dreyfus, Cinq années, 
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himself crystallized in his own pains.19 He suffers from nerves all night.20 
“A horrible night of fever and delirium.”21 These are not imaginary pains 
and anxieties: “I was put into irons last night! Why? I don’t know why 
. . . . How can I not go mad through such long atrocious nights?”22 He 
even draws a picture of the double manacles used to shackle him in the 
bed at night.23 Only much later will Dreyfus find out the reason for this 
extra act of cruelty against him: in a ploy to force the issue of his wrong-
ful imprisonment to the fore, Alfred’s brother Mathieu arranged for a 
Welsh newspaper to report an attempted escape from Devil’s Island, and 
when this false news reached France and the anti-Semitic press picked 
it up, the government reacted by imposing new conditions on Alfred’s 
treatment in exile.24
Along the way, no matter what other matter he may write about in 
both the journals and the letters, Dreyfus complains of books and news-
papers not reaching him or arriving very late, long after Lucie tells him 
that she had posted them to him. Most of the time, note, it is Lucie who 
chooses the titles, based on general hints given by Alfred, but also, as we 
have earlier suggested, titles selected from her knowledge of his tastes 
and interests and also probably on the shared conversations conducted 
in the first happy years of their marriage and courtship. In a supplement 
to his letter dated 12 September, 1896, Alfred recalls fireside chats with 
Lucie in the happier days of their marriage:
Je viens to causer encore, comme dans cet heureux temps, hé-
las déjà lointain, où nous bavardions tranquillement au coin 
de notre feu, en regardant jouer sur le tapis nos chers petits 
amours, nos enfants.25
149.
19 1 September 1896: “Je suis comme cristallisé dans ma douleur . . .” Cinq années de ma vie, 152.
20 2 September 1896: “Les nerfs m’ont fait horriblement souffrir toute la nuit . . .” Cinq années de ma vie, 
152. 
21 3 September 1896: “Nuit horrible de fièvre et de délire” Cinq années de ma vie, 153.
22 7 September 1896: “J’ ai été mis aux fers hier au soir! Pourquoi? Je l’ignore . . . . Comment ne suis-he pas 
devenu fou dans la longueur de cette nuit atroce?” Cinq années de ma vie, 155.
23 Cinq années de ma vie, 159.
24 A reader of this paragraph in manuscript shouted in anger and frustration, “Why on earth was 
Mathieu meddling in such a way? Couldn’t he have imagined the consequences?” Alas, no he 
couldn’t have. This was another failure of the imagination, another miscalculation in the strategy, 
driven by its own frustrations and rage.
25 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 315.
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I have just been speaking to you again, as in that happy 
time, alas so far distant, when we would chat peacefully 
in the corner by the fire, looking at our dear loves, our 
children, playing on the carpet.
A sentimental picture, to be sure, yet an idealized image of what 
must actually have been their custom at home. This is the time26 when 
they could share feelings and ideas and thus lay the groundwork for the 
structure of the new kind of relationship and new kind of domestic lan-
guage they would have to construct during the long ordeal ahead.27 Al-
fred catches a hint of that preliminary labour in the same letter when he 
tells his wife, using long, involved syntax,
Vois-tu, chère Lucie, nous avons été tellement accablés par 
cet affreux destin—oh! l’affreux destin—oh! si horrible que 
l’on se demande à chaque instant comment nos cerveaux ont 
pu y résister—puis nous avons continué à nous entretenir 
de nos souffrances, de toutes nos douleurs, ne pouvant 28. . .
Don’t you see, dear Lucie, that we have been so crushed 
by this frightful destiny—oh! So horrible that we have 
to ask ourselves at every instant how our brains could 
be able to resist it—then we have carried on our mutual 
support through our sufferings, all our pains, only being 
able . . .
26 On time in Jewish thought, see Ouaknin, Le livre brûlé, 120.
27 Conversation in rabbinical writings involves mutual questions and answers, challenges, probing, 
and revelations through exploration of what one’s master and student or between the study 
partners: what one asks and what one says in reply is never wrong but always in the process of 
becoming a part of the chain of a self-correcting and expanding tradition; this is called mahloquet, 
and as modern commentators like Ouaknin and Faur write, it creates an open dialectic. These, 
however, are not the set-piece dialogues between Socrates (Plato’s master and his docile 
interlocutors who quickly accede to his higher wisdom and declare, “We knew nothing; we do not 
know what we are talking about.” Above all, says Ouaknin, mahloquet “est une façon de dire et de 
penser le réfus de la synthèse et du système; antidogmatisme qui, seul, rend possible une vérité vivante” 
(is a way of speaking and thinking the refusal of synthesis and system; an anti-dogmatism which 
alone makes possible a living truth), Le livre brûlé, 134.
28 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 315.
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These internal conversations in his mind are not only with himself 
but also, through his imagination, and through the force of mutual wills, 
in an imaginary space of textual union, for he speaks not only of his 
own cogitations but as though Lucie were also really and truly a party 
to these mental discussions and to the emotional and spiritual support 
they produce. But as the sentence meanders and the syntax falters,29 
Alfred begins to think that there is more to the case against him than 
merely an error of judgement by the courts, the military, and the gov-
ernment, something he cannot bring himself to say,30 even to Lucie.
Que nos cœurs se sont aigris, à notre insu, malgré nous, et 
au lieu de ne penser qu’à une chose, ne voir qu’une chose, 
déchiffrer, faire déchiffrer le mystère de cet effroyable drame, 
au fur et à mesure que le temps passait, sans en amener 
l’êclairissement, nous avons fini par accuser d’un nouveau 
vouloir, veux mêmes qui font peut-être ce qu’ils peuvent pour 
cela . . . et à ce système, tout finirait par se délabrer en nous, 
et il ne faut pas, chérie, il faut voir plus haut.31
[So that only] our hearts are irritated, without our real-
izing it, despite ourselves, and instead of thinking of one 
thing only, of only seeing one thing, to decipher, [and] 
are led to this frightful drama [being] deciphered, more 
or less, as the time passes, without leading to any en-
lightenment, we finish by blaming even those who per-
haps can wish for that . . . ill will and at this system, all 
will finish by falling apart on us, and this must not hap-
pen, darling, we must look higher.
29 According to Oaknin, “Dans la phrase hébraïque les mots ne sont pas subordonnées les uns aux 
autres par une logique grammaticale ou autre, ils ‘coexistent’, les uns auprès des autres et peuvent 
à [tout] l’instant signifier en dehors de leurs contextes ou être déplacé dans un autre contexte, 
tout en gardant les sens du premier contexte” (In a Hebrew phrase words are not subordinated to 
each other in one grammatical logic or another; they ‘coexist’ one alongside the other and may at 
any moment signify outside of their contexts or be displaced into another context, all the while 
keeping the sense of their first context), Le livre brûlé, 145. I do not mean that either Alfred or 
Lucie mean to write like this but that their education at its most basic level, in which the modalities 
of language are formed, slip into such constructs under sustained crisis conditions.
30 Not only is it difficult for him to conceive of these things, he finds it difficult, as we can see here in 
the confusing syntax, to put down in words.
31 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 315.
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Thus, what began with a sentimental scene of domestic bliss reaches 
its conclusion in a despondent picture of moral collapse, and a fright-
ful prospect of something he wants Lucie to reject with him by turning 
their inner gaze towards heaven—the scene of the infernal phantasma-
goria projecting the worst anti-Semitic images over all of France.32 Most 
of the time, however, at least in the letters and notebooks that have 
survived—or have been allowed to survive—Dreyfus maintains his ap-
pearance, keeps wearing the face of the loyal officer, and keeps the faith 
to Lucie, his muse and starlike guardian. The illusion he wants to hold 
on to is of their shared dreams and aspirations and of their mutual con-
cern for each other and for the honour of their children.
After 1896, Lucie was told she could no longer pick and send books 
and magazines to her husband, but must instead remit funds for him 
to use to make his own orders through the penal system in French Guy-
ana.33 It would seem that this new policy served several purposes: first, 
it takes away from Lucie the opportunity to do something practical on 
behalf of Alfred, which like the actual tactile possession of letters writ-
ten in the hand of each of the couple was interfered with to cause emo-
tional distress; second, the authorities may have believed in their bigot-
ry that Lucie’s choice of books was some form of code, part of a Jewish, 
mystical conspiracy; and third, by channelling the book orders through 
the officials of the prison and colonial systems, these agents thought to 
add another layer of censorship over what the prisoner would be able 
to read. Only in the retrospective calm of his explanatory essays of Five 
Years of my Life does Dreyfus begin to name the specific titles. In chapter 
VIII, he outlines his programme of readings:
32 Romain Rolland, speaking of a M. Félix Weil: “He flung out ideas and created lines of thought: he 
would set great intellectual machines working, and would immediately grow disgusted with them. 
More than once he had scandalized people, who had been converted to a cause by his arguments, 
by producing the most incisive and discouraging criticism of the cause itself” (Jean Christophe, vol. 
II, 351).
33 18 July 1896: “J’ai regret, mon chéri, de n’avoir plus la liberté de t’envoyer des livres. M. le ministre m’a 
fait savoir que tu étais autorisé dorénavant à faire toi-même ton choix” (I regret, my darling, that I am 
no longer at liberty to send you books. The Minister has let me know that you are authorized from 
now on to make your own choices) Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 307. This, of course, 
is a horrible, cynical joke played by the authorities. He was no more to do anything like ordering 
books than strolling around the compound to look at the sea or observe the flowers growing on 
the island.
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Ce fonds comprenait, outré un certain nombre de revues lit-
téraires et scientifiques, quelques livres de lecture courante, 
les Etudes sur la littérature contemporare de Schérer, 
l’Histoire de la littérature de Lanson, quelques oeuvres de 
Balzac, les Mémoires de Barras, la petite Critique de Janin, 
une Histoire de la peinture, l‘Histoire des Francs, les Ré-
cits des temps mérovingiens d’Augustin Thierry, les tomes 
VII et VIII de l‘Histoire générale du IVe siècle jusqu’à nos 
jours de Lavisse et Rambaud, les Essais de Montaigne, et 
surtout les oeuvres de Shakespeare.34
Many of these titles and authors are commented upon in the cahiers 
of Devil’s Island, while the others are hinted at by vague allusion. These 
books named here consist mostly of school texts, anthologies, and 
general introductions to history, literature, and painting. In a letter of 
11 June, 1895, Alfred writes to Lucie about several magazines he has 
been able to obtain: “On me remet la Revue des Deux-Mondes, la Revue 
de Paris et la Revue Rose,” and then adds the wish that she send him 
“quelques romans de lecture facile” (some easy-to-read novels).35 It would 
be wonderful to know what he meant by this and what titles and au-
thors she may have sent to him. Duclert claims that Alfred was allowed 
to receive twenty books each trimester, so that over the five-year pe-
riod he might—had the jailers so permitted—have had access to at least 
three hundred titles.36 The wide range of titles and writers in the cahiers 
indicates, as we shall see when we discuss the kind of intellectual he 
was, that Dreyfus not only read more extensively than he hints here but 
that he wished to read more extensively still. It is important to recall 
that for the first few years Lucie chose the books to send him, and that 
34 Cinq années de ma vie, 165–166. “This collection consists of a certain number of literary and 
scientific journals, some books of current reading, some of [Edmund Henri Adolphe] Schérer’s 
[1815-1889] Studies on Contemporary Literature (1886). Lanson’s History of Literature, some works 
by Balzac, the Memoirs [1896] of [Paul, vicomte de] Barras [1755-1829] , [Jules Gabriel] Janin’s 
(1804-1874) Brief Critique (1886), a History of Painting, a History of the Franks, [Jacques Nicolas] 
Augustin Thierry’s [1795-1856] Tales of Merovingian Times (1840). [Ernest] Lavisse and [Alfred 
Nicolas] Rambaud’s [1842-1905] [Volumes VII and VIII of General History of the Fourth Century 
to Our Own Times (12 vols. 1893-1901)], [Michel de] Montaigne’s [1533-1592] Essays [ed. 1877], 
and above all the Works of Shakespeare.”
35 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 245.
36 Duclert, V, 1896, “La detention, la double-boucle, l‘enfermement,” Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi 
longuement, 283.
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afterwards when the packets ceased to arrive Alfred drew more deeply 
from his memory. The complaints he makes show that many—most?—
of what he hoped to receive never arrived at all. It is also likely that 
many of the authors, titles, and topics discoursed upon derived from 
memories of school study (from lycée through military college) and fam-
ily discussions. Of Shakespeare, Dreyfus adds, “I had never understood 
this great writer so well as during this tragic period [of my own life]. I 
read and re-read him. Hamlet and King Lear appeared to me in all their 
dramatic power.”37
Another list mentioned by Vincent Duclert is one of various jour-
nals, letters, and other papers supposedly returned to Dreyfus in 1900 
after much effort, including most surprisingly: “4 Bibles, 2 Nouveau Tes-
tament, 3 paquets contenant des brochures de Sermons.”38 The unexpected 
biblical material and sermons suggests, however, that these papers were 
not part of Dreyfus’s personal readings during his stay on Devil’s Island 
but materials sent to him by Christian missionary groups. This may 
have been normal for all prisoners, but for Dreyfus, such conversionary 
brochures and New Testaments would have seemed like gross insults, 
something confirmed by their absence from the captain’s own list in his 
publications. Another document mentioned by Duclert but not found 
elsewhere is “un cahier iconographique,”39 mysterious because all of the 
surviving cahiers contain large numbers of the doodles that could con-
ceivably be called iconographique, unless this is a reference to the one 
very early notebook discovered by Maxime Préaud in Colonial Museum 
in Aix-en-Provence and called the Cahier d’Aix.40 When we discuss Drey-
fus’s drawings in the next volume, we will examine the differences be-
tween these lost cahiers and the fifteen deposited by the captain in the 
Bibliothèque nationale. We will also consider in what sense these doo-
dles may be considered iconographic—that is, having symbolic mean-
ings individually and in clusters.
Interesting as the 1905 selection of letters and journal entries may 
37 “Je n’ai jamais aussi bien compris le grand écrivain que durant cette époque si tragique’ je le lus et relus; 
Hamlet et le roi Lear m’apparurent avec toute leur puissance dramatique” Cinq années de ma vie, 166.
38 Duclert, “Introduction,” Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement souvent, 55. This list is noted as 
coming from a Lettre du ministre des Colonies à Alfred Dreyfus, 20 octobre 1900 (CAOM, 133 MIOM 
5,” 55, n.3).
39 Duclert, “Introduction,” Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement souvent, p 58.
40 Maxime Préaud, “Variations à perpétuité” in Alfred Dreyfus, Cahiers de l’île du Diable, ed. Pierrette 
Turlais (Paris; Editions Artulis, 2009), 251–255, including several pages of photoreproductions.
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be in its own historical moment, since most of Lucie’s have been excised 
and Alfred’s own epistles carefully edited down, our emphasis now will 
be on the new edition of their mutual correspondence, because in this 
exchange over such a long period of time—although the latest editors 
have once again chosen not to put in all the letters, selecting mainly 
those by Lucie or Alfred that were stopped by the prison censors—be-
cause it is precisely in their repetitiousness and in their lack of direct 
coherence that many of the most interesting features of their individual 
personalities and of their mutual relationship are revealed.
The Souvenirs et correspondance41 of his father, selected, edited, and 
commented upon by Pierre Dreyfus in 1936, adds several more letters 
than are to be found in Cinq Années, Alfred now being dead and the 
whole affair becoming an historical memory rather than a burning cur-
rent issue. Divided into three sections, this new presentation of Alfred 
Dreyfus’s life, career, and writings, while somewhat fuller than that of 
the earlier book, still frustrates in many ways. To begin with, the first 
part, “La vie du Capitaine Dreyfus exposée par son fils, 1859–1899,” tells us 
virtually nothing about Pierre’s own recollections of his father, moth-
er, or family, either what he heard from his parents or other relatives 
or what he experienced as a child growing up in the midst of the affair 
and its aftermath.42 The second part, “Les souvenirs du Capitaine Drey-
fus 1899–1896,” is mostly a reproduction of Cinq Années. However, the 
third part, “Les dernières années 1906–1935,” brings in new information. 
The commentary that follows now concentrates, as does the rest of my 
book, not on the historical questions that still plague the student of the 
trials of Alfred Dreyfus and their impact on French society but on what 
these documents tell us about the man, his milieu, his mentality, and 
the midrash of his life.
In his Préface, Pierre Dreyfus (who never openly names himself ex-
cept by the initials PD) gives a quick sketch of his father’s personality, 
which I will gloss sentence by sentence:
41 P[ierre] D[reyfus], ed. Alfred Dreyfus, Souvenirs er correspondance, publié par son fils (Paris: Bernard 
Grasset, 1936).
42 Bloch-Dano: “La cohésion du groupe vient de ce temps où, à l’écart de la société de ses institutions, 
les Juifs n’avaient d’autres ressources que celles du groupe familial. Plus ce groupe était puissant, plus 
l’individu était protégé” (The cohesion of the group comes from a time when, kept apart from 
society and its institutions, Jews had no other resources than those of the family group. The more 
powerful was this group, the more the individual was protected) in Madame Proust, 105.
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Mon père qui, par nature, n’était pas d’un caractère très ex-
pansif, avait été marqué encore par cinq années de tortures 
et de solitude absolue et s’était concentrée sur lui-même.43
My father, who was not by nature a very expressive 
character, had been marked by five years of torture 
and absolute solitary confinement and had drawn into 
himself. 
By nature, that is, in essence, although as our discussions show, this 
quality of his personality is more complex than Pierre allows for and is 
partly a consequence of his upbringing as a Jewish refugee from Alsace 
separated from most of his family. These three qualities are significant 
in themselves and more intense through the conjunction in a young 
man suddenly subject to intense external pressures as the Jewish alien 
at a time of rising anti-Semitism, as well as being the deracinated youth 
growing up under tense personal and public pressures and perhaps also 
as the one male sibling brought up by older sisters when his brother 
was not. What did he do? He chose the most untypical profession for a 
Jew—a soldier; this was also the most masculine of professions, which 
that removed him from the female environment.
These choices, whether made freely or under family pressures, exac-
erbated his not very expansif character. The range of translations given 
for the word expansif includes communicative, demonstrative, exuberant, 
confident, frank, and open. In other words, from the range of antonyms, 
what his son Pierre says is that his father was reticent, reserved, and 
taciturn, although not timid or hesitant. Alfred Dreyfus was often per-
ceived to be cold, withdrawn, unfeeling, lacking in both inner grace and 
external poise—and was called later by unsympathetic witnesses “the 
zinc marionette.” I have suggested that this public perception, noted as 
much by friends and supporters of Alfred as by his political enemies, 
was a role of “delegated madman” in the Grand Guignol of the affair.44 
43 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 13.
44 It seems no accident that the theatre founded with this name to perform melodramatic horror 
shows should prove a success in Paris from 1897 on, the date of the height of the affair. Guignol had 
been the name of a popular local hand puppet in Lyons, and his name had become a common term 
for a type of fool who was involuntarily the object of ridicule because of his awkward movements 
and lack of social graces.
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These characteristics may have been exaggerated, as the son explains, 
by the tortures undergone by his father, but also brought out some very 
minor symptoms of autism in young Alfred.45
Il vivait une vie intérieure intense, mais ne savait plus guère 
extérioriser ses sentiments.46
He lived an intensely interior life, but he hardly knew 
how to externalize his feelings.
This intense interior life that Pierre points to should be understood 
as marking the thoughtful, intellectual side of Alfred Dreyfus, a designa-
tion of his profound strength in being able to withstand so many years 
of physical and psychological torture by being able to withdraw into a 
world of philosophical ideas and discursive memories. If he was not able 
to express his feelings openly in such a way as to win the approval of the 
great public or even to evoke sympathy in his accusers and judges, he 
could maintain his dignity, as indicated by his proud proclamation of his 
innocence over and over again, not least when he was marched through 
the troops assembled to watch his degradation in 1894 or when he held 
himself erect and silent in the face of the hostile second court-martial 
in Rennes in 1898.
Il avait perdu l’habitude de les exprimer, et comme par ail-
leurs il répugnait à se plaindre, à exposer en public ses souf-
frances, il paraissait très distant à ceux qui les connaissaient 
peu.47
He had lost the habit of expressing them, and yet how 
he loathed to complain about himself, or to expose his 
sufferings in public; he seemed very distant to those 
who barely knew him.
45 This form of posttraumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) will someday have to be discussed, not only as 
it helps explain Dreyfus’s behavior at the time of his arrest, trial, and condemnation, along with 
his lengthy period of imprisonment, exile, and isolation, but also the appearance he made upon 
his return to France and then his decision to retire from the army and lead a retired, private life.
46 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 13.
47 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 13.
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He had lost his customary ability to express his feelings, writes Pierre, 
assuming that prior to his arrest and condemnation, his father had been 
more normal in the demonstration of his sentiments; yet close read-
ing of the surviving documents, including those of friendly and bigoted 
prison officials, suggests that there were many moments, usually when 
he thought he was alone, or at least not under public scrutiny, when 
Alfred became enraged, threw himself against walls, and screamed in 
pain and frustration. Many of his letters also reveal a constant struggle 
to keep himself from losing all self-control, lapsing into wild tantrums, 
or falling into despondency and immobility. Alfred more than once 
writes to Lucie that she knows how fragile are his nerves and therefore 
how close to madness he has always felt himself to be. Aware too of the 
common slurs against Jews as nervous, weak, and timorous, Alfred has 
always done all he could to project a version of himself that is steady, 
strong, and brave. Almost never does he cry out in pain to anyone other 
than Lucie in what he hopes will be the privacy of their epistles, believ-
ing that showing such a reaction to his suffering will give comfort to his 
opponents and confirm in the eyes of the hostile public the unsuitability 
of a Jew to be a soldier-citizen of France. This is part of his honour, the 
duty he owes to the army and the republic, and the heritage he hands on 
to his children. However, Pierre knows that the coldness seen by those 
with little acquaintance with his father is not the true character of Al-
fred Dreyfus.
In his narrative of the accusation, arrest, and trial of his father, Pierre 
seems to pass over with barely a mention the most important factor, 
what he rightly—but without careful analysis of the words he uses and 
the phenomenon he refers to—“the virus of anti-Semitism,” the mon-
ster that bores within the body politic and there picks out its scapegoat, 
“the abhorred Jew.”48 He can cite a letter of 28 October, 1894, from Colo-
nel Joseph Henry to the anti-Semitic newspaper Libre Parole of Edouard 
Drumont announcing that “Tout Israël est en mouvement” (The whole of 
Israel is on the move)49 and yet not take it as more than a minor annoy-
ance, an incidental factor in the case against his father. These more neu-
48 “Le virus antisémite . . . . le Juif abhorré” Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 26.
49 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 31.
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trally termed “haines religieuses” (religious hatreds)50 do not seem to him 
to constitute the very essence of the case. He does not see that an actual 
crime has not been proved, or at least not one of such significance as 
to warrant the charges laid against his father. Like others in the family 
and inner circle of their friends, he cannot imagine why the investiga-
tion to find the German spy terminated when a Jew was found to play 
the necessary role of scapegoat, thus satisfying petty jealousies amongst 
junior officers and the prejudices of officials in the high command and 
the Ministry of War. In outlining his father’s life history, Pierre Dreyfus 
merely identifies Alfred as “of Israelite origins” (d’origine israëlite)51 and 
does not even do as much with Alfred’s chosen wife, “Mlle Hadamard, 
fille d’un négociant en diamants, et petite-fille du capitaine Hatzfeld, ancien 
élève de l’Ecole Polytechnique (promotion 1835).”52
Pierre, like his father, seems to assume that because religion is of 
minor importance in their lives—but this may not have been true for 
Lucie, as we shall see—it was not really important in the jealousies and 
arrogance roused by the affair.53 Not even when Pierre cites an openly 
anti-Semitic remark made by one of the group involved in organizing 
the conspiracy does it strike him that such a calumny might be the driv-
ing force of the whole case against his father. Yet that conspiracy was 
not planned out step by step over many years or months but was rather 
an ad hoc arrogant response to the opportunity of finding a scapegoat, 
and then the manipulations became more and more byzantine when 
the opposition by the family and friends of Dreyfus was observed to 
challenge the authority and credibility of the army and the government; 
each new step taken took on the colouring of the latent anti-Semitism 
in the persons and the institutions involved in the cover-up. How could 
the system have responded to the initial lies and errors?
50 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 34.
51 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 40.
52 “Miss Lucie Hadamard, daughter of a diamond merchant, and granddaughter of Captain Hatzfeld, 
former student of the Ecole Polytechnique (commissioned in 1835)” Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 42.
53 David and Louise Hadamard brought their daughter Lucie Eugénie up to be a good Jewish wife. 
Burns writes: “As tall as Alfred, with thick dark hair parted in the middle and pulled back with a 
bandeau to control her curls, and with brown eyes, broad shoulders, and a slim waistline made 
slimmer by the tight lacing of the day, Lucie [she was nineteen when she met Alfred] had been 
raised at her family’s country home at Châtou, near Paris.” The information available concerning 
her education is spare and tantalizing: “She may have attended the private Ecole Monceau where 
one of her sisters had been a student, but tutors and family members directed much of her 
education” (Burns, Dreyfus: A Family Affair, 79).
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Here, for instance, is how Colonel Picquart, himself no great friend of 
the Jews, but a man of honour, was handed an insult to his intelligence. 
After he pointed out to his superiors that the handwriting on the in-
criminating documents presented to bolster the case were similar to each 
other but not to Dreyfus’s, and even that Dreyfus has been locked away 
for a year, he was confronted by this absurdity from his superior officer:
Et comme Picquart crut devoir faire remarquer qu’il s’agissait 
d’une correspondance récente, Bertillon répliqua sans sour-
ciller: “Alors, c’est que les Juifs ont exercé quelqu’un depuis 
un an pour imiter l’écriture, ils sont arrivés à l’identité.”54
And as Picquart believed it his duty to remark that it was 
a question of recent correspondence, Bertillon replied 
without flinching, “Well, it’s the Jews who have over the 
year found someone to imitate the handwriting and now 
they’ve got it down pat.”
Rather than a clash of cultures or religious apprehensions of real-
ity, the confrontation is between prejudice and judiciousness, ignorance 
and common sense, and bigotry and tolerance. The choice, then, has 
to be whether the Dreyfus’s opponents were stupid, naive, arrogant, 
or evil—that is, whether the misapprehensions and misprisions arose 
from an inability to comprehend the facts and circumstances, from an 
unwillingness to question authority and its official line of argument, 
from a resistance to giving any value to what was said or done by per-
sons considered inferiors and interlopers, or from a sheer perverse wish 
to hurt or humiliate others. There probably were a few individuals who 
had secret agendas to work through and who took the opportunity of 
Dreyfus’s presence in a sensitive position to deflect suspicion away from 
themselves or their allies, but that does not explain the length of the 
resistance to the truth nor the pervasiveness of the willingness to accept 
patently absurd claims as the truth.
This kind of misapprehension seen operating throughout the Drey-
fus Affair arises through a false reduction of the concept of religion to a 
matter of personal beliefs and private feelings, one where theology and 
54 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 74.
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religious practice are moved to the margins of modern, secular experi-
ence. Arguing or feeling this way creates a situation in which there is 
an epistemological impasse or crisis. How so? Well, on one side, there 
are those parties to the affair for whom religion is everything—a Wel-
tanschauung, a mythical imagination, a racial quality separating every 
nationality, cultural group, language cohort, community, and regional 
culture—and, on the other, those for whom religion is so trivial that 
they try to avoid seeing its manifestations in themselves or in their 
neighbours or enemies. It is not a question of Pierre or Alfred Dreyfus 
not knowing that Judaism and anti-Semitism were relevant factors in 
the whole ordeal but that the intensity and seriousness of that relevance 
did not register fully. Hence, the two groups of partisans talked at cross-
purposes, contended in politics and social rivalries without noticing the 
grid of blind spots between them, and misinterpreted their supposed 
victories and defeats. This is not just a matter of eviscerating religions 
of all their aesthetic, spiritual, and intellectual richness but of mistak-
ing the motivations and consequences of their own mutual actions and 
achievements. Here is a passage that supposedly reveals another dia-
logue between some of the conspirators:
Du Paty, Henry et Gribelin s’y rendirent, mais Henry resta ca-
ché. Du Paty expliqua à Esterhazy les machinations des Juifs 
et l’assura qu’il pourrait compter sur des défenseurs résolus s’il 
était prêt à obéir aux instructions qui lui seraient données.55
Du Paty, Henry and Gribelin went to the place, but Hen-
ry remained hidden. Du Paty explained to Esterhazy the 
machinations of the Jews and assured him that he could 
count on resolute defenders, if he were prepared to obey 
the instructions which would be given to him.
It should be obvious that the conspirators are manipulating 
Esterhazy,56 the real spy and traitor who is selling minor secrets to the 
55 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 93
56 Compare the satirical version of this manipulative and duplicitous action in Anatole France’s short 
story Emile: “And here Zoé, we approach a scene in the comedy of life, the melancholy humor 
of which may one day be appreciated. During the Dreyfus Affair it occurred to Emile Vincent 
[i.e., Zola] to say that Esterhazy was a fraud and a traitor. He said it because he knew it was so 
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Germans because he needs the money to pay for his mistress and his 
gambling debts, and who actually hates the French—he writes in a letter 
later that he dreams of leading mounted Hungarian Uhlans into Paris 
to slaughter hundreds of thousands of French men and women.57 So he 
was not motivated by simple, stupid greed or bribed by the dark forces 
lurking behind this petty intrigue. The others, the highly-placed mili-
tary men, however, seized the occasion to get at Alfred Dreyfus because 
they resented him as a Jewish upstart, and then, once started in this 
plot, they are drawn by their own arrogance to elaborate upon the de-
ception more and more, finding their own hatred of Jews the path of 
least resistance to gaining support in the rest of the army, the govern-
ment, and French society. But this is not obvious to the writer of Sou-
venirs et correspondance: he sees the arrogance and the stupidity but not 
the endemic and persistent anti-Semitism. He knows that what is going 
on is a “simulacrum,”58 but not how it works or what motivates it. Alfred 
goes further and writes on 23 January, 1895, from Devil’s Island:
Il semble que je suis le jouet d’une terrible hallucination, que 
tout cela va se dissiper . . . mais hélas! la réalité est tout au-
tour de moi.59
It seems that I am the plaything in a terrible hallucination, 
that all of that is going to fly off into nothingness . . . but, 
alas! reality is all around me.
He too, like his son and his other supporters, is so close and so far 
from understanding what is happening. Soon after, Alfred writes to “Ma 
chère Lucie” on 14 February, 1895, that he believes and hopes that in the 
future, “quand on rancontera mon histoire, elle paraître invraisemblable,”60 
and because he was far too candid ever to conceal the truth. From that day he was regarded as 
the enemy of his country and of the army. He was treated as a traitor and an alien” (France, 
Crainquebille Putois, Riquet and other Profitable Tales, 126).
57 Remember that moment near the end of book IV of Gulliver’s Travels when Swift’s maniacal 
protagonist revels in the thought that thousands of Houhymhms will set sail for Europe to seek 
revenge on the madness of these talking Yahoos and confront their massed regiments and crush 
them into gelatinous putty, a mummy. Esterhazy was as mad as Lemuel Gulliver but for no good 
reasons.
58 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 102.
59 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 113.
60 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 119.
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when someone tells my story, it will seem unbelievable. However, these 
unbelievable nightmares and hallucinations are not a figment of Drey-
fus’s own mind but a mass delusion, a phantasmagoria, enveloping all of 
France and even the rest of Europe.
Three features of this process of deception and self-deception about 
Judaism and anti-Semitism can be seen in the letters that Lucie and 
Alfred write to one another that are published in their son Pierre’s selec-
tive anthology. First, there are the casual and neutral uses of Christian 
terms, such as martyrdom (martyre), sacrifice (sacrifice), calvary (calvaire), 
and the stain of sinfulness (tache).61 They can also write about “une justice 
divine,”62 which they hope and pray will watch over them and solve the 
inscrutable enigma of the charges against Alfred. So far as the husband 
and wife seem concerned, these words are merely colorful expressions 
of their sense of pain and humiliation. They come with no sacramental, 
liturgical, or mythical resonance.63 If there is a zone of allusiveness in 
this lexicon, it is to the principles and ideals of the French Revolution 
and republic, generally to abstract truth and justice. Similarly, when 
they occasionally use the word God (Dieu) or faith (foi), it is as an ex-
clamation rather than an appeal to the deity or a prayerful statement. 
Words like exile, saint, or martyr, which could have a Jewish connotation 
or a Christian signification, tend again to be neutralized terms of inten-
sification of the secular pains felt by the husband and wife. More specific 
references to Jewish customs and practices are subdued and virtually 
unnoticed.64 For instance, Lucie writes on 30 December, 1894,
61 Benmozegh recalls “a principle of the Kabbalists, according to which ‘all the foreign gods who are 
referred to in Scripture contain a spark of holiness’” (Israel and Humanity, 115).
62 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 111.
63 “The philosophical study of the Hebrew language confirms in its own way this mystical explanation, 
by showing the genius of the language is to proceed directly to the fundamental idea without 
stopping at the verbal form, and that is one is perfectly entitled therefore to perceive the expression 
of divine qualities beneath the polytheistic names” (Benmozegh, Israel and Humanity, 115).
64 According to Michael Burns, who has examined the archives, personal and private, to discover all 
that seems possible to find out about the background of Alfred Dreyfus’s mother and father and of 
the young boy’s religious upbringing, “The Dreyfus family left no record of the children’s religious 
instruction in Mulhouse; nor did the synagogue hold documentation of their formal schooling, if any. 
But if they learned the Hebrew required for the confirmation ceremony [bar mitzvah]—a ceremony 
of special significance for their observant parents—the children also had to learn the ‘sacred 
declaration of patriotic loyalty’ to France that accompanied the religious rite” (Dreyfus: A Family 
Affair, 39). Can we also assume that when a baby Alfred was circumcised and that he went to some 
sort of cheder for his earliest education in Jewish knowledge? As Burns sees, all such information 
remains conjectural and elusive, except that, as we are showing in our close reading of the letters and 
other documents extant of his life during the ordeal, Dreyfus has an implicit awareness of the basis 
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C’est ce soir l’anniversaire de la mort de ton père, nous irons 
tous au temple. Pauvre grand-papa, en mourant, il ne con-
naissait pas son bonheur.65
This evening is the anniversary of your father’s death, 
we are all going to temple. Poor grandpa, in dying, he did 
not know his own happiness.
In a later letter, Lucie brings to the surface the equivalence of “vérité 
= bonheur”66 (truth = happiness) This can be read in specifically Jewish 
terms: “Tonight is your father’s yahrzeit [yearly memorial for him and 
his relatives] and we are all going to shul [synagogue] to pray. Poor zayda 
[grandfather] when he passed away didn’t realize what mazel [luck] he 
had by not knowing of your arrest, conviction and exile.” But the trans-
lation could render the terms in a less Hebraic way, without the inflec-
tions of Yiddish appropriate to Ashkenazi Jews: “This evening on the 
memorial day of your father’s passing, the whole family will go to the 
temple (in the French sense of a non-Catholic house of worship) for a 
service. Poor Granddad, in dying before the events of your case became 
known, was saved private humiliations and public shame.” On the thir-
tieth of December, 1894, Lucie again writes about this occasion but adds 
that she has gone to the temple with Mathieu to say kaddish (the prayer 
for the dead) for “le triste anniversaire de la mort de ton pauvre père” (the 
sad anniversary of your poor father’s death), and then she adds still fur-
ther, “Que de soucis, que de chagrins nous avons eus en une année. Quels 
malheurs épuvantables et immérités peuvent s’abattre sur une famille en si 
peu de temps”67 (What cares, what grief we have had in one year. What 
horrible and unmerited miseries could beat down on one family in so 
little a time). It is as though she wants to cry out in words that Alfred 
will recognize from the Passover haggadah (book of traditional rabbinic 
tales and songs), “Dayenu! Enough for us!”
Another more specifically Jewish allusion appears in a postscript to 
Alfred’s letter of 12 March, 1895, when he tells Lucie “Quand tu auras une 
of Judaism and an occasional explicit ability to articulate those beliefs and patterns of belief.
65 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 51.
66 12 August 1895. Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 253
67 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 100.
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bonne nouvelle á m’announcer, envoie-moi une dépêche, je l‘attends chaque 
jour comme le Messie”68 (When you have some good news to tell me, send 
me an urgent message, I am waiting for it every day as for the Messiah). 
Christians wait for the Second Coming, while Jews expect the Moshiach 
to appear at any moment—for the first time. Besides, the almost light-
hearted and ironic mixture here shows the character of Dreyfus’s nesha-
ma (his soul) more than any more ponderous or sanctimonious Christian 
expectation of the End of Days. Usually, as we shall discuss more fully 
when we deal with the latest edition of their letters, it is Lucie who lets 
slip the little Yiddishisms of her family, rather than Alfred, who, while 
not quite with the level of cynicism or bitterness against his background 
of Sigmund Freud arguing for his bride-to-be Martha Bernays to forgo 
her Jewish beliefs and practices, such as keeping kosher, has made an 
effort to assimilate himself to military life. Where her husband sees the 
forces ranged against him as part of some inexplicable enigma69 that has 
caused a judicial error, it is the wife who speaks in more traditional rab-
binical terms of their joint martyrdom, although she also is shaping re-
marks around supportive echoes of what Alfred writes:
Dieu qui nous a si cruellement éprouvés nous donnera la vo-
lonté d’accomplir jusqu’au bout notre de devoir, de relever 
notre nom de la tache qu’on lui a odieusement jetée, et nous 
accordera la réparation éclatante sans laquelle ni nous, ni 
nos enfants, nous ne pouvons nous résigner à vivre. J’ai la 
conviction qu’avec une volonté de fer, une énergie indompt-
able et une persévérance à toute épreuve, on peut surmonter 
toutes les difficultés, on peut sonder tous les mystères . . . .70
God who has so cruelly tested us will give us the will to 
reach the fullness of our duty, to remove from our name 
68 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 122.
69 Typical of his letters to Lucie, on 7 September 1895, Alfred writes: “Il faut avoir l’énigme de cette 
machination infernale qui nous a enlevé ce qui fait vivre et ce qu’il nous faut: notre honneur” (The 
enigma of this infernal machine must be found out so that we can live and have what we must: 
our honor); Ecris-moi souvent, ecris moi longuement, 258. Note how Dreyfus uses the “uncanny 
expression” (according to Norbert Col) rather than the more familiar idiom “avoir l’énigme”—
uncanny because it indicates how Dreyfus is being twisted out of his normal ways of speaking and 
thinking, unless this is an error in the transcript by editor Vincent Duclert.
70 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 128.
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the stain that has been so odiously thrown on it, and 
will grant to us a brilliant reparation without which we 
and our children, we cannot resign ourselves to live. I 
am convinced that with an iron will, [so that with] an 
indomitable energy and an unflinching perseverance 
[we can pass through] through all experience, we can 
surmount all difficulties, we can get to the bottom of all 
the mysteries . . .
Then, swept up by the power of her own enthusiasm and again echo-
ing and reinforcing Alfred’s own self-encouraging words and phrases, 
she states:
La vérité peut éclater aujourd’hui comme elle peut éclater 
demain ou après. Personne ne le sait, Dieu fasse que ce soit 
le plus vite possible. Je ne puis te dire qu’une chose, mon bon 
chéri, c’est que la lumière se fera et que nous l’aurons pleine 
et entière.71
The truth may flash out today as it may break forth to-
morrow or [in the days] after. No one knows when God 
will make it happen [and may it be] as quickly as pos-
sible. I can only tell you this one thing, my dear good 
husband, it is that the light will shine forth and it will be 
full and whole for us.
Note here how Lucie, herself the light, the Shekhina, resonates with the 
kabbalistic terms found in nineteenth-century Jewish liturgy and hence 
familiar to herself and to Alfred, even if they have never thought of the 
sources or implications of such language. The truth is a light that flash-
es out like lightning (zohar) when God wills, and thus, while we cannot 
know when it will happen, the emergence of this zoharistic clarification 
of mysteries is not unexpected. It will be a Day of Redemption, messi-
anic in its glorious light, may it happen, as the formula goes: “speedily in 
our days.”72 Then comes the tikkun ha-olam, the repair, the correction, 
71 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 128.
72 Ouaknin teaches: “Le livre est donc le lieu d’un paradoxe—ou d’une rencontre; il recueille l’Infini 
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and the reunification of God and his Shekhina, which is Israel.73 It will 
prove the end of the Galut, exile, dispersion, suffering, and dishonour. 
In more plain and practical terms, as Alfred’s brother writes on 25 Sep-
tember, two weeks later, “Dieu ne permettra pas qu’un innocent paie pour 
des coupables”74 (God will not permit an innocent man to pay for [the 
crimes] of those who are culpable). But none of them seems fully aware 
of the “machination”75 at work to keep the falsely accused exile locked 
away on Devil’s Island).
Thanks to the lengthy delays between writing and receiving letters, 
it is only on 26 June, 1896, that Alfred answers the fervent hopes that 
Lucie has expressed of a divinely ordained release from torments:
Tu me dis aussi d’accepter la certitude que la lumière la plus 
complet serait faite sur ce lugubre drame. Non seulement, 
j’en accepte la certitude mais ma confiance, comme ma foi 
ont toujours été absolues; je connais trop bien les senti-
ments d’honneur qui animent tous les membres de nos deux 
familles pour avoir jamais pu en douter.76
You tell me to accept with certainty that the most com-
plete light will shine on this lugubrious drama. Not 
only do I accept that with certainty, but my confidence, 
like my faith, has always been absolute, I know too well 
the sense of honor that animates all members of our 
(Tsimtsoum), mais il dévoile immédiatement son incapacité à cet accueil en montrant que l’Infini ne 
peut se laisser englober, ne peut se laisser enfermer en une présence sur laquelle on pourrait avoir une 
quelconque emprise. Il y a alors débordement, et plus, éclatement (Chevira) du Livre en trois livres” (The 
book is thus a place of paradox—or of an encounter; it is gathers together the Infinite (Tsimtsoum), 
but it immediately reveals its incapacity in this welcome by showing that the Infinite cannot be 
englobed, cannot let itself be possessed by any act of domination or possession. There is then an 
overflowing, and more, the explosive shattering of light (Shevira) that shatters the Book into three 
books) in Le livre brûlé, 226.
73 According to Elijah Benamozegh, “Nowhere is God thought of as an isolated being which, having 
accomplished the work of creation, handed over control of the universe forever to the laws which 
He had established. These laws are regarded as the expression of an unending intercourse between 
cause and effect. They constitute the Divine as it exists here, the Shekhina, God inhabiting His 
creation,” Israel and Humanity, 70.
74 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 129.
75 Alfred speaks of “cette machination dont nous sommes les malhereuses et épuvantables victims” (this 
machination of which we are the unhappy and horrible victims): Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 130.
76 Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 137.
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two families ever to have any doubts.
However, what Alfred has absolute confidence and faith in is not 
exactly that which Lucie has written about. She has been speaking, at 
least partly, about a spiritual expectation of divine intervention, albeit 
a concomitant enhancement of human strength of character, while he, 
to keep away from the doldrums of despair and defeatism, writes of his 
indomitable faith in the loyalty of the families. It is true that as much 
as husband and wife have been tested and proved in the fires of this in-
iquity, so too the Hadamard and Dreyfus families have rallied to sup-
port Alfred and to give comfort to one another, both actions being things 
that commentators have found remarkable, because too often in similar 
circumstances marriages have broken apart, families have disassociated 
themselves from members accused of high crimes and misdemeanours, 
and individuals have broken—sought divorce, changed their abodes and 
names, undergone mental breakdowns, or committed suicide.
The faith that Alfred writes about is also religious but in a different 
way than Lucie’s. For him, ironically as for his bitterest enemies, France 
is the sacred country and thus duty to her and her institutions are sacra-
mental acts.77 He also sees France as the supreme judge to which he sub-
mits his fate, not to any biblical version of God but to this “juge suprême,” 
his fatherland, “la patrie.”78 As a shocking corollary to that, it is Alfred’s 
personal honour that is of supreme value. It seems as though Lucie is 
only echoing his sentiments as part of the therapy she is conducting for 
him, but she makes explicit a thought that Alfred would suppress—and 
that she, in her normal state of mind, would find horrifying: that they 
would rather that their children were dead than have to live in disgrace: 
“J’aimerais mieux voir nos enfants morts que de penser que le nom qu’il por-
tent est déshonoré”79 (I would rather see our children dead than think of 
the name they bear being dishonoured). This is his own horrible “culte de 
l’honneur.”80 It seems Lucie, shaken by the violence of Alfred’s treatment, 
attempts quietly to assuage his rattled nerves and help him turn towards 
77 On 24 April 1897: “Et la réalité, las voici, toujours la même: c’ést que dans cette horrible affaire, il y a 
un double intérêt en jeu, celui de la patrie, le nôtre, que l’un est aussi sacré que l’autre” (And the reality 
here is always the same is that in this horrible affair there is a double interest in play, that of the 
nation, [and] our own, and that is as sacred as the other) Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 154.
78 Alfred to Lucie, 10 August 1897: Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 158.
79 Alfred to Lucie, 14 April 1895: Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 119.
80 Alfred to Lucie, 28 August 1898: Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 174.
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a more peaceful resolution to the great mystery confronting them.81
Yet, knowing as only she knows—the true state of affairs back in 
France being still vigorously censored by colonial and prison officials—
the need to keep this a secret is almost too much for her to bear. She 
fears that Alfred, with an already weakened body and mind, may not be 
able to withstand the new shock of positive news about a revision of his 
conviction. She knows his vulnerability because of the extreme state-
ments he makes and also because, more than him, she has been observ-
ing from afar his mood swings and his detailed descriptions of the loss 
of sanity he fears.82
Moi, je ne vis que dans la pensée de la joie profonde à la pensé 
que tu auras en apprenant cette nouvelle, et je me souhaite 
des forces, un pouvoir surhumain pour te voir dans ce mo-
ment de satisfaction suprême. Pourvu, mon Dieu, que cet 
ébranlement si grand ne te soit pas funeste et que ton pauvre 
corps affaibli ne se ressente pas d’une telle secousse!83
I can only live [or rather: see] in this thought of pro-
found joy the thoughts that you will have on learning 
this news, and I wish that I had the strength, a superhu-
man power to see you at the moment of supreme satis-
faction. Provided, dear God, that this great shock does 
not prove fatal and that your poor weakened body does 
not suffer from such a great blow!
It has been Lucie’s duty, she understands, to provide Alfred with 
81 More disturbing is the resonance here of the temporary changes in Jewish sensibility that occurred 
at the time of the First and Second Crusades, when parents and whole communities took the 
decision to sacrifice their children rather than see them taken from them, forcibly baptized, and 
brought up as Christians to hate their former selves. At that time, during the eleventh through 
thirteenth centuries, there was a midrashic reconstruction of the Akeda, the Binding of Isaac, to 
show Abraham so willing to slay his son on the altar, that when God restored the youth unharmed 
from the ordeal, the father killed him again. At times, Sarah, who is usually kept away from the 
performance of the deed God has commanded Abraham because of her maternal sensibilities, 
emerges as an active participant in the Kiddush ha-Shem, the Sanctification of the Name.
82 She also knows his previous demonstrations of nervous irritability; she also has known since their 
days of courtship when Alfred’s letters warned her of these tendencies and begged her to be patient 
and sympathetic with his appearance of coldness and rages. These matters will be discussed later 
in reference to the imposed autism seen in Alfred after his return to France in 1899.
83 Lucie to Alfred, 26 September 1898: Dreyfus, Souvenirs, 175.
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the feedback he needs to keep up his strength and resolution, but also, 
insofar as she can in the midst of her own problems—her separation, 
her need to overcome the bourgeois Frenchwoman’s reluctance to play 
a public role in politics, her shyness as a Jew to appeal to hostile gov-
ernment and legal officers, her need to hide from the children her fears 
and worries for their missing father (she tells them he is on a long trip 
as part of his soldier’s duty), and her instinctive need to keep from ex-
acerbating his sense of isolation or raising his hopes too high before 
any confirmation of social change can be addressed to him—to lead him 
gently toward a state of mind conformable to his own real character. 
This complex task becomes even more difficult in the final days of his 
imprisonment before his return to France, because the wheels of justice 
turn so slowly and the complete information on his current status is 
deliberately obscured by the same cruel and devious agents who have 
managed his whole experience on Devil’s Island.84
The story of what happens to Alfred and Lucie just before, during, 
and immediately after the second conviction at Rennes will be integrat-
ed into discussions in further chapters of this book and those that fol-
low, just as we will put off for the moment a close reading of their letters 
in the modern edition and the new edition of the journals Alfred kept 
between the time of his pardon and his rehabilitation. The focus, how-
ever, will be less on the political or judicial side of the story than on the 
personal. For even more than the strong active engagement by both Lu-
cie and Mathieu in pursuing legal rectification of the judicial errors and 
later the crimes revealed, it is the special relationship that Captain and 
Madam Dreyfus established in their letters that amazes more than any 
other phenomenon in the whole affair. As we shall see in later volumes 
in this series, perhaps the most amazing thing of all is the intellectual 
reconceptualization of Alfred in his prison notebooks. Before that, more 
groundwork in preparation for those discussions has to be laid, or in 
midrashic terms: we have to look at the textures, contextures, antitex-
84 How cruel the jailers were is explained by Duclert in an introductory section to the last 
stages of Dreyfus’s imprisonment on Devil’s Island: “Il n’imagine pas que tous ses appels ont été 
systématiquement ignore et qu’il a fallu une mobilization publique sans precedent pour que ceux de sa 
femme soient finalement entendus par le gouvernement” (He did not imagine that all his appeals 
were systematically ignored and it would be necessary to mount a public mobilization without 
precedent by those [appeals] of his wife finally to be heard by the government) (Ecris-moi souvent, 
écris moi longuement, 401).
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tures, and untextures of these two further bodies of evidence.85
ParT 2: aLfrEd and LuCiE’s LOvE LETTErs
En Pologne, la mazoure devient souvent le lieu où le sort de 
toute une vie se décide, où les cœurs se pèsent, où les éternels 
dévouements se promettent, où la patrie recrute ses martyrs 
et ses héroïnes. En ces contrées, la mazoure n’est donc pas 
seulement une danse; elle est une poésie nationale, destinée, 
comme toutes les poésies des peuples vaincus, à transmettre 
le brûlant faisceau des sentiments patriotiques, sous le voile 
transparent d’une mélodie populaire. Aussi, n’y a-t-il rien de 
surprenant à ce que la plupart d’entre elles modulent dans 
leurs notes et dans les strophes qui y sont attachées, les deux 
tons dominants dans le cœur du Polonais moderne: le plaisir 
de l’amour et la mélancolie du danger.
—Franz Liszt86
But it is precisely in the space between the literal meaning 
and the legal ruling that the experience of Talmudism is to 
be found. After rudimentary explanation of words and con-
cepts, after the judicial extrapolation of practices and regu-
lations, the dance of reason begins.
—Leon Wieseltier87
This section of the chapter will argue that the letters between Alfred and 
85 As [Ithamar] Gruenwald notes, the “midrashic condition” is a mental attitude that entails the 
creation of meaning rather than concern for the lexical or philological understanding of a text’” 
(Wolfson, Through a Speculum that Shines, 331, n. 19), and one might add of the historical or 
generic character of that same text.
86 F. Liszt, F. Chopin, 4th ed. (Leipzig: Breitkopf et Haertel, 1890). Chapter III. “In the mazurka 
the bold and vigorous colouring of the polonaise gives place to the most delicate, tender and 
evanescent shades; it is not the nation as a whole, in a united, single and characteristic impetus, 
which is brought before us, but the character and the impressions become purely personal and are 
always individualized and divided” (Franz Liszt, Life of Chopin, 2nd ed., trans. John Broadhouse 
(London: William Reeves), 86).
87 Leon Wieseltier, “Unlocking the Talmud’s Secrets: Thoughts on the Steinsaltz Talmud in English” 
The New York Times, Sunday Book Review (17 December 1989), reprinted by David Sasha on Sephardic 
Heritage Update (11 November 2010) on the occasion of Steinsaltz’s completion of his translation 
of the whole Talmud online at davidsasha@googlegroups.com (seen 11 November 2010).
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Lucie Dreyfus are in themselves a kind of frenetic and, at the same time, 
subtle dance, an interchange and a mutually supportive sharing of ide-
as, feelings, and dreams.88 Franz Liszt’s romantic effusions on Chopin’s 
life and music—they are one, in his mind—also provide interesting in-
sights that can be applied, albeit with proper adjustments to the differ-
ent times, places, characters, and intellectual and political contexts, to 
the interwoven and superimposed nature of the epistles between hus-
band and wife. Although he was an anti-Semite, Liszt succeeded, as A. 
Z. Idelsohn points out, “in penetrating into Israel’s spirit.”89 Taking the 
occasion of the mazurka in a metaphorical sense as both a figure of long-
distance social relationships and longed-for emotional and intellectual 
encounters, what Liszt says in his own voice and that of other characters 
opens up the obscure region of the Dreyfus letters. For instance, when 
the older musician writes,
Here chance may bring into contrast those who a few 
hours before were perfect strangers to each other. The 
ordeal of a single moment, a single word, may separate 
long united hearts; necessity often forces sudden confi-
dences and invincible suspicions kept close in the mind.90
The reader of those desperate letters penned across the Atlantic 
Ocean, arriving out of order, held back for three or four months at a 
time, sees the correspondents forced by circumstances and intense long-
ing to fear the worst, hope for the best, and seek to grasp some tangible 
echo or ghost of a remembered image to reassure the other and the self 
of their love, their loyalty, their courage to carry on, and their trust in 
an eventual resolution to the oppressive enigma that keeps them apart 
and in the darkness of doubts and fears.
Then Liszt cites an unnamed witty woman, who exclaims in regard 
to the dancers performing the mazurka: “They often play a comedy to 
avoid a tragedy!” He goes on:
That which has never been spoken is yet often surmised 
88 For a historical survey, social analysis, and pictures of the mazurka in action, see Maja Trochimcyzk, 
“Mazur (Mazurka)” online at http://www2/fiu.edu/~kneskij/mazurka (seen 14 November 2010).
89 Idelsohn, Jewish Music, 191.
90 Liszt, Life of Chopin, Broadhouse trans., 66.
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and understood. Vague generalities are often made use 
of to quicken interrogation, while hiding its drift, and 
evasive replies are closely listened to, like the ringing of 
a coin, as a test of quality. The suitor is often pleading his 
cause when he seems to be pleading for others, and the 
most graceful flattery is at times the veil which disguises 
exactions.91
To be sure, Alfred and Lucie were not courting or meeting for the first 
time; they had been married for five years, had two children, and found 
themselves in a state of shock and confusion by what had occurred 
when the arrest happened. But in this first major separation,92 they 
had to find a way to communicate in letters across layers of obscurity,93 
knowing full well that everything they said to one another would be 
scrutinized by hostile censors, and thus they had to assume masks—
how many, we shall be showing throughout this book, but not always 
masks of their own making—and then discovered that their own voices, 
intentions, and realities could not be seen or heard clearly by the other 
or by themselves.94 They would ask each other questions and knew they 
could not answer directly for several reasons: it was too painful to speak 
the words, and they feared of alarming the other; it was forbidden to 
transmit such information under the conditions of their right to send 
letters at all; it was beyond their individual capacities to describe or even 
91 Liszt, Life of Chopin, Broadhouse trans., 66–67.
92 Earlier separations, as we shall see in later letters that they write to one another, were part of 
the normal routine for army wives and their husbands, a matter of days or weeks on maneuvers; 
this long separation during the affair tested their love and loyalty to an extreme not imagined in 
romantic novels.
93 The figure of the parokhet, the curtain drawn across the Holy of Holies, the Ark of the Covenant, 
represents in kabbalistic thought a separation between the visible and the invisible, the literal 
words on the page of a text, and the interpretations that make the invisible visible; see Ouaknin, Le 
livre brûlé, 284. For Alfred and Lucy, however, as they stand on either side of a veil of metaphysical 
and geographical distance, of censorious regulations forbidding the communication of vital kinds 
of information, of anti-Semitic hatred that they know will punish any references thought to be 
treasonous and part of an international Jewish conspiracy, of anxiety about each other’s abilities 
to write and read between the lines, and of fears that what they say will inadvertently offend the 
other and trigger uncontrollable mental disturbances. At the same time, the veil of ambiguity and 
hinting also creates a mystical covering or canopy under which they hope to find or must create a 
city of refuge.
94 Dreyfus only rarely uses the word “mask” himself, but when he does, it opens up the vision of the 
dreadful nightmare and phantasmagoria playing all around him during the affair; cp. His letter of 
3 October 1896 (Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 322).
——————————————— 2. Alfred and Lucie’s Love Letters ———————————————
 
— 113 —
imagine the full extent of their ordeals.95 For these reasons, without 
becoming a lighthearted farce or a grotesque comedy, the irony of their 
crisscrossing epistles and mutually supportive language created texts 
that could not really sustain the generic capacity of the language they 
thought they were sharing.
For example, in no way, can one say that either Alfred or Lucie were 
lying in what they wrote to one another. They are quite frank at times 
about how difficult it is to keep news from the other, and so while they 
intuit that each has more to say about their suffering day and night, nei-
ther can really guess the extent of what is happening to the other, Lucie 
especially in regard to the increasing isolation and physical tortures Al-
fred is subjected to and Alfred in regard to the efforts Lucie is making 
on his behalf to win a retrial and eventual rehabilitation of the family 
name, and the mounting campaign throughout France and the rest of 
the world to effect these ends. Thus, we see a hint at how to describe 
these factors in what Liszt writes concerning Chopin’s mazurkas:
But the inimitable skill with which they are constantly 
able to interchange the garbs of truth and fiction (like 
touchstones, most certain when least suspected, the one 
always hidden under the cloak of the other) and the force 
which expends a great amount of intellect on the least 
important occasions (just as Gil Blas used up as much in-
telligence in finding the means of subsistence for one day 
as the King of Spain did to govern his whole dominions), 
at least make upon us an impression as painful as that 
produced by the jugglers of India and their exhibitions 
of wonderful skill, where sharp and deadly weapons fly 
glittering in the air, which the smallest error or the least 
lack of perfect mastery would convert into bright and 
swift messengers of instant death! Such skill is fraught 
with concealed terror, anxiety and anguish. From a com-
plication of circumstances danger may lurk behind the 
95 “L’essence de la question,” writes Ouaknin, “est d’ouvrir et laisser ouvertes [des] possibilités . . .” (The 
essence of a question is to open and to leave open possibilities), and then “La chose demandée doit 
rester en suspens . . . mise en suspens de façon que le çontre’ équilibre le ‘pour’” (The thing asked must 
remain in suspense . . . put into suspense in such a way that the ‘contra’ balances the ‘pro’) in Le 
livre brûlé, 139.
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slightest inadvertence, in the smallest imprudence, in 
possible accidents, while on the other hand powerful 
help may be suddenly rendered by the most obscure and 
forgotten individual.96
Recognizing that not every single detail in this complicated state-
ment bears pertinence to the Dreyfus letters, nevertheless I argue that 
Liszt’s words set up a remarkable paradigm for arranging our analysis of 
those epistles. To begin with, however, we have to separate the rather 
complicated apparatus of analogues and allusions. In the first sentence, 
the two parenthetical remarks can be put aside for a moment, allowing 
us to see an allegorical narration of the dancers in the mazurka dressed 
alternatively in the costumes of truth and fiction and weaving in and 
out of contact with each other.
Then we see that the wearing of these “garbs” in the Polish dance 
is compared to the use of a touchstone, one of the four Stones of Wis-
dom can be shown to be metonymically related to each other, any one 
of which can stand for any one, two, three, or all four of the others, as a 
means of evaluating (the touchstone), sharpening (the whetstone), hold-
ing together (the keystone), and drawing into stronger contiguity (the 
lodestone) the others.97 In each particular instance, the stone itself has 
little or no significance, but by its function becomes more powerful, in-
fluential, and essential to the operation of the whole phenomenon.98 
96 Liszt, Life of Chopin, Broadhouse trans., 68–69.
97 In the second parenthetical comment, Liszt alludes to Le Sage’s picaresque novel of the Adventures 
of Gil Blas. This literary allusion is followed by a sustained comparison of the mazurka dancers 
with Indian fakirs, emphasis placed as much on the showy, somewhat duplicitous quality of the 
performers and on the real dangers that obtain should there be any slip-up or loss of attention. 
Like all picaresque novels, Gil Blas is the somewhat cynical reflections of a man or woman who 
has made it through life, most of it “on the road,” at all levels of society, secular and religious, in 
cities and towns, at courts and in slums, and revealing finally that it is wit alone and taking care of 
oneself that really matter.
98 Although Ferenc or Franz Liszt was at times a fairly rabid anti-Semite—much more so than 
Chopin—what he wrote about the mazurka can be taken as an interesting insight and approach 
to the Dreyfus letters. There is much we can learn from the Jew haters since in their very mental 
illness, they see and speak about things that nice, liberal, tolerant people do not like to talk 
about—or can perceive at all. See, for instance, Dan Damon, “Chasms of Perdition: How Ferenc 
Liszt tried to tame the divine essence of the Romani soul,” Central European Review 3: 13 (2 
April 2001) online as http://www/ce-review.org./01/13/damon13 (seen 14 November 2010). 
Considering the book on The Gypsy in Music, written under the influence of Wagnerian anti-
Semitism, Damon argues, “Whatever the explanation for his anti-Semitism Ferenc Liszt made 
cynical use of the musical talent of the Roma to belittle whatever Jews had achieved. Liszt sought 
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Now back to the exchange of epistles between Lucie and Alfred. These 
letters, those that survive today—and we cannot be sure how many were 
lost, were never sent, did not arrive, or were destroyed by the prison cen-
sors—also constitute another kind of textual phenomenon, one that 
recalls, however distantly, the multiple layers and polyphonic voices 
of the Talmud. In the history of letter writing in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, a whole genre of fiction based on the exchange of 
epistles developed. These fictional letters make clear some of the more 
specific aspects of the Dreyfus Affair as a whole and the exchange of let-
ters between Alfred and Lucie Dreyfus in particular. Although there were 
already telegrams and a few telephones available at the end of the nine-
teenth century, for the most part people still communicated by handwrit-
ten letters. In Marcel Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu, it is possible 
to see the progressive development of communication from handwritten 
notes, telegrams, and pneumatic letters to the use of telephones. Official 
documents were also beginning to appear in typewritten form.
Handwritten epistles have to be read as emerging from the midst of 
existential experiences, speaking privately to the person or persons they 
are addressed to in terms of ongoing events and urgent or contingent ac-
tions. Unlike the communications available to us a hundred years later, 
wherein electronic and digital information can be exchanged instanta-
neously, written letters require often rare and expensive physical equip-
ment—sheets of paper, a supply of pens, sufficient ink, sturdy envelopes, 
postage stamps, and a delivery service of some sort—but above all, time: 
time to think about what to say, time to inscribe the message and usually 
a copy or a résumé for one’s records, and time to send the letter across 
long distances by ship, train, automobile, or horse-driven carriage and 
eventually on foot by a postman.
In regard to those epistles sent between Captain and Madam Drey-
fus, it is necessary to point out again that the time to think about what 
to write was, mildly put, constrained, stressed, and difficult because of 
to prove that merely being persecuted and stateless was not enough to excuse the Jews for their 
material success and ambition. Liszt’s thesis was: the gypsies glorified God through the creation 
of natural beauty in the form of music; the Jews could only manage the worldly creations of 
money and crafted goods.” In other words: “Jews were too clever for their own good.” Finally, 
says Damon, “Liszt’s adoration was of little benefit to the Roma, just as his bigotry failed to bury 
the achievements of Jewish musicians.” Unfortunately, the kind of bile spewed forth by such 
admirable musicians as Liszt and Chopin helped pave the road to the crematoria and other killing 
fields of the Nazi empire.
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the conditions of Alfred’s imprisonment: in particular his limited space; 
his confined quarters; the unpleasant, uncomfortable, and feverish heat; 
as well as the need to make his wishes for paper, pen, ink, and so forth 
known through the agency of prison guards who were meant to humili-
ate him and treat him as virtually a nonperson. It was consequently not 
only a matter of finding a time, a place, and a means for writing but of 
composing his mind, and that, most significantly, was something that 
was both the consequence of penning these letters to Lucie and the 
means by which such temporary “moral” equilibrium was achieved. Once 
he had found and made use of the time, the place, and the implements 
for composing his epistle, the situation was again out of his control: the 
letters he wrote, like those he received, were subject to strict censorship 
and might not be posted to Paris with any sense of urgency.
Similarly, Lucie Dreyfus also was constrained in what she could write 
by the knowledge that her messages would be scrutinized and subject to 
censorship, delay, or nondelivery. Yet her fortitude and forethought in 
inscribing letters were able to do several absolutely essential things: (1) 
not least, to meet the strict requirements of the regulations imposed by 
military and political officials, of which she was acutely aware—Lucie 
only slipped up on a few occasions, and those few were only because 
not even she could have imagined the cruelty operating against her and 
Alfred; (2) closest to the surface of what was being communicated, to 
use her cunning and intuition in composing letters that would provide 
some comfort to the prisoner, serve to forestall his depressive thoughts 
of suicide, engage him in a domestic relationship99 neither of them could 
be sure would ever be returned to anything like normalcy, if at all, again, 
and providing subtle hints of a project to have his case reheard and the 
judicial error that he, she, and other close family members or friends al-
ways presumed had been made corrected. Perhaps there was also a third 
99 Burns puts together from mostly unedited materials in the archives a typical routine for the 
young married couple raising two children in the days before Alfred’s arrest when their whole 
world was turned topsy-turvy: “Rarely staying in his office later than 6:00 p.m., [Alfred] rejoined 
Lucie for a quiet dinner followed by an evening at the symphony or a rubber of bridge with the 
Hadamards and family members visiting from the provinces. Most of the time, however, the 
couple spent alone, taking short promenades through their quartier and returning to read by the 
fire. They were building a considerable library in the new apartment, with titles that reflected their 
varied interests—from six-volume sets of Napoleonic campaigns, cavalry tactics, and military 
fortifications to histories by Fustel [de Coulanges] and Ernest Lavisse. Balzac novels, Shakespeare 
plays (translated into French), and a broad range of literary magazines and Parisian periodicals” 
(Burns, Dreyfus: A Family Affair, 98).
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subtle function in her letters to Alfred. Thus, more so than in his own 
desperate missives back to her, she reinforced his virtually never-men-
tioned Jewishness, directing in a very nuanced manner the direction of 
their private, intimate exchange of emotional signals, which lasted over 
a year or more, towards a sense of traditional, kabbalistic notions of 
tikkun ha’olam—restoration of primal order, repair of a fragmented exis-
tential reality, and revelation of a moral purpose and meaning in life.100
The exchange of letters between husband and wife was anything 
but an orderly or regular one, therefore, since there was no real natural 
or logical flow of question and answer, remark and reply, while letters 
from Paris could have words, sentences, paragraphs, or even the entire 
content between the salutation and the farewell blacked out by prison 
authorities. When Alfred remarked in one letter, for instance, on the 
comfort deriving from the very fact of holding in his hand a piece of 
paper Lucie had held and seeing her thoughts and feelings written in her 
own loving hand, the authorities decided to have her epistles typed out 
by some minor functionary and on neutral, prison paper, thus depriv-
ing the husband of the least physical contact with his wife. How hurtful 
this administrative procedure was to Alfred and Lucie may be seen in 
her letter of 20 February, 1896, in which she expresses her relief that a 
letter has arrived from him in his own handwriting rather than in the 
impersonal lettering of a prison official:
C’est toujours une grande satisfaction pour moi que de voir 
ton écriture, il me semble que je tiens aussi une parcelle de 
toi; une copie supprime tout le caractère intime de la lettre 
et vous [. . .] l’impression peut seul vous donner le travail 
machinal et tout personnel qui accompagne la pensée.101
It is always a great satisfaction for me to see your hand-
writing. It seems that I am holding on to a part of your-
self. A copy suppresses all the intimate character of the 
letter and [gives] you [in the impersonal sense] the im-
pression that only a mechanical piece of work gives and 
100 Lucie had a more sustained and formidable knowledge of Judaism than Alfred, as we shall discuss 
in later volumes in which we consider Dreyfus in love and as a Jew.
101 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 350.
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[thus leaves out] everything personal that accompanies 
the thought.
Despite the awkwardness and fragmented nature of these remarks, 
we can see what she is trying to say. She recognizes the difference be-
tween a personal script, which can embody a writer’s personality and 
circumstances, and a mere mechanical reproduction of the words. It is 
not only that the “impression” is different in each case but that the sig-
nificant meaning is also different.
She then continues her little essay on the importance of handwritten 
epistles as a facet in their special, almost metaphysical relationship, gen-
erated under pressure in the letters they send to one another, a theme 
to be developed later in this chapter. For the letter, in the tradition of 
Jewish reading technology, has more than just a body of information 
that is communicated by the meanings of the words; the text and the 
words have a volume, a substantiality to them, in the way they fill the 
page they are written on, the size, the shape, the pressures of the hand 
on the paper, and the inner dimensions of language itself.
Même quand je te lis selon que ton écriture est plus ou moins 
ferme, je me forge toutes sortes de chimères, je te vois tantôt 
fatigue, tantôt énervé, ou courageux, ou déprimé.102
Even when I read according to whether your script is 
more or less firm, I create all sorts of phantoms. I see 
you sometimes fatigued, sometimes enervated, or cou-
rageous, or depressed.
Such a passage in her letters, when we read it after the passage of 
more than a century, resonates with historical ironies, not least of 
which is the connection to the nature of the crime committed against 
Alfred and his family through forged, suppressed, and pretended docu-
ments. But in this instant of her writing, Lucie is indicating the way 
she can interpret letters by extraverbal qualities in the physical object 
itself, and as we shall see later in this chapter, her own uncharacteristi-
cally formal tone points toward secondary levels of signification in her 
102 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 350.
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remarks—her own signal to Alfred that she understands more about 
his condition than she knows he is allowed to speak under the eyes of 
the censors and, furthermore, that she expects him to interpret her let-
ters at deeper levels than she feels permitted to write, partly because 
of those same censorious eyes scrutinizing everything she sends to 
him and holding back or destroying anything that would bring him real 
comfort from knowledge of how far the Dreyfusard cause is progress-
ing. Thus, still further in this same letter, with its misdating and its 
elided parts of sentences,
C’est cette impression qui me manque lorsque la lettre est 
copiée par une écriture indifférente et ce m’est l’une des 
choses les plus pénibles parmi tous les chagrins secondaires 
que j’ai eu à subir.103
It is this impression which is lacking when your letter 
is copied into an indifferent script and it is to me one 
of the most painful things among all the secondary cha-
grins to which I am forced to submit.
It should not be overlooked that “impression” is one of those words 
in the lexicon of late nineteenth-century Europe laden with aesthetic 
and intellectual weight, partly from the revolutionary changes in all the 
arts in regard to seeing, hearing, and shaping space and also in the views 
of the mind that give a new spin on the older mode of associationist 
psychology stemming from Descartes and Locke, there now emerging 
as a whole new concept of depth psychology, wherein the mind is not 
strictly under the supervision of the will, let alone the rational faculties 
(the superego), and deep memories, inexpressible passions, and anxie-
ties (the id) act to create a consciousness (the ego) that is at best a phan-
tasmagoric parody of the mind.
As in epistolary novels since the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries, such as Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, the recipient of letters could 
never be sure that what he or she held in their hands was an actual re-
sponse to one of their own, and that answers were being given to their 
own questions and in the context of certain confessions or statements 
103 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 350–351.
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of fact, or even an actual message and not a major alteration or a total 
forgery. The entire case against the captain in the Dreyfus Affair itself 
can be seen as a series of manipulated documents, forgeries, out-of-
sequence fabrications, and misconstrued or misapplied contexts.
Thus, the first body of evidence about Alfred Dreyfus the man, as 
opposed to the cipher used by others in an ideological battle that more 
or less obscures the real reasons for his being framed as a traitor, in his 
own words, comes in the five hundred or so letters that he and his wife 
Lucie wrote to one another. There are a few letters from his children and 
other members of his family, such as Mathieu, or friends, such as Joseph 
Reinach. These letters, while written under difficult circumstances for 
all concerned, (none, however, so much as Alfred’s), were also composed 
with a consciousness that military and colonial censors would be scru-
tinizing every word for indications of Dreyfus’s connections with the 
German government, suspicious markers of anti-government feeling or 
even conspiratorial machinations, and other evidence of alien thoughts 
and actions, not least of which would have been expressions of Jewish 
loyalty and beliefs, which in the heated anti-Semitic atmosphere of the 
times would have been tantamount to treason.
Nevertheless, Alfred and Lucie, in these letters over five years, 
managed to communicate deep feelings of mutual support and con-
cern for each other and the children. Although Lucie could not let Al-
fred know about any of the efforts to gain a revision of the decision 
of the court-martial or reveal the extent of the support being built up 
amongst intellectuals, she could and did make him aware that he was 
not alone and that he should have hope. Alfred, on his part, in the way 
he repeated words and phrases from Lucie’s letters, reiterated his own 
assertions of faith in the ultimate justice in the army and in France 
and of his affection for his wife and family, and—this is important—in 
what he did not write at all, in the choice of words he used, did more 
than communicate his private love for Lucie and the children and his 
profound faith in reason and in France, he also created a relationship 
that was, as we may see in many of the novels of the period, a new 
kind of very introspective domestic bond with Lucie, a very strong 
love based on trust and friendship without any of the traditional signs 
of masculine superiority or domination. These letters have been ed-
ited, selected, and printed several times in the past hundred years, 
sometimes to win support for Dreyfus in his call for a revision of the 
guilty verdict, sometimes to seek his rehabilitation as an honourable 
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officer, and sometimes to provide a much fuller psychological or “inti-
mate portrait” of the man and his wife.
The book called Five Years of My Life, published soon after his arriv-
al back in France in 1898, contains a selection of those letters mostly 
between husband and wife, along with some introductory material 
and other things, such as sketches and photographs. Unlike the un-
edited, raw letters themselves, the book was designed, in all senses of 
the word, certainly with political intentions in order to garner sup-
port and sympathy for the cause of regaining the honour of his fam-
ily name and his status in the army and yet as a means of creating a 
positive historical portrait of himself and thus hiding his weaknesses 
at the time of his arrest and during his long ordeal in prison and other 
aspects of his personality evident in the letters that he did not want 
made public. His weakness and feebleness were very real, and Alfred 
and Lucie both feared throughout the affair that he would not be able 
to make it through with his sanity intact. His hypersensitivity led him 
earlier in his life to assume a pose of aloofness, which was often taken 
as snobbery; he would not chat with his fellow young officers or drink 
with them, or even go riding with them. He was a shy, introspective 
and sometimes annoyingly withdrawn personality, preferring to spend 
time in the evenings with Lucie and the children, holidaying with her or 
his families, and studying.104
In addition, the very selecting and annotating of his letters, like the 
original act of writing them from his cell, provided Dreyfus with a means 
of trying to keep his mind focused and active in the endeavour he had un-
dertaken to maintain his sanity and to avoid falling into despair, and com-
mitting suicide. Unlike the unedited letters, which demonstrate in their 
rhythmic repetition of key phrases and their private code of mutual affec-
tion the inwardness of Dreyfus’s experiences, the edited collection does 
not emphasize this aspect of his circumstances. It misses out on the way he 
and Lucie helped each other create a special private Jewish space for their 
love.105 The edited collection is presented after Alfred’s return to France, 
his release from prison, and is part of the campaign he undertook, along 
104 A number of extravagant lies were concocted at the time of his arrest and publicized in the popular, 
anti-Semitic press that he had been a womanizer and a gambler. Nothing could be further from 
the truth.
105 As Andrew Marvell told his reluctant lover, “The grave’s a fine and private place/ But none do there 
embrace.”
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with his brother Mathieu and other friends and allies, to vindicate his 
name and punish the real culprits in the affair. The book presumes his own 
knowledge of how many supporters he has and how strong his case really 
is and therefore cannot be taken as a true context in which the painfulness 
of self-creation and self-discovery by Lucie and Alfred came about.
Dreyfus also kept a journal and added to it when he came back from 
Devil’s Island. As he found out what had been done on his behalf, both by 
his family and by many strangers, he sought to understand the dynam-
ics of the affair and to discover the truth of what had happened, who 
was really at fault, and who deserved punishment for this intricate and 
complex conspiracy to frame him and to protect the culprits who forged 
documents, perjured themselves in various trials, instigated the anti-
Semitic riots, carried out assassinations, attempted murders, and put 
France into great danger from foreign enemies. While Mathieu Dreyfus 
had quickly transformed himself from an Alsatian manufacturer into a 
clever activist and legal agent on behalf of his brother, and dealt with 
politicians, social leaders, and cultural celebrities, Alfred—very much 
weakened in body and mind by his ordeal—nevertheless trained himself 
to join in the investigations into his case. He too became able to speak to 
the intellectual elite of France as an equal. His journals record his trans-
formation from artillery officer well versed in technological knowledge 
to political scientist and, in a sense, moral philosopher.
The third body of evidence is much more difficult to deal with. It con-
sists of his prison notebooks, the cahiers, kept while on Devil’s Island. 
There were, it seems, at least thirty-five of these workbooks in all,106 
the first twenty of which were destroyed by their author, leaving four-
teen, deposited in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France and now edited 
by Pierrette Turlais in a mixed facsimile-transcribed version. There may 
have been drafts of Alfred’s letters in the first, now missing, notebooks. 
In addition to the mathematical formulae and drawings also probably 
evident in the lost volumes, the remaining cahiers contain in addition 
reading notes and exercises in translation of English.
106 Alfred Dreyfus, Les Cahiers de l’Ile du Diable, ed. Pierrette Turlais (Paris: Éditions Artulis, 2009), 44. 
See also Thomas Wieder, “Les exercices d’écriture du bagnard Alfred Dreyfus,” Le Monde des Livres 
(17 Décembre 2009) online at http://www/lemonde.fr/web/imprimer_element/0,40-0@2-3260, 
50-128 (seen 22 March 2010).
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Shekhina, Lucidity, and illumination
If, therefore, he [Balzac] wrote chiefly to women it was not 
only, as he remarked scoffingly to Théophile Gautier, because 
“cela forme le style,” but from a profound and perhaps partly 
subconscious desire to find the woman who would under-
stand him.
—Stefan Zweig107
The divine woman is an “optical apparatus” that refracts the 
light and renders the veiled image visible, like the rainbow 
that is manifest in the coverings of the cloud.
—Elliot R. Wolfson108
Lucie Hadamard, young as she was during the whole Affair,109 became 
the one person who found out who Alfred Dreyfus really was—that is, 
the real person inside the awkward, shy, and public cipher. Thus, she 
served as the virtual Jewish muse who inspired him with courage to 
explore his inner self and to stay alive as a thinking man. The woman of 
twenty-four at the time of his arrest discovered how, in the very act of 
understanding him as no one else did, neither at the time of the affair 
nor virtually since then, she could transform his love of herself, fam-
ily, and nation into something more than romantic fantasy, sentimental 
piety, and patriotic fanaticism. Michelle Perrot correctly describes her 
character in this situation:
Elle connaît le pouvoir des mots, même différés. Elle est 
consciente de la situation épouvantable que vit son mari. 
107 Stefan Zweig, Balzac, trans. William and Dorothy Rose, 2nd ed. (London: Cassell & Co., 1948 
[1947]), 113. This is the last book that Zweig wrote and posthumously edited from fragmentary 
manuscript pages by Richard Friedenthal in London in 1945.
108 Elliot R. Wolfson, Through a Speculum that Shines: Vision and Imagination in Medieval Jewish 
Mysticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 274. Wolfson, who is paraphrasing 
Zohar 1:18a, b, goes on to say most shockingly, “Here we come again upon the mechanics of vision, 
and the implied iconicity of the divine: what has form is invisible and what is visible has no form” 
(275).
109 When they were married on 21 April, 1890, by the Chief Rabbi, Zadok Kahn, she was twenty years 
old and Alfred was thirty. Cf. Michelle Perrot, “Lucie et Alfred: Avant-propos,” Alfred and Lucie 
Dreyfus, “Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement souvent, écris-moi longuement . . .” Correspondeance 
de l’île du Diable (1894–1899), ed. Vincent Duclert (Paris: Mille et Une Nuits, 2005), 9.
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Elle sait la nervosité de cet être hypersensible, pénétré de 
l’importance du cerveau, organe phare du discours médical, 
qui lui confesse ‘un état d’éréthisme cérébral et nerveux [. . .] 
terrible” (4 Novembre 1897).110
She knew the power of words, even [when] differed. She 
was conscious of the horrible situation in which her hus-
band lived. She knew the nervousness of this overly-ex-
citable being, who perceived the importance of the brain, 
the guiding organ of medical discourse, who confesses to 
her that he is in “a state of extreme cerebral irritability 
and [. . .] terrible nervousness” (4 November 1897).
How she grasped the psychological and psychiatric symptoms Dreyfus 
describes in his letters, which are only partly transferred from his jour-
nals written at the same time, indicates at least four factors in her per-
sonality which surprise and shock anyone familiar with the knowledge 
and understanding supposedly characteristic of middle-class women of 
the period. First, she must have had a particularly acute intuition, very 
much in harmony with her husband’s mentality, and thus been able to 
extrapolate details and implications from his cris du coeur and attempts 
to articulate and hence to control his sense of enervation, the normal 
term for such irritability and unsteadiness. Second, well-read and intel-
ligent, she was able to draw on her own formal education and memories 
of conversations at home with her parents, siblings, their spouses, and 
their intellectual friends, and coordinate it with recollected domestic 
discussions with Alfred during their first four years of marriage. Third, 
Lucie herself was going through a moral crisis—moral in the sense we 
have already shown as usual in the period as the term for what we would 
classify as both psychological and ethical—and thus could read out of 
her own painful experiences an analogy to Alfred’s condition. Fourth, as 
the daughter of a religious Jewish household who imbibed the common-
places and ritual patterns of rabbinical thought and who was educated 
in the essentials of liturgy, prayer, and argumentation accessible to in-
telligent women at the time, Lucie could fit the diagnosis she was intuit-
ing of Alfred’s mental illness with her knowledge of treatments implicit 
110 Michelle Perrot, “Lucie et Alfred: Avant-propos,” 15.
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in many Hebrew proverbs, exemplary tales, and juridical rulings. While 
neither she herself nor her family were as au fait with intellectual devel-
opments in Parisian society as were Proust’s mother and grandmother, 
the latter’s formation in both French and Jewish cultures was probably 
not different in kind from that of Lucie Hadamard.111 Each of these four 
qualities of her character will be discussed as we read our way through 
some of the hundreds of letters exchanged between 1894 and 1898.
Recent historians of the affair, like Michelle Perrot and Vincent Du-
clert, describe Lucie as the embodiment of truth, justice, and wisdom 
who was able to keep her husband sane and alive during the five-year 
ordeal of his imprisonment. More than that, she was to Alfred the incar-
nation or the imaging forth of Emet, Daat, Hochma, and Shechina, pow-
erful, dynamic concepts in Kabbalah. We should be reminded that Kab-
balah was becoming fashionable again amongst intellectuals at the turn 
of the century, and that unlike Eastern forms of mysticism to which it 
is often compared, it is, in Mel Alexenberg’s words, “a down-to-earth 
mysticism to encounter everyday life.”112 More than that, I would ar-
gue, it is a brilliant exercise in mythical and mathematical thinking that 
coordinates rabbinical tradition with the most up-to-date science in its 
milieu, and hence the sort of thought-game that would have interested 
Alfred Dreyfus had he known about it. That he didn’t know in any ex-
plicit way is obvious, but just as obvious, as I hope this book shows, was 
his implicit grasp of its essential principles.113
In Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement souvent, the editors divide 
up the letters according to the historical periods of Alfred’s incarcera-
tion, where he was located and how intense were the isolation and other 
forms of torture applied. The examination that follows, however, does 
not seek to read out of the epistles any historical narrative of their rela-
tionship or any coordination to events taking place in Paris at the same 
time. As we have said, the letters form a continuous process of recreat-
ing their mutual love and loyalty in terms virtually unknown elsewhere 
in nineteenth-century French or European literature, and they may be 
111 Evelyne Bloch-Dano, Madame Proust (Paris: Grasset, 2004).
112 Menachem Wecker, “Interview: Mel Alexenberg” Iconia (31 January, 2007) online at http://iconia. 
canonist.com/2007/01/31/interview-mel-alexenberg (seen 20 December, 2010).
113 How such an implicit absorption or imitation of cultural factors can occur in a family group or 
small community is hinted at in Gabriel Tarde, L’opinion et la foule (Paris: PUF, 1989; orig. 1901), 
66–67, insofar as he begins to use terms and concepts at the heart of contemporary psychohistory, 
such as group fantasy and collective unconscious.
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seen as engaged in a kind of plural analysis.114 It will be seen therefore 
that in the initial period of their communications, while Alfred was 
transferred to different military prisons in France and before the regi-
men of constant censorship, rewriting of letters, and delays or block-
age of delivery was in place, husband and wife could probe each other’s 
responses and teach themselves to read the subtexts in their epistles.
In these letters of late 1894 and early 1895, almost everything that 
will be found later is set out in a preliminary format. The first extant 
letter is the one of Tuesday, 4 December, 1894, that Alfred writes while 
still in the Cherche-Midi prison in Paris waiting for his court-martial. He 
says he finally has a moment in which to write to his dear Lucie.
Je ne peux pas te décrire tout ce que j’ai souffert, il n’y a pas 
au monde de termes assez saisissants pour cela.115
I cannot describe to you all that I have suffered; there are 
not words strong enough for that.
Although these statements are clichés common to all intimate letters 
and especially to lovers forced to be apart, they provide the establish-
ment of a programme to overcome separation and the limits of normal 
language. Alfred will have to learn how to describe his sufferings—that 
is, to find a lexicon of words, phrases, and allusions that communicate 
his condition and his feelings—while Lucie will have to learn how to 
confirm his ordeal by expressing her understanding and her sympathet-
ic suffering. Three aspects to the problem are (1) hitherto, the couple 
have not had to write letters to one another, except the normal notes 
back and forth when, during their courtship, Alfred was on manoeuvres, 
and so now both must learn how to translate their ordinary oral com-
munications by fragmentary speech, gestures, and acts of endearment 
to one another into coherent written discourse; (2) as a respectable Pa-
114 The term is taken from the teachings of William Théaux, a French psychoanalyst who studied with 
Jacques Lacan in the 1960s and who developed in Paris and Lyons a form of relationship between 
analyst and analysands based on the group of patients making a contract with and monitoring the 
doctor in such a way as to interfere with the usual problems of transference: countertransference 
since it was the collective that had the power not the authoritative analyst. This mutuality of the 
Dreyfus couple also suggests other forms of lay analysis conducted by groups of individuals who 
alternatively play the roles of analyst and analysand.
115 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 70.
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risian middle-class couple they suddenly have to override the norms and 
conventions of that respectability, with its built-in dominance by the 
husband, the reticence of the wife, and the coyness of both to articulate 
intimate desires, longings, and memories; and (3) as a mostly assimi-
lated Jewish man and woman writing to each other in French, they have 
to devise some strategies for expressing deeper, more emotionally-laden 
and culturally-particular feelings and memories associated with their 
Jewishness.
Now a few lines later in the same letter, Alfred says,
Mais j’espère en Dieu en la justice, la vérité finira bien par se 
faire jour. Ma conscience est calme et tranquille, elle ne me 
reproche rien.116 
But I hope for Justice in God, that the Truth will finally 
see the dawn of day. My conscience is calm and tranquil, 
and reproaches me in nothing.
For virtually the first and only time in all his letters, Alfred here 
explicitly expresses his belief in God; later he will allow Lucie to make 
those references, even obliquely, while he speaks, as he does in the next 
part of the sentence, of his secular faith in justice and truth. He is firm 
in his beliefs and is sure that ultimately the truth will out against all the 
calumnies brought against him. Yet by the next pasage, he is starting 
to describe a mental state that will trouble him throughout his entire 
five years of incarceration, one that Lucie will recognize as having been 
evident in nuce from the beginning of their relationship:
J’ai toujours fait mon devoir, jamais je n’ai fléchi la tête. J’ai 
été accablé, atterré dans ma prison sombre, en tête-à-tête 
avec mon cerveau, j’ai eu des moments de folie farouche, j’ai 
même divagué, mais ma conscience veillait.117
I have always done my duty, never have I bowed my 
head. I have been overwhelmed, thrown to the earth in 
116 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 70.
117 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 70.
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my dark prison, in a conversation with my own brain, I 
have had moments of wild madness, I have been inco-
herent, but my conscience watched over me.
In what seems like a contradiction, he claims that he has never 
bowed down before adversity, like Mordechai in the book of Esther 
when asked to bow before the tyrant Haman, or like any Jews under 
pressure to bow to the idols of worldly power and corruption. The brute 
force brought against him has been overpowering, and he has been 
brought low, as he has, by implication in the metaphoric use of the 
same words that describe how he is actually—and will be even worse 
off as the time goes on, having been subjected to cruel treatment and 
torture. Nevertheless, in this state of physical and psychological de-
feat, he has entered into a dialogue with himself, a tête à tête with his 
brain, his mind, his intellect, and his inner self. Note how each of these 
clauses seems to relate to the others less as a developmental order of 
intensifying understanding or engagement but more as a string of non 
sequiturs, as though all were simultaneous, part of the knot of confused 
sensations and thoughts that assail him. Yet despite this confusion, 
he comes back to his faith, now in the form of his conscience that is 
the nurse, guide, and guardian of his sanity—his rational self. It is the 
guardian angel, the guiding spirit, this image of God in himself that 
he knows will protect him, but at the same time, given the context of 
all the subsequent letters, this conscience is also something else: it is 
Lucie herself, as he repeats more and more often, whose picture is in 
his mind118 and whose constructed presence in his imagination keeps 
him healthy, alive, and sane—she is, in other words, his Shekhina, his 
Hochma, his embodiment of justice and truth.119
118 “Created in the image of divine reality, man is its realization in matter” (Benmozegh, Israel and 
Humanity, 155).
119 Wolfson shows that “Through the agency of the imagination one enters the ‘ắlam al-mithắl’ (mundus 
imaginalis), in Henry Corbin’s telling phrase, which is not the imaginary world of subjective 
fantasy or psychotic hallucination, but is instead a realm where invisible realities become visible 
and corporeal entities are spiritualized. The world of the imaginal [sic] is an intermediary realm 
wherein the imaginative forms (or archetypal images) symbolize the intelligible in terms of the 
sensory. The primary function of the imagination is hermeneutical: rather than recalling past 
sense data or combining these data in some innovative and, technically speaking, unexperienced 
way, the imagination produces symbols of the spiritual entities that act as interpretive filtering 
screens through which these entities appear in human consciousness,” (Through a Speculum that 
Shines, 61, 62.] As we shall subsequently show, in Dreyfus’ special epistolary relationship with his 
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Then Alfred continues with his letter:
Elle [i.e., his rational inner self] me disait: “Haut la tête 
et regarde le monde en face! Fort de ta conscience, marche 
droite et relève-toi! C’est une épreuve épouvantable, mais il 
faut la subir.”120
She spoke to me: “Hold your head up high and look the 
world in the face! Fortified by your conscience, march 
forward and free yourself! It is a horrible ordeal, but you 
must submit to it.”
Preparing himself for the ceremony of disgrace when his military in-
signia will be stripped away and his sword broken and when he will be 
marched before the troops as a mark of his humiliation, Dreyfus girds 
up his loins with courage, rehearsing too his dignified refusal to accede 
to the charges against him by signalling to Lucie what he will do in the 
courtyard: he will shout out repeatedly, “I am innocent!” and “Vive la 
France!”
In a postscript to this letter, the husband warns his wife of the fact 
that from now on, they will have no moments and no place of intimacy, 
and that all their private messages will need to be oblique and secretive:
Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement à la prison: tes let-
tres passeront comme les miennes, par M. le Commissaire du 
Gouvernement.121
Write to me in prison; your letters will pass like my own 
through the Government Superintendent 
A more significant directive to Lucie than this reminder that from now 
on everything they say or write or do will be under strict censorship is 
wife, neither the Sufi ideas nor the Jungian concept of archetype plays a part. However, Wolfson’s 
most secret and shocking insights from medieval Jewish Kabbalah do touch on one of the most 
hidden of the torments Alfred experienced, the long separation from sexual relations with Lucie 
and the inability of his finding any relief because of his round-the-clock surveillance and because 
at times he was shackled to his bed throughout the night.
120 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 70.
121 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 71.
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given in Alfred’s letter of 10 December, wherein he tells her,
Nous aurons besoin tous deux de nous soigner réciproque-
ment pour oublier cette terrible éprouve, la plus terrible que 
les forces humaines puissant supporter.122
We will both have need to take care of one another in 
order to forget this terrible ordeal, the most awful the 
human powers can sustain.
Here is a recognition of reciprocity in their ordeal and of the need 
for mutual endurance, and a dynamic and interactive process of com-
municating to create a place out of real space and a time out of real time 
where they can not only share their love and loyalty but also generate 
the power necessary to transform the status quo, a process that Lucie 
must undertake on her own, against all expectations of a young married 
woman, and with Alfred providing his own support and directions for 
her efforts. In the event, of course, he does not know and therefore can-
not appreciate all that she is doing, both on her own and in collaboration 
with his brother, Mathieu, and other members of the family, along with 
a growing number of Dreyfusards who rally to the cause over the years.
Meanwhile, Lucie, through intuition and intelligent guesswork, tries 
to translate the clues and hints provided by her husband’s letters at once 
to feed him back the strength he needs from his own words, by her con-
firmation in repetition of what he says or implies, and to avoid raising 
false expectations or generating suspicions in the censorious eyes al-
ways monitoring her letters.
We can see this happening in the first of her letters printed in Ecris-
moi souvent, écris moi longuement, from 23 December, 1894. She begins 
with exclamations of sympathy and pathos:
Mon pauvre, pauvre Fred chéri,
Quel malheur, qu’elle torture, quelle ignominie. Nous en 
sommes tous terrifies, anéantis. Je sais comme tu es coura-
geux, je t’admire. Tu es un malheureux martyr.123
122 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 74.
123 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 80.
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My poor, poor Fred darling,
What unhappiness, what torture, what ignominy. We are 
all frightened, crushed. I know that you are courageous, 
and I admire you. You are an unhappy martyr.
Not Lucie alone but both her whole family and his are dumbfounded 
by what has happened, and no one believes the charges against him are 
possible. She has probably not received his letters yet, or if she has, they 
have not registered yet in their full import, so she speaks here on behalf 
of the whole extended family (the mishpucha) to reassure him that he 
is not forgotten or rejected. She also must begin to urge on him the 
importance of not giving in to despair, of not taking the soldier’s way 
out—suicide—as hoped for by his brother officers in their initial search 
for confirmation of guilt, to avoid the tedious duties of preparing a case 
against him. She remains loyal. Unlike so many wives and families in 
similar circumstances, real and fictional, Lucie does not desert him in 
his time of need, having complete and utter faith in his innocence, nor 
will either of their families, no matter what public ridicule is poured 
over them and what social inconveniences are put in their way, such as 
servants leaving their employ, having to move into one large household 
together, and pooling their wealth to employ the best lawyers and de-
tectives to defend him and get to the bottom of the mystery. Thus, she 
reassures Alfred:
Notre vie, notre fortune à tous sera sacrifiée à la recherche du 
coupable; nous le trouverons, il le faut. Tu seras réhabilité.124
Our life, our fortune, all will be sacrificed in the search 
for the guilty party, we will find him, we must. You will 
be rehabilitated.
By her second letter of 23 December, written in the evening, she be-
gins to play off his words. She echoes his cries of pain and anguish, his 
fears of going mad, and his asseverations of innocence, and speaks now 
with a different form of “we” than in the earlier letter, where it seemed 
124 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 80.
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primarily to stand for all the people in his and her family; now it rep-
resents more clearly the couple itself, husband and wife, who must see 
themselves as together in this ordeal, each one’s pains and humiliations, 
loneliness and torture, to be shared and thus made bearable.
Tu sais si je t’aime, si je t’adore, mon bien cher mari; no-
tre immense malheur, l’horrible infamie dont nous sommes 
l’objecte ne font que resserrer encore les liens de mon af-
fection.125
You must know that I love you so much, that I adore you 
so much, my dearly beloved husband, our immense un-
happiness, the horrible infamy of which we are the ob-
ject can only strengthen the ties of my affection.
Then she echoes the famous words of Ruth in the Bible126 when she 
comes back with her mother-in-law Naomi to live with her as a dutiful 
daughter-in-law. For though a Moabite, the traditional enemy of the Is-
raelites, she avers,
Où tu iras j’irai, où tu demeuras je demeurerai; ton peuple 
sera mon people, et ton Dieu sera mon Dieu; où tu mourras je 
mourrai, et j’y serai enterrée (I.16–17)
For whither thou goest, I shall go; whither thou lodgest 
I shall lodge. Thy people shall be my people, and thy God 
shall be my God; where thou diest, will I die, and there 
will I be buried.
This passage is a locus classicus of Jewish love and loyalty across all 
differences and distances.
Partout où tu iras, où l’on t’enverra, je te suivrai; à deux nous 
supporterons plus facilement l’expatriement, nous vivrons 
125 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 81.
126 As well as of the Song of Songs: “Set me as a seal upon thine heart, as a seal upon thine arm: for love 
is strong as death . . . .” (8.6).
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l’un pour l’autre . . . ; nous élèverons nos enfants, nous leur 
donnerons une âme bien trempée contre les vicissitudes de 
la vie.127
Wherever you will go, wherever they will send you, I will 
follow you, we two together will support the expatria-
tion more easily, we will live for one another . . . ; we will 
raise our children, we will give them a soul well-tempered 
against the vicissitudes of life.128
Although her words may echo romantic novels and other exagger-
ated and postured literature, in this letter, Lucie pushes herself beyond 
the boundaries of bourgeois convention to assert the mutuality of their 
love, not only a passionate sensual amour between lovers but a domestic 
bond transcending sentimental pieties. Later, to be sure, it will become 
clear that a special law has been passed in the assembly to keep Alfred 
from being sent to New Caledonia, where wives could follow their hus-
bands and even bring their children to be raised in the colony. He will 
be sent to Cayenne, to the small former leper colony island known as 
the Ile du Diable, and there kept in isolation and subjected to unprec-
edented indignities. At the moment, however, when Lucie still believes 
there is a chance to go into exile with her husband, she is prepared to 
leave her comfortable life, her family, and her Jewish community to be 
with Alfred. When Alfred eventually hears of this, he will argue against 
her plans. Even before he knows of the destination of his exile, he does 
not want his wife to separate herself from her family and take the chil-
dren away from their cousins and grandparents, and the opportunities 
for education possible only in Paris; most of all, to accomplish his deep 
wish to be reunited with her, he needs Lucie to stay in France and lead 
the fight on his behalf against the wrongful charges brought against him 
and the judicial error committed in the court-martial.
In making himself dependent on his wife in this way, Alfred departs 
127 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 81.
128 A friend from France thought the words as well as the sentiments of the loving husband and 
wife “old–fashioned.” But this reversion to a somewhat archaic diction and attitude certainly is 
the heart of the matter, especially as the passage echoes biblical Hebrew. The lovers support one 
another because they otherwise would fall, as a house collapses in a storm, as a wounded person 
needs the aid of another to stand straight. Their souls are well-tempered, in the sense of a musical 
instrument that stays in tune despite changes in the atmosphere.
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from the normal continuities of domestic politics as understood in most 
of Europe at this time, which has men dominant and actors in the pub-
lic sphere and women subordinate and at best active in the privacy of 
their homes or in small salon circles. Their love will be changed into one 
based on friendship, mutual trust, and negotiations of how to do and 
say things in public. Thus, in his letter of 24 December, 1894,129 Alfred 
writes to Lucie:
Oui, ma chérie, tu es sublime de courage et de dévouement; 
tu vaux mieux que moi. Je t’aimais déjà de tout mon cœur et 
de toute mon âme; aujourd’hui, je fais plus, je t’admire. Tu es 
certes une des plus nobles femmes qui soient sur terre. Mon 
admiration pour toi est telle que, si j’arrive à boire le calice 
jusqu’au bout, ce sera pour être digne de ton héroïsme.130
Yes, my beloved, you are sublime in your courage and 
your devotion, you are worth more than I am. I loved 
you already with all my heart and all my soul; today I do 
more, I admire you. You are indeed one of the most no-
ble women ever on earth. My admiration for you is such 
that if I reach the end and must drain the chalice to the 
dregs, it will be in honor of your heroism.
Here we can see the husband worshipping his wife, a sublime and no-
ble woman, praising her for her courage and heroism, so much so that he 
would be honoured if he were called upon to sacrifice himself, as Jesus 
did before his Crucifixion, but such an explicit Christian concept might 
be given a less offensive tone by alluding obliquely to a classical instance, 
the point in his imprisonment when Socrates chose to drink the hem-
lock. Implicit in this confession of his faith in Lucie (Pennina or Pn’ei 
Or, meaning the Face of Light, divine illumination, or enlightenment) 
is recognition in her of the qualities associated in Jewish tradition with 
heroic figures such as Esther, Judith, or Ruth, females hypostatized in 
129 They do not take notice of the fact that it is Christmas Eve. The normal calendar, Christian or 
Jewish, disappears before the existential time of their suffering and love. Holidays are only 
mentioned in reference to the children, both when Lucie speaks of their excitement and Alfred of 
the need to purchase them toys.
130 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 84.
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kabbalistic tradition to the roles of Wisdom, Truth, and Shekhina, the 
shadow or presence of God in exile.
In response, not necessarily direct since letters were constantly de-
layed and crisscrossing each other, on 26 December, 1894, Lucie pens 
these words:
Pauvre cher Freddy, comme tu es courageux, quelles horri-
bles tortures tu endures. Tu es bon, foncièrement bon, tu as 
toujours été pour moi le plus tendre, le plus attentionné des 
maris, tu m’as témoigné pendant ces quatre années de vie 
commune une affection, un dévouement dont je te sais recon-
naissante et, mon pauvre trésor, ce qu’il y a de plus pénible 
c’est que tu n’es pas du tout au bout de tes souffrances. Je te 
demande un énorme sacrifice, celui de vivre pour moi, pour 
tes enfants, de lutter jusqu’à ta réhabilitation qui, j’en suis 
convaincue et nous le sommes tous, ne tardera pas à venir.131
Poor dear Freddy, how courageous you are, what horri-
ble tortures you are enduring. You are good, thoroughly 
good, you have always been to me the most tender, the 
most attentive of husbands, you have vouchsafed to me 
over four years of our life together an affection, a devo-
tion of which I am completely conscious and, my poor 
treasure, what is even more distressing is that you are 
not at the end of your sufferings. I ask of you an enor-
mous sacrifice, that of living for me, for your children, of 
fighting on until your rehabilitation which, I am utterly 
convinced and so are all of us, will not be late in coming.
This mutual admiration society increases in intensity into a virtual 
cult of mutual worship, as when Alfred writes on 26 December, 1894:
Tu es sublime, mon adorée, et j’admire ton courage et ton 
héroïsme, Je t’aimais déjà; aujourd’hui, je me mets à deux 
genoux devant toi, car tu es une femme sublime. 132 
131 Ecris-moi souvent écris moi longuement, 88.
132 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 89
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You are sublime, my adored one, and I admire your cour-
age and your heroism. I loved you before already, but to-
day I bend both my knees before you, for you are a sub-
lime woman.
In one sense, the pattern of worship, adoration, and genuflection re-
calls the Marian worship popular in France during the second half of 
the nineteenth century, as seen in Emile Zola’s Lourdes, the first novel 
in his trilogy, Les Trois Villes,133 which describes the ecstatic fervour dis-
played at the shrine. It would have been difficult for a person to live in 
Paris in those years and not be affected by the intensity of the Catholic 
cult, even if, like Alfred and Lucie, as assimilated Jews, he or she found 
the whole idea of such popular mysticism bizarre and repugnant. Al-
though the pair may have known something of Jewish mysticism, with 
its kabbalistic rituals and formulae, it would also have been foreign to 
their sensibilities. However, in times of extreme stress and anxiety, the 
language and iconography overcome these cultural filters, and the terms 
and concepts come streaming into their letters as a way of expressing 
the inexpressible and imagining the unimaginable. At one point, break-
ing the conventions of bourgeois French patriarchy, not in the manner 
of Romantic poets or even earlier troubadors from Provence, Alfred ex-
claims: “Decidément, ma chère adorée, les femmes sont supérieures à nous; 
parmi elles, tu es des plus belles et des plus nobles figures que je connaisse”134 
(Decidedly, my dearly adored, women are superior to us [men]; amongst 
them, you are the most beautiful and noble that I know). This hyper-
bolical language of love, is it sincere? Should we take it literally? In what 
sense is it metaphorical?
Without it, Alfred finds that he has no other way to tell Lucie about 
what he is going through: he can, he claims, resist the physical suffer-
ing—“elles glissent sur ma peau” (they slide off my skin). But what he 
133 Emile Zola, Trois Villes, trans. as Lourdes, Rome, Paris by Ernest A. Vizatelly. It is especially in 
the crowd scenes of pilgrims processing up and around and then into the shrine of Our Lady 
of Lourdes—chapter after chapter of increasing ecstasy and bizarre behaviors—where Zola 
manifests the full power of the fanaticism in the pious Catholics of all ranks in society. This wild 
scene might also be compared to the religious excitement Zola describes in the second volume 
of the trilogy, Rome, where a papal ceremony nearly turns into a riot, and the Holy Father has to 
escape, though first trying to salvage the many coins that roll away.
134 Alfred to Lucie, 27 December, 1894: Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 94.
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cannot face is “cette torture morale” (this moral torture). As we pointed 
out already, the term moral plays a key role in the formation of the expe-
riential basis of the affair and the way those closest to its centre respond 
to it: it refers to ethical, emotional, psychological, and spiritual states of 
being in the individual and the various collectivities involved, not least 
the husband-wife unit of Alfred and Lucie, their immediate families, 
and the inner circle of early Dreyfusards. This moral torture is also “le 
drame le plus effroyable” (the most horrible drama), a calvaire (a calvary) 
or martyre (a martyrdom). In other words, something inflicted by one 
group on another person who is himself less an individual than a meto-
nymic representative for the group he or she belongs to. It is a festival 
of hate, pain, and humiliation against the central figure, who remains in 
the heart of the panopticon, where all can see him, although only a few, 
like Lucie, feel along with him because they are part of him.135
Alfred writes to his wife on the twenty-sixth of December—note 
how many letters are written in one or two days, as though writing is 
the only way for both of them to endure the torment of their separation 
and the knowledge of the other’s sufferings:
Ah! ma chérie, si je ne t ‘avais, comme je quitterais la vie avec 
délices! Ton amour me retient, lui seul me permet de sup-
porter la haine de tout un people.136
Ah, my cherished one, if I did not have you, how I would 
quit this life with joy! Your love holds me back, the only 
thing that enables me to support the hatred of a whole 
people.
135 On what happens when the ritualized and licit Festival of Laughter and Blood gives way to the 
violent outbursts on the street of a new game called Pasquino, listen to Romain Rolland: “The more 
moral stringency paralyzed action and gagged speech, the bolder did action become and speech 
the more untrammeled during those few days. Everything that was secreted away in the lower 
depths of the soul, jealousy, secret hate, lewd curiosity, the malicious instincts inherent in the 
socials animal, would burst forth with all the vehemence and joy of revenge. Every man had the 
right to go into the streets, and, prudently masked, to nail to the pillory in full view of the public 
gaze, the object of his detestation, to lay before all and sundry all that he had found by a year of 
patient industry, his whole hoard of scandalous secrets gathered drop by drop” (Jean Christophe, 
vol. III, 305). In a sense, the Dreyfus Affair works in an analogous way, when France, afraid to 
speak the secret anxieties over modernization, projects its inner demons and empties the poison 
sack of its self-hatred on to the Jew and pretends it is all for reasons of state and the ideals of king, 
army, and church.
136 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 91.
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The enormity of the humiliation and shame he feels is registered as 
the hatred of the whole nation, all of France, every single person outside 
of his own family, especially Lucie, and every institution and principle 
he once believed in with the fervour of a devotee.
The second section of Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement is devot-
ed to letters written from 5 to 17 January, 1895, while Alfred was kept 
in the Santé Prison awaiting deportation to Devil’s Island. Reassuring 
his wife on 5 January, 1894, that the degradation having been passed 
through and the impending exile being imminent, “Le moral tient” (his 
moral being remains strong and firm, his inner courage); he neverthe-
less “commence à être à bout de patience et de forces” (begins to feel his pa-
tience and his strength running out).137 He also fears the moral collapse 
of his mind, the plunge into a mad and painful confusion of his nervous 
structure: “il me semblait que j’étais le jouet d’une hallucination” (it seemed 
to me as though I were a plaything in an hallucination).138
Then on the evening of the same day, not finding any consolation, 
he cries out in near despair that all his ambitions, achievements, and 
honour, and his love and devotion to the fatherland are all “perdues par 
une machination qui procède bien plus du fantastique que du réel”139 (lost in 
a machination—what we have decided to call the contraption—that is 
driven more by the fantastic than the real). In the letters that follow, 
Alfred and Lucie repeat the basic terms and images of the letters from 
Cherche-Midi, even with the constant warning that “M. de Directuer de 
la prison . . . est obligé de lire toutes me lettres”140 (the Prison Warden is 
required to read all my letters). These writings, though, also advance the 
thoughts and feelings the husband and wife have about one another, 
something that shows them both learning, each in their own style, to 
operate within the straitened circumstances of distance and isolation, 
and the text thus confirms our earlier interpretations and also exposes 
the semantic zone allusion the Dreyfuses express, whether or not they 
are fully conscious of its implications.
Not all that they write indicates a realization of the need to main-
tain a secret code drawing on their shared Jewish background, but the 
137 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 119.
138 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 120.
139 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 122.
140 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 131.
——————————————— 2. Alfred and Lucie’s Love Letters ———————————————
 
— 139 —
evidence does begin to mount that to a certain degree, they are indeed 
aware of something different and deeper in their minds emerging in 
these letters. Thus, on 8 January, 1895, in the same letter in which 
Alfred mentions the censorship operative all the time on his letters—
meaning those he writes and those sent to him—he also says,
Tu me demandes aussi, ma chérie, ce que je fais du matin au 
soir, et du soir au matin. Je ne veux pas te communiquer mes 
tristes réflexions, ta douleur est déjà assez grande, et il est 
inutile de l’augmenter encoure. Ce que je t’ai dit plus haut 
suffit pour te faire comprendre ce que je désire en ce moment: 
l’exil en plein air avec toi, en attendant la réhabilitation,
Quant au reste, je te le raconterai plus tard, quand nous se-
rons réunis et heureux.141
You also ask me, my darling, what I do from sunrise to 
sunset and from sunset to sunrise. I do not want to tell 
you my sad reflections, your grief being already great 
enough, and it is useless to increase it further. What I 
told you above suffices for now to let you understand 
what I desire at this very moment: exile in the open air 
with you, waiting for the rehabilitation.
As for the rest, I will tell you everything much later, 
when we are reunited and happy.
On the surface, Alfred says he will not give her details of his daily rou-
tine and thus fill his letters with a diary of the experiences and feelings 
of each day. He rejects the use of the letter as a journal of events and a 
narrative of his shifting emotions. What he has written already—a few 
brief descriptions of the conditions under which he is imprisoned—are 
all he will say on this matter. More profoundly, the dismissal of her re-
quest to share through letters his every moment of suffering indicates 
that the letters will be directed to a different level of experience and use 
language for a purpose other than conveying information.
In a letter from la Santé Prison written on 9 January, 1895, Alfred 
speaks to Lucie in one of his most explicitly Jewish confessions. He be-
141 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 132.
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gins by telling her that he has just received a batch of belated letters 
from her and the rest of the family. In these circumstances, he tells her, 
“Il faut nous incliner et suffrir en silence”142 (We must bow down and 
suffer in silence)—that is, accept the inevitable with resignation and 
make no cries of complaint or pain. Recalling the day of his degradation 
the previous Sabbath, he declares, “Cette journée de Samedi reste dans 
mon esprit gravée en lettres de feu”143 (This day of the Sabbath/Saturday 
remains engraven on my heart in letters of fire), an image drawn from 
biblical and rabbinical writings, alluding to the tables of the law pre-
sented to Moses on Mount Sinai, and in kabbalistic terms, the flaming 
letters of the covenant between God and Israel. There may also be found 
a Christological resonance in these words, however, suggested further 
in his comment that “[M]on coeur a saigné, il saigne encore, il ne vit qu’avec 
l’espoir qu’on lui rendra un jour ses gallons, qu’il a noblement gagnés et qu’il 
n’a jamais souillés”144 (My heart bled and bleeds yet, it cannot live with-
out the hope that one day the stripes will be returned, those so nobly 
earned and never tainted). The image of the bleeding heart, however, 
does not allude to Jesus on the cross but to his own wrongful sacrifice 
in the ceremony of degradation, a dishonour he hopes will be reversed, 
the language now shifting from its religious aura to that of military re-
habilitation, with his officer’s braids returned and his rank and name 
restored.
The idea of purgation from the taint of the false charges of treason 
and espionage ambiguously sits between three points of reference: the 
ancient Jewish notion of sin-offerings, the Christian myth of salvation 
through the bleeding heart of Jesus, and the military code of honour 
and rehabilitation.145 In another Sabbath letter, this one written on 12 
142 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 133.
143 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 133.
144 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 133.
145 In his address to the First Zionist Congress in Basle on 20 August 1897, Max Nordau imagined the 
disappointments and disillusionments of the assimilated Western Jew when he or she discovers 
that their place in the society they believe to be home is questioned by those who dominate that 
nation, a realization that follows “recent tendencies,” that is, the Dreyfus Affair: “The Western 
Jew has bread, but man does not live on bread alone. The life of the Western Jew is no longer 
endangered through the enmity of the mob; but bodily wounds are not the only wounds that 
cause pain, and from which one may bleed to death. The Western Jew meant emancipation to 
be real liberation, and hastened to draw the final conclusions therefrom. But the nations [i.e., 
the goyim,] made him fear that he erred in being so heedlessly logical. The magnanimous laws, 
magnanimously lay down the theory of equality of rights. But governments and society exercise 
the practice of equality of rights in a manner which renders it the same mockery as did the 
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January, 1895, Alfred wrestles with his belief in God and his trust in the 
law, also ambiguously rendered as having its primary focus on French 
republican principles and more covertly in Jewish notions of justice and 
truth:
S’il y a une justice en ce monde, il faut espérer que la vérité 
éclatera bientôt et nous dédommagera de tout ce que nous 
avons souffert.146
If there is justice in this world, we must hope that the 
truth will break through soon and compensate us for all 
that we have suffered.
Here again he speaks of the redeeming light that will shine through 
the darkness to solve the mystery of who the real culprit is in the case 
of treason and espionage, but also, more allusively, he thinks religiously 
and Jewishly of the divine power of the law to set the world straight on 
its path of righteousness again, the hope for messianic rescue from dark-
ness and ignorance, with the pains and humiliations serving here as sin 
offerings—that is, his and Lucie’s part in fulfilling the terms of the brit, 
the covenant entered into at Sinai. But this is not the humble, patient 
suffering of Christian schemes of salvation, where the help comes from 
outside, aided variously by faith and good works, but rather in Hebrew 
concepts of participation by the individual and drawing on the stock of 
merit (zekhut) built up by all of Israel and the tikkun (gathering up of 
lost and hidden sparks) of each person and each generation through the 
performance of mitzvot (obligatory acts of charity, ritual gestures, etc.). 
Only in this way, Alfred says, can “cette énigme indéchifferable”147 (the 
indecipherable puzzle) be solved. A few days later he puts it this way:
appointment of Sancho Panza to the splendid position of Viceroy of the Island of Barataria. The 
Jew says naively: ‘I am a human being, and I regard nothing human as alien,’ the answer he meets 
is: ‘Softly, your rights as a man must be enjoyed cautiously; you lack the right notion of honour, 
feeling for duty, morality, patriotism, idealism [everything, in fact, that Alfred Dreyfus lived and 
suffered for]. You must, therefore, hold aloof from all vocations which make possession of these 
qualifications as conditions [and when Alfred held himself aloof, he was mocked for having no 
feelings].” “Speech of Max Nordau at the First Zionist Congress, August 29, 1897,” translated and 
reprinted on Mideast Web online at http://www.mideastweb.org (seen 12 December 2010).
146 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 141.
147 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 142.
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Cette nuit, je ne me suis encore endormi qu’à 2 heures de ma-
tin. J’ai pensé à toi, à vous tous, à cette énigme épouvant-
able que je voudrais déchiffrer . . . J’ai roulé dans ma cervelle 
mille moyens plus violents, plus extravagants les uns que les 
autres à vous indiquer pour déchirer le voile derrière lequel 
s’abrite un monstre.148
Tonight I could not fall asleep until 2 a.m. I was thinking 
of you, of all of you, of this horrible enigma that I wish I 
could decipher . . . I turned over in my head a thousand 
violent ways, each one more violent and extravagant 
than the other, to show you how to tear the veil behind 
which hides a monster.
Again, looking at this passage, what seems fairly simple in the be-
ginning—his sleepless tossing and turning all night worrying about the 
puzzle of his accusation and punishment and the need to find out the 
identity of the real spy and traitor who committed the horrible crime he 
was found guilty of—turns out to be much more complex. There are two 
different problems to solve that keep him awake: one is the mystery of 
who brought about the false charges against him—later this will come 
to include the need to understand the reasons why his brother officers 
and the institutions he had so much faith in turned against him—and 
the other, how to communicate to Lucie the need to see behind the veil 
of mystery that lies over their lives.
While he calls upon a variety of discourses well known in literature 
and scholarship about different kinds of love, what he does not mention 
here explicitly is the other figure of sacrifice for love and purification 
through suffering, Lucie, his dependence upon her as his superior, god-
like guide and nurse who under the awful circumstances of their plight 
must speak and act on his behalf in Paris. It is this “amour reciproque”149 
that is at the heart of their new relationship, new for them, to be sure, 
but also new in literature, as it extends and transforms the Neoplaton-
ic imagery of twelfth- and thirteenth-century troubador concepts of 
148 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 146.
149 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 138.
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fin’amor, phenomena hinted at but never fully developed in the theo-
retical-autobiographical essays of Stendhal, Michelet, and others in the 
course of the nineteenth century, as well as in the novels of Balzac, Flau-
bert, and Bourget. Not only do sensual or sexual relationships merge 
with ideas of hypostatized friendship, as in the courtly love treatises, 
with Ovidean realism impregnating Christian spirituality with real pas-
sions of the flesh, but Alfred and Lucie’s letters raised the domestic love 
of parents for children and concern for their education and future de-
velopment to a level of psychological bonding and social reformation. 
These ideas are hinted at in the epistles; they are developed more fully 
in the prison cahiers.
I hinted earlier that one of the ways Alfred and Lucie find to dis-
cuss deeper meanings in their relationship and in the circumstances 
they are trying to work their way through was through their discus-
sions—and even, at times, arguments—about how to bring up their 
children, discipline them, educate them, and prepare them for their fu-
tures, which may be always tainted with the charges against Alfred. It 
is the “gazouillement”150 (chirping or chattering) of the little ones that 
allows Lucie to act as a conduit, translator, and encoder of their and 
her own deepest feelings in letters she composes on their behalf.151 Her 
intentions are the best, both to cheer her husband with reports on the 
progress of little Pierre and Jeanne, to confirm their innocent and un-
mitigated love and longing for their pappa, and to express longings of 
her own that exceed the proprieties of middle-class etiquette; they also 
serve to provide an alternative topic of conversation than that of Al-
fred’s sufferings in prison, in that the upbringing of the little ones is a 
joint responsibility and Lucie claims to be turning for advice and sup-
port to the father in these matters. That these reports mirror Alfred’s 
own may not be a conscious aspect of her writings, but it is all too clear 
to the outside observer, looking back long after the events, that the cou-
150 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 150, 151, etc.
151 Chaim Vital in Sh’ar Ruah ha-Qodesh 5d (The Gate of the Holy Spirit) speaks of sifsufe ‘ofot, the 
chirping of birds: “Sometimes they can be explained in another manner, for the soul of some 
righteous person comes from the upper world and is clothed in that form and image; it is not 
an actual creature or bird, but only appears and is seen in this way, and he reveals the secrets of 
Torah” (cited by Wolfson, Through a Speculum that Shines, 320). For Alfred and Lucie, the children 
are the visual manifestation of their act of love that produced Jeanne and Pierre, as well as the 
showing forth of the innocent honor they must protect. As in Vital’s explication, their chattering 
can be translated into the deepest secrets of their parents’ hopes and fears.
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ple’s letters are also transcribed and their own intentions, whether fully 
known or not, have to be translated into terms appropriate to their so-
cial condition and to the special terms of the prison authorities.
But just as prison censors and politicians when asked to read the let-
ters sympathetically could only find them tedious and vacuous, so Lu-
cie—and sometimes Alfred himself—apologizes for the repetitiveness 
and clumsiness in expression.
Tu dois trouver mes lettres bien monotones, mon pauvre 
vieux, je me répète dans toutes, toujours je t’exhorte au cour-
age. Je te vois te crisper en lisant ces lignes, mais je t’en con-
jure, maîtrise tes nerfs, pense moins à notre malheur. Je sais 
combine cela est difficile, car je passé moi-même par ces mo-
ments d’angoisse tels que je ne sais que deviner.152
You must find my letters very monotonous, my poor old 
fellow. I repeat myself in all of them, always exhorting 
you to courage. I can see you growing irritable in read-
ing these lines, but I conjure you to control your nerves, 
think less of our misery. I know how hard that can be, for 
I too experience these moments of anguish, such that I 
only know will keep coming.153
The unusual term of endearment, “mon pauvre vieux,” signals an odd 
tone to this apologetic. She already knows that Alfred craves her let-
ters, receives them with ecstatic joy, and constantly rereads them, so 
her expressions of worry that he will be irritated by her repetitiveness 
are surely further indications of an encoded message between them. It 
is true, certainly, that she needs to keep saying over and over how much 
she admires his courage, just as she must remind him to avoid despair, 
to master his delicate nerves, and to remember that she shares with him 
all the anguish of the ordeal they are going through. But the repetitive-
152 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 151.
153 The syntax is obscure here, and Norbert Col suggests translating the last half of the last sentence: 
“for I too experience such moments of anguish that I can only make guesses.” However, it is best 
that we simply recognize that Dreyfus is writing in pain and frustration. The amazing thing is how 
often, despite this, he breaks out of the doldrums and creates a virtual metaphysical conceit in 
praise of Lucie and of love.
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ness in the letters also indicates that what the husband and wife are 
doing is fighting against the system that separates them physically and 
tries to interrupt the easy, intimate flow of information between them. 
Since they cannot present to each other a running and logical pattern 
of statement and response, following a relatively orderly chronological 
framework, because delivery of mail is awkward, haphazard, and delib-
erately constrained, as well as being subject to prying eyes ever vigilant 
to find either or both of them involved in some sort of Jewish conspir-
acy against the army or the republic, they need to remind themselves 
that the letters do not form a record of daily events, whose progress can 
be tracked through cause and effect, but a steady stream of confirma-
tions and reassurances of their mutual love and loyalty. They also need 
to communicate something else about their relationship, which, while it 
breaches many codes of social and domestic propriety, never can be seen 
to overstep the boundaries of their respect for one another.
This is the state we find them in as they write in the third stage of 
Alfred’s hallucinatory journey to Devil’s Island.154 From 18 January 
to 21 February, 1895, he is kept in the cells at Ile de Ré, the port of 
Saint-Martin, where an even more intense and humiliating regimen of 
body searches and incarceration is put in place. His letters are subject to 
greater scrutiny and delays, with all messages from other members of 
both the Hadamard and Dreyfus families forbidden.155 Duclert156 sug-
gests that this harshness comes from an implicit wish by the authorities 
to drive Dreyfus to despair and eventually suicide. In the letters written 
during this period, the historian also opines, coming close to the in-
ner dimensions of the husband and wife’s communications, they seek 
“de construire un espace que leur soit proper et que personne ne pourra leur 
retirer”157 (to construct a space all their own and from which no one can 
remove them).
154 This is how Paul Bourget describes the trip across the Atlantic from France to America in his 
travelogue Outre-Mer: “Et dans la demi-hallucination que donne le bercement de la mer . . .” (Vol. 1, 
subtitled “Notes sur l’Amerique” [Paris: Plon, nd], 15). But if the gently rocking motion of the large 
cruise liner gentled Bourget into a semitrance of luxury, with time seeming to disappear in a haze 
of fine foods, music, and luxurious appointments, for Alfred Dreyfus, the tense, cramped journey 
to Devil’s Island was the culmination of transformation of his life from normality to the bizarre 
and on to the nightmare of his imprisonment, isolation, and torture.
155 Duclert, Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, III, “Au bagne de l’Ile de Ré,” 155–161.
156 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, “Au bagne,” 158
157 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, “Au bagne,” 161.
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Most of what they say to one another during this early period of their 
exchange of letters, if it can even be called that, remains similar in lan-
guage, tone, and allusion to what has gone before. There are now and 
then, however, new points that strike us as different and consequently 
need to be discussed before we move into the main section of the letters, 
those written during the stay on Devil’s Island itself.
For example, in a letter of 27 January, 1895, Lucie draws out the 
implications of earlier remarks on the mutuality of their love and loy-
alty by saying that, having passed through so much discouragement and 
worry already, they can only live in and through each other: “Il faut que 
nous vivions tous deux.”158 She also realizes that words alone cannot re-
lease him from his atrocious sufferings (“Je sais . . . que toutes ces paroles 
ne t’enlevent pas les atroces souffrances actuelles”) and that only his iron 
will and clear conscience will see him through, but even then, she adds, 
“Il faut que nous résistions tous deux” (We must be able to resist together, 
as a couple). How that can be done is hinted at in another of her close-
to-articulate Jewish remarks, extremely rare according to Duclert, in an 
understatement of considerable interest.159 She asks Alfred whether she 
should arrange for a rabbi to visit him and offer consolation, stating 
quite clearly that she could, if he wanted, call on the aid of the very rabbi 
who married them and who is likely to have been a friend at least of her 
family, if not of their combined family:
Ne serais-tu pas heureux et désireux de voir un ministre de 
notre culte: dans ce cas, les secours de la religion nous sont 
une grande consolation. Veux-tu, si tu penses comme moi, 
demander au grand rabbin de France de designer un de ces 
messieurs pour te consoler, te réconforter? Et si tu ne peux 
écrire toi-même, veux-tu prier Monsieur le Directeur d’être 
assez bon pour lui écrire?160
Would you not be happy and desirous to see a minister 
of our cult; in that case the support of religion would be 
a great consolation. Do you wish, if you think as I do, 
158 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 177.
159 Duclert, Notes, Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 481, n. 21.
160 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 177, 178.
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to ask the Chief Rabbi of France to delegate one of his 
ministers to console you, comfort you? And if you do not 
wish to write to him yourself, could you entreat the War-
den to be so kind as to write to him?
The language Lucie uses here is rather complex and weaves around 
several of the key issues we have been discussing already in regard to the 
mutuality of their relationship, the need to discover an appropriate lexi-
con and imagery to transmit their deepest feelings, of a sort normally 
hidden in bourgeois families of the period, and, in addition, this letter’s 
special circumstances, wherein she knows that it will be scrutinized by 
prison censors and realizes that reference to Jewish issues would be ex-
tremely suspicious. Perhaps, still further, it is likely that in previous dis-
cussions, long before the crisis of his arrest and imprisonment, Alfred 
had expressed the need to remain aloof from institutionalized Judaism, 
particularly in regard to their family friendship with Zadok Kahn, Chief 
Rabbi of France, who had performed their marriage. The expression “un 
minister de notre culte” is not only neutral, it is an official formula, one 
that made the members of the Israelite persuasion in France come un-
der the same rights and obligations as Protestants of all types.161 The 
syntax assumes a formality and indirection that is virtually absent in 
all her other letters, perhaps because, as we said, she is broaching very 
sensitive matters. Rather than speaking of their shared faith and the 
communal identity they share with their relatives and almost all of their 
friends, Lucie uses the virtually legalistic expression “minister of our 
cult.” A meeting with a rabbi would, if he thinks as she does, offer conso-
lation and comfort, and these terms, while certainly applicable in many 
instances to pastoral care offered by the Jewish ministry, are nontradi-
tional expressions; more normally, the rabbi would come to pray with 
and help the despairing individual or family with ethical advice from 
modern or traditional books.
The oddest statement of all is the last sentence, wherein Lucie asks 
161 Given the charged atmosphere of heightened anti-Semitism back in France, as well as elsewhere 
in Europe at this time, the word rabbi (other than in Zadok Kahn and Jew [Yehidi or Yid]) is laden 
with unsavory Eastern, Orientalistic and Semitic signals that neither Alfred nor Lucie would wish 
to trigger in the minds of their censors—or in the those of their non-Jewish supporters; similarly, 
a word like “prêtre” (priest), though specific to Catholic clergy, would not be appropriate to any 
form of post-Temple Judaism since the cult had fallen into desuetude and the role of priests 
(kohanim) had become at best honorific.
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indirectly if Alfred wishes to write to Rabbi Kahn himself or request that 
Monsieur le Directeur do so on his behalf. Either she is extremely naive 
or disingenuous here, as any such request from either prison or colonial 
officials, or even the Chief Rabbi himself in this regard would be turned 
down flatly as something contrary to the special regulations sent from 
Paris or due to the already manifest prejudices of the prison authorities, 
or she has some ulterior motive. As it is unlikely that either she or any of 
her advisers, such as Mathieu Dreyfus, have any intention of forcing the 
government to show its anti-Semitic hand more openly than it already 
has, the only other reason for this kind of request to Alfred from his wife 
must be an attempt on her part to signal that her closeness to him goes 
beyond the kind of love, loyalty, courage, and hope they have spoken of 
before in their letters: she now wants him to know that she will be per-
forming the role of spiritual adviser, giving him—in the role of a non-
Christian Boethius in prison—the consolation of Jewish philosophy.162
Just like the Shekhina, the divine shadow and presence which sepa-
rates itself from the Godhead during the crisis of creation, when the 
universe contracts in the tsimtsum, leaving in the otherwise vacuous 
space and time retreated from by the deity a mysterious aura of spirit, 
so Lucie, in the shared suffering and martyrdom of Alfred, becomes his 
active other in the world he has been forced to leave. Like the Shekhina, 
who is God’s female consort and co-creator, Lady Wisdom or Hochma, 
Lucie plays the role of Israel, the Bride of scriptures, that extension 
of the divine—separated from the infinite En-Sof (world without end) 
by the cosmic energies of the sephirot—acting and suffering in this 
world, ha-olam hazeh. It is the duty of Israel embodied and unified in 
the Shekhina to gather up all the sparks of primal energy scattered 
and hidden after the breaking of the great vessels in the moment of 
separation—the Big Bang—the recollecting of these shells of light 
constituting the tikkun ha-olam, the repair and correction of the bro-
ken world, thus preparing for the moment when God and his Shekhina 
can join together again, inaugurating the messianic age.163 The sparks 
162 André Maurois recalls being at a Christmas party when he was five or six years old when “I learned 
from another child, who was beside me in the church, that my parents were Jews and that this was 
an astonishing fact” (Call No Man Happy, trans. Denver and Jane Lindley [London: Jonathan Cape, 
1943], 11).
163 Ouaknin says, following Rabbi Nahman, “Il s’agit de la Chevira hakélim, ‘la brisure des vases’ . . . 
Après le Tsimtsoum, la lumière divine jaillit dans l’espace vide sous forme de rayon en ligne droite. Cette 
lumière se nomme Adam Qadmon, cést-à-dire l’’Homme primordial” (It is a question of the Shevra 
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that remain after millennia of regathering are now mostly those that 
emanate from the other side, sitra achra, which though malevolent, 
hostile, and pernicious nevertheless contain within them aspects of 
eternal energy and power. For Alfred and for Lucie, confronted by “la 
machination infernale,”164 the task remains to soldier on bravely and 
stoically through all “les tortures morales,”165 until the enigma is broken 
and the light of truth breaks forth again to free them.
Lo dibera Tora k’lechon bene adam166
Les Hébreux, en fait d’œuvres scéniques, ne paraissent 
point avoir atteint l‘idée du drame complet, où l’on vise sur-
tout à mettre l’action devant les yeux du spectateur, et où la 
vraisemblance, sous le rapport des changements de lieux doit 
être observée.
—Ernest Renan167
hakelim, ‘the breaking of the vases or vessels’ . . . After the Tsimtsoum, the divine light leaps 
forth into empty space in the form of a straight line. This light is called Adam Qadmon, that is, 
“Primordial Man’” (Le livre brûlé, 381).
164 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 181.
165 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 180.
166 Rabbi Nachom de Gamzo: “Torah does not speak in the language of man,” a statement opposite to 
many Christian exegetes who say that the Bible speaks in the language of men and therefore must 
be read allegorically in order to read the language of God, and therefore says Ouaknin, “Everything 
is essential, each letters possesses a vital sense and importance, and everything needs to be 
interpreted, conjunctions and prepositions, punctuation marks and rhetorical markers, the size, 
thickness, and shape of letters, every jot and tittle” (Le livre brûlé, 116). In the case of Alfred and 
Lucie Dreyfus, we cannot go so far, but we will try to explode the text out of its linearity—little as 
there is of it left in the conditions they write in—to discover something of vital importance.
167 “The Hebrews, in regard to scenic plays, do not at all seem to have reached the idea of a complete 
drama where the chief aim was to put an action in front of the eyes of a spectator and where 
verisimilitude in regard to the changes in place was to be observed”: Renan, Le Cantique des 
cantiques, 50. What Renan means here, typically in nineteenth-century terms, is that ancient 
peoples, especially the Jews, did not know how to mount a middle-class realistic play, with 
coherent actions performed before an audience with suspended disbelief in its artificiality and 
where the imitation of reality was to be complete. None of this, of course, would be seen in a 
Shakespearean play or theatre, not because neither he nor his audience was mature enough to 
conceive of such a performance but because the conventions of drama for the most part—in most 
times and in most places—operated on different principles than those developed eventually in the 
brief period of classical Greek tragedy and new comedy. Theatricality tended to be envisaged rather 
as ritual, ceremonial festivals, often with a transformative or shamanistic purpose—initiations, 
metamorphoses, conjuring forth of phantom ancestors—and consequently the emergence of 
monotheistic Judaism, with its abhorrence of idol worship and other forms of magic, recreated 
(midrashed) its own archaic cultural artifacts and the customs of neighboring civilizations, 
creating new inward dramas and performative rituals. See José Faur’s forthcoming The Gospel 
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Because Lucie cannot write to her husband about any of the efforts be-
ing made on his behalf other than in vague hints, such as “[c]omme on 
apprécie dans ces moments terribles les personnes dévouées et elles sont en 
nombre très grand”168 (as one comes to appreciate in these terrible times, 
there are many people devoted to you, a very great number), or even 
about who is making these efforts, and how many supporters there 
actually are beyond the family members he already knows about, she 
must return to the interchange of comments each makes on how they 
read and recall each other’s letters. Alfred writes on 31 January, 1895, 
that he reads and rereads all her letters, finding in them “un echo de vous 
tous”169 (an echo of all of you), this all meaning Lucie, the children she 
writes for from their supposed dictation, and other close relatives who 
have sent him epistles of their own. Then he describes the process more 
minutely:
Je relisais ta lettre quatre ou cinq fois, je m’imprégnais de 
chaque mot,—peu à peu les mots écrits se transformaient 
en paroles dites . . . il me semblait bientôt t’entendre me 
parler près de moi. Oh! musique délicieuse qui allait à mon 
âme! Puis depuis quatre jours, plus rien, la morne tristesse, 
l’épouvantable solitude.170
I reread your letter four or five times. I was impregnated 
by each word,—little by little written words transformed 
themselves into spoken statements . . . soon it seemed 
that I could hear you speaking close by me. Oh! what de-
licious music that came into my soul! Then for the four 
days, nothing more, the unbearable solitude.
According to the Jews, in section III of which he discusses the theatricality of Christianity and 
the rationality and legal disposition of Judaism; cp. my Festivals of Laughter, Blood and Justice 
(London, ON: Sussco, 2008). With the re-valuation of notions such as time, space, personhood, 
and reality, the rabbinical imagination passed on to men and women such as Alfred and Lucie 
Dreyfus an ability—and an anxiety—in playing out the roles that have been imposed on them by 
hostile and alien societies.
168 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 183.
169 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 184.
170 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 184.
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The meditation on the epistle with its iterated reading171 causes a 
metamorphosis in his perception of reality. As in kabbalistic exercises 
to achieve devekut (cleaving to the divine object), Alfred through intense 
focusing turns the inscribed letters on the paper into audible sounds, 
Lucie’s own voice, standing close to him, speaking from within. It is a 
sacred music, a spiritual melody, like the heavenly choir of angels that 
sings around the enthroned Godhead. But harsh reality returns: because 
of the absence of further letters,172 he experiences the closing down over 
him of solitude. In this metaphor of verbal impregnation, used again 
on 14 February,173 when he speaks of being impregnated by her face (“à 
m’imprégner de ton visage”),174 the reference is to at least two places. The 
first is quite Christian, deriving from the liturgical hymns and iconog-
raphy associated with the Annunciation, wherein the angel Gabriel, on 
behalf of God the Father, impregnates Mary with the fecundating word 
to make her conceive Jesus in her womb in a spiritualized sexual act 
manifested in the passage of the Verbum into her womb as light passes 
through a glass, and often spoken of in the ingenious metaphysical con-
ceits of the Baroque Era of the seventeenth century. The other source 
for this witty language of fertilization and conception through words as 
letter combinations, sound constructs, and thought containers appears 
in kabbalistic texts, especially those associated with the Song of Songs 
(Shir ha-Shirim).175 Whether the mixing and matching of Christian, Jew-
ish, and secular love imagery should be credited to some mystifying hy-
bridity, philosophical ambiguity, or deliberate personal conflations,176 
the point is that Alfred and Lucie create a language of love far different 
from anything else to be found amongst their contemporaries.177
171 Leo Strauss explains that “the purpose of repeated conventional statements is to hide the 
disclosure, in the repetition, of the unconventional views” (Strauss, Persecution and the Art of 
Writing, 64).
172 On absence in a text as the demand for filling in, for something to be created in and through the 
silence of its apparent inanity; see Ouaknin, Le livre brûlé, 112.
173 Ironically, as we read this, it is St. Valentine’s Day, but it is unlikely that anyone in France would 
have recognized this more American and British celebration until a hundred years later when 
commercial exigencies started to make it popular in the hexagon and elsewhere on the Continent.
174 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 200.
175 Alfred Dreyfus may have read about the Song of Songs in the commentary by one of his favourite 
authors published in 1860: Ernest Renan, trans. and commented, Le Cantique des Cantiques (Paris: 
Arléa, 2004).
176 These issues are discussed in Sandrick Le Maguer, Portrait d’Israël en jeune fille: genèse de Marie 
(Paris: NRF/Gallimard/L’Infini, 2008).
177 Faur cites the midrashic study of The Song of Solomon, Shir ha-Shirim Rabba VIII.1(2) 39b: 
— 152 —
————————————————— bodies of evidence —————————————————
 
And of this solitary confinement, always with the silence of guards 
who do not speak to him, he feels his heart bleed and his nerves shiver 
with pain.
Toutes les fibres de la sensibilité tressaillir, l’une après 
l’autre . . . souffrir enfin le long martyre du cœur . . . Voilà ce 
qu’il y a de vraiment épouvantable!178
All the fibres of my sensibility shiver, one after the oth-
er . . . to suffer finally the long martyrdom of the heart 
. . . Here it is, what is truly unbearable!
Most remarkable here is the way Dreyfus describes his psychologi-
cal and emotional condition, something we shall see him do with ever 
greater insistence and detail in the letters from Devil’s Island. The term 
sensibilité can, in a general way, be matched to the English term sensibil-
ity, with its gamut of meanings from a positive notion of being intel-
ligent and filled with common sense to the more negative connotations 
shown in Jane Austen’s novel Sense and Sensibility, wherein the term is 
contrasted to common sense and reasonable behaviour; sensibilité thus 
covers the same ground as sentimentality in all its superficial qualities. 
But at its core, the word also can have a more technical sense, that of 
the sensorium, the body’s nervous system and its processes of emotive 
responses to inner and outer stimuli. Not by chance, I would say, one of 
the exemplary citations in the Petit Robert dictionary comes from the 
son of Dreyfus’s former teacher of mathematics and chemistry at lycée, 
the novelist and psychologist Paul Bourget:179 “un je ne sais pas quoi de 
frémissements qui trahissait une sensibilité restée vive et neuve” (an inde-
finable something of quivering or trembling which betrayed a sensibility 
still alive and new).
More specifically, in this part of his letter, Dreyfus is referring to his 
nervous system, with each of his nerves being tortured by the long or-
“Borrowing from Song of Songs (8:2) the rabbis referred to [the revelation of the Law at] Sinai 
as ‘my mother’s house’ because, they explained ‘it was there where Israel was gestated, as a newly 
born baby’” (The Horizontal Society, Section IV, Introductory Remarks).
178 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 185.
179 Fuller discussion of the relationship between Alfred Dreyfus and these two Bourgets, father and 
son, will appear in the next book in this series.
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deal. In the nineteenth century, we should recall, what we assign to men-
tal states, hormonal imbalances, and other conditions of emotional in-
stability were considered due to overly excitable nervous constitutions or 
the draining away of nervous energy, as in enervation.180 Another word 
that Alfred uses in self-diagnosis of this long-term condition being exac-
erbated by the moral tortures in prison is éréthisme, from the Greek word 
erethismos (irritation), which takes on the medical sense of a violent exal-
tation, excessive tension, sometimes, and a state of extreme excitability 
and irritability associated with the heart as well as with the mind. Here, 
then, on 4 November, 1897, almost speaking of himself in the third per-
son, Alfred self-diagnoses the ætiology of his mental illness:
Mais la trop longue souffrance, une situation épouvantable, 
le climat qui à lui seul embrase le cerveau, si tout cela ne m’a 
jamais fait oublier aucun de mes devoirs, tout cela fini par 
me mettre dans un état d’éréthisme cérébral et nerveux qui 
est terrible.181
But the excessive suffering, a terrifying situation, the 
climate which by itself is enough to set my brain on fire, 
which all by itself never made me forget any of my du-
ties, all that finished by putting me into a state of cer-
ebral and nervous erethism which is terrible.
The treatment he recommends for himself is silence—but how iron-
ic, when his whole life on Devil’s Island is one of enforced, obligatory 
silence on the part of all the twelve to fifteen guards who watch him day 
and night. The silence he needs is more than the absence of disturbing 
noise, confusing and irritating: it is the peaceful, warm home life with 
Lucie and the children. Without their quiet conversations by the fire-
side, the prognosis is dire, if not fatal. On 24 November, 1897, he tells 
Lucie, again withdrawing into the self-objectifying third person, that “le 
corps, le cerveau, le coeur, tout est épuisé” (the body, the brain, the heart, 
all are exhausted), and what remains is his soul: “L’âme est restée intangi-
180 This old psychiatry is still around in many common expressions, such as “to have a lot of nerve” or 
“to lose one’s nerve,” even in “to be nervous” and “to be nervy.”
181 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 389.
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ble, toujours aussi ardente, la volonté inébranable, forte du droit de tout être 
humain à la justice et à la verite, pour lui, pour les siens”182 (The soul has 
remained untouched, as ardent ever, the will unshakeable, strong in the 
right of all human beings to have justice and the truth, for himself, for 
his own [family]).183
Alongside these descriptions of his painful and excitable nerves, 
which Lucie knows Alfred has always suffered from, there is also the 
question of the processes of reading and interpreting the letters, the 
language itself taken as an index of their inner and outer states. Their 
writings—and in Alfred’s case there are also journaux, carnets, and cahiers 
to be considered—may be examined as external brains, as we will do 
in the next chapter.
In the same letter of 31 January, 1895, considered above, Alfred 
apologizes for his style, which he describes as “baroque and décousu”184 
(baroque and disconnected). Another way to speak of this conceited, ba-
roque, witty way of writing and reading texts is to think of it in Jewish 
terms, as part of the invisible-visible dialectic of confronting words on 
the page with questions that challenge their status as linear and logical 
communication, that force the words on the page to have a substance 
and a volume, a volume which, as soon as perceived, spills out of the 
passage like water bursting from a dam, in an inexhaustible outflowing 
182 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 392.
183 Faur cites Josephus, Contra Apion, I.60: “The result, then, of our thorough grounding in the laws 
from the first dawn of intelligence is that we have them, as it were, engraved on our souls” (The 
Horizontal Society, Section IV, Introductory Remarks). Note that this polemical defense of Judaism 
was edited by Théodore Reinach, with a French translation by Léon Blum in 1930, both leading 
Dreyfusards during the affair. Expounding on Josephus’s metaphor of engraving the law on the 
soul, Faur calls it “a kind of ontogenetic intuition, continuously activated by Tora[h] learning and 
practices.” Although Dreyfus did not continuously study the holy books, the deep impressions 
of rabbinical thought and practice were part of his mental makeup. The ordeal of his nightmare 
triggered archaic patterns of feeling, thinking, and writing inculcated in the ways he learned to 
speak and think at home, whether or not he was actually taught by his father or a Hebrew teacher. 
Those archaic memory patterns become the sod, the secret of his soul, although the precise and 
substantive knowledge was at best confused and at worst missing. Through the hints and the 
cryptograms (remez), he was able, in the depths of his soul, where the darkest secrets were hidden, 
“to dig up stems and innovative (doctrines) and corollaries [from the root principles],” but to have 
understood the laws and how to apply them, he would have had proper rabbinical training. “To 
accomplish this [Dreyfus would have needed] in depth analysis and judicial theory (sebara)” so 
that he could not condense or expand, only touch them theoretically and draw archaic strength, 
enough to survive. Cf. The Horizontal Society, Section IV, Section 4. One can know the truth but not 
necessarily the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
184 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 185.
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of creative energies.185 This overly intricate and uncoordinated writing, 
so far as Alfred sees it at first, is only a product of his mental or moral 
tortures. The conditions of his imprisonment have upset all his normal 
skills and intellectual talents.
Je ne sais plus écrite, les mots ne me viennent plus, tant mon 
cerveau est délabré. Il n’y a plus un point fixe dans ma tête: 
l’espoir de connaître un jour la vérité, de voir mon innocence 
reconnue et proclamée. C’est ce que je balbutie nuit et jour, 
dans mes rêves comme dans mon réveil.186
I no longer know how to write, words no longer come 
to me, so much is my brain torn to shreds. There is no 
longer just one fixed point in my head: the hope to know 
the truth one day, to see my innocence recognized and 
proclaimed. That’s what I stammer night and day, in my 
dreams as in my waking.
The more he writes about what is going on in his head, and the more 
he tries to answer Lucie’s questions and challenges in the letters that 
manage to arrive in his prison cell, the more the very act of repeating 
his words over and over with minor variations generates friction that 
ignites the charge inherent in the thoughts, so that for a few moments, 
now and then, the light flashes out and he—and Lucie—glimpse the in-
ner truth of a transcendent experience.
On 10 February, 1895, somewhat more controlled, Alfred writes 
that he is going through something beyond the talents of any novelist 
to describe. “Jamais romancier, si riche que soit son imagination, n’aurait 
185 Ouaknin tells us, “Dans la conception talmudique de l interprétation, le Texte est indéfini, ouvert à des 
interprétations toujours nouvelles . . . . celui-ci demeure inépuisable et ouvert parce que sa structure est 
celle du ‘visible-invisible’” (In the talmudic conception of interprétation, the Text is indefinite, open 
to interpretations [which are] always new . . . this [Text] remains inexhaustible and open because 
its structure is that of the ‘visible-invisible’) in Le livre brûlé, 246. Ouaknin here cites Umberto Eco, 
L’Œuvre ouverte (Paris: Seuil, 1965) and Gershom Scholem, La kabbale et son symbolisme (Paris: 
Payot, 1975). The visible text has meaning only when it is interpreted, that is, when the hidden 
or invisible meaning is made manifest in the explosive act of questioning its very strictures. 
Ouaknin puts it this way in italics to emphasize the centrality of the idea: “L’interprétation n’est pas 
seulement perception, elle est constitution du sens” (Interpretation is not only perception; it is the 
constitution of sense) in Le livre brûlé, 247.
186 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 185.
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pu écrire une historie plus tragique”187 (Never would a novelist, however 
rich his imagination might be, have written a more tragic history than 
mine), a statement showing that he realizes how awkward and difficult 
it is to transmit a valid picture of his condition with the inadequate lan-
guage, even if there were literary precedents, at his disposal. But not 
only rhetoric and novelistic discourses fail to provide the terms he so 
longs to find; it is also a failure of the imagination, his as much as that 
of his mentors and models.188
Then, on the same day, and thus with no chance of her having seen 
his letter, Lucie responds in similar terms, manifesting her capacity to 
anticipate as well as echo his complaints and cries of anguish when she 
says that she cannot understand why her letters do not arrive regularly, 
the rigor of the censorship seeming excruciatingly severe since all she 
does is write her true feelings to her beloved husband, and then says, in a 
passage previously edited from the published letters, “Je m’imagine aisé-
ment les souffrances que tu as dû endurer étant ainsi sans nouvelles.”189 She 
has used the same word imagination, and says that through her own im-
aginative faculties, she can see and feel his sufferings—that is, that for 
all his fears of inadequacy of style and rhetoric, she has understood. She 
has picked up the hints, followed the allusions, rearranged the confused 
and baroque utterances, and created a forceful picture in her mind. Nei-
ther of them engage in a systematic process; they are not metaphysical 
poets or specialists in the occult, and the disorderly writing and arrival 
of letters ensures that what we finally see190 can only be understood in 
hindsight when our own minds can midrash the collection.191 
187 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 198.
188 Inadequacy and failure are not, however, absolute, not sins staining the soul of the feeble man 
crying out in despair. Benmozegh points out that “For the Kabbalah, just as imperfection is 
always mixed with holiness, so truth is perpetually mixed with error. The one is the husk or outer 
covering, the other the inner reality, the quickening spirit” (Israel and Humanity, 96).
189 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 199.
190 Until there is a complete edition of all the letters of Alfred and Lucie Dreyfus, including those 
written before the affair, everything we say has to be tentative, as well as speculative.
191 Faur: “There is a huge difference between rational idealism and Tora[h]. One exposes the basis of 
perfect demonstration (apodeixis), the other proposes. Rational idealism demonstrates; Hebrew 
Scripture persuades. Greek ‘knowledge’(episteme) closes the subject; Hebrew ‘wisdom’ (חכמה 
[Hochma]) inaugurates a dialogue . . .” The Horizontal Society, Section IV, 46. Dreyfus tries to be 
assimilated perfectly to Greek knowledge, both technē and episteme, but he finds it constructive 
and uncomfortable and reaches out towards חכמה, Lady Wisdom, and Shekhina, his wife Lucie.
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ParT 3: inTErnaL Pains and ExTErnaL Brains
Persecution . . . gives rise to a peculiar technique of writ-
ing, and therewith to a peculiar type of literature, in which 
the truth about all crucial things is presented exclusively 
between the lines. That literature is addressed, not to all 
readers, but to trustworthy and intelligent readers only. 
It has all the advantages of private communication with-
out having its greatest disadvantage—that it reaches 
only the writer’s acquaintances. It has all the advantages 
of public communication without having its greatest dis-
advantage—capital punishment for the author.
—Leo Strauss192
Study itself was viewed as a mode of “visual meditation”—
a technique known in medieval Christian mysticism as 
well—in which there is an imaginative recreation of the 
prophetic vision within the mystic’s own consciousness.
—Elliot R. Wolfson193
The close to 250 pages of selected letters included in Ecris-moi souvent, 
écris-moi longuement can be seen to reiterate many of the same themes, 
images, rhetorical ploys, and cris du coeur registered already in the let-
ters of the opening section of Vincent Duclert’s book. My focus here is 
on a few key epistles wherein Alfred engages in sustained descriptions 
and self-examination of his fragile mental state and then Lucie mirrors 
his language, encourages him to talk out his pains and humiliations, and 
implicitly and quietly leads him towards resignation, reconciliation, and 
relief from the most acute of his fears and anxieties.
On 27 April, 1895, Alfred writes to Lucie from Iles du Salut (neither 
of them ever uses the term Ile du Diable)194 that she should never ask on 
his behalf for the government to show grace or pity (“que tu ne demandes 
pour moi ni grâce ni pitié”) but only that they carry out their investiga-
tions to the uttermost (“à outrance”).195 For no matter how awful his 
192 Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1952), 26.
193 Wolfson, Through a Speculum that Shines, 331
194 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 228.
195 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 229.
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conditions are, he will not beg from them anything other than truth and 
justice. This is a very Jewish position, and appears in Amos Oz’s work 
wherein a character says to his son after escaping the Holocaust, “Weak-
ness is a sin.” Nevertheless, Alfred knows that his situation is bleak and 
that Lucie, reading his letters, with their complaints and shattering 
cries of pain, will misunderstand him as asking for immediate release, 
no matter the nature of the conditions imposed on such a pardon or 
grace. Whatever his physical or moral torments, he pleads with her that 
she should only protest “mon innocence jusqu’à mon dernier souffle”196 (my 
innocence down to my last breath). That leads to another confession of 
faith, expressed in muted Jewish terms:
Mais s’il y a une justice en ce monde, il me semble impossi-
ble, ma raison se refuse à y croire, que nous ne retrouvions le 
bonheur qui n’aurait jamais dû nous être enlevé.197
But if there is a justice in this world, it seems to me im-
possible, my reason refuses to believe that we will not re-
gain our happiness which should never have been taken 
away from us.
The justice he seeks is on earth, if it is real, will be manifested in real 
historical terms and times, and he cannot believe otherwise—his un-
stated but implicit Jewish confidence in the almighty power of the law 
will not let him—than that he and Lucie will be happy again, the crime 
committed against them being totally unjustified. And yet, for all this 
faith and confidence, Alfred tells Lucie he is all too aware that the letters 
he writes are frightening to her and may convey the wrong impression 
of his firmness of heart and soul.
Je t’écris certes parfois des lettres exaltées, sous l’empire 
d’impressions nerveuses extrêmes ou de dépression physique 
considérable; mais qui n’aurait pas de ces coups de folie, de 
ces révoltes du cœur et de l’âme, dans une situation aussi 
196 Ecris-moi souvent écris moi longuement, 229.
197 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 229.
—————————————— 3. Internal Pains and External Brains ——————————————
 
— 159 —
tragique, aussi émouvante que la nôtre?198
Certainly I sometimes write you excited letters, under 
the domination of extreme nervous impressions or of 
considerable physical depression, but who would not 
suffer acts of madness or rebellions in the heart, in a 
situation as tragic and horrible as ours?
He is trying desperately to ask her to read between the lines, or more 
accurately, inside the lines, to see that for all his agony and anxiety, he 
is not insane, and that she has to work with him in investigating the 
source of the charges against him.199 He wants to live to take part in 
the public restoration of his good name, and to do this he needs her 
help, her support, and her understanding. She cannot fall into the trap 
of thinking he has gone mad or dismissing his extreme statements as 
marks of folly or despair. He therefore again asks,
Et puis, toujours seul, en tête-à-tête avec moi-même, livré 
à mes tristes pensées, sans nouvelles de toi, des enfants, de 
tous ceux qui me sont chers depuis plus de deux mois, à qui 
confierais-je les souffrances de mon cœur, si ce n’est à toi, con-
fidente de toutes mes pensées?200
And then, always alone, in conversation with myself, 
given over to my sad thoughts, without news of you, 
the children and all those who have been dear to me 
for more than two months, to whom can I entrust my 
heart’s sufferings, if not to you, confidant of all my 
thoughts?
Alfred then moves to a realization, implicit earlier, as we have seen, 
that it is not he alone who suffers or Lucie who suffers in her own way 
because of his condition, but that they suffer together, within one an-
198 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 229.
199 Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, 26. “Another axiom: ‘a careful writer of normal 
intelligence is more intelligent than the most intelligent censor. For the burden of proof rests with 
the censor.’”
200 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 229.
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other, a metaphysical and psychical process expressed in his concern for 
the future of their two children:201
Je souffre non seulement pour moi, mais bien plus encore 
pour toi, pour nos chers enfants. C’est en ces derniers, ma 
chérie, qui tu dois puiser cette force morale, cette énergie 
surhumaine qui te sont nécessaire pour aboutir à tout prix 
à ce que notre honneur apparaisse de nouveau, à tous sans 
exception, ce qu’il a toujours été, pur et sans tache.202
I suffer not only for myself, but indeed much more for 
you, for our dear children. It is from them that you, my 
darling, must draw out the moral force, the superhuman 
energy that you must have to bring this about at any 
price that are indispensable to you, so that at all costs 
our honor will be visible again, to everyone with excep-
tion, as it has always been, pure and unsullied.
The designations of moral strength and superhuman energy can, of 
course, be registered simply as exaggerated rhetoric to impress on Lucie 
the urgency of the situation.203 In context, in the pattern of allusions 
this study is uncovering, the expressions also describe a more kabbalis-
tic power that derives from the performance of the mitzvot. Suffering is 
not the passive phenomenon it is in Christian mysticism, where it pre-
pares the faithful soul for the reception of a heavenly grace, either after 
201 Compare this mode of indirection and deference of communications with what Strauss sees in 
Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed. There, Rambam calls his book both a treatise (ma’amar) and 
also something spoken in conversation, part of fleeting, passing speech. “If the Guide is, in a sense, 
not a book at all, if it is merely a substitute for conversations or speeches, then it cannot be read 
in the way we may read, for instance, Ibn Sina’s Al-Shifâ, or Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica” 
(Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, 47, 48). How then is the Guide written, and how do we 
read it? In the same way, I suggest, as we do the letters of Alfred and Lucie Dreyfus. “The Guide 
is written in the form of letters addressed to a friend and favorite pupil, Joseph. By addressing 
his book to one man, Maimonides made sure that he did not transgress the prohibition against 
explaining ma’aseh merkebah [esoteric discussions on the description of the Heavenly Chariot in 
Ezekiel] to more than one man. [He mentions too that] Joseph possessed all the qualities required 
of a student of the secret lore and explains the necessity of written communication by his pupil’s 
departure . . . [and] Joseph’s departure . . . was the consequence of his being a Jew in the Diaspora 
. . . . Only the necessity of saving the law can have caused him to break the law” (49).
202 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 229.
203 Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, 26.
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life or perhaps within it. In rabbinical thought, suffering is an active 
process of struggling to attain justice, to fulfil the commandments of 
the law. By drawing on the innocence of their son and daughter, Alfred 
says, Lucie can carry out the tasks Alfred is unable to do, and her actions 
will further energize the husband to endure his tortures and survive un-
til the mission is accomplished: the charges dismissed, the verdict over-
turned, and the sullied family name returned to its former glory
By late April and early May 1895, Lucie writes a series of letters that 
she holds back until she can send them all at once, thus creating, as 
Duclert suggests, a virtual diary or journal of her own. In these letters, 
amongst other matters, she tells of the birthday of her father, David 
Hadamard, a happy occasion marred by sad thoughts and worries about 
Alfred, indeed of a collective grieving. Again, rather than an actual nar-
rative or list of events that occur from day to day, Lucie’s letters speak 
in more general terms of feelings and aspirations, sadness and frustra-
tions. On 4 May, 1895, for example, she writes:
La bizarrerie de l’existence fait que le corps vit indifférem-
ment de toutes les souffrances morales, c’est une sorte de ma-
chine qui [sait]204 de routine et accomplit machinalement les 
exigences de la vie.205
The bizarre nature of existence makes the body live re-
gardless of all moral or psychical sufferings; it is a sort 
of machine that knows the routine and performs all the 
exigencies of life mechanically.
Those details of act, emotion and situation that constitute the nor-
mal content of a diary or a personal letter are not dealt with because, for 
her, life is a mechanical process wherein actions seem almost to perform 
themselves, normal feelings are numbed or felt at a level of virtual un-
consciousness, and people, places, and events simply pass unnoticed. 
Like Alfred, she finds more reality in the writing and reading of letters 
than in the physical existence of things and persons around her. While 
204 The suggested missing word is from Duclert. The whole letter is printed here for the first time. 
Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 231.
205 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 231.
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this is not strictly true, the statement does describe one whole aspect 
of her life. The reality is more complex: on the one hand, because she is 
well attuned to the needs of her children and her parents’ home, where 
she has now moved and, on the other, because in a substantial part of 
her daily life she is devoted to Alfred’s release and working diligently 
with his brother Mathieu and others to lobby the government and to 
supervise detectives hired to investigate what the police or other agents 
refuse to look into. If read sequentially as a record of cause and effect or 
logically as a rational argument, her letters collapse under the weight 
of contradiction and non sequitur.206 They need to be perceived in the 
way of Talmudic midrashing, where events are replaced by figurative, 
encoded anecdotes (aggadot), chronological sequencing of time by inter-
textual associations,207 and coherence of expression by suspensions and 
fragmentation that come together only occasionally in the text itself but 
much more often in the minds of the students learning.208
206 On the use of contradictions and non sequiturs, Strauss says, “To speak of the same subject in a 
contradictory means on pages far apart from each other; to make one of the two contradictory 
statements in passing . . . incidental . . . not directly to contradict but to deny the first statement’s 
implications, to seem to repeat the first statement but to add or omit an apparently negligible 
expression . . . to be introduced between the two contradictory statements an intermediary 
assertion which, by itself not contradictory to the first statement, becomes a contradictory to it by 
the addition, or the omission, of an apparently negligible expression; the contradictory statement 
creeps in as a repetition of the intermediary statement” (Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, 
70, 71). But at the same time, we should recall what Wolfson points out, “We must be aware of the 
fact that any given culture fosters divergent views that are not always logicially consistent. Indeed, 
different impulses can be operative within a culture at the same time without necessitating a 
resolution that adopts one alternative to the exclusion of the others” (Through a Speculum that 
Shines, 27).
207 Following his rabbinical authorities, Ouaknin argues that at a certain point in reading “histoire 
et interprétation sont deux termed inseparable l’un de l’autre” (history and interpretation are two 
terms that cannot be separated) in Le livre brûlé, 258. Time being in man and man being in time, 
history cannot be measured only by one, making the individual dependent upon the chronological 
passage of years and centuries flowing forward from the past through the present into the future; 
instead, by acts of interpretation—midrashing of memory, experience and action—time reveals 
its meanings in regard to eternity and infinity. The Jew can reach back into the past and draw 
forth strength and courage, as well as the honor and loyalty won by good deeds of ancestors, just 
as each small mitzvah, even when performed only through intention when the circumstances do 
not permit otherwise, still adds to the patrimony (zekhut) to be passed on to future generations. 
In this sense, time is reversible and can transform the outcome of actions and decisions taken.
208 “But how does he proceed,” asks Strauss following Rambam’s argument in the Guide of the 
Perplexed, “if the pupil fails to understand the hint? He will simply stop. This does not mean that 
he will stop talking. On the contrary, since by suddenly becoming silent he would perplex the 
pupil without being of any help to him, he will continue talking by giving the first, rather revealing 
sentence a more conventional meaning and thus gradually lead him back to the safe region of 
accepted views” (Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, 53).
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At that point, Lucie turns from her concern for the relationship be-
tween herself and her husband as though they reached an impasse, and 
so to avoid provoking an epistemological crisis that might harm the two 
of them or open their conversation to abuse by the scrutinizing censors 
who read and assess all their communications, she begins to speak of 
their innocent children.209 Such maternal concerns and the recording of 
infantile prattle are, as we have already remarked, hints of something 
beyond, which at the moment Lucie dares not express openly, both be-
cause she fears the reaction by the military censors and because she in-
tuits the need to tread very slowly and softly on issues that would upset 
her husband.210
On 8 May, 1895, Alfred writes one of the letters which contain his 
lament for the physical distance between them, but also his realiza-
tion that, thanks to the sacred mission they have each undertaken to 
accomplish, “nous nous réfugerions dans notre affection mutuelle, dans 
notre amour grandi par des événements aussi tragiques”211 (we would 
take refuge in our mutual affection, in our love enlarged by such tragic 
events). On 11 May, Lucie writes—one can hardly say responds, since 
letters cross and arrive out of sequence—“Tu sais que mes pensées sont 
les tiennes et que nos souffrances sont communes”212 (You know that my 
thoughts are yours and that our sufferings are common)—that is, that 
she occupies the same textual space Alfred does, a locus of refuge cre-
ated by love and an area of understanding that needs only the barest of 
hints to spark off understanding in the other. “I spend hours in read-
ing and re-reading your fine letters,” writes Lucie on 7 June, 1895;213 
“they are my consolation, waiting until I will have the joy of seeing you 
return.” Then she adds, showing her part in the exchange: “I will tell 
you what I think, that which I cannot stop writing to you: I have hope, 
a great deal of hope. I have the conviction that all will come out well, 
209 “But a good writer will never submit to the ordeal of indulging in insignificant talk. Consequently, 
after having given a hint which refers to a certain chapter of the secret teaching, he will write some 
sentences which at first glance seem to be conventional but which on closer examination prove to 
contain a new hint, referring to another chapter of the secret teaching” (Strauss, Persecution and 
the Art of Writing, 54).
210 A saying by Ibn Ezra: “He who understands should be silent” (cited by Leo Persecution and the Art 
of Writing, 184).
211 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement. 232.
212 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement. 235.
213 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement. 243.
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that your rehabilitation will be a brilliant explosion of light and life 
will preserve you again in goodness.”214
The allusion to the explosive, lightning flashes that characterize 
kabbalistic reading services here are by now familiar to their letters, 
as much so as the highly intimate, perhaps repressed innuendos in 
their description of their way of transmogrifying the reading itself 
into a sexual encounter:215 “Il me semble,” Lucie writes on 8 July, 1895, 
“que je t’entendais parler, que ta voix chérie résonnait à mes oreilles; il 
me parvenait enfin quelque chose de toi, tes pensées si nobles et si belles 
venaient se refléter dans mon esprit”216 (It seems to me that I hear you 
speak, that your beloved voice resonates in my ears; there enters into 
me finally something of yourself, your noble and beautiful thoughts 
come to be reflected in my soul).217 Surely, behind her passionate lan-
guage there are these familiar verses from the Song of Songs, Le Can-
tique des Cantiques:
214 “Je passé des heures à lire et relire tes bonnes lettres: elles sont ma consolation, en attendant que j’aie 
le bonheur de venir te retrouver. Je te dirai ce que je pense, ce que je ne cesse de t’écrire: j’ai de l’espoir, 
beaucoup d’espoir. J’ai la conviction que tout ira bien, que ta réhabilitation sera éclatante et que la vie te 
réserve encore du bonheur [. . .]” 
215 Marc-Alain Ouaknin writes: “Eclatement d’un espace littéraire: le texte ne sera plus abordé dans sa 
linearité, mais dans sa spatialité, son volume. Ou peut-être doit-on dire que l’éclatement du texte est ce 
qui va permettre le passage du Texte-ligne au texte-volume” (An explosion of literary space: the text 
will no longer be approached in its linearity but in the spatiality of its volume. Or perhaps on 
ought to say that the explosion of the text is what permits the passage from linear Text to volume-
text) in Le livre brûlé: Philosophie du Talmud (Paris: Leiu Commun/Sagesse, 1993), 103.
216 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 248.
217 Gabriel Tarde describes the fullness of conversation as a speech act and social event and 
consequently as a civilizing phenomenon: “Les interlocuteurs agissent les uns sur les autres, de 
très près, par le timbre de voix, le regard, la physionomie, les passes magnétique des gestes, et non pas 
selulement par le langage” (The interlocutors would act on one another, [standing] very close to 
each other, by the timbre of their voices, the look [they give one another], the physiognomy, the 
magnetic passes of their gestures, and not only by the [spoken words of their] language) L’opinion 
et la foule, 88. Although he mentions some of the facets of conversation lost in a telephonic 
version, as Proust does in greater detail (perhaps referring to this section of Tarde), the attempt of 
novelists (rather than dramatists and actors on the stage) to reproduce the fullness of the occasion 
become acute in the development of fiction in the nineteenth century when rhetoric per se is 
suppressed in such writing. For Lucie and Alfred, the process of inscribing their letters surpasses 
both the efforts of orators, playwrights, novelists and others because this couple is compelled 
to create in letters subject to excruciating censorship across vast distances of geographical and 
epistemological space and in a time-scheme that lacks order, coherence or control by themselves. 
Note too in Tarde’s expression about magnetic passes in the gestures of the speakers in a 
conversation, that he thinks they hypnotize each other and themselves, forming imitative shape 
and boundaries to their communication. In a sense, too, Alfred and Lucie also create a magnetic 
relationship of this kind in their letters, and when they tell each other they read and reread these 
epistles in the silent, lonely days and nights, they recognize part of the phenomenon.
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C’est la voix de mon bien-aimé!
Le voici, il vient,
Sautant sur les montagnes,
Bondissant sur les collines,
Mon bien-aimé est semblable à la gazelle . . . .
Mon bien-aimé est à moi, et je suis à lui . . . .
(CC 1:8, 9, 16)
These lines not only resonate through liturgies of both Jewish and 
Catholic worship but echo through secular courtly love songs long after-
wards, brought closer to general knowledge in the nineteenth century 
through a host of biblical plays, music performances, and pseudo-medi-
eval histories. The figurative language of resonance of sound and projec-
tion of light, psychic entry of one soul into another and transformation 
of the spirit, all this also plays its part in the metaphysical discourses 
that Alfred and Lucie seem to recreate for each other, almost without 
being aware of it, inadvertently. Another metaphor used by Lucie is that 
of resonating in harmony with one another, as in her letter of 9 Decem-
ber, 1895:
Lorsque je lis ces lignes toutes pleines de volonté et d’énergie, 
je sens que mon être tout entière vibre avec toi, ton activité 
morale entretint mes forces et il me semble qu’elles sont dou-
bles par la puissance de ta volonté.218
When I read these lines full of will and energy, I feel that 
my entire being vibrates with you, your psychic activity 
supports and repairs my strength and it seems to me 
that it is doubled by the power of your will.
Although there might be echoes here of Nietzsche’s and other nine-
teenth-century philosophers’ theories of the will to power and the force 
of destiny, the imagery in Lucie’s and Alfred’s letters vibrates rather 
within a zone of allusions derived from kabbalistic writings and seven-
teenth-century erotic poetry. However, this language has much more 
218 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 267.
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than a rhetorical wit to it: it is their only way of expressing the violent 
passions within them. Unlike even the most subtle or naturalistic de-
scriptions of conjugal desires in the novels of the period, the letters of 
Lucie and Alfred break out of all conventional bonds of propriety. More 
than that, Lucie’s images and concepts come close to the secret heart of 
Kabbalah as expounded by Wolfson.219
Just before the last letter discussed above, Lucie writes on 28 No-
vember, 1895, that the letters she puts in the mail to be transported 
across the sea are “lignes inanimées et froides” (inanimate and cold) and 
it is a “déchirement” (a rending to pieces) to send them out,220 as though 
someone had ripped a foetus from her womb. How can he respond to 
the tenderness and affection of her feelings when the words once in-
scribed and sent into the world are like a horrible abortion?221 Each epis-
tle is consequently like a still birth: “Le sentiment est trop violent pour que 
je puisse le décrire” (The passion is too strong for me to describe).222
Before he ever receives such a letter, Alfred is still writing on 27 
December, 1895, that he is in anguish over the failure of mail to arrive. 
Yet in another sense, they have already established such a powerful 
bond between them through the writing of letters that each can intuit 
what the other would write or has written on pages that are lost in the 
219 Wolfson: “ . . . according to kabbalistic phallocentrism, the feminine is ontologically localized in 
the male organ. Thus, the engendering mythic structure of kabbalistic symbolism may be referred 
to as the androgynous phallus. The unification of masculine and feminine symbolically signifies 
the ontological reintegration of the female to the male. Representations of the Shekhina as an 
autonomous feminine persona are characteristic of the state of exile and fragmentation. Even 
the image of the Shekhina as a bride adorned for her wedding is a transition between exile and 
redemption. The latter is fully represented when the bride enters the nuptial chamber and is 
transformed therein into the crown of the bridegroom. This transformation represents the final 
restoration of the female to the male, for the bride becomes the corona of the penis” (Through a 
Speculum that Shines, 275, n. 14).
220 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 266.
221 André Maurois: “In a child’s mind words are not well defined; they designate zones of emotion 
more or less extensive and not clearly bounded; in this respect many adults remain children all 
their lives” (Call No Man Happy, 15).
222 Wolfson cites Elijah Solomon Zalman, the Gaon of Vilna: “ ‘It is known that all union is dependent 
on sight, as it is written, ‘[When the {rain}bow is in the cloud] I will see it and remember the 
everlasting covenant . . . .[the sign of the] covenant that I have established’ (Gen. 9:16–17) It 
is known that the establishment of a covenant (haqamat berit) is in [sexual] copulation.’” Then 
Wolfson says in his own voice: “The biblical idiom haqamat ha-berit is here understood as signifying 
the erection of the penis that is necessary for sexual intercourse, and that is dependent on the 
vision of the bow in the cloud: the union of the masculine in the feminine. In the phenomenal 
plane of kabbalistic ritual and myth, eros and vision are harnessed in an inseparable bond” 
(Wolfson, Through a Speculum that Shines, 286–287). 
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dark and empty space between them.
Nos pensées sont communs, nos cœurs ont toujours battu à 
l’unisson, nos âmes vibrent aujourd’hui ensemble et veulent 
leur honneur avec l’ardeur brulante d’êtres honnêtes frappés 
dans ce qu’ils ont plus précieux.223
Our thoughts are common, our hearts are always beat-
ing in unison, our souls vibrate today together and wish 
for their honor with the burning ardor of truthful crea-
tures beaten down in what they hold most precious.
Again on 31 December, 1895, as the New Year comes in, Alfred moans 
that he can only live with and because of Lucie; everything in himself is 
dependent upon her. Out of the depths of the tomb, of the excruciating 
silence of his cell, de profundis:
J’exhale des cris de douleur, cris de souffrance, de quelques 
noms qu’ils se nomment, le cœur est toujours vaillant s’il ne 
sait pas toujours se taire.224
I breathe out cries of grief, cries of suffering, of several 
names which it names, my heart is always valiant if it 
does not always know how to keep its silence.
The plea is not towards God the Unnamed and Unnamable, but to 
the three names always in his heart and on his lips—Lucie, Pierre, and 
Jeanne. It is this most blasphemous of religions that keeps Alfred alive, 
much more so than his cult of reason and truth, his belief in justice and 
in France.225
By 26 March, 1896, the conditions under which Alfred lives on Dev-
il’s Island have become worse than ever. The more efforts are made in 
223 Ecris-moi souvent, écris-moi longuement, 269–270.
224 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 272.
225 Eleazar of Worms: “The Creator has no body, physical stature, image of form at all . . . . The glory is 
an appearance of the resplendent light which is called Shekhina, and the will of the Creator shows 
and images that very light to the prophets, according to the hour, to this one as that [form] and to 
the other as that . . . . The appearance of His splendor, which is His glory, is like a consuming fire, 
and is called Shekhina” (cited in Wolfson, Through a Speculum that Shines, 214).
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Paris to call for a revision of the trial he had undergone two years earlier, 
the more the authorities in Cayenne are told to make life so uncomfort-
able for the single and singular prisoner on Ile du Diable that he will do 
something desperate. If he dies, the instructions go, his body should 
quickly be disposed of at sea for the sharks to take care of, rather than 
risk a returning a martyr’s corpse to France. Yet Alfred tries to keep the 
information of his condition from Lucie, and the letters continue to 
manifest a timeless and placeless existence of separations, loneliness, 
hope, and encouragement. Thus, he writes with exquisite understate-
ment and painful irony:
Je suis un peu comme le malade sur son lit de torture qui 
souffre le martyre, qui vit parce que son devoir l‘y oblige et 
qui demande toujours à son médecin: “Quand finiront mes 
tortures?”226
I am a little like the sick man on his bed of torture who 
suffers martyrdom, who lives because his duty obligates 
him to and who always asks his doctor: “When will my 
tortures come to an end?”
The new regimen means that Alfred is shackled to his bed every 
night, his view of the sea blocked by a palisade built around his tiny 
hut, the fresh air cut off as well as the light, and the number of guards 
observing but never speaking to him round the clock increased. Let-
ters are withheld more often, and the arrival of books and magazines is 
continuously delayed. Yet could Lucie read past the effort to make her 
think his language merely exaggerates his daily life in prison? It would 
only take reading past the insignificant phrase “un peu comme la malade” 
to grasp the reality. He has always suggested strongly that his tortures 
were physical as well as “morales” and that “cet infernal supplice”227 (this 
infernal agony) has two objective essences: the pressure on his delicate 
and excitable nervous system and the threat to his very physical exist-
ence. But can she believe that supplice and torture are not figurative con-
structs and are actual cruel and excessive punishments, acts of sadistic 
226 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 294.
227 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 298.
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violence? The “abominable cauchemar dans lequel nous vivons”228 (this hor-
rible nightmare we live in) must be the literal reality in which they find 
themselves. The phantasmagoria does not blow away when the wind dis-
sipates the clouds of smoke and the magic lantern is switched off.
Je viens jeter dans mes lettres les cris d’angoisse et 
d’impatience de mon âme, et j’en souffre ensuite tout un long 
mois, en pensant à l’émotion que tu vas avoir, et j’en suis plus 
malheureux encore,
I have thrown my cries of anguish and the impatience of 
my soul into my letters, and I have suffered from that for 
a whole month in thinking of the emotion which you will 
have, and I am even more unhappy.
For he knows that his missives are not neutral reports or merely rhe-
torical cris du coeur; they are part of himself, and part of the agony that 
crosses the sea and becomes part of Lucie, and when they enter into her 
soul they are doubled, not diminished. On those increasingly infrequent 
times when her letters do arrive and he can read her words, drawing 
their content—and the physical embodiment of her longing and suffer-
ing—into himself, it is only partly a consolation and a relief to him. He 
feels like a madman full of grief, and his head blows up, ready to explode 
and unable to understand anything, like the man with the exploding 
head in Georges Méliès’s film: “Je suis comme fou de chagrin, ma tête gon-
flée ne comprend plus.”229
However, in what seems like a less stressful day, 3 September, 1896, 
when he can write one his longest letters to Lucie, he hints at how she 
should interpret his words, using directions that seem as though they 
were lifted directly from Maimonides’s council to his pupil in The Guide 
of the Perplexed:
Tu pardonneras le décousu de cette lettre; je t’écris, comme 
je te le disais, sous le coup d’une émotion profonde, ne cher-
chant même pas à rassembler mes idées, m’en sentant même 
228 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 302.
229 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 304.
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incapable, me disant avec effroi que je vais passer tout un 
mois n’ayant comme lecture que tes pauvres lignes, si courtes, 
où me parles des enfants, où je n’aurai rien enfin à lire de toi; 
cependant, je vais tout de même essayer de résumer.230
You must pardon the disconnected nature of this letter; I 
write to you, as though I were speaking to you, under the 
pressure of a profound emotion, not seeking to collect 
my ideas, feeling myself incapable, speaking to myself 
afraid that I am going to pass a whole month with noth-
ing to read other than these poor lines, so short, where 
the children speak to me, where I will have nothing fi-
nally to read from you; however, I am going to try all the 
same to sum up.
It seems at first as though he were speaking only about his own dif-
ficulty in writing a coherent letter to Lucie and cautioning her not to 
try to make sense out of what is only an outburst of emotion. However, 
the more carefully we examine the words, the more it emerges that he 
is also talking about how all letters should be read, and using nega-
tive and fragmentary hints—as the Rambam advised—he outlines a 
more subtle method of analysis, a midrashic exercise. The difference 
between written and spoken discourse is elided. The words that come 
out under the pressure of intense emotional stress do not just mirror 
the disconnected and illogical words that flow out. They also embody 
the deepest, most secret passions of their soul, the tortuous conditions 
of both their lives having sensitized each to a degree of intuitive com-
prehension never before experienced in their marriage. It will indeed 
be necessary to collect his apparently random and scattered thought 
to make sense of what he—and she—are trying to say to one another. 
But the secret meaning is not a veiled allegorical discourse that needs 
to be decoded and spread out in the sunlight. Instead, it is the very 
supernal superverbal love and loyalty of their relationship that needs 
to be manifested mutually in their souls, a kind of affection and trust 
that lies outside all confines of bourgeois domesticity or romantic love 
in literary tradition.
230 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 313.
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It is something akin to the mystical intention and cleaving of Kabba-
lah, yet outside the norms of those mystical exercises as well, because it 
is part of an attempt to rectify the world of French justice and truth. The 
closest analogue is the letters of the children, innocent of the intentions 
of their parents and transcribed for ostensible reasons other than being 
part of the mutually longed-for paternal sensuous embrace. When Lucie 
pens the letters from Pierre and Jeanne, adjusting their childish words 
to the written mode, she seems to disappear from the letters she writes 
to Alfred. Yet it is this selfless withdrawal from the handwritten pages 
of her epistles that mimics the tsimtsum, the contraction of the Godhead 
into His own mysterious and ineffable otherness (En-Sof), that leaves 
a created and creating space (makom) for the Shekhina to take shape, 
to enter into this world (ha-olam hazeh), and to dwell with Israel in ex-
ile and accompany the children of Israel on their long exodus from the 
lands of darkness, idolatry, and superstition—indeed, to be with and in 
Israel, each and every individual.
Did or could Alfred and Lucie Dreyfus know enough to be aware of 
what their letters are saying in the interpretations we have shown, or 
are our midrashings too far-fetched to be sustained by the documen-
tary facts in the historical record? I think that Alfred goes in and out of 
such an awareness, as does Lucie, and only under pressure, when their 
epistles seem to give them each mutual reassurance strong enough to 
maintain the illusions they wish so intently to maintain, do they be-
lieve—and know—what they are saying. There is no explicit proof that 
either of them actually did read, hear lectures or sermons on, or think 
about rabbinical and kabbalistic ways of thought, but had they been so 
inclined, as we know from studies of what Marcel Proust was reading at 
about the same time, the information was available in French transla-
tions of classical Jewish volumes and in articles being published in re-
views of the Jewish Consistory.
Furthermore, with his fluency in German and his connections in 
German-speaking lands, Alfred could have gone further in his readings, 
as well as attended lectures and seminars on his travels into Alsace and 
Switzerland. Nevertheless, the proof is in the pudding, and when one or 
the other of the couple—or both together—creates little disquisitions 
and poetic conceits or midrashim that conform more or less to rabbini-
cal precedent, then our own readings require us to make explicit what is 
implicit in their texts.
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These impressions and illusions she wishes she could actualise are 
fully Jewish in their import, without, however, necessitating either Al-
fred or Lucie to know or say that they are. On 5 March, 1897, the wife 
tells her husband,
Quand je t’écris, au moins, j’ai quelques instants d’illusion, 
la plume, l’imagination, la tension de la volonté me trans-
portèrent près de toi, là, tout près, comme je voudrais être, 
te soutenant, te consolant, te rassurant sur l’avenir, et 
t’apportant tout l’espoir que mon cœur contient renfermé et 
que je voudrais tant te communiquer.231
When I write to you, at least, I have several instants of 
illusion, the pen, the imagination, the tension of my will 
would carry me close to you, there, so close, just where 
I would like to be, supporting you, consoling you, reas-
suring you of the future, and carrying to you all the hope 
that is wrapped up in my heart and that I would so much 
want to communicate to you.
Yet the terms of this metaphysical conceit that both letter writers try 
to generate by force of will cannot be equated with kabbalistic ecstasy. 
The momentary instants of feeling that make them believe they have 
transcended the vast ocean between them or crossed over into a realm 
of experience already at peace and governed by justice and truth cannot 
be sustained, only hoped for—sometimes to the point of hallucination. 
In the supplement to the letter of 12 September, 1896, discussed earlier 
in this chapter, Alfred remarks,
On dit que la douleur était la grande éducatrice du cœur hu-
main; eh bien, c’est faux, archi-faux; le malheur, autant on ne 
l’a pas mérité, révolte, rend mauvais, injuste.232
They say that pain was the great teacher of the human 
heart; oh well, that is false, hugely false, unhappiness 
231 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 353.
232 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 316.
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rather that is unmerited, rebellion, makes one evil and 
unjust.
Cynically put, Dreyfus rejects the Christian idea that suffering is 
salutary, that it teaches the soul to be wise and forbearing, and that it 
prepares the believer to receive the grace of God. Not at all, he says: un-
happiness arises from the experience of injustice in the world, the signs 
of rebellion against truth and honour, and one feels only bitterness and 
anger as a consequence. But once he spits this out, he tells Lucie that 
although he may be crushed under the weight of physical tortures and 
stretched to the limits of his sanity by the pressures of his rage, he, with 
her help, must ceaselessly labour to find the truth, to expose the per-
petrators of the criminal acts against him, and to achieve their goal of 
a new trial and thus acquittal and rehabilitation. He reiterates, “Qu’il 
faut redevirir ce que nous étions, ce que nous sommes, des êtres humains, qui 
souffrent horriblement, atrocement, victims de la plus effroyable machina-
tion qu’on puisse rêver”233 (We must become again what we were, what we 
are, human beings, who suffer horribly, atrociously, victims of the most 
frightful machinations one could ever dream of).
In Jewish tradition, the victim of injustice must never give in, but 
struggle on in heart and soul, by reason and through faith, waiting for 
but not dependent upon a divine sign, and the goal is to become fully 
and truly human, a mensch, a willing partner in the covenant of the law. 
Dreyfus acts and thinks and feels not on his own behalf in some private 
inner relationship with an absent God, but through and with the sup-
port of his wife and on behalf of their children.234 Thus this supplement 
233 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 316.
234 A brief letter from Jeanne on 10 October 1896 permits us to see what Lucie is teaching the 
children in Alfred’s absence, and we must assume that she would not instruct them in any beliefs 
contrary to his own or what they have already decided should be taught to the little ones: “Papa 
chéri,/ Je voudrais que tu reviennes bientôt, il faut que tu le demandes au bon Dieu, moi je lui demande 
tous les jours./Je t’embrasse beaucoup beaucoup./Ta petite Jeanne” (Dear Papa, I wish that you come 
back soon, you must ask the good God, I ask him everyday. I kiss you lots and lots. Your little 
Jeanne” (Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 324). Similarly on 25 December 1896, Pierrot 
writes to his Dear Papa that he often writes “au bon Dieu” for the return of his father (Ecris-moi 
souvent, écris moi longuement, 332). Both children, it would seem, have been taught their prayers 
and a belief in God, as well as Bible stories; what these prayers, beliefs and stories consisted of, 
however, remains lost in the mists of time. Remember that Lucie transcribes the letters on behalf 
of the children and probably coaches them in what to say as well. She uses a Catholic expression, 
“le bon Dieu,” a formulaic not to be found in Protestant cultures, and perhaps here, a little like 
Proust’s mother, she felt closer to the majority French culture than the minority Christians. It 
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to this epistle concludes with a statement of faith suppressed in previ-
ous editions of the letters:
Nous devrons avoir cette foi qui nous fait accepter les plus 
dures situations, pour arriver à rendre à nos enfants un nom 
sans taches, un nom respecté.
Oui chère Lucie, cette foi, il faut que tu l'aies, il faut que vous 
l‘ayez tous; elle doit planer au-dessus de toutes les souffranc-
es, de toutes les douleurs humaines.235
We must have this faith, so that we can accept the most 
difficult situations, in order to be able to render to our 
children a name without stains, a respected name.
Yes, dear Lucie, this faith, you must have it, all of you 
must have it, it must soar above all sufferings, all human 
pains.
This is an intellectual faith, not a vague spirituality; it is a commit-
ment of the heart in all knowledge of its implications and consequences. 
This time, Alfred calls on not only Lucie to pledge herself to the duty 
they have before them but to all the others in their two families. The 
clearing of his name of all infamy includes all of them, all generations, 
backwards and forwards in time, for it is not an individual matter; it 
belongs to the family, and to all of Israel. More than that, to see that 
Alfred has the proper titles, rank, and honour restored to his name is 
also to ensure that the dignity and reputation of the God of Israel in the 
world is restored.
This comes close to being, but always remains just below the surface 
of his text, and there is no doubt also of his consciousness, an admission 
that the key causal factor in his horrible nightmare is anti-Semitism. Yet 
despite such a “long examen de conscience,” as he calls it, the long dark 
night of suffering (“cette nuit atroce que je viens de passer”) continues to 
pass into a day that merely precedes the next. This meditation (“réflex-
ion”) that comes from his hallucinating brain (“mon cerveau halluciné”) 
may seem to her a more endearing and personal term to speak of a Jewish deity who in Yiddish 
can be called Gottenyu, my dear little God.
235 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 316–317.
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continues his dreadful nightmare (“ce lugubre cauchemar”).236 But to 
what end these meditations, he does not know, and he cannot under-
stand himself when Lucie is there in his dreams or in her letters to help 
him out.237 Only in her letters does he find a calm moment and place. Yet 
“je comprenais, sous le calme apparent de vos lettres, quelle douleur atroce se 
cachait” (I understand under the apparent calm of all your letters what 
an unbearable pain was hiding). 238
There are moments like this when Alfred feels despondent because 
he does not believe the family back home appreciates fully what he is 
going through on Devil’s Island. Because Lucie cannot report on the 
progress of efforts for a revision of the trial or the extent to which new 
evidence has been piling up of the perfidy of the officers and court of-
ficials, as well as politicians, in their collusion against him from the very 
beginning of the case, he doubts sufficient measures have been taken 
on his behalf. He also finds that Lucie’s letters seem to miss out on the 
directions he has given her or that she has misread the feelings he has 
expressed. It is sometimes as though someone were to wake up in the 
night and find himself blind and deaf, unable to know what has hap-
pened to him, unaware that anyone is trying to help, frightened that the 
world has disappeared into a vast, impenetrable, and silent darkness.
Je relisais aussi, comme chaque mois, les lettres que j’ai de 
toi, les compagnons de ma profonde solitude, les lettres de 
tous, et je crois que tu n’a pas saisi entièrement ma pensée, 
un peu confuse forcément dans les nombreuses lettres que je 
t’ai écrites.239
I was also rereading, as I do every month, the letters 
I have had from you, the companions of my profound 
solitude, the letters from all of you, and I believe that 
you have not fully grasped my thought, inevitably a little 
confused in the numerous letters I have written to you.
He wants to excuse her, take some of the blame on himself for not 
236 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 317.
237 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 318.
238 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 319.
239 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 329.
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writing clearly enough and for having written too much in a confused 
and disorderly way. He doesn’t want to blame her, become angry with 
her, and risk alienating his own and only support throughout the whole 
ordeal. So when he speaks to her about avoiding rancor or bitterness 
against any individuals who might be behind the crimes against him—
that is, to maintain a dignified and calm posture in all her dealings with 
the outside world, especially the persons responsible for seeing his ap-
peals through to their justifiable conclusion, he is also speaking to him-
self, to quieten his frustration and his impatience—and his doubts about 
her loyalty and determination. “J’ajoute qu’il ne s’agit d’apporter dans cette 
horrible affaire ni acrimonie, ni amertume contre les personnes. Il faut viser 
plus haut” (I must add that it is not a matter of bearing acrimony nor bit-
terness against individuals in this horrible affair. One must aim much 
higher). Perhaps also, ironically, when he tells her to aim higher—higher 
than, in the immediate import of the sentence, the underlings in the 
whole sorry affair, and look to God for help, support, and understand-
ing—he might be also saying, “Watch out for the persons in the most 
responsible positions in the army and the government.” Although it is 
most unlikely that Dreyfus could think such a thing at this time in the 
affair, because of his idealism and the limits on his knowledge of what is 
happening back in Paris, nevertheless this caution and hint to seek out 
the culprits in the highest offices in the republic will be all too true in 
retrospect.
On New Year’s Day of 1897, Lucie begins her letter to her dearly be-
loved Alfred with the usual mixture of hopes and encouragements for 
a peaceful future through the resolution of their problems. Then, in a 
passage suppressed in the earliest editions of the letters, she says, “Que 
Dieu enfin ait pitié de nous”240 (May God have pity on us!), thus seeming 
to break the taboo against crying out for pity and mercy, as though the 
couple were Christians; but to push these common expressions, embed-
ded in French life and culture, though indeed imbued with Christian 
overtones as though they could mean more than the context allows 
them to resonate, would be to expect far too much of Lucie and Alfred 
as theologians. Her plaintive letters continues: “Qu’il nous permettre de 
vivre le repos, qu’il mette un terme à nos angoisses, aux blessures de notre 
coeur et de notre âme” (May He permit us to live in repose, may He put an 
240 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 341.
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end to our anguish, to the wounds in our heart and in our soul), formu-
laic demands for release from intense pain in the cruel and unmerited 
catastrophe of their lives.
At the end of the letter, in an appended statement, Lucie returns 
to the more familiar language of their interprenetrative experience of 
one another, where they regarded one another’s letters as reflections of 
each other’s souls (“un reflet de ton âme, de ta pensée”) and as a mystical 
space in which they converse, their usually tightened nerves relaxed (“ce 
qui m’a détendu les nerfs et reposée un peu”).241 In response, as it were, on 
6 January, 1897, Alfred writes something quite similar, though in the 
language of his own more masculine sensibility, affirming that the goal 
is always the same—the rehabilitation of the family name:
Mais, hélas! si l’on peut être stoïque devant la mort, il est dif-
ficile de l’être devant la douleur de chaque jour, devant cette 
pensée lancinante de se demander quand finira cet horrible 
cauchemar dans lequel nous vivons depuis si longtemps, si 
cela peut s’appeler vivre que de souffrir sans répit.242
But, alas! if one can be stoical before death, it is diffi-
cult to be [so] before daily pains, before this penetrating 
thought of asking oneself when will it ever end, this hor-
rible nightmare in which we have lived so long, if it can 
be called living to suffer without respite.
The specific terms may be more classical and impersonal, but the an-
guish is the same, and the same cry for relief binds Alfred’s letter to 
Lucie’s. Yet Lucie has another strategy to make manifest the deepest, 
virtually unspeakable anguish in her heart: the projection of her feelings 
into the voice, person, and condition of the children. Thus, on 1 Febru-
ary, 1897, she tells her husband about little Jeanne’s illness and how it 
has been passed on to Pierrot. The girl had a mild case of chickenpox and 
now the boy has it, both desiring to be pampered and fondled (“d’être 
dorloté et câliné”).243 To show this otherwise repressed longing, the wife 
241 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 342.
242 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 345.
243 In a section of the letters previously unpublished: Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 348.
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and mother signs her letter with a never-before-used phrase: “Ton affec-
tionnée Lucie” (Your affectionate Lucie).
It is possible to see Alfred moving, by the force of his will, into self-
analysis, while at the same time, under the pressures of the physical and 
moral tortures he is undergoing, slipping back into black despair. In his 
letter of 24 April, 1897, he starts by saying that it is utterly painful to 
keep waiting for her letters, and because he has no letters from her to 
answer, his own are filled with repetitions of what he has written too 
often already. Repetition warms his heart, as though he were generating 
heat to make a spark, or as though he were in sexual congress with her, 
and yet for all that, the constant iteration of words and phrases does not 
relieve him. The agony is inexpressible, and the inexpressible does not 
go away through a one-sided expression, even if he were to howl like a 
beast.244 When he attempts to pull himself together and transform this 
personal pain into a statement of idealism, his love and loyalty to the 
nation,245 when, indeed, he sees himself a martyr to Lucie and to France, 
he becomes detached, as he often says, from the essential core of his 
self, his Jewishness:
Et la réalité, la voici, toujours la même: c’est que dans ce-
tte horrible affaire il y a un double intérêt en jeu, celui de la 
patrie, le nôtre, que l’un est aussi sacré que l’autre.246
In reality, the here and now, [is] always the same: it is 
that in this horrible affair there is a double interest in 
play, that of the nation, and our own, which is as sacred 
as the other.
The words are cryptic, cramped, ambiguous at best: the double inter-
est at play is on the one side, clearly that of France, “our nation,” his 
and Lucie’s and their children’s; he also says, “[M]a vie est à mon pays” 
(my life belongs to my country), but on the other, the interest is in his 
244 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 359.
245 Romain Rolland’s Olivier remarks of the Jews: “The best of them . . . make the mistake, in all 
sincerity, of identifying the destiny of France with their Jewish dreams . . .” (Jean Christophe, vol. 
II, 385) and then a little later: “The Jews are well off in France: I am glad of it: but they must not 
think of turning France into Judea!” (II, 386).
246 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 360.
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honour, his integrity, and his innocence. He owes it to Lucie to stay alive 
and healthy and sane. He owes it to his children to fight against the 
machinations of the state, the army, and the judiciary to clear his name 
of all taints. What he owes to the family and to and through his love to 
Lucie is his Jewish self. In another sense, behind or inside this para-
dox, “le nôtre” refers to the interest he has in honouring the name of the 
God of Israel, insofar as Lucie has come to embody that concept of the 
sacred. When he speaks of name and country and patrimony, each word 
can reverberate with Jewish meanings, the Shem of the God who blesses 
all things, the Makom, the place which is infinite and eternal and which 
is also the Eretz Yisroel, the Promised Land of Israel, and the Zekhut, 
the legacy of obligations of the deity accumulated by all of Israel by the 
righteous of all generations and to which all of Israel is entitled to a por-
tion in times of need and despair.
Most of the time Alfred speaks outside the explicit language of reli-
gion and tries to secularise and Frenchify his hopes and dreams, to jux-
tapose rather than oppose or prioritise his love of Lucie and of France. 
Thus, in his letter of 5 July, 1897, he tells his wife:
Je joins les mains dans une prière suprême, que j’adresse en-
core à tous ceux [à qui] j’ai fait appel, pour qu’ils t’apportent 
un concours plus ardent, plus généreux que jamais dans la 
découverte de la vérité.247
I join my hands in a supreme prayer which I address to 
all those to whom I have appealed for them to bring to 
you a more burning unity, more generous than ever for 
the discovery of the truth.
An ardent prayer, with joined hands—anything but a Jewish gesture, 
but a commonplace of French Catholic culture so deeply embedded in 
the ordinary language that the significance is totally neutralized—di-
rected not at God but at his family and their allies, for them to double 
their efforts on his behalf.248 The news from home is totally inadequate 
247 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 367.
248 On 22 July 1897, Alfred writes in the same figurative gesture of joined hands in prayer: Ecris-moi 
souvent, écris moi longuement, 370.
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to his emotional needs. He does not realize—how could he?—what has 
already been accomplished and how close the nation is to the idea of 
his rehabilitation. Yet he is also correct, insofar as it will not be until 
Emile Zola forces the issue with his public J’Accuse that the most spec-
tacular stage of the affair is set off. As the censored passages in Lucie’s 
letter of 15 July, 1897, show, the truth was on the march—“Cette fois 
je m’avancerai avec plus de certitude encore et je t’affirmerai d’une façon ab-
solument catégorique que ton nom sera lavé de cette horrible souffrance, que 
la certitude de ta rehabilitation est absolue en moi”249 (This time I will be 
advancing with even more certitude and I can affirm to you in a fashion 
absolutely categorical that your name will be cleansed of this horrible 
suffering, that certainty of your rehabilitation is absolute in me)—yet 
there was no way he could know it.250 Whatever truths he could read out 
of her letters that did arrive were oblique, fragmentary, and understat-
ed. The point at issue here, though, is that whenever Dreyfus wants to 
make a statement that could be read by the public—even if that public 
is only himself, Lucie, and the censors who read their letters—his lan-
guage is vague, pompous, and secular. When he is crushed by circum-
stances, crying out in pain, appealing to Lucie for moral and emotional 
support, he reveals the hidden core of his being, obliquely, to be sure, 
but profoundly true in his Jewishness.
Alfred writes what he calls “mon testament moral” on 20 August, 
1897,251 a letter stopped by the censors from being sent to Lucie, and 
existing only in fragments. Although he speaks insistently of “l’extrême 
franchise, la franchise brutale même” (the extreme frankness, brutal 
249 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 369.
250 Further explicating mahloquet, Ouaknin draws on Emmanuel Lévinas’ De Dieu qui vient à l’idée 
(Paris: Vrin, 1982, 166): “la parole de question est ‘la première fissure visible dans le psychisme de la 
satisfaction’. Le refus de la satisfaction, du contentement où, en d’autres termes, de la totalité est un des 
traits essentiels de la Mahloquet. La question brise la totalité, le concept, elle est l’ouverture et chemin 
de (et vers) la transcendance, elle est source de Hidouch, de savoir transcendant” (The word of the 
question is “the first visible fissure in the psychism of satisfaction.” The refusal of satisfaction, of 
contentment or, in other words, of the totality is one of the essential characteristics of Hidoush, of 
transcendant knowledge” (Le livre brûlé, 233). The purpose of the questionings and challenges of 
authority is to “make it new”, new in the sense of a continuous, dynamic overflowing of meaning, 
never stuck into a fixed iconic statement or of what is true, since such a truth is false, is an idol. 
“L’importance du Hidouch,” writes Ouaknin, “réside dans le fait qu’il introduit une discontinuité dans le 
rhythme de la conscience et dans le train de l’être, qu íl brise le bloc de l’être” (The importance of Hidoush 
resides in the fact that it introduces a discontinuity in the rhythm of consciousness and in the 
train of being, that it breaks the [solid] block of being”) in Le livre brûlé, 243).
251 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 375.
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frankness even), it is difficult to see in what survives of this letter what 
goaded the prison authorities into stopping the epistle from going to its 
destined reader. In contradiction to this assertion, he tells Lucie on 2 
October, 1897,
Comme je te l’ai dit, mes longues lettres sont trop l’expression 
intime et profonde aussi bien de mes sentiments que de mon 
immuable volonté, pour qu’il soit utile d’y revenir; elles sont 
comme mon testament moral.252
As I have told you, my long letters are too much the in-
timate and profound expression of my sentiments as of 
my immutable will, so that it would be useful to return 
to them, they are like my moral testament. 
In other words, this time around, what he calls his moral testament 
is not brutally frank, but carefully considered, an edited version of his 
hopes and aspirations. But a testament of this sort, common to Jewish 
tradition as a means for fathers to set out the principles by which they 
hope their children will live after their demise, sometimes appended to 
and sometimes substituted for an actual disposition of worldly goods, 
would normally be written in Hebrew, weaving together in melitza for-
mat many scriptural and Talmudic phrases and concepts, and would be-
come a family treasure in itself.253 For Alfred Dreyfus, however, aside 
from citing Shakespeare—he speaks of Banco’s (i.e., Banquo’s)254 ghost 
from Macbeth—the legacy to his children will be the good name he 
hopes to be restored and the example of his own endurance under ter-
rible duress during the whole of the ordeal of imprisonment.
This citation from Shakespeare or any other literary source, includ-
ing the historians and philosophers he so extensively comments on in 
the cahiers, is rare, the language of Alfred remaining close to the neutral, 
252 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 382.
253 One thinks here of the famous inscription Sigmund Freud’s father wrote on the flyleaf of the Bible 
in modern edition and translation he had read to his son from when he was a boy and now passes 
on with hope that the grown man, already successful as a neurologist, would return to the Law for 
inspiration and guidance.
254 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 383. See also Duclert’s lengthy note on this error and 
Dreyfus’ love for Shakespeare, 492, n. 56. We will discuss these matters more closely when we 
consider the prison cahiers from Devil’s Island in the second volume of this series.
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secular ideals of mid-nineteenth-century French patriotism, or, as we 
have been trying to show, occasionally slipping into the rhythms, tones, 
rhetorical tropes, and words of biblical prophecy and poetry, Jewish lit-
urgy, Talmudic debate and sometimes kabbalistic fantasy, this slippage 
brought on by the extremes of torment, physical and moral, he lived 
through for five years of his life. Although at times Lucie picks up his 
lead, echoes his rhythms and words, and occasionally takes the directing 
role in moving through this exalted discourse, she is usually anchored to 
domestic matters and care of the children. She is also forced to suppress 
her wish to enlighten her husband as to the state of play in the project 
to rehabilitate him, with a few exceptions, at which time, of course, her 
letters are censored or stopped altogether.
In this last phase of their epistolary communications, whether in-
tentionally or not, she begins to mimic the ringing polemics of Zola and 
other Dreyfusards. This can be seen in the previously unpublished letter 
of 20 January, 1898, as pointed out by Duclert.255 It is unlikely that Al-
fred was able to recognize these clues as to the advanced state of the af-
fair, which was reaching its climax in Paris. But the closer the end comes 
to his sufferings, the less can he see the clues in the erratic behaviour of 
his jailers. Sometimes they relax their guard a little, then they increase 
it cruelly and sadistically. Lucie’s letters, as we can now see, begin to 
drop their guard and speak enthusiastically about the coming resolu-
tion, but since these are the very letters held back from him, Alfred be-
gins to doubt her commitment and assumes the worst in his legal and 
political position. Sensing a crisis rising again in his mental state, Lucie 
begs him on 6 March, 1898, to give her a detailed account of his health: 
“Dis-moi longuement comment tu es, comment tu te portes. Dis-le moi en 
toute franchise”256 (Tell me at length what is the matter with you. Speak 
to me in all frankness). Later still, on 7 April, 1898, she tries to explain 
away a misunderstanding on his part, that she is not annoyed by his 
repeated descriptions of his poor mental health, that she understands 
his position exactly and admires his courage and fortitude, and that she 
herself is glad to suffer along with him, to share his burdens.257 She is 
255 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 408–409 ; see also 494, n. 7. She is insistent that the great 
burden is finally being lifted in her letter of 17 March 1898: Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 
415.
256 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 413.
257 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 417.
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even more insistent on 16 August, 1898, when she writes, “Je désire si 
ardemment te pénétrer de ma pleine confiance en un bon avenir prochain que 
j’ai peut-être manqué de clarté dans l’expression de ce sentiment. Dorénavant 
je tâcherai d’être plus nette”258 (I desire so ardently to penetrate you with 
my full confidence in a favourable outcome soon that perhaps I missed 
being clear in my expression of this sentiment. From now on I will at-
tempt to be plain).
Although Lucie can see everything coming right at last, still the weeks 
drag by, the months pass without an official decision, and no news she 
can send to him which will be confirmed by documents and newspapers. 
What encouraging words she does write, as on 14 July, 1898, Bastille 
Day, ironically are prevented from coming to him because the political 
factions against him, and the prison authorities, absolutely convinced 
of his guilt and of a Jewish plot against France, resist to the very last 
moment.
In late July of that last year of his imprisonment and exile, his let-
ters change markedly. They suddenly take on the character of little es-
says on topics such as the education of the children or on the nature of 
language, as though the boundary between the epistles and the cahiers 
was breached. Nevertheless, just as about at the same time, in his last 
workbooks, the facade of intellectual objectivity and distance from his 
own sufferings begins to break down, here too he lets cries of pain and 
frustration seep into these little disquisitions:
Et si je n’écoutais que mon cœur, je t’écrirais plus souvent, 
car il me semble ainsi—pure illusion, je le sais, mais qui sou-
lage néanmoins—qu’au même instant, à la même minute, 
tu me sentiras à travers la distance que nous sépare battre 
un cœur qui ne vit que pour toi, pour nos enfants, un cœur 
qui t’aime . . .259
And if I had only listened to my own heart, I would have 
written more often, for it seems to me thus—a pure il-
lusion, I know, but which nevertheless comforts me—
that at the same moment, in the same minute, across 
258 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 431.
259 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 428–429.
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the distance which separates us you feel a heart beat-
ing that only lives for you, for our children, a heart that 
loves you . . .
Again, the more hopeless things seem, the more he expresses himself 
in these metaphysical terms, creating the conceit of the two hearts beat-
ing in unison or one heart in two distant places. He need not write because 
they are closer together than geography or the physical delivery of pieces 
of paper with words inscribed on them. But never have they been caught 
up so much in a crisis of communication, when, right on the cusp of suc-
cess, their physical letters fail to arrive or are misread because of the lack 
of coherence, and because, at least on Lucie’s side, with the confidence she 
has in the expected resolution to all their problems, she falls away from 
that sense of shared crisis that made the metaphysical union possible.
By 26 September, 1898, she writes a totally new kind of letter to Al-
fred, one filled with a catalogue of actions taken on his behalf: “Je veux 
te raconter très brièvement la succession des faits.” 260 Such a letter, how-
ever, she should have known, would be held back, and when it did arrive 
without a proper historical context and not backed up by confirming 
documents, it would be misunderstood by her husband. Matters reach 
such a point of confusion that in her letter of 22 November, 1898, she 
signs herself “L. Dreyfus,”261 the driest, most impersonal way possible. 
Salutation and inner greetings are less formal, so why this strange sign-
ing off? Could it be that, so hopeful is she of an immediate release from 
his prison, she expects the letter to be stopped before it reaches Alfred 
and either held by the officials or posted back to her?
Unfortunately, nothing happens for many more weeks and months, 
and their letters slip back into the old routine, perhaps tinged with 
an even greater despair and frustration than before. In the letter of 6 
March, 1898,262 again filled with demands for him to send all the details 
possible of his health and mental condition, as well as her apologies for 
the tediousness of her repeated words and phrases from previous letters 
over all these years, she diagnoses her moral condition as “cette obses-
sion,” manifest in the fixation on rehabilitating his honour.
260 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 433.
261 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 439.
262 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 412–413.
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Just as she intuits the need to make him talk through his pains and 
humiliations in order to draw him up out of his black hole of despair, so 
too she makes her treatment consist of self-abasing comments about 
her own lack of skill in writing and her weak intellect. Her attempts to 
reassure him of the light that is already breaking forth into the dark-
ness of the mysterious case against him, Alfred does not comprehend 
in a way that makes her confident of his mental condition: she knows, 
in a way, that her letters may not be getting through; she confesses to 
her inadequacy in expressing herself clearly and cogently, and she fears 
that her husband may be too far gone in his illness to recover even af-
ter a judicial revision and rehabilitation. For example, in her letter of 
7 April, 1898, she writes that they should be habituated to suffering 
“l’irrégularité des couriers,”263 but everything is much worse than that. In 
a previously unpublished part of this letter,
Je me souviens quelquefois de tristesse combine je me sen-
tais isolée, malheureuse quand je me devais de me séparer de 
toi pendant quelques jours, j’aurais donné beaucoup pour que 
ces moments envisagés avec tant d’anxiété, soient passes. 
Qu’aurais-je dit si j’avais pu prévoir une chose pareille, que 
toi mon mari bien-aimé tu me serais arraché pendant près 
de quatre ans, et que pendant ces quatre années, j’aurais le 
supplice de vivre, s’assister à la torture et d’être impuissante 
à la soulager, à adoucir tes souffrances.264
I sometimes recall with sadness how I felt isolated, un-
happy, when I had to be separated from you for four 
days [during military manoeuvres]. I would have given 
anything for those moments I dream of in anxiety to be 
over. What could I have said if I had been able to foresee 
such a thing as you, my beloved husband, wrenched away 
from me for close to four years, during which I found life 
an agony, of being with you in your torture and being 
powerless to comfort you, to soften your sufferings.
263 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 416.
264 Ecris-moi souvent, écris moi longuement, 417.
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She had been prepared to take the normal difficulties of being a sol-
dier’s wife, of having him away from home for days at a time on official 
duties, but she could never have imagined this horrible fate of not only 
enduring more than four years of separation but of knowing intimately 
his terrible pains in exile, in isolation, and in torture, and of not being 
able to offer the right kind of relief through her letters. More than a 
distant witness of his misery and agony, she tells him she has been shar-
ing every moment of his torment. Is this merely a figurative statement? 
She has to convince Alfred now that she has not resigned herself to his 
fate, accepting it all as a given, beyond remedy, as she thinks he is now 
accusing her of doing, but to show him that she is painfully aware of 
the terrible burden of responsibilities destiny has put on her to accom-
plish things beyond the capacity of a woman, beyond the conventional 
restraints put on a middle-class wife by a sexist society, and beyond the 
range of public sympathy a Jewish wife and mother could elicit from 
an essentially anti-Semitic culture. And yet this confession of inadequa-
cies is not all true; she has accomplished much, transformed herself into 
something Alfred dreamed she could be—and was already, in his con-
ceit of the Shekhina—and something, if he did know, as he will come to 
know, he will hesitate in speaking of because he is not all that different 
from other men in France at that time.
As we shall see, when we consider the carnets and journals, Alfred 
barely mentions Lucie and what she did for him, just as he shades from 
public view all his own intellectual accomplishments and interests. 
Partly this relapse into patriarchal and cultural conventionality is a 
consequence of the broken body and soul he brings back from Devil’s 
Island and partly a result of social pressures, probably as true in his 
Jewish families as it is in the wider community. Nevertheless, nothing 
should obscure what the two writers created during the five years of 
the ordeal and across “perilous seas forlorn” nor, as we will argue in de-





Chapter Three: The Phantasmagoria of a 
Secular Midrash
InTroduCTIon
Mais il ne fallait pas oublier que toutes les folies avaient reçu 
droit de cité dans mon affaire et s’y étaient donné libre car-
rière. Il fallait donc pénétrer résolurent dans les arcanes de 
toute cette fantasmagorie.
—Alfred Dreyfus1
The prison workbooks or cahiers tell quite another story than that seen 
in the various collections of letters alone or in the selected and com-
mentated editions discussed already, and these compendia of jottings 
and drawings expand aspects of what we find in the journals following 
Dreyfus’s return to France.2 But why have fewer than half survived? It 
is not so much because the tropical heat and humidity destroyed them, 
or because the prison authorities confiscated them, but because Alfred 
Dreyfus did not wish their contents to be made public.3 Yet, as Pierrette 
Turlais suggests, “If it quickly seems that the correspondence with his 
wife Lucie and the writing of his journal opened up a source of life, it also 
1 “It should not be forgotten that all the madmen were given the keys to the city in my affair and 
they had a free run. It should therefore be necessary to penetrate resolutely into all the secret 
passageways of this phantasmagoria.” Alfred Dreyfus, Carnets (1899-1907): Après le process de 
Rennes, ed. Philippe Oriol (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1998), 215.
2 Speaking of the Goncourt Brothers Journal, Anatole France defines the genre in this way: 
“A journal [is] a memorial, a volume of reminiscences [that] escapes all the fashions, all the 
conventions that are imposed on the works of the mind” (“The Journal of the Goncourts” in On 
Life & Letters, first series, trans. A. W. Evans [London: John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1924 (1910)] 
74). Though the cahiers do not form themselves into a journal, we could say there are at least 
two aspects of Dreyfus’s personality at work in their composition, one consciously attempting 
to stave off madness by deliberate intellectual, mathematical, and repetitive exercises, the other 
unconsciously revealing his pains, his often manic idealism, and his probably little understood 
Jewish heritage; and these various components of his jotting escape conventions under the 
outrageous conditions of his treatment on Devil’s Island.
3 The fifteen remaining books were donated to the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris in 1923. The 
latest discussions on the state of the missing and surviving cahiers can be found in Pierrette 
Turlais’s new limited edition and the fine essays included therein, including her fine “Foreward.”
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appears that the unknown part of his writing permitted him to commu-
nicate with that same source.”4 What this “source of life” now appears 
to be is an inner world of intellectual ferment, an expanding and criti-
cal ocean of memories—expanding because the more Dreyfus began to 
write down his thoughts, the more he remembered, and the more he 
remembered, the more he could compare, weigh, and extrapolate new 
ideas from these remembered texts. To again cite Turlais, whose critical 
judgements are sensitive, rich with provocative implications that I will 
be trying to draw out, and contextualized in a midrashic way:
Whereas the letters and the journal authorized an inti-
mate gushing forth of life and construct, letter by letter, 
an unfalsifiable memory, the cahiers permit an opening 
into the world that extends and probably relieves the 
strict limitations to his self.5
The cahiers that survive are those that Alfred Dreyfus wanted to sur-
vive, and it is now possible to study them in Turlais’s mixed facsimile 
and transcribed version. Aside from a few, usually scratched-out, begin-
nings of letters to Lucie or government officials, occasional lists of food 
and personal items the prisoner wished to request from his guards, and 
some exercises in learning English, the pages in these workbooks are a 
mix of doodles, mathematical formulae, reading notes, and translations 
of the books he was thinking about studying during the nearly five years 
of incarceration, and finally, perhaps most important of all, Dreyfus’s 
short essays on a wide variety of topics. As Turlais points out, “The inner 
world of Capt. Dreyfus’s exile rests in these notebooks,”6 and therefore 
it is important for us to begin to take a measure of how large that in-
ner world really was—or rather, we need to assess its volume, shape, 
and power of resonance. Most historians of the Dreyfus Affair to date 
have assumed that it was rather small, restricted not only by the harsh 
conditions of his imprisonment but by the limited horizons he had as a 
middle-class provincial from Alsace, an artillery officer, and a Jew.
Therefore, with only some of the cahiers available, everything I have 
4 Turlais, “Foreward,” 44. All translations from this and other documents in her edition of the 
cahiers are my own, unless otherwise stated.
5 Turlais, “Foreward,” 44.




to say in this book must remain tentative and incomplete. However, 
even those speculative and fragmentary conclusions that can now be 
offered will destabilize all previous generalizations about the man, his 
experience of the milieu in which he found himself by destiny and by 
choice, the mentalities he shared with those in the various concentric 
and interweaving circles in which he moved, and the midrashic universe 
he had inherited, only very small parts of which he knew about or real-
ized he was participating in. These intersecting, overlapping, and some-
times wholly unperceived and imperceptible worlds within worlds are 
not all composed of his natural languages, mostly French, of course, but 
also the English he was learning so he could read Shakespeare in the 
original and also perhaps because he was beginning to think of migrat-
ing to North America or the British colonies in the South Pacific,7 as well 
German, Italian, Scandinavian, and Russian languages. These circles 
within circles were also made of mathematical and chemical symbols 
and equations, geometrical forms, and line drawings of machines and 
natural objects. Next to this rational and abstract world of science and 
technology there lies that far more mysterious realm of his obsessive 
doodling. In Turlais’s words:
And then . . . and then an element—what can we call 
it?—a strange design, abstract, born from an identi-
cal structure but ever-changing, comes in to punctu-
ate or mark the stresses of the manuscript hundreds of 
times. The patterning suggests, over and over again, ara-
besques, cerebral lobes, demonic rictus, masks or indeci-
pherable heraldic devices.8
There are suggestions that these apparently endless drawings repre-
sent Dreyfus’s attempt to fill time and space and to create a visual cor-
relative of the horrifyingly heavy cloud of silence he lived under night 
7 See also Dreyfus’s interesting comments on the British colonization of North America and its 
confrontation with French efforts in the same region, his fascination with Paul Bourget’s travel 
account of a visit to New York City, Newport, and other parts of the United States, and the details 
of contemporary Australian and New Zealand politics and economy. Was he perhaps thinking of 
leaving the civilization of France after he was eventually released and going to the Anglo-American 
culture that seemed to offer more tolerance and freedom?
8 Turlais, “Foreward,” Cahiers, 44. See also Comte-Sponville “La leçon d’Alfred Dreyfus” in Turlais, 
Cahiers, 242.
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and day for all those years. His prison guards, required to examine care-
fully all his journals and notebooks, as well as letters, were stupefied 
by these doodles; they could make no real sense of them but suspected 
that they were kabbalistic signs or secret messages of some Judaic plot 
or another. As we will keep arguing, the Jew haters of the time—of any 
time!—may not always be as wrong as we would like to think, not be-
cause they are total ignoramuses and blinded by their bigotry and inan-
ity but because they are prepared by these social, moral, faults to notice 
what “normal” and “liberal” minds do not want to deal with.
So what are these doodles or drawings or cryptic messages? First of 
all, they are not so much a sign of madness as a deliberate attempt to 
avoid insanity. In the last several years, unfortunately, we have learned 
from hostages held by terrorists for long periods of time that worse than 
physical torment is the mental anguish of being forced to do nothing, to 
receive no news about the outside world, to experience no sympathy or 
empathy from one’s captors, and to find consciousness shrinking down 
to almost nothing. It then becomes important, as Dreyfus seems to have 
discovered, to organize what time and space there is in one’s mind on 
the empty pages of notebooks one is allowed to scribble in and thus to 
gain a modicum of control over the psychological environment.
Perhaps at the same time, this was an attempt to envisage, embody, 
and participate in time and space, expanding it beyond the debilitating 
confines of a bed to which he was shackled for long hours of the night, 
of a tiny cabin—and one that was replaced by one even smaller in the 
course of the confinement—poorly ventilated and sparsely furnished, a 
very small rocky island whose domains he was soon forbidden access to, 
with even the comforting sight of the sea cut off by the construction of 
a palisade. Perhaps this psychological (moral) expansion was also aes-
thetic, metaphysical, intellectual, and spiritual; it was certainly desper-
ate. As Jean-Louis Lévy puts in his preface to Turlais’s edition of the 
cahiers, “For the exiled Dreyfus, automatic drawing is nothing more nor 
less than strategy for survival.” Then he adds, “It is up to us to respect 
the mystery.”9
A typical page from the notebook, if we dare suggest such a thing, has 
the whole surface of textual space filled with hundreds of relentlessly 
repeated drawings, sometimes fitted around, under, or over the writing 




of words, and all these doodles look alike at first insofar as they emerge 
from an X or an א, sometimes from a Y or a ץ, but each one distinct in 
size, shape, and elaboration. In one sense, they correlate with the math-
ematical formulations; they abstract from the environment, the outer 
world of hatred and loneliness, the formal patterns of rationality and 
design. They also correlate to the literary and philosophical texts and 
intellectual speculations on other pages, especially where Dreyfus en-
gages with his two favourite writers, Montaigne and Shakespeare, and 
argues with the key nineteenth-century thinkers Michelet, Taine, and 
Renan.10 The drawings affirm that there can be order and reason even in 
the midst of chaos, and that chaos bows to pattern and order. He argues 
through his doodles that each individual entity has its own integrity and 
value, whereas the state, the government, the press, the public, and his 
prison guards seek to crush him, grind him down into nothingness. I 
will come back to the problem of these drawings in a later volume, where 
I will integrate them into Jewish art and aesthetics.
The earlier, now missing, cahiers probably could have revealed how 
intensely despondent or even suicidal Dreyfus was. That is not quite all 
guesswork, however, since one atypical journal from the earliest period 
has survived, inadvertently, in the Colonial Museum at Aix, and has now 
been discussed and a few pages reproduced in Turlais’s volume.11 But 
10 Turlais, “Foreward,” 44. It will be shown in later parts of this book and in subsequent studies of 
the authors, both creative and historical, that Alfred Dreyfus felt most intellectually drawn to, 
one of the characteristics he searched for was a commitment to practical applications of scientific 
and moral ideas. This is also a very Jewish attitude, as we shall show. Although he tried to remain 
upbeat in his prison notebooks, nevertheless Dreyfus would have agreed with Anatole France that 
“M. Renan is distinguished by a special feeling of resigned mistrust. He has never had illusions 
regarding the irremediable uncertainty of human testimony” (“The Errors of History” in On Life 
and Letters, second series, trans. A. W. Evans (London: John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1923. 1914), 
110). Surely one of the great lessons learned from his ordeal, even before he became aware of 
the full dimensions of the affair that was occurring whilst he was in exile on Devil’s Island, is 
that documents and witnesses, along with experts and judges, cannot be trusted implicitly. For 
this reason, we may have to reevaluate Dreyfus’s attractions to beauty (poetic and natural) over 
dispassionate discourses of naturalistic fiction or supposedly objective science, when we read 
Anatole France saying, “For my own part, if I had to choose between beauty and truth, I should not 
hesitate either: it is beauty that I should keep, certain that it has in it a higher and deeper truth 
than truth itself” (113). However, as we will give a preliminary report in the final chapter of this 
book, in Dreyfus’s case at least, the argument would need to be contextualized by Jewish concepts 
of both beauty and truth. One might want all to compare, as France does, this very nineteenth-
century Romantic idealism with what Ernest Renan writes in Histoire du peuple d’Israël; cp. Anatole 
France’s review essay, “The History of the People of Israel” in On Life and Letters, second series, 
trans. A. W. Evans (London: John Lane/Bodley Head, 1923/1914), 293–299.
11 Maxime Préaud, “Variations à perpetuité” in Turlais, Cahiers, 251–255. This so-called Aix 
— 192 —
—————————— The PhanTasmagoria of a secular Midrash ——————————
 
although it seems to derive from the very first weeks or months of his 
exile and there is a gap of about four years between it and the workbooks 
we do have, it is not easy to determine what the intermediate versions 
might have looked like or contained, if indeed there were any. Because 
this somewhat anomalous workbook contains many schoolboy drawings 
of geometrical figures, some attempts at caricatured faces, and a jumble 
of plays on the letters of Alfred Dreyfus’s name, initials, monogrammatic 
elaborations, and mathematical equations, Maxime Préaud speculates on 
a transitional series of developments in the missing cahiers—those that 
Dreyfus himself suppressed and probably destroyed. But that informa-
tion cannot be verified, and the very idea of some gradual shifting from 
the kind of page in Aix Cahier No. 60 to the BNF Cahier 1 dated 3 August, 
1898, seems highly unlikely, for we do not know whether the cahiers that 
Dreyfus destroyed were regularly or irregularly written over the years 
before 1898 and 1899—or whether he kept any at all. The evidence from 
letters and journals suggests otherwise, that is, that the prisoner was 
too disheartened, depressed, and “detached” to write—that is, that this 
was some manner of warding off evil spirits from within, as he says,12 or 
that the scribbles, including the drawing of repeated variations on the 
flowering X/א and Y/ץ were, as the prison reports suggest, “cabalistiques” 
and “architecturales,” meant to engage in the kind of creative intellectual 
activities the workbooks demonstrate.13
What we do know from the extant journals is that Alfred was read-
ing quite a bit, although the kinds of scholarly journals and literature 
he could receive was limited, both by his own tastes and what Lucie felt 
she could safely send to him.14 There was also a period in which, after 
new regulations from the Minister of the Colonies in Paris, his wife had 
Cahiers is marked as No. 60, and there are two other partial copies made from it listed as No. 63 
and No. 64.
12 Anatole France reminds his readers that “it is not from magicians and spirits but from novelists 
and poets that we must ask the way to the unknown world” (“Hypnotism in Literature,” a review 
of Marfa: Le Palimpseste by Gilbert-Augustin Thièrry in Of Life & Letters, vol. I, 106). We should 
add to poets and novelists letter writers, and keepers of cahiers and also remind ourselves of 
the palimpsest of midrashic writing, whereby rabbinical writers present their arguments in the 
name and through the words of predecessors and keep occupying the same textual space as the 
scriptures they claim to explicate and renew.
13 Préaud, “Variations à perpetuité,” Cahiers, 253.
14 We have collated various lists and discussed these journals, as well as the known books Dreyfus 
had in his possession on Devil’s Island, in chapter II. There could have been up to three hundred 
or more actual texts in his personal library, perhaps not at any one time; there would certainly not 




to stop sending him books and journals, and therefore Alfred had to 
depend on what was available from the prison library in Cayenne. This 
man, whose Jewish culture elevated books to the highest category of 
intellectual pleasures, felt the deprivation of reading matter deeply. The 
receipt of packets from Lucie or from the local library was vital to his 
sense of self and sanity.15 Given the hundreds and hundreds of titles 
and authors he refers to, it also is more than likely that the bulk of the 
books, authors, and themes he writes about derive from his memory of 
what he had read and studied as a boy, from the literature he and Lucie 
discussed in their fireside chats in the evenings, and from phrases, im-
ages, and ideas sparked off by references in the various magazines he 
could receive from time to time. Certainly, his beloved Montaigne’s Ess-
ais was a rich anthology of quotations and paraphrases.
The pages of these fourteen remaining cahiers contain more than just 
the reading notes and exercises in translation that Turlais and others 
have noted. There are also a few prose poems, lists of aphorisms and 
apothegms of his own composition, technical discussions on bicycles, 
photography, economics and meteorology, and speculative mini-essays 
on politics, aesthetics, rhetoric, historiography, and education.16 I have 
15 Bloch-Dano: “Les livres font partie de son univers mental, et reflètent une culture, vivante qui n’a rien 
à voir avec une occupation mondaine. Jeanne [Proust] est bien représentative de ce milieu israélite pour 
lequel la vie intellectuelle est primordiale, et jugé supérieure à toute autre activité” (Books were a part 
of her mental universe, and reflected a living culture which had nothing to do with a worldly 
occupation. Jeanne Proust is a good representative of this Jewish milieu for whom intellectual 
life is primordial and judged to be superior to all other activities), Madame Proust, 156.
16 Perhaps the shape and contents of Alfred Dreyfus’s workbooks recalls the Talmudic commentaries 
created over generations by the rabbis. Important to this conception was the institution of the 
kalla, which according to José Faur, was “a month-long convention, during which students and 
sages from all over the Jewish world gathered to study a Talmudic tractate . . . . There were two 
Kalla meetings per year, one in the month of Afar (winter) and another in month of Elul (summer). 
In addition…the Kalla was attended by outside students and sages, as well as by the magistrates 
and highest judicial and political officials of the nation.” Then Faur draws the important analogy, 
which we extend to Dreyfus’s cahiers, comparing larger to smaller things: “Just as the Synagogue 
is a virtual experience of the Temple, and the liturgy of the sacramental services, so the Talmud 
is a virtual Kalla experience. Through the Babylonian Talmud, students and sages from the 
fragmented Israel have unfettered access to the Kalla world and hear the voices of Jews from 
Tiberias and Caesarea, from Lydia and from Sippore, from Nehar De’a, from Fum be-Dita [sic] 
and from Sura, and from countless other seats of learning and as one, pupil and teacher, learned 
and common, disciple and sage, brilliant and mediocre, share in their discussions, reflect on their 
ideas, and renew their bonds with an integral Jewish society. This is why the Talmud is much more 
than a book or a landscape of things lost; it is a virtual Kalla, a holistic experience . . . . Hence 
the folklore, exegesis, psychological insights, esoteric and metaphysical meditations, stories and 
tales, crisscrossing the legal principles and doctrines taught by the sages” (The Horizontal Society, 
Section IV, 46).
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compiled three indices in the Appendix in the next book in this series 
to show (a) the books and authors Dreyfus refers to, (b) the topics he 
writes about, and (c) the mathematical and scientific notions he names 
in relation to the formulae and equations he plays with in the cahiers.17 
Given that we only have the notebooks of 1898 and 1899, the range of 
reading is nothing but amazing, particularly as these were the last frus-
trating and painful years of his horrible nightmare.
What were the books Dreyfus was reading and thinking about? Mon-
taigne and Shakespeare, to be sure, as Turlais points out18—and as eve-
ryone who has glanced at the manuscripts has recognized, he taught 
himself English so as to read the great Renaissance playwright in the 
original. Yet there is much, much more. He also read and commented on 
nineteenth-century authors such as Hippolyte Taine and Ernest Renan, 
Jules Michelet, and Paul Bourget. He calls the first three amongst the 
most important of his century and points to the fourth as his teacher 
from lycée, with whom he had maintained contact. Taine, Renan, and 
Michelet are, for the compiler of these cahiers, more than just histori-
ans; they are great stylists, teachers, and poets, while Paul Bourget is a 
popular novelist but also a psychologist.
Although Marcel Proust did not like his style of psychological fic-
tion—he thought Bourget explained too much, according to Anatole 
France19— Bourget belongs to the school of Hippolyte Taine, and this 
makes Dreyfus doubly within that tradition as well. Literature, in the 
sense of belles-lettres rather than a more strict construction of creative 
writing or even fiction, should be morally and psychologically true; in-
stead of the self-indulgence and introspective tendencies that became 
17 I have also added a brief comment on the nature of the mathematical, chemical, and physics 
formulae in the workbooks prepared by Ken McNeil, a former colleague in the Department of 
Humanities, University of Waikato.
18 Turlais, “Foreward,” Cahiers, 44.
19 Dreyfus is not alone in such tastes and evaluations, as we can see in a remark made by Anatole 
France, “Science and Morals: M. Paul Bourget” trans. Bernard Mill, On Life and Letters, Third 
Series (London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1924): “By his method and general bent of mind 
he [Bourget] belongs to the school of M. Taine, for whom he professes a legitimate admiration, 
and he is not without intellectual affinity with M. Sully Prudhomme, his senior as a poet” (53). 
(Prud’homme was another poet Dreyfus admires in the cahiers.) In this essay, France discusses 
Bourget’s latest novel Le Disciple. Most significant is the fact that although Dreyfus gained the 
support of and often became friendly with writers in the Naturalist School, such as Emile Zola, his 
own predilections belonged to a more conservative group of writers concerned, as France entitles 
this essay, with Science and Morals. See also France’s discussion of Un Coeur de Femme in “Paul 




prevalent in the 1890s and beyond, this form of discourse serves society 
and the individual reader through its ability to express its liberal ethic 
through clarity of style. It is a literature of wit and scepticism, intellec-
tual and fluent.20
20 Cp. The witty ironies in Anatole France, The Amythst Ring, trans. B Drillien (London: The Library 
Press, 1899), where one of the characters, the Duc de Brécé, explains to a gathering of important 
friends in his rural chateau: “I am convinced . . . that the fuss made over this affair is, and can only 
be, some abominable plot instigated by the enemies of France” (17). And when the Abbé Guitrel 
says who these enemies might be—“free-thinkers, and freemasons . . . Protestants,” Brécé adds 
pointedly. “And Jews . . . Jews and Germans. What unheard of audacity to question the decision 
of a court martial! For, when all is said and done, it is quite impossible for seven French officers 
to have made a mistake” (18). Still further, the Duke continues, ominously foreshadowing events 
forty years later under the Nazi regime: “the Jews will bring misfortune upon France. Why don’t 
we get rid of them? Nothing could be easier” (20). The fear he and his friends express was all too 
common during the affair, even among those clever and honest enough to see through the smoke 
screen to Dreyfus’s innocence: “For when all’s said and done, the Army is all that is left us . . . . 
That is why I insist that to meddle with it is nothing short of sacrilege” (49). Many of these good 
Frenchmen in Anatole France’s novel are not slobbering racists but fervent conservative patriots. 
Thus, speaking of the Baronne de Bomont, a converted Jew, the curate explains, “What I mean is 
that she has been converted and baptized, and is therefore a Christian. She is a good Christian, I 
might add, and gives largely to our charities . . .” However, Brécé interrupts his friend and reveals 
himself as an anti-Semite of a more racist and rabid variety: “To me a converted Jew remains 
a Jew; I cannot make any distinction between them” (62) The abbé tries to wriggle out of this 
problem by arguing “that the curse pronounced against the Jews was inspired by their crime, and 
not their race and that therefore . . .” but the duke diverts the conversation to something else. 
Only later does the novel return to the subject of Jews and a discussion on “anti-Jewish frenzies” 
(82). In another anecdote, concerning a duel fought between Raoul and Isidore Mayer, the issue 
was the fact that the true Frenchman refused to allow the Jew to touch a book containing a list 
of military officers because “It is sacred to the French Army!” Mayer asks why Raoul is so upset, 
and the answer is: “Because you are of the same religion as the traitor!” (89). In other words, while 
exposing the graft and pettifogging nature of small town elites, France weaves in and out of their 
stupid conversation allusions to the Dreyfus Affair and attitudes that run the gamut of rabid to 
mild anti-Semitism. Some of the characters, like M. Letterier and M. Bergeret, express a more 
liberal, tolerant view of both the case against and the person of Dreyfus, but they are basically 
ineffective and comical persons. Outside in the streets, the mobs march, shouting, “Mort à Zola! 
Mort à Leterrier! Mort à Bergeret! Mort aux juifs!” (148). In another place, another cry is added: 
“Conspuez Leterrier!” or “Conspuez Bergeret!” (190), that is, “Spit on them!” For most people, 
then, the Dreyfusards are a “syndicate of treachery” (168) and anyone who expresses sympathy 
for or belief in Dreyfus’s innocence is himself “a Jew, a Prussian, an ‘Intellectual’ . . .” and their 
opinion “was bought” (187). Greater scorn is heaped on such stupidity by Bergeret, a favorite and 
repeating character in France’s stories and novels, when he confronts M. de Terremonde and tries 
to convince him that Jews are assimilable. But the self-proclaimed anti-Semite will not be moved. 
Prof. Bergeret then warns him to be careful of Jehovah: “If I were in your place, I would beware 
of Him. He was a Jew at heart, and who knows whether He has not always remained a Jew? Who 
knows whether at this moment He is not avenging His people?” (258) As Terremonde rides away 
from the professor of Latin, the spokesman for the author shouted “Beware! . . . Do not keep their 
God” (259). The novel closes at about the time of Colonel Henry’s suicide, an event that forced all 
but the most die-hard anti-Dreyfusards to give up their cause, and they, rather than own up to 
their error, simply slink away into the darkness (278–279).
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At the same time, always in solitary confinement, always at the con-
fluence of rage, despair, nostalgia, and madness21—indeed, at times, he 
veers away from his stated topic, with a cri du coeur or a long-repressed 
memory of infancy or schooldays—Dreyfus was working through and 
learning from the technical journals he was sent, exercising his profes-
sional skills, attempting to keep up with advances in science, and main-
taining his grip on secularism and sanity. Recall that he was by profes-
sion and training, after all, a military engineer. While he writes little 
essays on the technical problem of inclines on the curves of railway lines 
or the way to improve the recoil in rifles and cannons, his mathematical 
formulae seem to be most concerned with abstract geometrical forms. 
At times, too, he writes out chemical equations, sometimes connected 
to an understanding of the human body as an organism and sometimes 
to changes in the weather. In a way, he is reassuring himself that the 
natural world—kept apart by all sorts of physical and moral barriers—
was rational, orderly, and sane, no matter how absurd and hostile the 
political and juridical realms might have become for him.
In addition to his literary, historical, and scientific essays and notes—
and we also need to point to the several descriptive passages that seem 
effectively to be nothing less than prose poems—there are the many 
pages of various drawings.22 These drawings perhaps are the most unu-
sual and fascinating feature of the prison notebooks. Yet my argument 
is that they should not be treated as separate from all the other modes 
of composition and speculation in the cahiers.
The modern biographers of Dreyfus, if they touch on his intellec-
tual formation at all—and some even saw the notebooks in the Biblio-
thèque Nationale before they were made public at the end of 2009—at 
best seem to ask why he spent so much time with classical texts such 
as Homer and Cicero or Renaissance authors such as Montaigne and 
Shakespeare, or Racine and Corneille. Their reading is superficial and 
inadequate. Look at the appendix of the next book and you will see a 
much longer list and a much wider range of authors, with Dreyfus citing 
21 One can justly compare Dreyfus’s prison notebooks therefore with not only Job’s complaints from 
the dung heap or Boethius’s search for a consolation of philosophy from his cell in Ravenna but 
also various nineteenth-century exemplars we will discuss anon, as well as comparing Dreyfus’s 
imposed isolation with the self-chosen experiences of Gauguin in his tropical dreamland and 
Proust in his cork-lined bedroom.




many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers in French, English, 
Latin, and sometimes in Italian. Most of the time, as we examine the 
list, it is clear that the closer he comes down to discussing his own time 
and place (that is, France in the fin de siècle), he not only talks about phi-
losophers, historians, psychologists, and scientists but also discusses 
painters, musicians, poets, dramatists, and novelists. Sometimes he is 
quite up to date, as when he refers to Eugene Brieux’s play Les Bienfai-
teurs published in 1896. Although he does not mention all or even a few 
of the avant-garde cultural figures, he knows enough to have opinions,23 
and his tastes and predilections are for more traditional, more bour-
geois, and, one might say, more practical authors and artists, practical 
in the sense that they were concerned with the world more than with 
themselves. Hence his admiration of Michelet, Renan, Taine, and Bour-
get.
However, it is not enough to ask how many authors and texts he read 
or recollected during the years on Devil’s Island, nor just to set them 
out in columns by period, language, and topic. Such exercises certainly 
enhance our view of Dreyfus’s wide reading, but they do not express 
all his interests in European culture. After all, as we have observed, he 
seems not to be concerned with any of the avant-garde movements in 
the arts or the most radical advances in mathematics, psychiatry, or 
philosophy, and in fact, when he approaches them, he backs off with 
boutades against the art for art’s sake programmes and rejects the inher-
ent absolutism and racism in many of the so-called philosophical ideas 
of the fin de siècle. It is therefore important to go beyond those lists and 
explicit statements of taste and opinion. Who appears most often, both 
explicitly by name and by implication in the preferences and likes Drey-
fus expresses? When he does comment on books and authors, which 
passages does he focus on or choose to translate? And does he develop 
a kind of theory of literary or historiographical criticism that blurs the 
distinction between genres, because he believes that a moralized aes-
thetic should obtain in all cases? At times that seems to be the conclu-
23 On the importance and uniqueness of “opinions” in the nineteenth century, see Tarde, L’opinion 
et la foule, esp. 73ff. Rather than well-crafted traditional statements of belief and philosophical 
or political ideology that could be taught in schools, as well as preached in churches and other 
institutions of public faith, the new bourgeois individual of the modern age was forming “opinions” 
of his or her own based on private experience, and crowds were coerced or seduced into “public 
opinion” by the emergent mass media, such as newspapers, magazines, and best-selling books.
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sion one must reach, and yet Dreyfus is too often questioning himself as 
well as his authorities to arrive at any one fixed point. Perhaps, while he 
was in prison under his onerous conditions of exile and solitary confine-
ment, he was allowed—or rather, allowed himself, dare we say?—the 
luxury of thinking through matters that he had never had the time or 
opportunity to deal with before.
In his commentaries on the more recent authors of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, while he often considers their moral and po-
litical positions, he does keep turning the argument towards—or has 
sudden slides into—consideration of aesthetics and the artistic temper-
ament or personality. And yet, while he pays close attention to matters 
of style and form, he rejects the notion of art for art’s sake. What also 
comes through in these choices and ways of questioning and challeng-
ing the books and persons he deals with is his rabbinical attitude and 
method, again something as evident in the product of his musings as 
absent in any direct way of allusion or citation.
ParT 1: MIdraShIng The Cahiers
He [Hillel] used to say: If I am not for myself, who will be 
for me? And being for my own self, what am I? And if not 
now, when?
—Pirqe Avot, 1:14
My memory, even my involuntary memory, had lost all recol-
lection of the love of Albertine, But it seems that there is also 
an involuntary memory of the limbs, a pale and fruitless imi-
tation of the other kind, which lives on longer, rather as none 
non-intelligent animals or vegetables live on longer than man.
—Marcel Proust24
The very first little essay in the prison notebooks appears on folio 2. Let 
me cite it in full to give some idea of what it is all about and how Dreyfus 
works:
24 Marcel Proust, Finding Time Again (1927), vol. 6 of A la recherché du temps perdu, trans. Ian 
Patterson (London: Penguin Classics, 2004), 5.
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“The Virtues are lost in self-interest as rivers in the 
sea”—from La Rochefoucauld
The idea is reiterated by D’Annuzio in The Triumph of Death 
I believe, and it is admirably developed in a poetic form. 
It struck me when I read it, but I could only recall the 
germ of the thought, resting on the maxim of La Roche-
foucauld, It is so true that ideas that guide human nature 
remain eternal; one can only rearrange them or modify 
their form, the better to appropriate the expression.25
Self-interest is, of course, the common term for egotism and greed in 
the world before our own, when it has come, if anything, to mean the 
goal and essence of one’s life. Dreyfus belongs to a traditional world of 
moral values, and he recognizes a commonplace in the contemporary 
Italian’s poem, assigning its clearest expression to the French aphorist 
of the seventeenth century. He draws the analogy from memory, not an 
available encyclopaedia of citations. He then states the rhetorical princi-
ple that the truest ideas are those that form part of the universal tradi-
tion, rhetoric here meaning not only a school discipline or a technique 
of formal argumentation, but a body of knowledge: what is known is 
knowable and memorable precisely because it has already been shaped 
into memorable sentences and mental images. This grounds Dreyfus 
firmly in his own civilization and, at the same time, as we will be show-
ing, permits him to express his own Jewishness in modes of argument 
and thought that overlap with the secular and Christian heritage of 
French education.26 If the virtues are lost in self-interest and run into 
the vast sea of confused and meaningless experience, it is because this 
ideal of an ethical life must keep orienting itself to both the social world 
of human relationships (including politics) and a more transcendent 
world of religious and philosophical ideas.
On the same folio page of the first extant cahier, Dreyfus places a 
25 Cahiers, 52.
26 Faur: “Since times of yore, Jews have been absorbing ideas and values from other civilizations—
that is a fact. What is significant is what they chose to absorb and what they chose to reject” (The 
Horizontal Society, Section V, 56). Hence, we need to examine what Dreyfus chose to read and 
comment about, what he puts aside as relevant and what he chooses to question and challenge.
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short crucial essay on Pierre Loti. To understand it as typical of the pris-
on notebooks, the whole text needs to be cited and analysed closely:
The Dust, Galilee, Jerusalem by Pierre Loti
Very inferior to his earlier works. No psychology. A great 
intensity of picturesque sentiment, perception and mel-
ancholy things, fugitive and vague images, an incurable 
delusion. A very correct and vibrant notation of vague 
and changeable states of nature, a piercing acuteness of 
perceptions and sensations, but without arriving at any 
moral conclusion. All that one can say about these books 
is that Loti has fixed the most mobile and strange aspects 
of nature with a surprising justness, and that is all. Rai-
mundo by Loti. Quite superior to and distant from these 
travel books describing the stages towards Jerusalem. He 
disengages his personality to write a simple and natural 
human work. Admirable descriptions of Basque life.27
In the telegraphic prose of this critical essay, Dreyfus measures and 
compares books by the very popular Pierre Loti. They may have been 
among the “easy little books” he had first asked Lucie to send him when 
he knew he was being transported to Devil’s Island. Of the first three 
travel books about a journey to the Holy Land, Dreyfus sees how su-
perficial and facile they are, yet he is also aware of the reason for their 
popularity: they are slickly written and pander to popular tastes for the 
exotic, the picturesque, and the sentimental. Without psychology, that 
is, with no consideration of the way the mind receives, processes, and 
evaluates the scenes Loti so aptly describes, there is no lasting value 
in the books. The best one can say about them is that they reproduce 
static pictures, postcard views of what was then still called Palestine. 
However, in Raimundo, Loti succeeds in delving into the character of the 
lead character in order to arrive at the essence of the Basque people and 
culture. Although he does not mention it, the first three books come 
close to evoking the Land of Israel, the older Jewish settlements, and 
27 Cahiers, 52. This critical essay about Loti is separated from the opening essay on D’Anunzio and La 
Rochefoucauld by several mathematical equations.
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what was beginning in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, 
the new Yeshuv, the return of Jews to their ancestral homeland and the 
beginnings of political Zionism. It may be said, on the basis of what we 
uncovered in our long analyses of the letters between Alfred and Lu-
cie, that this period of martyrdom on Devil’s Island was the beginning, 
albeit aborted or at least deferred to unconscious workings-out, of his 
own moral journey to Jerusalem.
Following this literary excursion, Dreyfus writes down, seemingly at 
random, some verses in Latin from Virgil:
Ah! miseram Eurydicen! anime fugiente vocabat:
Eurdicen toto referebant flumine ripae.28
. . . with fleeting breath, called Eurydice—ah, hapless 
Eurydice!
“Eurydice” the banks re-echoed, all down the stream.29
These two lines are taken, whether from some passage in Montaigne 
or from his own schoolboy memories, from Virgil’s Georgics, Book IV, 
lines 526 and 527. They describe how Orpheus, ever lamenting the loss 
of his wife, whom he was forced to leave in the underworld because she 
had broken the regulations on looking back once her husband had res-
cued her from the clutches of Dis, Death, was torn apart by the frenzied 
maenads, and his head was thrown into the river Hebrus. As it is swept 
down the rushing current, the severed head sings the name of his wife 
over and over again, with the banks echoing his lament. Aside from the 
sheer beauty of these poetic lines by Virgil, one must ask why Dreyfus 
cites these lines and why here?30 In the first place, the prisoner feels cut 
off and helplessly separated from his beloved wife Lucie. Invisible and 
mysterious forces that seem to have broken apart his domestic life and 
his professional career are sweeping him along. Second, it is not only a 
madness that rips up apart his life, but a madness within himself, the 
28 Cahiers, 52.
29 Trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Virgil, Aeneid and the Minor Poems, vol. I, Loeb Classics (London: 
William Heinemann and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966 [rev. ed. 1934, orig. 
1918]), 233.
30 Hillel the Elder: “Moreover he once saw a skull floating on the face of the waters. He said to it: For 
drowning others thou was drowned; and they that drowned thee shall be drowned” (Pirqe Avot 
2:7).
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frustrations and rage that he can barely contain arising from his long-
standing hypersensitive disposition and enervation exacerbated by the 
tortures of the prison authorities.
Still on this second folio page, Dreyfus cites in English Shakespeare’s 
Othello, III.iii, the speech by Iago:
 
Who steals my purse steals trash; ’tis something, nothing; 
’Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands: 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him 
And makes me poor indeed.
Although a modern literary scholar would see the words of this arch-
villain as darkly ironic, given Iago’s evil and Machiavellian intentions 
against the tragic Moor, and as much a tissue of commonplaces as Polo-
nius’s rodomontades in Hamlet, for Dreyfus it is these very time-worn 
expressions that encapsulate his own feelings, otherwise almost inar-
ticulate in his nervous condition. Throughout the letters, we have seen 
Lucie and Alfred repeating their frenetic need to clear the honour of the 
family name, and this compulsive impulse drives virtually everything 
Alfred reads, thinks, and writes about.31
Thus, it is not out of nothing that Virgil’s lines or this speech from 
Shakespeare appear on the pages of the workbooks. They are deeply 
constitutive concepts of his whole project in writing out and so cre-
ating an intellectual refuge from the terrible machine grinding him 
down every day and every night. Dreyfus does not seek refuge in great 
books and ideas only to escape from the tortures he is undergoing: 
he works hard to create this alternate space and to draw out of his 
deepest memories aspects of his own personality he was not normally 
engaged in developing, and he wrestles with the angel of his own in-
tellect to make his self viable in the harsh, agonizing environment he 
cannot deny. Like with Jacob, though, it takes more than just endur-
ing a whole long night to emerge victorious in the morning with a new 
31 “For Judaism, the world is like a great family, where the father lives in immediate contact with his 
children, who are the different peoples of the earth . . . . In heaven a single God, father of all men 
alike; on earth a family of peoples, among whom Israel is the ‘first born, charged with teaching and 
administering the true religion of mankind, of which he is priest.’” Elijah Benamozegh, Israel and 
Humanity, trans. and ed. Maxwell Luri (New York and Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1994), 53–54.
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name; it also means being wounded and realizing that the victory is far 
from complete. Jacob gains a new name, Israel, and a new determina-
tion in his life, while for Dreyfus the return to his ancestral identity is 
more complex and subtle.
In the very next little essay, he attempts, on the verso of folio 6, 
to confront one of his favourite authors, Ernest Renan, and begins to 
wrestle with a theme that bothers him many times throughout the sur-
viving cahiers:
From Renan: “The study of literary history will replace 
in great part the direct reading of works of the human 
mind.” I am grieved to find myself in absolute disagree-
ment with Renan. The study of literary history can only 
complete direct reading of works of the human mind.32
Having decided in some sort of conscious way to fill his cahiers with 
intellectual matters of various kinds, as we have noted before, Dreyfus 
now has to rationalize what he is doing, that is, justify to himself the 
project according to his circumstances—he does not have a large library 
to draw on or colleagues to consult; he has limited space, time, and en-
ergy, and even further, limited emotional focus in which to contemplate 
the ideas he wishes to write out. So here for the first time, we can see 
him starting to engage with his intellectual masters; he confesses that 
he disagrees with Renan—absolutely. As though prescient with fore-
sight into the postmodernist obsession with theory over substance and 
the death of an author in a mode of criticism that “privileges” the critic 
over the creative artist, Renan laments that direct experience of works 
of the human mind will have to give way to secondary texts.33 In a sense, 
this is the old Platonic problem of mimesis, of art as an imitation of real-
ity, and so less perfect, if not a mere hollow and shallow shadow of the 
original, and then critical essays or histories of the imitations as even 
more distorted and inane compositions, divorcing each new generation 
32 Cahiers, 53.
33 Compare that to another of Dreyfus’s favourite authors, Hippolyte Taine: “The modern method 
which I strive to pursue, and which is beginning to be introduced in all the moral sciences, consists 
in considering human productions, and particularly works of art, as facts and productions of which 
it is essential to mark the characteristics and seek the causes, and nothing more” (The Philosophy 
of Art, trans. John Durand. [New York: Holt & Williams, 1873] 37). Dreyfus does not limit his 
method to such a positivistic science and seeks something more than physical facts.
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from its ability to enter into a living dialogue with the products of hu-
man cogitation and speculation.34
Such questions, though, seem appropriate within a culture formed 
on Hellenistic ideas of art as imitation and texts as arguments whose ba-
sis is in historical facts and testimonials shaped by tendentious drives, 
while a Jewish point of view argues in a different way altogether, stating 
that mankind, formed in the image of God, seeks to enhance and de-
velop that image so as to participate more fully in the divine creativity 
and that textuality moves in and out of direct contact with the earliest 
intellectual voices, enlivening them at the same time as making them 
enhance the individuality of the latest and future voices.
Consequently, at a seemingly mundane level, Dreyfus begins to ad-
vance his thought by proposing contra Renan that “the study of literary 
history can only complete direct reading of works of the human mind,” 
for this kind of secondary approach to direct experience of another 
mind than one’s own,
[which] coordinates the elements, minimizes the obscu-
rities, makes comprehensible the transformations, the 
influence exercised by the surrounding milieu and cur-
rent ideas.
These criteria for conducting and evaluating the critical programme 
would undermine the wall set up by Renan between direct access to an 
author’s creative energy and excitement and the student, who he fears 
will only encounter the lesser mind of the historian or reviewer. Drey-
fus sets out the parameters of a critical theory that uses the developing 
34 According to Ouaknin, there are three steps in mahloquet, the rabbinic manner of questioning 
and challenging a text in pairs: study and thought are the necessary preparations for entering 
into such a dialogue of learning; it is not a simple exchange of ideas through question and 
answer, as in a Socratic dialogue, with its maieutic of recalling what was what once known and 
has been forgotten but a constant process of sheylot-ou-t’shouvot, questions and challenging 
responses, and finally the dialogue does not take place on the same level of thought—it creates 
a new dimension of thought (Tsimtsoum, 111). This new level of understanding where truth is 
constructed is a shared interiority, shared by the interlocutors themselves and with God who is 
always a participant as well (112). This is what Lucie and Alfred believe they are constructing 
in their letters, a language—world at a different level of experience than they have ever known 
and that is beyond the understanding of the censors reading their epistles. He also believes he 
is creating something of the same sort in the various workbooks he fills out, in dialogue with 
himself, with the authors he reads and recollects, and with the man he hopes to become through 
the whole exercise.
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secondary texts to create an approach that directs the student through 
a well-shaped course of study towards contact with ancestral minds, 
shadow voices that would otherwise recede into obscurity by the pas-
sage of time. History conceived as both the accumulation of differences 
and the loss of points of direct contact can also be reconstructed in this 
way to become a roadmap that takes advantage of hindsight, each ad-
vance into the future at the same time being a clarification of what hap-
pened in the past and how its meaningfulness has become more evident 
with the realization of its potentialities. The reason Dreyfus prefers Re-
nan, Michelet, and Taine, for instance, rather than say Sainte-Beuve or 
Thiers,35 is because these moral teachers take into account the transfor-
mations, the influence of surrounding milieu, and the current of ideas. 
To find out how they do this takes up much of his mental energy.
But first he needs to affirm for himself that “never will anything 
be able to replace direct reading of great works of the human mind.” 
By this he means more than reading old authors in their original lan-
guages, or more recent philosophers and historians in their pristine 
texts, rather than a schoolbook résumé and dumbed-down popular par-
aphrase; these original readings require introductory essays, generous 
annotations and glossaries, and translations into contemporary lan-
guages. For what purpose?
A moral or intellectual emotion will never be produced 
except by direct reading of great works; the ideas they 
stimulate, that they arouse in passing in the conscious-
ness and then the unconscious provokes in the mind a 
form of elevated character.36
35 Although he is critical of these authors, Dreyfus came to them because, as Anatole France put 
it in terms of one: “The ‘Histoire de la Révolution’ and the ‘Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire,’ 
by M. Thiers, were, for more than thirty years, the books most read in France, if we except ‘Les 
Trois Mousquetaires,’ which it will be admitted, does not belong to the same class” (“M. Thiers as 
Historian,” on the occasion of the inauguration of the monument to him at Père-Lachaise in On 
Life & Letters, I, 209). Dreyfus would therefore have read Thiers and Sainte-Beuve in school and he 
can now, with a more mature mind and a sensibility honed by the nightmare, reflect more wisely 
on the tasks of a historiographer.
36 Note that my translations attempt to follow Dreyfus’s own often halting syntax, hesitations, and 
repetitions. Instead of crossing out and rewriting to polish his style, he starts again in several 
places to write new versions of these essays that are so important to him. Sometimes, though, 
he starts and then crosses out and moves on to something else, and even, rarely, he starts his 
essay, then is diverted to something else—and when that something else is highly personal, such 
as a memory of his childhood or a cri du coeur in reaction to current torture, frustration, and 
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The purpose of reading, he argues here, is to come into direct contact 
with another human mind through its intellectual and artistic produc-
tions, and that contact is stimulating, inspiring, and creative in itself. 
The purpose is to create a character of a high moral kind. These devel-
opments should happen both to the conscious and the unconscious 
mind—but what can Dreyfus mean by “unconscious” in 1898 when he 
is writing these notebooks? This is the time when Sigmund Freud was 
only beginning to develop his theories of the mind as overwhelmingly 
composed of drives, passions, impulses, memories, and anxieties most-
ly below or outside the range of volitional control or awareness. Poets 
and philosophers throughout the nineteenth century had been probing 
the limits of the conscious mind, and some, following Rousseau, had al-
ready been asserting the primacy of secret inner realms over distorting 
socially-constructed paradigms of personality, thus seeking out primi-
tive, folk, and exotic models and experiences. Others, like Nietzsche, 
sang the praises of violent emotions and actions over peaceful and con-
templative lives.
In rabbinical writings, however, the unconscious was what was either 
forgotten and could be learned through study under careful guidance or 
what was not yet articulated and realized, so that an interpretation of 
a text would be measured by how far it enhanced, clarified, and made 
relevant ancient pronouncements and narrative exemplars, and ethical 
life always sought to adjust and thus advance the applications of the 
law in such ways as were most just and compassionate.37 For Dreyfus, 
too, reading to be inspired and challenged by great works of the human 
mind was a moral act with the purpose of making himself and other stu-
dents wiser and better able to cope with adversity. He would certainly 
have agreed with most of what is in Pirqe Avot, the Ethics of the Fathers, 
the highly aggadic book of the Mishna traditionally read aloud in the 
synagogue during Sabbath services between the end of Passover and 
the start of the New Year, through the northern hemisphere summer. 
For example, Simeon, the son of Rabbi Gamliel, is quoted as saying,
loneliness, we shall take special note of those moments.
37 In an ambiguous and perhaps teasing tone, see Romain Rolland: “Kindness is not a rare quality 
with the Jews: of all the virtues it is the most readily admitted among them, even when they do 
not practice it” (Jean Christophe, Vol. II, 379).
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All my days I have grown up among the wise, and I have 
found naught of better service than silence; not learning 
but doing is the chief thing; and he who speaks profusely 
causes sin . . . By three things is the world preserved: by 
truth, by judgment, and by peace . . .38
Whether Alfred Dreyfus ever read these words himself or heard them 
recited in synagogue during the summer months,39 they nevertheless 
resonate within his own objections to Renan,40 a teacher he respects but 
whose pronouncements he cannot accept without question or challenge:
The study of literary history is the domain of criticism, 
the realm of purely subjective science. The reading of 
great works is the domain of the objective, preserved in 
the light of awakening wise and intellectual ideas. One 
must therefore see in Renan’s phrase a mere whim [une 
boutade] or, more likely, his mind was tending towards 
the same criticism, philology . . .
Look at what he says here: literary criticism is the zone of the sub-
jective whereas direct reading of those texts is objective. This is what 
we now call “counterintuitive.” It is a witty paradox, an overturning of 
the expected, commonsense judgement. He seems to dismiss Renan’s 
remark as a joke or a whim and calls such criticism philology. But what 
Dreyfus actually meant to say here we cannot tell, because the final four 
lines are rubbed out.
What he wishes to say, though, is suggested by a second version of 
this same essay, which he wrote on the verso of folio 11.41 Skipping over 
38 Pirqe Avot, 1: 17–18.
39 Idelsohn: “One of Judaism’s chief features is its staunch adherence to and fearless proclamation of 
the truth, however painful to personal vanity that truth may be” (Jewish Music, 78); or put another 
way, no matter how painful and dangerous it may be to the individual or community forced to live 
in a hostile society.
40 Cf. Anatole France: “It seems that the true image of the past has been revealed to us by the great 
historical school of our own age . . . . we have created the comparative history of humanity. Fresh 
sciences such as ethnography, archaeology, and philology had had a great share in doing this . . . . 
And this sense of origins, this divination of a lost past, this knowledge of the childhood of humanity, 
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his little essay on the writings of “great northern writers, Bjornson, Ib-
sen, Tolstoy, Dostoivesky,”42 and two versions of the essay “On Religious 
Faith”43 that we will deal with at length presently, let us turn for a mo-
ment to this rewriting of the response to Renan’s dictum. It is virtu-
ally the same word for word until the last two paragraphs. These modify 
what he said on the previous page:
The study of literary history is the domain of criticism, 
the domain of science; the reading of great works is the 
domain of sentiment, of the awakening of impressions 
of beauty of all kinds.
Rather than making the rhetorical balance of subjective/objective, 
Dreyfus here speaks of science and sentiment, expanding on that last 
term into impressions of beauty. The contrast is less strong and shades 
into complementarity, the only problem occurring when Renan draws 
the contrast himself. For Dreyfus, in the lines he was presumably not 
satisfied with before and crossed out, the solution is one of trying for a 
reconciliation, a compromise, a making of peace, and so he withdraws 
his own denigration of Renan’s comment as a boutade, a toss-off line:
One must not see in this idea expressed by this great 
mind who calls himself Renan only a simple whim [une 
boutade] at a moment when he himself plunged into the 
study of pure criticism, into philological studies that to-
tally absorbed him. The study of literary history makes 
one see the evolution of the human mind and, under this 
name, it is instructive and interesting.
Although Renan, for reasons of his own, turned his attention in a 
42 Cahiers, 54. This determination of northern writers includes Russians and Scandinavians and also 
Nietzsche from Germany and Switzerland, whom he also mentions, or rather, having pointed 
out the “humane” quality of the writers mentioned and taken their side against detractors, he 
slides into a discussion of the importance of putting literature into its context, chronological 
and geographical, which concern for the “temperament, climate, ambient influences” leads him 
to watch how the individual escapes from “Cartesian oppression” wherein the mind exists in a 
purely abstract vacuum, with Nietzsche being a primary example of someone who has “broken 
from himself.”
43 Cahiers, 54–55, Cahier I, Fo8 and Cahier Fo10.
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more strictly philological (scientific) direction,44 Dreyfus appreciates 
the great man’s previous openness to the humanist approach to liter-
ary studies and explains his own belief in the evolution of the human 
mind—a mind that grows, changes, and adjusts to its environment, and 
is not oppressed by the Cartesian split between an abstract inner world 
and the confused sensations on the outside. What Dreyfus must fight 
against in his own life are the horrible external tortures, the physical 
shackles of his exile on Devil’s Island, with its loneliness and despair, 
and the moral disintegration of his own mind, already hypersensitive 
and now likely to slip into madness through the shame and humiliation 
of the charges against him. It would be all too easy to plunge himself 
into a kind of philology, a universe made up only of words that rattle 
about in a vast and empty space. The important thing to do is to face up 
to the real problems of the hostile and dangerous world, and to wrestle 
with them like a good Jew, guided by the ethics of the fathers and the 
long tradition of questioning and mutual challenging. Neither one nor 
the other, not withdrawal from reality into sterile intellectualism and 
not total engagement with pain, humiliation, and suffering, but as
Rabban Gamaliel, the son of Rabbi Judah the Prince, 
said, An excellent thing is the study of the Torah com-
bined with some worldly occupation, for the labor de-
manded by them both makes sin to be forgotten. All 
study of the Torah without work must in the end be 
futile and become the cause of sin. Let all who are em-
ployed with the congregation act with them for Heaven’s 
sake, for then the merit of their fathers sustains them, 
and their righteousness endures forever.45
Intellectual work (Torah in the widest understanding of the term46) 
44 For Renan and for Dreyfus, the immediate sense of philology would be the scientific study of 
literary texts, that is, seeing each as a type produced by the measurable qualities of nationality, 
race, and economic class, but this kind of avoidance of dealing directly with the imaginative, poetic 
quality of the texts as works of art would conform to the rabbinical procedures of pilpul, where the 
immediate contexts, implications, and legal application of the scripture being studied are made 
subordinate to exegetical acrobatics.
45 Pirqe Avot, 2:2.
46 “The word Torah is left untranslated. It is variously used for the Pentateuch, the scriptures, the 
Oral Law, as well as for the whole body of religious truth, study and practice,” Siddur Sephath Emeth 
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and real-world labor (avoda), which is the work both of serving God in 
liturgical and ritual duties and also earning a living through service to 
the community, go together to help one forget sin, and through working 
with society (the congregation) one can draw on the “merit of the fa-
thers” (zekhut avot) and inherit the rewards of piety and ethical life: “All 
Israel has a portion in the world to come,” according to the headnote of 
the Chapters of the Fathers. So too we hope for Alfred Dreyfus.
But would he have known or cared?47 In this same cahier, between the 
two versions of the Renan essay, he writes two versions of an untitled 
essay I call “Religious Faith.” Let us see what he has to say. The difference 
between the two is not large, but shows how their author is thinking 
through and refining his ideas. On both folio 8 and folio 10, he begins in 
the same way with the same words:
Religious Faith
We need to reduce the question to two essential terms: 
to choose between determinism and revelation; and this 
choice is not a matter of reason—it is a question of faith. 
Against such faith, no criticism prevails; it is admirable 
and I envy those who possess it . . .
This is Dreyfus’s religious credo and his philosophical position. One 
either is or is not religious, and that means one is either: a determinist, 
since some god or other has created the world, limits where one is and 
what one can do, and thus sets out the basic parameters of life; or one is 
a rationalist, who sees the world as subject not to an arbitrary will but 
to laws of nature that can be understood by reason and science and, with 
that understanding, has the freedom to make adjustments in one’s life 
to secure advantages, subject to the realities of nature. But the type of 
person one is is not open to a totally free choice; it is a matter of faith, 
but what he means by foi needs to be found out. To begin with, accord-
(Speech of Truth) Order of Prayers for the Whole Year, Hebrew and English, no editor or translator 
named (New York: Hebrew Publishing Co. 1953), 229, note.
47 Compare the words of André Maurois, who like Alfred Dreyfus came from a Jewish family 
of Alsatian manufacturers displaced after 1870, in his autobiography: “To sustain me in this 
premature crisis of adolescence I had no religious faith whatever. I did not know (and even to-day 
do not know exactly) the doctrine of the religion which by birth should be mine” (Call No Man 
Happy, 30). Thanks at least to Lucie and her family, Dreyfus would not have been so ignorant of 
his own background.
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ing to Dreyfus, placing himself within the large camp of secularists and 
rationalists of the nineteenth century, but not completely and dogmati-
cally, faith is a frame of mind. He envies those who have it, finds it envi-
able, and yet cannot will himself by logical argument into its possession. 
At this point, the two versions of the essay begin to diverge. The first 
version continues in this way:
But since one doesn’t believe, not even as a child, since 
criticism, the spirit of reason, was melded into me—it is 
useless to break your head, to get all tipsy with aesthetic 
reasons, to search in nature, in the universal conscience 
etc. for reasons to believe—with the affirmations—with 
the affirmations of reason, of science, leave the dissolu-
tion of religions . . .
Before the syntax breaks down altogether, notice how Dreyfus finds 
himself unable to follow the various schools of rationalism, idealism, 
mysticism, and romantic naturalism available around him. He laments 
the fact that he cannot have faith because he was brought up with too 
much of a critical sensibility, and he says, speaking more to himself than 
to any objective imaginary audience, that there is no use getting your-
self into a state of confusion through Romantic aesthetics or German 
idealism or some imperative will to believe, all of which would attempt 
to break down the structures of organized religion. It would be so much 
easier to bear his own pains and humiliations if he could believe, but he 
doesn’t and he can’t, so why should he pound his head on a brick wall?
In the second little essay on folio 10, he says something similar but 
not quite the same:
Against faith, no criticism prevails, and I envy those who 
posses it. But since one doesn’t believe, like a small child, 
without reason, and true science does not meddle with 
it—despite the bankruptcy of science—it is useless to 
break your head, to get all tipsy with a so-called rational 
aesthetics—to search for it in nature, in the universal 
consciousness . . . or for reasons to believe in: of an af-
firmation of reason in science, a kind of dissolution of 
all religions.
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Once again, he begins by stating that he envies those who have faith, 
who were born with it, or at least were born into an environment where 
faith was impressed into their personality. The failure of science and ra-
tional philosophy on their own to help him out of his despair exposes 
their bankruptcy: true science, in fact, steps away from the most impor-
tant questions of all in life, and consequently, there is no use chasing the 
phantasm in any form of Rousseau’s back-to-nature primitivism or more 
contemporary pseudomystical aestheticism in search of the egotistical 
sublime or Hegelian hunt for the universal Time Spirit.48 He doesn’t see 
traditional religions as the great enemy, and wants no Voltaire to scream 
in his ears, “Ecrassez l’infame!”
In both versions, then, Dreyfus wishes he had faith to believe in re-
ligion, but he also cries out in pain at the inadequacies of all the appar-
ent alternatives propounded by his favourite authors and the supposed 
bedrock of his civilization. Therefore, he tries to explore the alternative 
more closely. In the first essay he writes:
To those who don’t believe, reason furnishes a contrary 
explanation to the phenomenon of belief. God enters 
the category of the ideal, in the dream that we all share 
of humanity where all will become noble, good and just. 
Religion is the beauty in the moral order and that is all. 
For purely philosophical idealism is only available to the 
highest intelligences, while purely religious idealism is 
only accessible to the most humble minds.
This seems to set out a paraphrase of the latest secular, moral religion 
for the nineteenth century. The old religious systems can be rationalized 
away as variations on a shared human deism, wherein everything es-
sentially good, noble, just, and tends towards a perfect ideal eventually. 
God is the ideal of beauty of a moral universe.49 But without considering 
48 Proust, Finding Time Again: “Dreyfusisme was now integrated into a range of respectable and 
normal things” (33–34).
49 Benmozegh cites Renan: “Enamored of beauty, nature soars towards her with an unceasing impulse, 
and approaches closer and closer to her in its forms. The universe is thus an immense being which 
rises relentlessly toward a higher end which it has prepared though all its previous efforts, proving 
at once its enormous desire for the good and its marvelous ingenuity,” and adds that in Kabbalah, 
this concept is carried out in a way that makes the enhancement of natural beauty come about 
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the absurdity of such time- and culture-bound categories of thought, 
Dreyfus sees their weakness in the social limitations they enforce: one 
must be rich and comfortable, well educated, and arrogant to believe in 
the ideals, but the primitive and poor, the uneducated and unsophisti-
cated alone have access, not to a lesser faith or set of popular supersti-
tions, but to religious idealism—to the longed-for faith of other times 
and other places.50 In a sense, Dreyfus mocks both science and religion 
as failed ideals and at the same time regrets that he cannot have faith 
in either.
He makes this even clearer in the second version of the essay On Re-
ligious Faith:
To those who don’t believe, however, reason furnishes 
an explanation of the phenomenon of all beliefs, the in-
nate need in all beings to come out of brutal realities, of 
plunging oneself into the domain of dreams, of the ideal, 
of a humanity which will be supremely beautiful, noble 
and just. A religion whichever it may be, is the beauty 
of the moral order, that is all. For a purely philosophi-
cal idealism is not intended for use by all intelligences, 
while the purely religious idealism is meant for more 
humble spirits.
The modern authors, such as Michelet, Renan, and Taine, whom 
through man’s intimate participation in the creative processes themselves, through nourishment, 
sexuality, and performance of the mitzvot (Benmozegh, Israel and Humanity, 188).
50 Faur: “‘superstititon’ and ‘superstitious’ are terms associated with ‘dread and belief in the 
irrational.’ In the original Latin, however, superstito and superstitious had a different meaning. 
‘Superstition’ was knowledge of a past event, and ‘superstitiosus’ was that individual who had 
the peculiar gift to ‘testify’ about an event in which he was not present” (The Horizontal Society, 
Section IV, Introductory Remarks). We could go further in this etymological game that opens 
up whole new ways of breaking into the hidden meanings of Dreyfus’s text. For instance, to 
testify was a legal term related to to theorize, which described the particular mission of delegated 
representatives of one city state (polis) to visit, participate in, and report back on the power 
of another city’s rituals; hence, it was the special ability to bring home a charged testimony a 
speech filled with enargaeia that infused the home state with the “truths” of their enemies or 
rivals. Dreyfus looks backwards to his life before he was charged with crimes and foreward to 
the day he will be rehabilitated, regaining his name and honor, and the purity of soul for himself 
and his family, that is all important to his sense of self and identity. His critical readings and 
commentaries give him a theoretical power to testify to his own innocence. Cp. discussions of 
melitza throughout this book.
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Dreyfus reads intensely, or those writing at around this very time, such 
as Freud and the Reinach brothers, whom he as yet does not know 
about, offer ways of rationalizing revealed religions based on faith; of 
explaining away mysteriousness and spirituality by recourse to analysis 
of dreams, myths, and archaic rituals; and of smoothing away all the 
specificities of different times and cultures in order to envisage a utopi-
an ideology of one sort or another, and it all depends on class and other 
circumstances to determine in which category of belief you fall.
Then, at this point in both versions of the essay, he makes his formal 
statement of belief. In the first he writes:
I am neither a believer not hostile to belief—I am a sym-
pathetic witness, on the contrary, to those who believe, 
since I am conscious of the moral good of those who do 
believe, on condition always that this belief does not be-
come a narrow idea, an abstract formula, or that reduces 
itself to an airy idealism. In conclusion, philosophical 
idealism for high intelligences, religious idealism for 
humble minds: this is what will become of the summing 
up of the beauty and the moral good in our beliefs.
Is Dreyfus, then, an agnostic or an atheist or merely confused and 
despondent? He seems to want to take a neutral stand, neither for nor 
against religion per se, inclined by disposition towards science and ra-
tionalism but all too aware of their inadequacies to deal with the situ-
ation he is in or the surging sense of meaninglessness in his life. He 
observes from afar, a not quite dispassionate witness to those with faith 
who can find the moral strength to withstand the forces of oppression 
and evil in the world, who can, as he seems unable to, understand the 
conspiracy of arrogance ranged against him. He ought, by his own cal-
culations, to belong to the superior intellects who can be satisfied—find 
a consolation of philosophy—in the higher ideals; he wishes he could 
have a simpler faith, perhaps like those of women and children or of his 
rabbinical ancestors.
The second version of this final statement follows exactly the words 
of the first, until the final sentence, where it diverges with a subtle new 
expression:
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In conclusion, philosophical idealism for high intelli-
gences, religious idealism for humble spirits; this is what 
we should reduce beauty and moral good in our beliefs.
It is the difference between “à quoi devraient se resumer” and “à quoi 
doivent se reduire,” between what should be summed up into a belief sys-
tem and what must be reduced into that desired system of beliefs. In the 
first, there is a sense of fulfilling a future duty and collecting together of 
diverse ideas; in the second, a subjunctive hope and speculative doubt 
about the consequences of reducing the diverse ideas into one faith.
On folio 10, after those last words shared with the first essay, Drey-
fus draws a line across the manuscript and adds nine of his doodles. He 
then writes:
Human thought in all its power, in all its [illegible word] 
can only use that force with a moral value which is im-
printed, or else it is as abstract and as dry as a math-
ematical problem can be [illegible word].51
If not conceived as a part of the essay on faith, these lines supplement 
it in a striking if ambiguous and frustrating way. The two unreadable 
words in the manuscript prevent any complete understanding of what 
it is that Dreyfus wishes to say here. Just as he argued that a person 
cannot reason his way into faith if he has been brought up to be critical 
and believe in science, even after he has realized that rationalism itself 
and science are inadequate to provide him with consolation or a way of 
understanding the horrible ordeal he is going through, just so la pen-
sée humaine with all its puissance can only achieve its ends by the moral 
value (la valeur morale) it has imprinted (est empreinte) in it—but what 
51 Compare the words of Max Nordau, as he ironically and scathingly excoriates the French attitude 
towards Jews: “I must utter the painful word. The nations which emancipated the Jews have 
mistaken their own feelings. In order to produce its full effect, emancipation should first have been 
completed in sentiment before it was declared law. But this was not the case . . . . The emancipation 
of the Jews was not the consequence of the conviction that grave injury had been done to a race, 
that it has been treated most terribly, and it was time to atone for the injustice of a thousand 
years; it was solely the result of the geometrical mode of thought of French rationalism of the 18th 
century. This rationalism was constructed by the aid of pure logic, without taking into account 
livings sentiments and the principles of the certainty of mathematical action; and it insisted upon 
trying to introduce these creations of pure intellect into the world of reality.” Nordau, “Address at 
the First Zionist Congress” (1897), MidEastWeb.
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the additional quality in such thoughts is that makes it effective we can 
only guess. Without that power of moral suasion, however it is come 
by, reason by itself is as dry and abstract as the mathematical equations 
Dreyfus scribbles up and down his pages, along with the obsessive little 
drawings.
Nothing explicit, it seems, is said about Judaism in either of these 
essays. Nor, it would seem, about Christianity, since the debate in his 
mind is between scientific rationalism and a kind of poetic, philosophi-
cal religion on the other. It may be that Dreyfus has couched his terms 
in a vague, occluded language that recalls Maimonides in his lengthy 
instructions to his pupil, The Guide of the Perplexed, in which someone 
who has trained himself in Greek knowledge—philosophy and math-
ematics, for the most part—finds himself perplexed by the mythical 
and mysterious language of the revealed scriptures, as well as by the 
crabbed, oblique midrashic style of the rabbis. The Rambam does not 
aim to enforce a faith on his student, to force a dogmatic interpretation 
on that divine text, or to reject reason and science; instead, he teaches, 
in his own midrashic style, with all its mixture of tones, its fragmenta-
tion and seemingly disordered presentation of the argument, how to 
read the sacred books so that they conform to Aristotelian principles of 
logic, grammar, and science.
On folio 12 of the first cahier,52 Dreyfus then offers a critical reading 
of Tolstoy. It will be of interest, in light of his statements about religion 
and science, to see what Dreyfus has to say about The Gospels Translated, 
Compared, and Harmonised, which was published in Russian between 
1880 and 1882 and translated by Wizewa and G. Art. He begins by para-
phrasing what these two translators say in their introductory remarks, 
noting that the Russian thinker is using his study of the New Testament 
to advance his own “new Christianity.” For them, this innovative read-
ing is peculiar.
The translators find that Tolstoy is at home in the sacred 
text. Discourse and parable, thought and imagery, all are 
taken in a new sense.
But then, as so often happens, Dreyfus intrudes into the paraphrase 
52 Cahiers, 56.
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to speak in his own voice, to raise his own objections to what Wizewa 
and Art have written, and to question Tolstoy’s ideas as well.
This should not astonish us. The text of the Four Gospels 
are not in agreement in all interpretations!
Dreyfus takes a sceptical position in regard to these Christian docu-
ments, establishing first of all that the Four Gospels do not agree with 
one another and that they are a composite of diverse kinds of discourse 
whose meanings interpreters have not agreed on. If Tolstoy offers a 
unique approach to interpretation, Dreyfus is not surprised: everyone 
in rabbinical tradition, and certainly anyone who has read or heard of 
Maimonides, should be prepared to see in discourse, parable, thought, 
and imagery a dynamic and multilayered textuality; this category natu-
rally includes the Gospels.53 
The two translators of Tolstoy express another surprise, that the 
Russian, “having proclaimed the divinity of Jesus’s doctrine, refuses 
then to recognize the divinity of his person.” For Dreyfus, that in itself 
seems a rational distinction, the revealed word having a divine nature 
that does not necessarily pass on to the deliverer of the Word, as with 
the law given to Moses on Sinai and Moses himself who is always a man, 
albeit the best of the prophets. What surprises Dreyfus, in the sense 
that his own Jewish sensibilities cannot follow Wizewa and Art in their 
Christian faith, is that “Tolstoy is simply incomplete” because “neither 
the person nor the doctrines are divine, they are simply human.” This is 
the position of a nineteenth-century secular, assimilated Jew, and one 
that he shares with many secularised Christians of his day, whether they 
call themselves atheists, agnostics, or nothing at all.
In the final sentences of this brief critical essay, Dreyfus becomes more 
complex and more obscure to us—because he has crossed out too much 
and his handwriting becomes undecipherable to the modern editors:
It would have been better for the translators to grasp 
simply these words [illegible word] of Alexandria, that 
53 Marcel Mergui and his Champs du Midrash group will be discussed later. One of their most 
interesting characteristics, as they seek to explain Christian scriptures as the result of primitive 
misunderstandings of Hebrew midrashim as the core of Gospel thinking, is that they stress the 
visualized midrash in iconography and art.
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it was not so well to examine all the matters of religion, 
that it would be better for each one of us to remain in his 
own beliefs. [This whole text has been crossed out.]
Which writer of Antiquity he refers to is not clear, but the import of 
his statement is, let everyone remain in the beliefs he was born to and 
make the best of it, since conversion under duress or in crisis means 
nothing, and those who did become something new, presumably Chris-
tian, have not really benefited. In a way, this accords with Dreyfus’s own 
statement of tolerance and envy of anyone with a true belief, any depar-
ture from what one grew up into being a form of drunken lurch.
Then, with the passage obliterated, in place of the rejected text, Drey-
fus draws a horizontal line, and writes, “Let us enter this subject”—and 
nothing follows but a drawing of two hyperbolas and a long series of 
numerical equations. Hopefully, these mathematical games are not the 
dry and abstract formulation of another inadequate state of mind.
From now on, rather than attempting to give a close reading of each 
of Dreyfus’s critical or speculative essays,54 we shall only focus on a few 
that demonstrate some special feature in his personality or situation 
that breaks through the surface of the text. But first a brief interlude 
and series of digressions.
dreyfus’s doodles, Iconography, and Kabbalistic Signs
That is what Bacon called the principle of our eternal igno-
rance, the ignorance to which the conditions of man con-
demns us, walled in as we are within a rock, solitary and 
deceived in the midst of the world.
—Anatole France55
In the various studies of Dreyfus’s drawings in French, the common 
term used for them is dessins, drawings, sketches, or designs, there ap-
parently being no French equivalent to the English word doodle.56 To 
54 In a future book, we will deal more extensively with Dreyfus’s readings, tastes, and opinions in 
matters of literature, historiography, culture and science.
55 France, “Goerge Sand,” On Life & Letters, I, 300.
56 It is possible that folk-etymology projects back into “doodle” some of the qualities associated with 
a similar-sounding word dawdle, to linger, to temporize, to wander about aimlessly.
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speak of these line drawings as scribbles or scratchings misses the point 
of the nonverbal quality of the work. Another French word, gaspiller, 
comes to mind, in that it matches with the etymological root of doodle 
(to play on a “doodle-fife” or bagpipe and hence to make annoying, tedi-
ous, and meaningless sounds or, by metaphoric extension, to make ob-
sessive, pointless, empty drawings while listening or speaking to some-
one else), but if the closest French equivalent to doodling is gaspillage, 
in the sense of wasting time, squandering energy, and lavishing effort 
better spent on something important, it seems never to have been used 
in regard to Alfred’s drawing.
Although many (though hardly all) of the drawings begin with an X 
(or aleph א) or a Y (or tsadeh ץ), these do not serve as letters or abbrevia-
tions for words. They might be compared to the bizarre imagery to be 
found in Glozel, and the connections between the whole Dreyfus Affair 
and this controversial archaeological site in central France, near Vichy, 
may be seen both in terms of the actual objects collected between 1924 
and 1932 and the newspaper articles, scientific studies, and popular im-
agination that swirled about in what came to be known as the War of the 
Bricks or the Second Dreyfus Affair. A key figure connecting the two af-
fairs is Salomon Reinach, a strong Dreyfusard in the 1890s and a major 
supporter of the legitimacy and importance of Glozel during the 1920s.
It is also possible to see in these drawings a kind of childish game, 
such as Elias Canetti imagines in his early memories when he saw people 
inside the wallpaper designs of his bedroom, but in regard to Alfred’s 
doodles, we could rather see projections of his anxieties, fears, desires, 
and hallucinations caused by isolation, sensory deprivation, and illness. 
They might be nightmare images, distortions of the once-familiar faces, 
flowers, and buildings he is now deprived of.
The constant iteration of these pictures, each one drawn to a basic 
X/א or Y/ץ pattern with endless variations of efflorescence of curvilinear 
designs, may also suggest a kind of series of animated cartoons, not in 
the sense of comic strips or books, with either satiric or heroic purpose, 
but rather a manifestation of the need Dreyfus felt to make order out of 
his disorderly life, to find the mobility his incarceration denied to him, 
and to generate a kind of free creativity otherwise impossible in the cir-
cumstances in which he found himself.
The prison guards assigned to watch all of Dreyfus’s activities and 
to collect and either recopy them or write a report on their contents 
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described the doodles in three ways: sometimes they called them archi-
tectural shapes, and we now know that in the missing cahiers, there may 
have been some transitional movement away from the cones and other 
geometrical drawings, along with shaded outlines of various structures 
that could well be construed as “architectural.” At other times, they 
called them “desseins cabbalistiques” by which they probably meant noth-
ing more than tediously, esoterically, and exotically Semitic, without 
seeing any specific secret significance in them. To them Kabbalah might 
not even have alluded to any historical school of medieval or Renais-
sance mystical traditions. If it did, then they would surely have sought 
expert advice, even if perversely anti-Semitic, since the constant sur-
veillance of the prisoner’s behaviour and the censorship of his writings 
was meant precisely to uncover evidence of any treasonous intentions, 
such as clues as to his non-French, that is, Jewish, tendencies and at-
titudes or beliefs.57
On a very few occasions, the scrutinizing guards recorded the doo-
dles as not only kabbalistic but as “desseins cabbalistiques ordinaires,” this 
second adjective suggesting either some further knowledge they had ob-
tained or subtle inferences they were making as to a particular system of 
Jewish conspiratorial system or code, with ordinaires pointing towards 
an official, regular purpose in the drawings.
But while again it is likely that the government agents assigned to 
check up on the deportee’s secret thoughts and feelings did not really 
have anything more in mind here than a vague allusion to the kind of 
absurdities contained in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion or at least spo-
ken of in irrational terms by anti-Semites such as Edouard Drumont, 
the argument made in this book is that we cannot dismiss the nonsense 
of the Jew-haters out of hand because this nonsense forms the matrix 
of the affair and of the society of irrationality in which the Holocaust 
would crystallize over the subsequent half-century. In other words, here 
as in other places, these anti-Semites did not merely misinterpret Jew-
ish practices, traditions, and beliefs. They did see and feel something 
57 As a matter of fact, while at this same period the School of Jewish Science (Jüdisscheswissenschaft) 
in Germany was spreading amongst rationalist reformers in France and other progressive 
countries, there was a countervailing body of opinion, usually centered around Sephardic and 
Italian rabbis, such as Elijah Benmozegh, who would argue that in many, though hardly all, 
instances that Kabbalah “is a faithful exponent of rabbinic thought” (Benmozegh, Israel and 
Humanity, 188).
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that academic historians of the affair then and now overlook, much as 
they fail to recognize certain aspects of the whole crazy conspiracy of ar-
rogance. The central characters in the affair, such as Dreyfus himself and 
his closest supporters always tried to deny the anti-Semitism out there, 
and the Jewishness in the prison writings and the letters, as if the noise 
in the streets and the slurs in the press meant nothing. One has only to 
look at the writings of Marcel Proust to see how deeply the feelings and 
prejudiced thoughts of anti-Semitism went in French society during the 
whole period of the affair and afterwards, when people forgot what they 
had been so excited about.58
Instruments for hearing, Seeing, Thinking, and Feeling
However, for religious reasons the idea was conceived by the 
Ashkenazic rabbis, to express the significance of every holy 
day by distinctive tunes, and to consecrate special melodies 
to each occasion in order to create the distinctive atmosphere 
for that day. . . . Upon entering the house of worship on one 
of these days, the Jew was inspired by the dominating mode 
or melody which reminded him of the purpose of the day.
—A. Z. Idelsohn59
According to the Belgian artist Emile Verhaeren, what distinguished the 
Parisian art scene at the end of the nineteenth century was its seething 
diversity of schools of painters, groups which were, he says, forever di-
viding up, regrouping, and splitting again.60 In a sense, this might also 
be a way of describing the political dynamics in the capital of France, 
and Paris was, as many come to think of it now, the capital of the nine-
teenth century in many other ways. But these competing, hostile and 
coalescing factions were not so much unstable and incoherent, that is, 
chaotic or anarchic, random or mindless, as they were exploratory and 
58 Proust, Finding Time Again: “For the rest, to conclude the topic of the duchesses who now frequented 
mme Verdurin’s, they came there, though this never occurred to them, in search of exactly the 
same thing as the Dreyfusards had once done, that is to say a social pleasure constituted in such a 
way that its enjoyment both assuaged political curiosity and satisfied the need to discuss among 
themselves the incidents they read about in the newspapers” (37).
59 Idelsohn, Jewish Music, 134–135.
60 Cited in Ingo F. Walther and Rasiner Metzger, Van Gogh: The Complete Paintings (Koln, London, 
etc.: Taschen, 2006 (original German edition 1990), 272.
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creative. Thus, Verhaeren goes on to say
The diverse tendencies remind one of movable geometri-
cal patterns, as in a kaleidoscope, one moment opposed 
and the next united, merging then separating again, and 
then crumbling, but nonetheless moving within a con-
stant circle, that of modern art.61
It will pay to look more closely at this metaphor and then to explore 
its implications in regard to two other complex conceits that I use in this 
book to try to see and understand Alfred Dreyfus and the Dreyfus Af-
fair—and use more than as just a touchstone by which to measure and 
test the constituency of its elements, but much more as a whetstone to 
sharpen our comprehension of what was going on in the minds of in-
volved individuals and groups and their milieu; as well as a lens.
The word kaleidoscope came into use in French on the model of the 
term invented by Sir David Brewster in 1817, built on the Greek roots 
kalos (beauty), eidor (aspect or form), and skopein (to see), to denomi-
nate a long tube, like a microscope or telescope, but with a lens through 
which are seen, against a background of curved or angular mirrors, an 
array of small pieces of coloured glass or beads; when the tube is rotated, 
the particles of tinted glass are reflected and refracted in the mirrors 
as ever-changing symmetrical patterns. Although it was quickly popu-
larized as a toy for children or a device for adult entertainment, with 
the kaleidoscope Brewster was seriously working in the investigation of 
polarized light, and he imagined uses for architects, painters, jewellers, 
and other craftsmen seeking new design patterns and colour combina-
tions. According to the specifications in his patent document,
The kaleidoscope . . . is an instrument for creating and 
exhibiting an infinite variety of beautiful forms, and is 
constructed in such a manner as either to please the eye 
by an ever-varying succession of splendid tints and sym-
metrical forms, or to enable the observer to render per-
manent such as may appear most appropriate for any of 
61 Cited in Walther and Metzger, Van Gogh, 272.
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the numerous branches of the ornamental arts.62
Before it became either a mere toy or an interesting metaphor in aes-
thetic discourse, Brewster was thinking,
if any object, however ugly or irregular in itself, is placed 
before the aperture . . . the part that can be seen though 
the aperture will be seen also in every sector, and every 
image of the object will be seen also in every sector, and 
every image of the object will coalesce into a form math-
ematically symmetrical and highly pleasing to the eye. 
If the object is put in motion, the combination of im-
ages will likewise be put in motion, and new forms per-
fectly different but equally symmetrical will successively 
present themselves, sometimes vanishing in the center, 
sometimes emerging from it, and sometimes playing 
around in double and opposite oscillations.
Thus, more than the Newtonian prism used to break up a ray of light 
into its constituent rainbow of colours, the kaleidoscope now creates 
new forms, tints, and—this is very important as a forerunner of ani-
mated motion pictures—movements. This way of thinking about the 
nature of sight and what can be done to create various illusions sought, 
by the play of mirrors and lenses, to foreshadow developments in paint-
ing and other arts that eventually come into focus under the names of 
impressionism, post-impressionism, cubism, fauvism, and so forth.
In regard to the mysterious designs or doodles that fill whole folios 
and the empty spaces on pages in Dreyfus’s workbooks from Devil’s Is-
land, we can perhaps suggest that he is himself playing with configura-
tions of light, lines, space, and movement. As we have already discussed 
in reference to Taine’s theories of intelligence and Tarde’s notions of 
imitation as the driving force of social behaviour and collective thought, 
the scientific ambit of Brewster’s new invention takes part in the impe-
tus of the nineteenth century’s break with the previous age’s rationality 
and classical concept of symmetry.
62 “Brewster’s Patent, A.D, 1817, No. 4136, Kaleidoscopes, Brewster’s Specifications.”
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The partial polarization of the light by successive reflex-
ions occasions a partial analysis of the transmitted light; 
but in order to develop the tints with brilliancy, the 
analysis of the light must precede its admission into the 
aperture. Instead of looking thro’ the extremity . . . of 
the tube, the effects which have been described may be 
exhibited to many persons at once, upon the principle of 
the solar microscope or magic lanthorn, and in this way, 
or by the application of the camera lucida, the figures 
may be accurately delineated.
Significantly, as a metaphoric reference point, this instrument does 
not introduce new materials or colours but generates new combinations 
and patterns and hence new responses in the viewer’s eyes. It moves 
into a realm of dynamic, moving imagery and perceptions that can be 
shared between many viewers, thus creating collective experiences of 
polarized light shows and illusionary visions of nonnatural phenome-
na. Moreover, in his final comments in the patent document, Brewster 
sees a further application which would correct the faults in previous at-
tempts to visualize sound:
When Custillon proposed the construction of an ocu-
lar harpsichord, he was mistaken in supposing that any 
combination of harmonic colours could afford the pleas-
ure to the person who viewed them, for it is only when 
these colours are connected with regular and beautiful 
forms that the eye is gratified by the combination. The 
kaleidoscope, therefore, seems to realize the idea of an 
ocular harpsichord.
This ideal of a mechanized synesthesia looks forward, not so much 
to the realistic or documentary style of motion pictures (“talkies”) that 
someone like Proust objected to on the ground that it would limit the 
imaginative play of the eye on reality that is the essence of poetic crea-
tion, but rather to the kind of fantasia and phantasmagoria filmed by 
Georges Méliès—including coordinated speaking and music—at the 
time of the Dreyfus Affair.
It was an advance on the many optical instruments invented during 
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the preceding century and would culminate in the 1890s with what we 
now call motion pictures. To understand the metaphorical and rhetori-
cal uses we are putting together in this book on Dreyfus, then, we need 
to be aware of the shifts in imagination that were occurring during his 
lifetime.63 Whether he had ever attended an entertainment or scientific 
performance involving these fantasy-producing machines is not more 
relevant, in a sense, than whether he attended an art exhibition or vis-
ited museums such as the Louvre in Paris displaying works from the 
various impressionistic and post-impressionistic schools during this 
period of the late nineteenth century. What is relevant is that these 
transformations in perceptual and aesthetic mentality were happening 
around him and that he himself shows an interest in the psychological, 
scientific, and aesthetic ideas that were driving these developments.
The phantasmagoria, which we have alluded to several times in ear-
lier chapters, was developed in France during the period of the Great 
Revolution and thus at about the same time as the kaleidoscope. Rather 
than a single instrument, the phantasmagoria was often a sustained, 
lengthy, and complex performance using optical projections, music and 
auditory effects, as well as tactile and olfactory elements. It was part of 
the popular entertainment industry that grew up in Western Europe 
over the nineteenth century, sometimes in ad hoc street performances 
and sometimes in fairgrounds, circuses, and theatres of magic and illu-
sion, and then on film. But there are two other manifestations of the 
phantasmagoria that we need to look at in order to understand how it 
can help us understand the Dreyfus Affair, this frenzied obsession that 
tore at the heart of France for at least seven long years.64
One is the way, partly touched upon earlier, in which, following 
Taine’s psychological discussions of intelligence, the double and triple 
play of simulacra and memory images form themselves into what is 
63 In Bourget's discussion of Flaubert’s imagination, a discussion Dreyfus shows that he read, there 
are two forms of this mental faculty and thus two constitutive collections of images registered 
from experience and created in the mind from the interplay of the individual’s own cognitive 
processes. Unlike Taine, but more like Proust and Flaubert, as Bourget indicates, Dreyfus saw 
the spirit of man engaged in a dynamic dialectic, constantly making and unmaking himself and 
struggling against deterministic tendencies in society and nature; cf. Bourget, Essais de psychologie 
contemporaine, 165–167.
64 Romain Rolland: “Both man and wife had been bowled over by the storm of the Dreyfus affair: 
both of them had taken the affair passionately to heart, and, like thousands of French people, they 
had suffered from the frenzy brought on by the turbulent wind of that exalted fit of hysteria which 
lasted for seven years” (Jean Christophe, Vol. II, 340).
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called an inner phantasmagoria of the mind. The other, apparently lim-
ited to the period of the Revolution and the First Empire, is how tacti-
cians and strategic operators projected spectral images into foggy night 
battles in order to disorient, frighten, and cause panic in the enemy; 
such a practical military usage suggests, moreover, that the devices de-
veloped by magicians and theatrical entertainers for popular audiences 
were available for propagandistic purposes—a kind of manipulation of 
crowds into mass trances that culminated in Nazi rallies in Nuremberg 
during the 1930s.65
Zekhut
All Israel have a portion in the world to come, as it said 
(Isaiah lx.21). And thy people shall be righteous; they shall 
inherit the land for ever, the branch of my planting, the work 
of my hands, that I may be glorified.
—Pirqe Avot
It has already been mentioned several times that one of the underlying 
secret principles behind Dreyfus’s self-concept as a Jew was that of inter-
generational merit.66 This idea of zekhut was surely one of the most revo-
lutionary ideas in the development of rabbinical Judaism after the fall of 
Jerusalem and the end of Jewish autonomy in the Land of Israel, after 
the destruction of the Temple and the impossibility of maintaining the 
cult of sacrifices by priests and Levites, and after the burning of the mo-
rasha or National Archives, where the statutes of the law were kept. Be-
fore the fourth century CE, zekhut usually had a simple meaning “merit” 
or “reward.” Individuals, usually the famous forefathers and foremothers 
of Israel, performed meritorious deeds. Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, 
Sarah, Rebecca, Leah, Rachel, and Ruth, as well as many others, were in-
cluded in this group. They were all honoured by Israel and by God for 
their great acts of generosity, goodness, bravery, and daring. They were 
remembered for their goodness, and the rest of Israel could remember 
them with pleasure and pride, and thus, because God also shared these 
65 Further discussion on this and related matter will appear in the next volume of this series.
66 Jacob Neusner, Theological and Philosophical Premises of Judaism (Boston, MA: Academic Studies 
Press, 2008); this is my primary authority on the concept and history of zekhut. Other authorities 
will be brought in later in this book.
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feelings of pleasure and pride, all of Israel could feel close to God.
But the radical shift in meaning and usage of zekhut was quite dif-
ferent, shockingly so.67 In the first place, as Jacob Neusner points out, 
“the Mishnah’s philosophers reject prophetic and charismatic authority 
and deem critical authority exercised by the sage’s disciple who has been 
carefully nurtured in rules, not in gifts of the spirit,”68 but also that the 
heavenly court gives its judgements and favours on the status of the 
whole community and is therefore not the sole determining authority; 
indeed, one is the concomitant of the other, forming “a single system of 
power.”69 Without the mediation of the temple, where the priestly cult 
of atonement sacrifices took place, the rabbinical courts could call on 
heavenly power to supplement or replace their own through submis-
sion. This submission takes the place of charismatic or heroic deeds, 
precisely because it involves acts that involve what the covenantal law 
grants to each individual and which God cannot demand from him or 
her—free will, life, and love of family and self. As Neusner puts it,
What we cannot accomplish through coercion, we can 
achieve through submission. God will do for us what we 
cannot do for ourselves, when we do for God what God 
cannot make us do. In a wholly concrete and tangible 
sense, love God with all the heart, the soul, the might, 
we have.70
Thus, not only did the great men and women, our forefathers and 
foremothers of blessed memory, gain spiritual merits that have been 
67 One of the translations offered for zekhut is the Christian term supererogation, where it refers to 
the overflowing of grace attained by Jesus on behalf of sinners and saints whose individual and 
collective good works are not sufficient for salvation. Using this term as a heading for his tale, S. 
Felix Mendelssohn recalls that “[d]uring the High Holiday services in a Brownsville Synagogue 
[a suburb of New York City] a bearded young man chanted the introductory prayers. When the 
services were over an elderly gentleman walked up to the young fellow and congratulated him, 
‘May I ask how much you are being paid for your services?’ ‘Nothing at all,’ replied the young 
man, ‘This represents my contribution to the congregation.’ The other thought a moment and said: 
‘That’s very nice of you. If one is unable and is yet a willing contributor, his conduct is certainly 
praiseworthy’” (The Jew Laughs, 180). The joke works on the disguised insult of the old gentlemen 
(damning the younger with faint praise) and exposing a moral truth (that even a faulty public 
prayer well-intended earns merit in the world to come).
68 Neusner, Theological Premises, 167.
69 Neusner, Theological Premises, 168.
70 Neusner, Theological Premises, 176.
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credited in the national heritage—often in the sense of honour and 
sometimes material or political rewards—for their heroic acts, but now 
the post-Fall rabbis began to teach that this zekhut is stored up in such 
an overwhelming abundance that God, when he remembers their good 
deeds, would reward their children’s children, all of Israel, even if the 
people of today are unable to carry out the mitzvot. God’s grace and love 
would come to all men and women just because they were Jews, even if, 
because of the terrible circumstances they lived in, they could neither 
perform meritorious deeds nor remain Jews and had converted against 
their will. So on the one hand, this new concept of zekhut constructed a 
cosmos in which Israel had inherited a vast stock of former merits and 
God would distribute them wherever they were needed. On the other 
hand, zekhut was something that ordinary individuals could earn for 
themselves and for their families; one need not be a priest, a patriarch, 
a prophet, a king, or a hero. Neusner then makes an even more astound-
ing claim:
It must follow that zekhut, not Torah, in a single word 
defines the generative myth, the critical symbol of the 
Judaism in the documents of which that symbol figures. 
A single case amplifies the claim that ordinary folk, not 
disciples of sages, have access to zekhut entirely outside 
of study of the Torah. In stories told about the rab-
bis, a single remarkable deed, exemplary for its deep 
humanity, sufficed to win for an ordinary person the 
zekhut—“the heritage of virtue and its consequent enti-
tlements”—that elicits the same marks of supernatural 
favour enjoyed by some rabbis on account of their life-
long, perpetual Torah-study.71
In other words, this new kind of meritorious deed was precisely the 
sort of action, whether active or passive, that God could never force a 
person to do; it was not among the commandments or mitzvot already 
mandated by scriptures as part of the original covenant between God 
and Israel. Above all the God of Israel, blessed be He, could not interfere 
with an individual’s free will, for that freedom of conscience is the one 
71 Neusner, Theological Premises, 179.
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lasting aspect of humanity that each one of us possesses—and shares 
in a profound universal way—with the deity; it is what makes us fun-
damentally created in the image, the tzelem of God: like the Holy One 
Himself, we each have free will, moral choice, a determination outside 
of all prescribed formulations of the law. Who and what we are is not 
determined by arbitrary rules or laws: we are who and what we are to 
a limited degree because of our parents and the education they give us, 
just as we are shaped by the evolution of our species and the geography 
and environment in which we are born and developed.
But these aspects of our existence, while they can condition what 
we experience in life, do not determine how we think or feel or see the 
world. Thus, the God of the Covenant could not ask a father to sacrifice 
his son or a son to sacrifice himself for his father, or a mother to give her 
last piece of bread to her son or daughter, or a person to help a stranger 
at the cost of his own well-being or life. But in the new interpretation 
of Jewish tradition and writings that developed at the time when Israel 
went into the world outside of the Holy Land without a priesthood or a 
temple to perform sacrifices, without a national territory under its con-
trol, and without an assured legal right to believe whatever it wished, 
the new dispersed people needed an ideology or a myth or a faith to live 
as a nation in exile. What Israel could not do for itself had to be done in 
another way, so that the accumulated merits of the ancestors could be 
put into effect in extreme circumstances.
These kind of ethical acts, often secret, usually very humble, always 
private and probably painful to perform, earned zekhut—rewards in the 
form of rain on a parched field, recovery of an infant after a horrid ill-
ness, relief from taxes in hard years, a sense of meaningfulness in an 
otherwise empty or evil world. Note that the people who are singled 
out for zekhut now are neither the priests, kings, or prophets of Israel 
nor the great rabbinical scholars of the Talmudic Age but rather sim-
ple, lowly folk. They are ordinary men and women, like Alfred and Lucie 
Dreyfus, and by their submission to their ordeal on behalf of truth and 
justice, not by any specific religious acts or Talmudic knowledge, they 
draw on the heritage of Israel and gain a portion in the world to come.
Zekhut was, when the new belief system began to develop in the 
centuries following the churban (destruction) of 70 CE, a revolution-
ary epistemological response to the unexpected and shocking rise of 
Christianity as a rival religion, one that, having assumed the powers 
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of the Roman Empire, challenged the very existence of Judaism in late 
Antiquity. It was an extraordinary and unexpected mythical answer to 
the myth of a Father-God who sends His only begotten Son to earth 
to give His life on the cross for the sake of all who believe in Him. In 
the Christian soteriological narrative, no individual, by himself or col-
lectively, can effect this salvation, whether by works or faith. Saints and 
martyrs can imitate Christ and win salvation only because Jesus had 
already done it, their lives reducing their individuality and condensing 
their historical specificity to the sacred imitatio christi. Faith and good 
works, depending on the mode of Christianity, flow from God’s grace, 
and only those who accept Jesus as their Messiah are entitled to these 
gifts earned by the Saviour.
In the rabbinical concept of zekhut, however, Israel collectively in the 
past and individually in the present creates the signs of merit that stir 
God’s heart, remind Him of His obligations under the covenant, and 
cause Him to pour forth His favours—but always in small, oblique, and 
unspectacular ways. World and national history do not change, but indi-
vidual lives are experienced in different ways, experienced as midrashic 
assuagement, correctives, and consolations. Faith or belief is moreover 
not the determinant value: deeds that were outside the range of Jewish 
law and Roman censorship and were often unperceived by both the Gen-
tile and Jewish communities were what counted most. To the individual 
who felt he or she could not endure another moment of history’s pain 
and humiliation, there came a moment of peace and rest, a small relief 
from agony and despair. So it seemed that there was order, so there was 
justice in the world, and there was a law still operative, but the law no 
longer needed a cult centre, a national government, or a body of esoteric 
rabbinical knowledge.
Were the answers to the two major crises at the formative period of 
Rabbinic or Talmudic Judaism still relevant in France at the time of the 
Dreyfus Affair? And were they pertinent to the specific historical case 
of Alfred and Lucie Dreyfus? Yes, I think, but not because they can be 
seen directly in the circumstances the Dreyfus family and other Jews 
were put through for close to two decades—and which closed with only 
an illusion of respite or resolution. The Great War that followed in 1914 
and the rise of Nazism in the 1930s and the Holocaust of the 1940s 
showed that the dominant negative forces of history had been grinding 
on relentlessly, even after Alfred was pardoned and seemed to regain 
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his honour. The false security of the Jewish community in nineteenth-
century France came to an end. The fervent belief in the principles of 
the Enlightenment and the Republic proved fatuous. Besides, just as 
there were already other forms of Judaism at the time of the fall of the 
temple and Jerusalem—among the followers of Philo Judeus in Alex-
andria or Flavius Josephus in Rome, for instance, and the writers of 
the Book of Jubilees or the book of Esther—and different alternatives 
would be developed throughout the later ages, such as various Kabbalot, 
the Haskallah, and secularised philosophies, as with Spinoza, so too, as 
Dreyfus saw, there were alternatives in reason and science or in poetic 
idealism and primitivist mysticism. But these alternatives could not be 
sustained in the face of what the state could do to all individuals, and 
especially to the Jewish people. In the letters he and his wife wrote, 
as in his prison notebooks, the Dreyfuses endured moral and physical 
tortures and in the process created something new for themselves—
through these writings, minor as they are in regard to world literature or 
history, they created a new kind of love and a new kind of loyalty, a new 
kind of intellectual critique, and a new kind of poetry. 72 Thus, Neusner’s 
comments strike to the heart of the matter of how to read and evaluate 
the letters between husband and wife and their powerful love of family 
and the prison workbooks filled by Alfred Dreyfus with an abundance 
of topics from science to art, mathematics to literature, and philosophy 
and psychology:
Zekhut integrates what has been differentiated. It holds 
together learning, virtue, and supernatural standing, 
by explaining how Torah-study transforms the learning 
man. Hierarchical classification, with its demonstration 
of the upward-reaching unity of all being, gives way to 
a different, and more compelling proposition: the unity 
of all being written within the heritage of zekhut, to be 
attained equally and without differentiation in all the 
72 My own temptation is to spend hundreds of pages in close reading and discussion of all the topics 
in the cahiers, but that sort of extensive analysis must be put off to the next book in this series 
on Dreyfus, tentatively entitled Alfred Dreyfus: Essayist, Historian, Poet and Jew. From now on 
I will begin to deal only with a few of the topics, choosing those in which long-lost aspects of 
his personality and character reach the surface, obliquely in other people’s words and images or 
explicitly in cries of agony.
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principal parts of the social order. The definition of ze-
khut therefore carries us to the heart of the integrating 
and integrated religious system of Judaism.73
ParT 2: More eSSayS and exCurSIonS
Ils perçoivent les choses et non les idées des choses. . . .74 Un 
esprit se trompe. Un esprit ignore—Jamais une machine à 
penser.75
—Paul Bourget
The fragmentariness or distortion of the human image 
in Jewish art is in effect not a reduction but an expan-
sion of the human form. The negative commandment 
prohibiting the depiction of the complete man is in sub-
stance a positive commandment to introduce the human 
spirit into the human form. In short, the slashed nose is 
the symbol of the soul.
—Steven S. Schwarzchild76
It is time now to turn back to the intellectual excursions in the prison 
workbooks from Devil’s Island. After leaving his discussion of a new 
translation of Tolstoy’s book on the Gospels, wherein he took issue with 
the comments of the translators on the need to focus on the odd ways 
the Russian idealist had dealt with the modes of narrating, appropri-
ateness of genres, mixing of styles and other peculiarities of presenta-
tion, without actually drawing his analogies to Maimonides, Dreyfus 
leaves off by asserting his unstated Jewish scepticism and rejection of 
the sanctity either of the New Testament or of Jesus. The first cahier 
continues for a while then with fragments of letters begun to Lucie, with 
73 Neusner, Theological Premises, 183.
74 Bourget, Outre-Mer, I, 87. Although he is talking about the new mind of Americans created in their 
vast and open land, the thought can be recontextualized to the situation of Dreyfus, who is forced 
to think and see and read all over again in a new way.
75 Bourget, Outre-Mer, I, 129. This passage can be translated as: “They see things but not the idea… of 
things.The mind fools itself. The mind knows nothing—there can never be a thinking machine.”
76 Stervn S. Schwarzchild, “The Legal Foundation of Jewish Aesthetics,” The Journal of Aesthetic 
Education 9:1 (1978) 35.
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lines recollected from the Latin, such as Ovid’s Mens interna sus ne siet 
usque melis (Of fear that my soul be not always occupied with its own 
flaws),77 introduced with a notice that “I could apply these lines of Ovid 
to myself” or simply set down on the page with no attribution or contex-
tualization, as with Semper veritas (The truth forever).78
There are also clusters of citations, from the ancient classics through 
to Renaissance writers, such as Montaigne and Shakespeare, constitut-
ing a small anthology of aphorisms and commonplaces. But then he 
has an outburst of personal feelings that trails off into silence and then 
bursts forth suddenly into an ambiguous Latin tag:
I am always on guard in my obstinate soul. The memory 
of these long and mournful days where I go, my head 
empty, body exhausted. In the empty future, dreaming 
of my destiny . . .
Fortis imagination generat casum
[A powerful imagination produces results]79
This cri du coeur laments the tedious, empty days he lives through, 
which he can only endure thanks to his obstinate, obdurate deter-
mination. The motto, however, suggests a resolution to this impasse 
through the imagination, a word loaded with both classical and roman-
tic resonance and beginning to gain increasing power in the new depth 
psychology of the 1890s. It will be not just an act of the will based on 
ideological commitment to the cause of justice and truth, but the crea-
tive act of imagining—whatever Dreyfus and his age will come to make 
this word mean, as they go beyond the classical sense of a faculty of the 
mind to store images, to generate vivid and persuasive pictures in the 
mind that can reshape those memories, and then the legal or politi-
cal decisions taken because they overpower other people’s recollections 
and modes of perception.
By adding the dimension of scientific investigations into public 
77 Cahier 1, Folio 13, Cahiers, 56.
78 Cahier 1, Folio 18, Cahiers, 57.
79 Cahier 1, Folio 31, Cahiers, 59.
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myths, private dreams, and culturally constructed paradigms of seeing 
(e.g., phantasmagoria, kaleidoscopes, photography, and x-rays), Dreyfus 
approaches the more dynamic, generative notions of midrashic visuali-
zation. The imagination, in brief, becomes more powerful and produc-
tive than the poets or novelists—whether Baudelaire, Mallarmé, or 
Flaubert—claim because it becomes a faculty through which the mind 
speculates on historical forces hidden within positive (determinable, 
measurable) facts and creates previously unperceived insights into itself 
as a complex, evolving organ of consciousness.80
In one rare instance, Dreyfus puts down a line that comes from what 
the modern editors vaguely designate as the Vulgate: Mori lucrum.81 This 
is seemingly a second unit in the longer passage from the New Testa-
ment: Vivere Christus est, et mori lucrum.
It is my eager expectation and hope that I shall not be at 
all ashamed, but with full courage now as always Christ 
will be honoured in my body, whether by life or death.
—Phil. I:20
However, while it might perhaps function within this Christian zone 
of meanings that Dreyfus is thinking of at this time, more likely, from 
the context and the whole drift of the intellectual content of the prison 
cahiers, he would be casting such a statement into an ironic or skeptical 
light, making “To die is to gain” a paradoxical aphorism, reading lucrum 
less as financial gains or profit than the honor or merit suggested by the 
New Testament translators, and resonant with anti-Semitic slanders 
against the miserly and shylockean meanness of money lenders. He thus 
twists the bigoted connotations around into something like “Through 
my death I will gain victory over your cruelty and superstitions.”
80 Bourget is here talking about the novelist Gustave Flaubert: “Chacun de nous aperçoit non pas 
l’univers, mais son univers; non pas la réalité, mais, de cette réalité, ce que son tempérament lui permet 
de s’approprier. Nous ne racontons que note songe de la vie humaine, et, en un certain sens, tout ouvrage 
d’imagination est une autobiographie, sinon strictement matérielle, du moins intimement exacte et 
profondément significative des arrière-fonds de notre nature” (Each us perceives not the universe but 
his own universe, not reality but this reality only what his temperment allows him to appropriate. 
We only recount our dream of human life, and, in a certain sense, the whole work of the human 
imagination is an autobiography, if not strictly material, at least intimately exact and proudly 
significant of the background of our nature) Essais de psychologie contemporaine, 115.
81 Cahiers 1, Folio 34, Cahiers, 59.
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This difficult aphorism is followed by the first of a series of little 
essays on Nature that appear many times in this and the subsequent 
prison notebooks.82 These meditations take into themselves themes 
that include the nature of intelligence and reason, the nature of child-
like apprehension of the world and scientific investigations, the nature 
of observing the landscape with the eyes of a poet or an agronomist, 
and then the powers of the mind through those various eyes to rest pas-
sively and muse on the impressions of what is or recollected as what 
was seen or then to act to change the physical world and thereby also to 
effect changes in the inner world of thought and feelings. At the close of 
this first essay on nature, Dreyfus writes:
The law of nature is love. The moral grandeur of the hu-
man heart measures itself by this need for, by its capac-
ity to love, the power of a man’s mind, in some order 
which the spirit (or kind) examines in pure science, phi-
losophy, literature, etc., resides in the power to love that 
in which it is occupies. The law of nature is thus love.
The periodic sentence rolls on through a series of sorites, interlinked 
and incrementally repeated, enclosed by the same dictum that the law 
of nature is love. This makes for an attempt to synthesize and recon-
cile competing attitudes towards the natural world prevalent in the late 
nineteenth century. But the dictum and the synthesis are too facile, and 
later versions of the essay begin to explore other ways of approaching the 
problems inherent in the conjunction of ideologies. For though Dreyfus 
always tried to be the great peacemaker and resolver of contradictions, 
he knows that merely wishing for irreconcilable forces to disappear in a 
lukewarm bowl of chicken soup is not enough; the rabbinical tradition 
of continuous question, challenge, and dialogue draws him out of these 
classical and Christian dreams of unrealistic harmony.
In the second essay of the series that follows immediately,83 he writes 
instead that the law of nature is love.
Moral guardian of the human heart, it measures itself 
82 Cahiers 1, Folio 34, Cahiers, 59.
83 Cahiers 1, Folio 36, Cahiers, 60.
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by the need, by the capacity to love, in whatever order 
of ides this love exercises itself. The law of nature is love.
Stripped to a less complex structure and focused on nature rather 
than on the contemplating mind, this essay allows Dreyfus to save him-
self from some of the enthusiastic excesses of the previous piece, but 
still comes out with an unsatisfactory poetic statement. It is just too 
facile to equate love and nature as though this were a popular music 
hall song. He will have to wrestle with this cantankerous problem many 
times before he reaches a less superficial resolution.
If love stands for the moral guardian of the human heart, then what 
morality is has to be pulled apart and examined carefully, no more to be 
assumed a given than nature or love. Dreyfus finds it dangerous to think 
in these allegorical personifications, although at the same time he finds 
it all too easy to slide into such essentialist categories of thought when 
he is suffering from all the woes of his exile and incarceration.
Then in another surprise statement, when he starts a brief critical 
review of Henrick Ibsen’s John Gabriel Borkman,84 a play only published in 
1896 and thus contemporaneous with his own ordeal, Dreyfus announc-
es that he has just reread the play, “the last work” of this author, and
I can hardly understand the moral worth of this work 
and it seems to be a weakness in this great man.
What is there in this play?
After a cursory outline of the plot and a sketch of the main charac-
ters, Dreyfus asks, “What does the author want to tell us?”
There is only the great foolishness of Erhart who speaks 
the sentence: “One must live.” But what does he mean 
by “live”? Is it to have fun with Mrs. Wilton? I can’t un-
derstand?
In one sense, it seems very strange that Dreyfus cannot understand 
84 Cahier 1, Folio 38, Verso, Cahiers, 61. The English translation (with no translator named) may 
be found in Eleven Plays of Henrik Ibsen, intro. H. L. Mencken (New York: Random House. The 
Modern Library, n.d.), originally from the Everyman Edition.
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this tragedy since it is about a man who suffers from his illusions and 
a crime committed that he should not have let himself fall into and re-
turns home to a self-inflicted isolation, an exile from the world and the 
consequences of his incarceration, the two imprisonments both, as it 
were, the result of what the essayist calls here “the great foolishness” 
and a little earlier “his great dream.” In another sense, everything about 
the play is based on matters that go against Dreyfus’s high ideals and his 
Jewish perspective on life, both in the confusion of financial and sexual 
ambitions and in the morbid, relentless self-blinding that overwhelms 
the protagonist who gives his name to the drama.
Moreover, Dreyfus has gone back to Ibsen because he expects to find 
a different kind of modern tragedy, a different kind of morality, and 
the play disappoints on both scores. On the one hand, literature should 
be moral and possess a social theme, showing how misunderstand-
ings and personal weaknesses lead to crimes and thus to a profound 
sense of guilt; on the other, Dreyfus wants great authors to probe into 
the complexities of human character and to reveal the contradictions 
and paradoxes in well-intentioned people who are driven beyond the 
limits of their capacity to deal with pain and humiliations through no 
real fault of their own. Borkman’s ideal of creating a financial empire 
seems paltry to Dreyfus, just as his relationship to the two women he 
has loved—one truly and deeply but sacrificed to his ambitions and the 
other less intensely and foolishly, only for wealth and social position—
strike Dreyfus as stupid and obnoxious. Although his own great dream 
of rehabilitating his honor might seem a foolishness to a more practical 
or hard-headed realist, for Dreyfus it is precisely the thing that gives 
both meaning and substance to his life, his family’s future, and his rela-
tionship to the historical state to which he has pledged his loyalty. Thus, 
of Ibsen’s problematic play, he writes:
I can see no moral thesis. I only see the baseness of man-
kind in all its depravity, which Ibsen demonstrated in his 
previous work. But I don’t see it here, that which he did 
in those earlier works: no effort at all for these beings to 
disengage their senses from their impure complications, 
the noble effort of humanity to do good.
Because he himself is suffering a terrible injustice and finds the out-
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side world—outside of Lucie and his children, her family and his own, 
so far as he knows—depraved and both cold and indifferent to his plight 
and collusive in his torments, now Ibsen is hollow, superficial, and flac-
cid. True, he was neither a professional drama critic nor a trained phi-
losopher or psychologist, but we cannot deny that Dreyfus had the po-
tential to become a great thinker in the coming century had he not been 
crushed by his experiences.
Hard on the heels of this little essay, Dreyfus cites two little Latin 
tags, one of which we already dealt with:
De natura reurum and above all Mori lucrum.85
This linking of the classical to the biblical suggests a new fermenting 
of ideas in his mind, and one is driven to cite, as Dreyfus does not, these 
lines from Lucretius, always echoing through his notebooks.86
In terms of number of references, Alfred de Vigny seems to be Drey-
fus’s favourite poet, and one can see why in the first little essay of cahier 
2,87 where he says of him, “The basis of de Vigny is solitude and bitter 
distress that accompany the sentiment of solitude.” These are the lead-
ing qualities of Dreyfus’s own conditions on the Ile du Diable. The as-
sessment of the poet thus continues:
He has no other resource than flight into dreams like 
Chateaubriand and lacks in imagination and egotism. 
He is alone and feels indifferent or hostile to humanity, 
85 Cahier 1, Folio 41, Verso, Cahiers, 61.
86 Lucretius, “Fear of Death,” On the Nature of Things: “True, men often declare that disease and a life 
of disgrace are more to be feared than the pit of death. And they may say that they know the soul 
is made of blood—or else of wind, if by chance their whim so wills it—and therefore that they 
have no need at all of our philosophy. Yet, you may be sure that this is nothing but idle boasting 
to win praise, and not their true belief. These same men, exiled from their country and banished 
far from the sight of their countrymen, stained with some foul crime, beset with disease heralding 
approaching death, keep going all the same. To whatever situation they come in their misery, in 
spite all their talk, they sacrifice to the dead, slaughter black cattle, and lay out offerings to the 
gods of the dead. In their bitter plight, they far more keenly turn their hearts to religion.
“That is why it is more fitting to judge the quality of a man when he is in doubt and danger, 
and to observe his manner in adversity; for then at last an honest cry is wrung from the bottom 
of his heart: the mask is torn off, and the truth stands exposed.” It will be evident in many of 
the essays on nature, the mind, and moral philosophy that Dreyfus has read deeply in Lucretius, 
although he would not agree with all the aspects of such an atomist and epicurean, an epikoros.
87 Cahiers 2, Folio 2, Cahiers, 64. 
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impressive and beautiful nature, those empty skies, and 
God, if he exists, is dead to the cries of the miserable.
Le juste opposera le dédain à l’absence
Il ne répondra plus que par un froid silence
Au silence eternel de la divinité.88
Whatever merits or demerits there may be in the prisoner’s literary 
criticism, clearly he finds himself able to express his otherwise inarticu-
late pains and humiliations through this description of de Vigny’s char-
acter and the citation of these chosen verses.
The next important insight into his character appears in a set of com-
ments given without title89 on the power and psychological discourses of 
literature and history. The first sentence, however, is almost unreadable: 
“It is curious [two words illegible] in reading writers however famous 
and of an unprecedented [inoüie] intellectual power [two words illegible] 
in many of them, the psychological sense is weak, even absolutely miss-
ing.” This is to be a leitmotif of his own criticism, the necessity of evaluat-
ing authors by a combination of their rhetorical strengths, their poetic 
insights, and their moral (i.e., their psychological) acuity, for these are 
characteristics he hopes to find in himself and which he looks to create 
in his own writings, whether in the letters to Lucie, as we have already 
noted, or here, through a more oblique suite of modalities, in the prison 
workbooks. Of these modern novelists, he says,
They speak very learnedly in order to use all the language 
of Rabelais on this or that case of morbidity, on such and 
such a social situation, accusing them of vices and faults, 
with a clarity that is often remarkable, without the abil-
ity to sense how everything is dependent on man, on his 
soul—in a word, on his psychology.
The missing words in the opening sentence might help focus on the 
authors or the type of literary and philosophical movements in the late 
88 “The just man will oppose the disdain of absence/he will no longer reply except with an icy silence/
in the eternal silence of divinity” (my translation).
89 Cahier 2, Folio 7, Verso, Cahiers, 65.
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nineteenth century he is reading and subjecting to this sensitive cri-
tique. The discourses of these writers are grounded in a low and mixed 
language, categorized here as Rabelaisian, but without satire or wit. This 
new species of literature has turned its focus on to the morbid themes 
and images of lowlife, crime, depravity, and madness, features of a hos-
tile and confused world that Dreyfus himself keeps fighting against and 
which he dreams great works of the human mind can help fortify him 
against and understand. But the poets, the novelists, and the psychol-
ogists of his own day disappoint Dreyfus because they wallow in the 
worst qualities of the human condition.
Such a fact would appear peremptory in a certain class 
of ideas, when one only considers that the idea will be 
formally denied when one studies man and the determi-
nant causes of this idea.
Why should such an idea of morbidity seem péremptoire to him? The 
destructive and limited factor must lie in the narrow focus of authors 
who only seek out the worst qualities in man to write about and who 
develop methods of research that narrow down this moral field. In his 
own experience, Dreyfus has a daily struggle to keep a wider perspective 
open, and hence he searches for texts that can both guide him through 
the present tortures and soften their blows until the nightmare of his 
life comes to a favourable resolution. Above all, he asserts as much to 
himself as to the authors he is arguing with, it is necessary that one not 
become obsessed by these idées fixes but seek a higher moral ground of 
objectivity and dispassionate observation.
Otherwise there are few men so detached from their 
own ideas as not to be astonished when they no longer 
serve those to whom they are dear. In all discussions 
of ideas, each one brings this unconscious false con-
sciousness which is the fact of mankind. And it is this 
more than anything which must be avoided if one 
wished to bring to a study, of whatever order it might 
be, plain impartiality.
The fixation on man’s disgusting nature, like all other obsessions, 
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must be overcome by a more objective, scientific approach, and yet, as 
we have already seen hinted in earlier essays and as will become more 
evident in those that are to come, Dreyfus also looks for poetic insights 
and imaginative speculations.90 Before that, however, he must read his 
chosen models carefully and keep questioning and challenging them, in 
accordance with his rabbinical propensities, whether or not he himself 
is conscious of the paradigm he works within:
No one ever felt this more than Fustel de Coulanges 
when he said in [one of] his books that before one un-
dertakes any subject in history, it is necessary to disen-
gage from all private interests, from all one’s founda-
tions, from all one’s own ideas, to study this history in 
its own milieu where it was elaborated—in a word, in the 
human context. And that which is true for history is true 
for everything. And this is one of Fustel de Coulange’s 
highest qualities, this higher impartiality that he brings 
to his historical studies.
To be sure, such an absolute objectivity is not only impossible to 
achieve—no one divorces himself from who he or she is and how that 
character was created by nature and nurture—but even as an ideal goal, 
it is questionable, as Dreyfus himself comes to remark. In the short run, 
had such an objectivity and dispassionate approach to evidence been 
operative in the military courts of Paris, the captain would not be sitting 
in a lonely prison cell penning these words. The mysteries of what preju-
dices and distortions of reason were manipulated against him remain to 
be solved, and the easy casting of blame onto human perversity must be 
resisted or madness ensues.
As though it is logically appropriate after this praise of Fustel de Cou-
langes and his ideal of objectivity, Dreyfus takes up a critique of Cesare 
Lombroso’s writings on the relationship between the criminal mind, 
90 Cf. Anatole France: “Beauty depends upon ourselves; it is the sensible form of all that we love. It 
is a mistake to contrast the realist novelists with the idealists. People oppose the real to the ideal 
as if the ideal were not the only form of the real which we can grasp. The truth is, the realists want 
to render life odious, while the idealists seek to beautify it” in “George Sand and Idealism in Art,” 
a review of E. Caro’s George Sand, On Life & Letters, I, 303.
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insanity, and genius.91 The Italian Jew’s work would seem to fit the cat-
egory of those authors obsessed by the morbid and unable to achieve a 
detached position from which to measure these qualities, either in his 
scientific method or in his style of composition. For Dreyfus to find the 
solution to such theoretical problems, he must wrestle with the authors 
who most attract him and yet who expose the very faults he sees with-
in himself, for we discover facts about his own character through the 
choices he makes in what to write about, the places he enters to make 
his critical comments, and the attitudes he refines as he moves along 
through the whole of the remaining fourteen prison cahiers.
M. Lombroso’s Theory of the Man of Genius
The celebrated Mr. Lombroso spent his life in searching 
to find out cruel truths and those which always charmed. 
He asked himself, whatever the facts might be—and 
they came often and, at the same time, they always gave 
him a formal denial—well, under which latitudes, in 
what conditions of the ambient milieu are alcoholics, 
criminals, idiots, deaf-mutes born? In his latest book, he 
discovered that some great men, belonging to a family 
of epileptics, have near cousins whose genius is a sort of 
degenerative psychosis!
Here is an author whose scientific penchant and personal obsession 
take him again and again to investigate the most degenerate members 
of the human race. Wherever he looks, he finds these morbid types, and 
then, of course, he only looks where he will find them. Even when he 
looks where others have found men of genius, heroes, and supermen, 
Lombroso finds the defectives and the deviants. In fact, because he 
looks in this way, the Italian scientist can now claim that degenerates 
and geniuses are cousins germane.92
91 Cahier 2, Folio 8, Cahiers, 65.
92 Cp. Shel Kimen, “The Power of Genius” Concepts of Culture (Spring 2003) online at http://www.
klever.org/wrdz/world/genius (seen 1 September 2007). From its classical sense of “guiding 
spirit” of a person or place, the word came by the 1700s to designate the importance or influence 
of a person in society and eventually to mark the inner spirit of creativity or understanding; from 
thence, it took over the old sense of “virtuouso” as an outstanding performer to become an artist 
out of the ordinary and above all normal rules of conduct and morality. For Dreyfus, genius is still 
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What fascinates Dreyfus here is less the discovery itself than the way 
of finding it, and the way Lombroso claims to have resisted and denied 
what he was seeing before his very eyes. Like a good, objective scientist, 
however, the Italian doctor had to accept his own findings, first resign-
ing himself to the facts and then finally proclaiming the consequences 
of these facts. “But the facts appeared so manifest to Mr. Lombroso,” 
Dreyfus writes, with his own wit shining through, “that he had to accept 
them as proof, he tells us with a childish naïveté.” The problem, Dreyfus 
adds, is that
Mr. Lombroso had forgotten that genius is nothing 
without that which gave it value and which, alone, puts 
into relief the highest moral values. Worker in thought 
or worker by hand, all those who have produced great 
works have a high moral conscience of their duty and of 
the goal they are pursuing.
What is at stake here in Dreyfus’s evaluation of this morbid theory 
of the close alliance between genius and idiocy is his own sanity and 
his own need to fight against everything in his circumstances that has 
been set up to break him, to drive him mad, to make him do as Job was 
urged by his so-called comforters to do, and accept appearances for real-
ity, rhetoric for evidence, and guilt for innocence. For a man to stand up 
to adversity, he may have to appear mad to those who want to see him 
degenerate into their bigoted caricature of what a traitor or a Jew looks 
like. A high moral conscience, resisting for all it is worth the inner and 
outer demons of his existence, may finally look like anything at all, but 
it retains its honour to the very end. A proper scientist should not be 
taken in by illusions shaped by his own prejudices.
When Dreyfus reads Lombroso’s new book, he is, first of all, repelled 
by the conclusions reached. However, he is not convinced by the facts 
presented and not sure they are facts at all.
Mais moi qui suis d’humeur difficile et rétive en ces sortes de 
matières, j’estime que M. Lombroso se contente de peu.
somewhere between an external guiding power and an internal source of energy and imagination.
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“But to me,” the prisoner writes, “with a difficult and stubborn hu-
mor in these sorts of things, I reckon that Mr. Lombroso contents him-
self with too little.” It is important to catch here especially, as from the 
opening sentences of this little essay, Dreyfus’s wit at work, his defen-
sive Jewish humour in his treatment of a fellow Jew—though he never 
acknowledges that relationship between them. In his darkest hours on 
Devil’s Island, tortured, deprived of all human contact, and without 
tactile support for his hypersensitive nerves, the captain maintains his 
dignity through his writing, and his style is not plodding or repetitive 
so much as it is exploratory, self-analytical, and probing. Here is a re-
spected man of science, a fellow Jew, telling him that great men are vir-
tually the same as idiots on the most basic level of their moral characters 
and personalities. Dreyfus must reject that. But he himself has to give 
reasons and not just shout out his defiance in a cry of pain.
He does so in a long paragraph93 we must cite and analyze because it 
is so filled with the ideas we have found important for overturning the 
previous judgements of Dreyfus’s character and personality, as much 
among those who admire him and his stand as among those who de-
spise him and wish him the worst, as well as those who believe they are 
merely objective reporters of the facts. But facts in themselves do not 
constitute truth:
The alienist-physician, who has made the greatest repu-
tation more by his paradoxes than by his books, is a 
laborious compiler of anecdotes and he gives them to 
us as unassailable proofs.
Such proofs prove to be mere anecdotes, some curious, some suspect, 
and this leads Dreyfus to an even sharper criticism, not only of Lombro-
so but of many others who are mesmerized by their own voices and the il-
lusion of reason where there is only delusion, for the captain is no passive 
recipient of other people’s opinions and he reads carefully and critically.
He affirms that Hegel, in an access of megalomania, had 
begun one of his lectures with these words: “I may say 
with Christ that not only do I teach the truth, but I am 
93 Cahiers, 66.
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myself the Truth.” Whoever knows a little about Hegel 
will doubt this little story strongly. If Poisson said that it 
does a man good to know mathematics, would one con-
clude that Poisson was deranged? Why, one day Ampère, 
in the heat of a mathematical discussion—and this an-
ecdote is true—took hold of the bonnet of a vehicle and 
used it for a blackboard so as to re-do his demonstra-
tions, and must we therefore conclude that Ampère was 
crazy!! . . . All that is naïve and puerile.
These anecdotes may prove that some great men can be occasionally 
eccentric and even touched in a more acute way, but it doesn’t mean that 
genius itself is kin to insanity or degeneration, nor does it mean that 
readers should accept every personal report on faith.
I do not wish to follow with the citation of a great num-
ber of anecdotes which swarm through Lombroso’s work 
to affirm his theory. I have shown their value sufficiently.
Thus, it is not the theory or the extrapolation of facts that is really at 
fault but the method of affirming or asserting one’s own personal biases 
without taking into account either the provenance of the anecdotes or 
the circumstances of the acts or words reported, as well as the tendency 
to confuse anecdotes with statistics. Hoping that Lombroso or those 
readers sympathetic to him will not think Dreyfus has an axe to grind 
(or a whip to lash), the only conclusion he can reach is “The author of 
these books is himself alienated,” a statement perhaps teasingly reflex-
ive, as Dreyfus fears he will be found insane.
Next comes an attempt by Dreyfus to give an English translation of 
Hume’s The Miser, which he must have had in a French version.94 A kind 
of Meneppian satire, the exemplary tale describes a miser who refuses 
to pay the fee to Charon to ferry him into the Underworld, for which 
Minos decides as a just punishment to send him back to the upper world 
“to see what use his heirs are making of his riches.” Not satisfied with 
his grammatical mistakes, Dreyfus attempts the translation again and 
then leaves it unfinished.
94 Cahier 2, Folio 10, Cahiers, 66.
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More significant than this momentary view into Dreyfus’s intellec-
tual efforts is his essay on another two of his favourite historians, Jules 
Michelet and Augustin Thierry, and his discussion of the best way for 
a writer to make use of evidence.95 It is Michelet he admires most as a 
sensitive model for his own writings, but Thierry who is recalled nostal-
gically as a school text, despite all his faults and failings as a Romantic. 
What is so special about Michelet is that “he had the patience and the 
labor of an historian and the pen of an artist.” Going much further than 
Thierry, who was able to assemble vast numbers of facts from his archi-
val documents, Michelet
had recourse to the chroniclers, he interrogated the works 
of literature and art; a piece of some proceedings, a book 
of devotions, a monument, a form of architecture often 
more than the falsified testimonies of historiography.
History therefore is not merely facts and figures, royal decrees and 
laws, or any other official version of events and persons. Michelet close-
ly studies all works of human genius, including art, spirituality, and po-
litical aspiration, not what great men and their lackeys wanted to be 
known, but what an age really felt that it was experiencing, an age made 
up of people at all levels and in all walks of life, public and private.
Michelet in all his history is [of the] people and a poet. 
He had vibrant soul which loved everywhere, sensed 
everything everywhere, and put his life everywhere. The 
expression [in his writing] is intense and solid, and he 
fixes the character of the epoch and draws out of it its 
beauty. Michelet protests against the Romantics, [but] 
in reality his history is a masterpiece of Romantic art.
There are inconveniences to this method, Dreyfus knows; he has 
already commented on the futility of attempting to be objective or to 
assume that one is implicitly and intuitively in touch with the essence 
of what one studies and thus does not need to give proofs or demon-
strate as valid a technique of interpretation. Although a Romantic in his 
95 Cahier 2, Folio 12, Verso, Cahiers, 67.
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enthusiasms, nevertheless, to Dreyfus, his approach to history breaks 
the boundaries of formal documentation and opens the research to the 
study of aesthetics and psychology, along with religious experiences; 
history belongs to all the people, not just the elite. In Jewish tradition, 
especially considering the Sephardic sympathies and sense of toleration 
for the defeated and the downtrodden, history belongs to those who 
have been beaten down, sent into exile, and made to wander in poverty 
and despair.96
A discussion and a paraphrase of Montaigne comes next, with Drey-
fus translating the original Renaissance text into a form of modern 
French and paring down the text and sometimes recasting what re-
mains to compensate for the missing passages. Like Shakespeare, to 
whom Dreyfus returns often and leans on as a major intellectual and 
moral support, and Montaigne, both of whom belong to the tradition 
of Crypto-Jewish literature,97 Dreyfus implies more than he knows he is 
writing. It is not that Dreyfus does not know he is Jewish or thinks he 
can hide his religious identity, nor is it a question of whether on certain 
occasions he would keep some of the traditions at home with Lucie, but 
that he does not know in a deep way the rabbinical ways of thinking and 
feeling. More importantly, for strategic reasons, both before and after 
96 A rather distorted and toxic version of this view was written by that champion anti-anti-Semite 
of all time, as his biographer Curtis Cate, put it once, Friedrich Nietzsche, in Beyond Good and 
Evil: “All that has been done on earth against ‘the nobles,’ the ‘mighty’, ‘overlords’. . . is as nothing 
compared to what the Jews did against them: the Jews, that priestly people who were only able 
to obtain satisfaction against their enemies and conquerors through a radical revaluation of the 
latter’s values, that is, by an act of the most spiritual revenge . . . . It was the Jews who…dared 
to invert the aristocratic value-equation . . . saying ‘the wretched alone are the good ones, the 
poor, the helpless, the lowly . . . . You who are powerful and noble are to all eternity the evil ones 
. . .” cited in Barry Rubin, “The Strangest Antisemite of them All: The Bizarre Case of Friedrich 
Nietzsche,” Gloria Center: Global Research in International Affairs (12 December 2010) at http://
www.gloria-center.org/gloria/2010/1w2/astrangest-antisemite-of-them-all-friedrich-nietzsche 
(seen 13 December 2010). What Nietzsche was saying was that by inventing Christianity, the Jews 
committed an unintentional error of cosmic importance. In themselves, Rubin says of Nietzsche 
views, Jews are a strong and proud people, to be admired and not despised, but the Nazis rendered 
those philosophical words absurd, putting the blame for all of Europe’s woes on the Children of 
Israel. Thus, the danger of using a rhetoric of exaggeration and irony where feckless, ignorant 
ideologues can transform them into apologies for genocide.
97 See Norman Simms and Charles Meyers, eds., Troubled Souls: Conversos, Crypto-Jews and Other 
Confused Jewish Intellectuals from the Fourteenth through the Eighteenth Centuries (Hamilton: 
Outrigger, 2001). Though Shakespeare’s background is a bit speculative still, and the connections 
are probably through the so-called Dark Lady who was his mistress, an Italian conversa he met 
through musical performers in London, there is no doubt that Montaigne is the son of a conversa 
mother—and his scepticism and curiosity are typically converse themes.
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his arrest he feels the need to keep any overt signs or statements of his 
Judaism under wraps. At work in the army headquarters, he was known 
to be unsocial and to avoid personal conversations with his fellow of-
ficers whom he justifiably mistrusted. After the accusation, arrest, and 
court-martial, he knew more than ever that censors would be looking 
for any excuse to increase the harshness of his treatment in prison, and 
the mere mention of Jewish ideas, images, or acts would sound alarm 
bells.98
The essay by Montaigne he has selected to talk about comes from 
the Essais, Book III, chapter 5, “Upon some Verses of Virgil.”99 The essay 
Dreyfus writes is introduced by two general statements, one on Mon-
taigne’s book in general, and one on this particular meditation on the 
relationship between classical style, epitomized in Virgil, in relation to 
French style in the Renaissance. When Dreyfus describes Montaigne’s 
whole book of essays as “easy and simple” in style but “with no uni-
ty, no composition,” he could be speaking of his own cahiers. When he 
moves on to the particular essay “On the Verses of Virgil,” however, he 
describes it as engaging “in some unknown way,” with its topic, pre-
senting “a citation from Lucretius . . . right in the middle of the most 
scabrous reflections that Montaigne parades before us.” Because Drey-
fus’s own bourgeois sensibilities are offended by the frankness of the 
language Montaigne uses—and which he elsewhere labels Rabelaisian, 
that is, earthy and concerned with bodily functions—“I cannot resist 
98 According to Max Nordau at the First Zionist Congress, “The emancipated Jew is insecure in his 
relations with his fellow-beings, timid with strangers, suspicious even toward the secret feeling 
of his friends. His best powers are exhausted in the suppression, or at least in the difficult 
concealment of his own real character. For he fears that this character might be recognized as 
Jewish, and he has never the satisfaction of knowing himself as he is in all his thought and 
sentiments. He becomes an inner cripple, and eternally unreal, and thereby always ridiculous and 
hateful to all higher feeling men, as in everything that is unreal. All the better Jews in Western 
Europe groan under this, or seek for alleviation. They no longer possess the belief which gives the 
patience necessary to bear sufferings, because it sees in them the will of a punishing but not a 
living God” (MiddleEastWeb). Although Dreyfus would never have considered himself one of those 
New Marranos, as Nordau calls them, who try to flee Judaism, while being unable to escape from 
themselves, he does seem to work out a temporary modus vivendi through his writings, first in the 
letters to Lucie, where they jointly create a new kind of metaphysical love and a new kind of space 
for their domestic hopes, and then in the prison cahiers, where he forges a temporary pseudo-
Talmud in which he can speak in a traditional rabbinic way, even though the specific subjects are 
alien to midrash.
99 This little essay on Montaigne is not all that little insofar as it contains Dreyfus’s lengthy 
paraphrase, and runs over several folios of the workbook. Cahier 2, Folio 13, 13 Verso, and 14, 
Cahiers, 68–69.
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the temptation of reproducing this exquisite chapter, except perhaps in 
passing over several of the facetious remarks which Montaigne permit-
ted himself to make.” To our own twenty-first century sensibilities, it 
seems most odd that a man who is living in squalor and under atrocious 
conditions, who has been subject to physical and moral indignities day 
and night for four years already, should find himself unable to set down 
in his own words equivalents to Montaigne’s sixteenth-century vocabu-
lary in matters of this kind. Yet this is what Dreyfus says and what he 
actually does in producing his abbreviated version of the essay.
What attracts Dreyfus to this exquisite essay on style despite its 
scabrous remarks are Montaigne’s reflections on training oneself to be 
healthy and sane from childhood onwards in order to prepare oneself, 
as Virgil did, for the moral life necessary to becoming a great poet. By 
making oneself strong and gaining self-control over one’s bodily needs, 
Montaigne reflects that it is possible to achieve the strength of charac-
ter that can resist all the temptations of maturity and prepares oneself 
to confront the coming of old age when the decline of those physical 
abilities mocks the desires to still perform them. At such a time, ar-
rived at an age when one feels oneself “[a]ll dried up and weighed down” 
by the burdens of life, poetry provides both a comfort and a channel 
through which the remaining passions can run their course. “Venus,” 
writes Montaigne in Dreyfus’s paraphrase, “is not so beautiful all naked, 
nor so alive and breathless, as she is in the verses of Virgil.”
Through citations from Virgil and Tasso, the Renaissance essayist 
expresses his longings and explains his appreciation for style, arguing 
that art becomes consolation and a mode of creation when physical re-
lief has become impossible and the days of reproduction are over. Can 
it be that here, squeamish as he appears and yet fascinated both by the 
Old French language and Montaigne’s citations from sensuous poetry, 
Dreyfus is indulging in erotic fantasies, dreaming of the most intimate 
of moments with his wife, Lucie, which he could not even bring himself 
to think of, let alone inscribe, in his letters home? It would certainly be 
remarkable if, through all the years of separation, and yet under con-
stant scrutiny by guards—including through the nights when he was 
sometimes shackled to his bed by iron chains—a still young, though 
hardly at this point vigorous, man, did not seek some physical outlet for 
his frustrated desires. Dreyfus distances himself from these unperform-
able deeds and unthinkable thoughts, first through reading Montaigne’s 
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essay and choosing this particular one for such an extended discussion, 
and then modernizing the language into his own and therefore control-
lable terms, editing out the most intense locutions, thus allowing Mon-
taigne, Virgil, and Tasso to express what he cannot admit to imagining 
for himself.
At the point at which Montaigne begins to follow Virgil’s descrip-
tions, mythologically and pastorally, of the affairs of Venus and Mars, 
he comes to a line from the Georgics, III, 137f:
Quo rapiet steins Venrem interiusque recondut . . .100
At this point, Dreyfus stops and leaves a large gap in the text of Mon-
taigne before he picks up his paraphrase again, but, even then finds him-
self entwined in a style of verbalized sensuousness he must have found 
as fascinating as troublesome. Yet it is Montaigne himself and suppos-
edly not Dreyfus who says,
I am vexed [bothered, frustrated] at the same small 
points and verbal allusions that have been born since. To 
these good people, one must not encounter [embrace, be 
intimate with] them with sharp and subtle words. Their 
language is firm and right and great with [pregnant with] 
a natural vigor and contrast—they are all epigramme, 
not by tail alone, but by head, stomach and feet. . . .
The sensuousness of the sentences slip by, barely subject to Dreyfus’s 
sense of propriety and his strenuous efforts to censor his own improper 
thoughts, until Montaigne cites, “It is sinewy and solid eloquence which 
does not so much please as it fills and ravishes.” Montaigne keeps going, 
citing Quintillion, Gallus, and other classical and later authors; Drey-
fus trails off into longer or shorter ellipses until he concludes, in Mont-
aigne’s words:
It also happens in my writing, as in a wild country, where 
no one either aids me or relieves me, when I ordinarily 
hear men who understand neither Latin nor French. I 
100 “It is thus that the [thirsty female] seizes Venus and becomes most deeply impregnated.”
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would have done my works elsewhere, but it would have 
been less my own, and its principal end and perfection 
is to be me.
With almost no adjustments necessary, these also could be Dreyfus’s 
deepest sentiments. For those historians who still say we know almost 
nothing and cannot know anything about the inner man of Dreyfus, 
surely it is time to read and to listen to what remains of the evidence 
in these cahiers, as in the letters. His wild country was a deserted and 
insalubrious prison island. Although there were guards constantly ob-
serving and manhandling him, he was locked into a silence and solitude 
beyond the limits of almost any other prisoner in modern history.101 
Paradoxically, however, it is unlikely that Dreyfus would have ever per-
mitted himself the time and energy needed to compose the essays he did 
had he not been held in an extended period of torment and humiliation. 
We search—so far in vain—for evidence in any later documents created 
after his return to France of the articulation of so many literary, philo-
sophical, psychological, and religious ideas.
What he writes about next after this discussion of Virgil’s style, by 
which is meant nothing less than the capacity of a writer to subsume his 
own sensual urges into beautiful poetry, is one of the strangest books 
about prison life in the nineteenth century, Xavier de Maîstre’s Voyage 
Around My Room.102 As Sainte-Beuve points out in his introduction to 
the 1862 edition of de Maistre’s Ouevres Completes, the younger brother 
to the more famous novelist Joseph composed this lighthearted and 
sentimental idyll inadvertently as a joi d’esprit, adopting the tones and 
often the phraseology of Lawrence Sterne’s Sentimental Journey, itself 
more popular in France than the more impressive and profound Life and 
Opinions of Tristram Shandy.
In forty-three chapters, de Maîstre records his imaginary excursions 
around the room where he is kept under house arrest in Turin at the 
time of the Napoleonic Wars, each short chapter consisting of a musing 
on some object, portrait, or moment of memory in his confinement. 
101 Except perhaps those exemplars in allegorical fictions, such as Robinson Crusoe, or in romantic 
novels, The Man in the Iron Mask, The Prisoner of Zenda, and so forth.
102 Cahier 2, Folio 16, Cahiers, 70. The Oeuvres Completes du Comte Xavier de Maistre were published 
with Sainte-Beuve’s “Notice sur Xavier de Maîstre” in Paris by Garnier Frères in 1862, including 
drawings by Staal and engraved by several hands.
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Dreyfus says he is attracted by the “soft, amiable figure of Count Xavier,” 
but although he cites some of the poetic lines from the text, surely it is 
the very condition of imprisonment that he identifies with, although, of 
course, the differences between what the nobleman underwent and his 
own circumstances are striking. De Maîstre had a manservant, lived in a 
well-appointed apartment in the middle of Turin, whose streets, parks, 
and crowds he could observe through his windows, and his house arrest 
lasted barely a month and a half. Dreyfus could only envy the author of 
this “soft” book and its poetic dreams.
The next little essay returns his attention to more serious matters. 
This discussion of the Abbé Félicité Robert de Lamennais (1782–1854) 
reflects on the questions of religion, strength of character, and the re-
lationship of faith to science. The standard view of him is that he “fit un 
effort pour adapter le catholicisme à une société plus humaine” (made an 
effort to adapt Catholicism to a more humane society).103 His theories 
have been summed up in this epigraph from the newspaper Avenir (Fu-
ture): “Dieu et Liberté” (God and Liberty). He also argued in his Essai sur 
l’indifférence that the greatest danger to the Church comes not from its 
enemies without but from the indifferent members of its congregation. 
Dreyfus may have agreed in general to some of the principles here but 
would not have been interested particularly in theological or pastoral 
matters within the Roman Catholic Church. Was there, rather, anything 
particular in Lamennais’s character or career104 to attract Dreyfus? When 
the young critic Sainte-Beuve went to visit him in May 1830, he found 
him “a drab, dusty little man, who looked like a village sacristan.”105 Ac-
cording to Harold Nicolson, he was also “a melancholy man who took a 
pessimistic view of the century . . . by nature timid and irresolute,”106 
103 E. Abry, C. Audic and P. Crouzet, Histoire illustrée de la litérature française (Paris: Henri Didier and 
Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1942; originally 1912), 475. This revision of an old school textbook 
under war-time censorship gives a noncontroversial view of French literary history, the new editor 
declaring it “un acte de reconnaissance et un acte de foi” (an act of gratitude and of faith), gratitude 
for being able to present to the reading public an up-to-date version of this book with four new 
chapters on the major authors from 1900 to 1938 and of faith in the integrity and viability of 
French civilization after the defeat by Germany. There is, of course, no mention of the Dreyfus 
Affair, the facts of either Nazi occupation nor of Vichy rule in the southern zone, and the few 
authors with Jewish background not noted as such.
104 A sort of biography is given in the entry on Lamennais in The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian 
Church, [ODCC] ed. F. K. Cross (London: Oxford University Press, 1963 [1958]), 781b–782b.
105 Harold Nicolson, Sainte-Beuve (New York and London: Constable, 1957), 45.
106 Abry, Audic, and Crouzet characterize him as already in his childhood displaying “une âme inquiète 
et indépendante” (an agitated and independent soul) in Histoire illustrée de la litérature française, 475.
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and yet he was “inspired by a fervent conviction that man was too weak 
to be accorded the right of private judgment.” What could possibly have 
appealed to Dreyfus, who, unlike Sainte-Beuve, was at once “fortified 
and perplexed” by his encounter with Lamennais?107
The life of this Catholic rebel begins with him losing faith at an 
early age (through the reading of Rousseau, it was said) and then be-
ing led back to the fold by his more pious brother, Jean-Marie Robert 
(1780–1860), then taking orders at the age of twenty-two and eventu-
ally becoming a professor of mathematics at the episcopal college of his 
birthplace, Saint-Malo, in 1804.108 When we look at the trajectory of his 
life, we see that he was a troublemaker from the beginning, asking too 
many questions and challenging the authority of the church. His first 
book, Réflexions sur l’état de l’église (1808), was suppressed by Napole-
on. Though an apologist for Ultramontaine Catholicism, he appealed to 
royalists and conservatives, but his repeated calls for religious freedom 
made him always suspicious to the hierarchy.
In Essai sur l’indfférence en matière de religion (1818–1824),109 Lamen-
nais “reproached the upper classes of his time with infidelity, and with 
giving all their aspirations to temporal matters.”110 For his liberal Fideist 
views,111 including an appeal in Paroles d’un croyant (1834),112 in which 
he called upon the Holy See to accept democracy, he was denounced as 
a subversive and castigated by Pope Gregory XVI in 1832113 and then, 
as Nicolson puts it, “spent the rest of his life attacking the Vatican,”114 
with a tendency in his writings towards a humanitarian socialism and 
mysticism. “Active in the 1848 revolution, he sat in the Assembly until 
107 Nicolson, Sainte-Beuve, 43.
108 ODCC, 781b.
109 Chambers Biographical Dictionary [CBD] calls this book “a magnificent, if paradoxical denunciation 
of private judgment and toleration, which was favorably received at Rome,” ed. Magnus Magnuson 
(Edinburgh: Chambers Harrap, 1995; based on the original 1897 edition), 853b.
110 S. Reinach, Orpheus, 407–408.
111 For background on these movements and the personalities involved in early nineteenth-century 
France, see Salomon Reinach, Orpheus: A History of Religions, trans. Florence Simmonds (New 
York: Liveright Publishing, 1930; orig. 1924), Chapter XII, “Christianity: From the Encyclopædia 
to the Condemnation of Modernism,” esp. 94–95, 433–434.
112 One bishop called these Words of a Believer an “Apocalypse of the devil” (S. Reinach, Orpheus, 407). 
CBD describes it as the book “that brought about complete rupture with the church” and resulted 
in one year’s imprisonment (854a).
113 S. Reinach, Orpheus, 407.
114 Nicolson, Sainte-Beuve, 46.
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the coup d’état.”115 According to Frank Paul Bowman, after the coup in 
December 1851, “He retired to private life . . . and, as he had requested, 
was given a pauper’s burial.”116
If it is not possible to see any continuity or a clear development in 
Lamennais’s themes, it might be possible to credit him for working with 
two sets of ideas that in other thinkers might have been too contra-
dictory to be sustained, but although these inconsistencies infuriated 
others, even his friends and admirers, they nevertheless marked him as 
one of the great if quirky philosophers of the first half of the nineteenth 
century.117 On the one hand, Lamennais proposed,
The principle of authority, which he equated with the 
“raison générale” or “sens commun.” He maintained that 
the individual is dependent on the community for his 
knowledge of the truth; to isolate oneself is to doubt; 
and toleration is evil.118
Thus, at the same time as he challenged the moral authority of the 
pope and the church hierarchy, stating that they were not above re-
proach, he also argued that ordinary men and women were incapable of 
making decisions of faith on their own and should yield to the spiritual 
powers of the church as guardian of traditional beliefs. But he also
equated Catholic Christianity with the religion of all 
mankind, denied the supernatural and proclaimed sub-
jects freed from loyalty to their temporal sovereigns 
115 CBD, 854a.
116 Bowman, Lamennais, Oxford Companion to French Literature online at http://www.answers.com/ 
topic/lamennais-f-licit-robert de (seen 01 January 2011).
117 CBD calls remarkable his Esquisse d’une philosophie (1840–1846). Of this four-volume treatise, The 
Catholic Encyclopedia writes: “It comprises a treatise on metaphysics in which God, man, and nature 
are studied by the light of reason only. Many of the opinions maintained in this book remind one 
that it was begun when its author was a Catholic, but there are many others which betray his later 
evolution; he denies in formal terms the fall of man, the Divinity of Christ, eternal punishment, 
and the supernatural order. The portions of the work devoted to æsthetics are among the finest 
that Lamennais ever wrote, while the general tone breathes a spirit of serenity and calm” online 
at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08762a (seen 01 January 2011). Frank Paul Bowman in his 
entry on Lamennais in the Oxford Companion to French Literature calls it “an ambitious synthesis of 
Romantic aesthetics, German transcendental philosophy, Christianity, and dreams of a new faith 
yet to come.”
118 ODCC, 782a.
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when rulers refused to conform their conduct to Chris-
tian ideals.119
If these controversies were merely squabbles within the Roman 
Church, they would have no interest for Dreyfus, but what attracted him 
was the intellectual struggle itself. Perhaps, then, he would be interest-
ed in the ideas discussed, especially Lamennais’s drift towards a more 
tolerant and liberal modernity, albeit with a strict sense of the weakness 
of ordinary people and the power of the church as an embodiment of 
traditional truths. Raphael Ledos de Beaufort sums up the key matters 
after the Revolution of 1830 in this way:
Lamennais was no longer the defender of Catholicism 
or the champion of the Restoration. Times had changed 
since the Breton abbé in his “Essai sur l’indifference en 
matière de religion” endeavoured to restore public faith in 
the principle of authority, thereby causing quite a sen-
sation, and winning from the enthusiastic gratitude of 
the supporters of the Church the proud name of “Bossu-
et Moderne”. In 1831, he had already in various articles 
which he contributed to the newspaper L’Avenir [The Fu-
ture], placed himself in opposition to the past. In these 
he had tried his democratic strength, and stood up in the 
contest as the powerful and gifted advocate of Christian 
brotherhood and freedom, which, when released from 
its subjection to princes, should unfold itself under the 
banner of the Church.120
Beaufort also explains why this modern Bossuet was attractive to 
fiery young men like Franz Liszt in this late Romantic period:
Lamennais’s true piety, his democratic principles, his 
119 ODCC, 782a.
120 Raphael Ledos de Beaufort, Franz Liszt: The Story of his Life (Boston: Oliver Ditson & Co., 1887); 
because this book is reproduced in the Project Gutenberg, it can only be annotated by chapter 
number: Chapter XIV. (It will be noted that, except for the insertion of my own contemporaries’ 
remarks on the nature of anti-Semitism and attitudes towards Judaism, I prefer to cite texts close 
in time to Dreyfus. This is part of the midrashic method of challenging and questioning the text.)
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views on life, imbued with love of freedom and human-
ity, and which led him boldly and violently to break off 
with the Church and with his glorious past, found an 
echo in the generous and impulsive soul of the young art-
ist, and ripened the Christian ideal views of art already 
awakened by the doctrines of the Saint-Simonians, and 
which were to give foundation to his artistic career and 
productions.
Sainte-Beuve, who was disappointed by the way Lamennais broke 
with the Church, wondered whether this once admirable writer had be-
come neither a priest nor a philosopher: “Was he nothing more than 
a fine but ambulating artist? . . . It is a misfortune to possess a mind 
that never ripened.”121 Can something similar be said about Dreyfus? 
He seems attracted to this contentious and melancholy Catholic writer a 
little over sixty years later, not by his specific ideas or faith, which would 
not interest him at all, but by what happened to him when the pope at-
tacked him and how he reacted; that example might be attractive—up 
to a point.
Dreyfus begins his own little essay by saying,
Certain men are interesting by the unity of their doc-
trine, by the force of their character, the logic of their 
system, their general intelligence which permits them 
to embrace in one ensemble everything in a vast system 
of ideas and to bring in all secondary ideas which cir-
cumstances, reflections, facts are caused to stand before 
their mind to create a synthesis, in a word, a doctrine.
This opening by way of a truism (a sententia) indicates that there are 
more ways than one to attain greatness as a thinker, whether in religion 
or in any other field; consistency and constancy are not necessary, which 
is a comfort to Dreyfus, who finds himself, under the duress of his im-
prisonment, forced to rethink his ideals and his attitudes, while at the 
same time asserting over and over again his steadfastness in regard to 
his loyalty to France, the love he has for Lucie and their families, and 
121 Cited by Nicolson, Sainte-Beuve, 46.
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the honour that he must regain at all costs. In Lamennais, he sees a man 
who seemed to vacillate, to shift and change his views under the pres-
sures of theological authoritarianism and in the context of revolution-
ary transformations of French society.
Hence, the second paragraph balances the first statement, offering 
an alternative way to greatness, that of Lamennais and perhaps of Drey-
fus himself.
Others, on the contrary, are interesting by the variation 
of their thoughts. Above all and, at best, it is on recog-
nizing that they were not the result of powerlessness, 
but rather the unintended logical development of a liv-
ing idea, one that changes and transforms itself.
Since thinkers cannot always, from the beginning, know the full con-
text or the hidden forces at work in the circumstances they must work 
in, a doctrine may develop out of the logic of its own engagement with 
the world and not merely by the intentions of its author. These diver-
gences come about out of strength instead of weakness, the writer—
Lamennais or Dreyfus—proving in adversity that he can follow where 
the truth leads him, not where others wish to direct his career.
The next sentence loses itself in a smudged word or two, but shows 
the importance of that very defiance of external power, whether of the 
state in all its mysterious machinations or of sadistic individuals who 
revel in treating a prisoner with contempt:
On the other hand [illegible words] . . . Considered 
from the one or the other point of view, the thought 
and work of a man becomes, following the very expres-
sion of Lamennais, his memoirs serve as a history of 
human thought. They show in one such man, as hap-
pens so often in the history of humanity, a doctrine, 
the steps or questions of which are all logical, or all at 
least having their own profound reasons being, touch-
ing on the contrary.
After this point Dreyfus reaches a conclusion about the relation of 
science and religion which does not come down on either side but seeks 
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a reconciliation, a harmony, and a balance to make peace in the house 
(shalom ba’bayit).
All religion is the explanation of things by the supernat-
ural, all science excludes the supernatural in its research, 
and all scientific philosophy, even the most elementary 
kind, eliminates the supernatural, at the same time at 
the point of departure and at its goal.
By this he argues that religion and science are different, to be sure, 
but difference does not make one more correct or apt than the other. 
Both are intellectual systems of thought. Two out of the three clauses in 
the sentence come down on the side of science over religion and do not 
cancel out the first.122
In his next essay on Shakespeare’s King Lear,123 it is likely that Drey-
fus is talking at least as much about his condition and feelings as he 
is about the characters in the tragedy. The essay is not an example of 
literary criticism in any objective or historical sense but an exercise in 
confessional inner dialogue,124 an exposure and expression of his own 
secret pains, his repressed grief and sorrow, as well as his rage against 
the injustices of the world and his doubts about the firmly-held beliefs 
and ideals he is suffering for. Although he seems to focus on Shake-
speare’s text, his own syntax trembles and falters. He fumbles for words, 
he repeats himself awkwardly, and he gets lost in the convolutions of his 
grammar, so the little essay becomes, as it were, a mirror held up to his 
own mind, an embodiment of the deepest agony within his own soul.
There are two ostensible points of self-identification in the tragedy: 
first, he grieves with and for Cordelia, expressing a sense of anguish and 
outrage he elsewhere attempts vigorously to keep under control, fearing 
at every moment the bursting forth of sheer madness; second, he sym-
pathizes with the old king, and yet the scene he chooses to concentrate 
on is one between Lear and Kent. In reading those lines of the play, he 
goes over the questions of justice, loyalty, and self-sacrifice that are not 
122 The little essay on Lamennais ends with a mysterious line: “I have pushed towards F too slowly.” 
At this point, I will not venture a wild guess as to the meaning of this.
123 Cahier 2, Folio 20 and 21, Cahiers, 71–72.
124 “Mahloquet is a way of speaking and of thinking the refusal of synthesis and of system: an anti-
dogmatism that, alone, makes possible the living truth” (Ouaknin, Tsmimtsoum, 110).
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only pertinent to his own situation but form the repeated motifs in his 
letters to Lucie. It is possible to extrapolate from this essay some of the 
key phrases and sentences that expose the elusive inner world of Alfred 
Dreyfus:
The excess of misfortune and the black anguish of the 
heart makes this piece of drama the most . . . grievous 
that was ever written . . . I believe that there is not one 
which wounds the heart more grievously than that of 
King Lear; for there is no other which shows more pro-
foundly the unbelievable feebleness of human nature. 
In order to destroy the happiest of conditions, it takes 
only one word, one remark—such is human judgement, 
where prejudices and passions are involved—it is fee-
ble, it staggers. . . . Our sentiments are less certain than 
those of most honest beasts. . . . they are so trusting, 
that they do not know how to distinguish true senti-
ments from [illegible words] and threaten them. . . . But, 
alas, how many men at all times and in all countries do 
we not see . . . with their high-flown notions of respon-
sibility . . . fooled previously by the over-confidence they 
have in their own power. . . . The unbelievable blindness 
of human nature creates the sombre sadness of Shake-
speare’s drama. . . .
Grief, weakness, and blindness are the key factors in his identifica-
tion with the tragedy, the main elements in his own tragic life.
After a brief stanza by Hegisippe Moreau,125 Dreyfus begins two long 
essays, one on art126 and the other on beauty in Michelet,127 to be fol-
lowed themselves, strikingly for our purposes, by a discussion of pho-
tographic equipment.128 While we shall have much more to say about 
125 Cahier 2, Folio 28, 72. Perhaps in this little poem, Dreyfus finds a dreamy image of his horrible 
torment when shackled to his bed. “On the cot [grabat], hot in my agony, /For the pity I still find 
in tears, / For a perfume of glory and of genius/ Is spread on this bed of pains [ce lit de douleurs];/ 
It is that what comes, widow of hopes/ To sing again, then to pray and die.”
126 Cahier 2, Folio 29 and Folio 29, Verso, Cahiers, 73.
127 Cahier 2, Folio 30, Cahiers, 74.
128 Cahier 2, Folio 35, Verso, Cahiers, 75. This essay is preceded by a few brief remarks on Henry IV and 
an aphorism: “No one is great to his valet de chamber.”
— 260 —
—————————— The PhanTasmagoria of a secular Midrash ——————————
 
Dreyfus’s attitude towards art, aesthetics, and the psychology of seeing 
in the next book in this series, when we return to a long discussion on 
his many drawings or doodles in the cahiers, it will be important to run 
through the key ideas he presents in these three essays. It is sufficient 
here to notice that the psychological bent to his critical remarks on lit-
erature, philosophy, and history is also relevant to the way he consid-
ers painters, musicians, and other artists. He knew what Paul Bourget 
wrote in his Essays on Contemporary Psychology: that there is a theory 
that considers our “ego” to be “a bundle of phenomena ceaselessly in the 
act of making and unmaking itself.”129
The essay on art starts with general statements, truisms, which as 
we will see can belong to the general cultural milieu around Dreyfus but 
also can be seen to have peculiar aspects that derive from his own men-
tality and also from a more specific tradition of rabbinical visual mid-
rashing of beauty as both service to God and creating an aesthetic of 
the law. Not all these aspects of the topic will be contained in this first 
of many little essays to be found in almost every one of the remaining 
cahiers, and not each essay will handle the topic clearly or coherently, 
but the ideas are working through Dreyfus’s mind whenever he can find 
the moments of sanity and calmness to let them:
Of Art
Art has in its hands all the power of creation, all that 
the poetry can do, the passion, the grandeur of a human 
period; all the aspiration, towards the Ideal, all the pan-
theistic images, all which falls from the sky or all which 
lifts itself from the earth.
The human labour that produces this category of externalisation of 
beauty participates in a vaster, divine project of creation. It is a process 
generated—and generating itself, as one can see from the personifica-
129 Bourget, Essais de psychologie contemporaine, 157: “la théorie psychoogique qui considère notre 
‘moi’comme un fasiceau de phénomènes sans cesse en train de se faire et de se défaire.” This “collection 
de petits faits” (collection of small facts) constituting the “moi” (ego) accords with both Taine and 
Flaubert but lacks the dynamics and moral direction that Dreyfus considers as essential to the 
individual struggling to maintain his personality under the most desperate of circumstances (cf. 
Bourget, Essais de psychologie contemporaine, 163).
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tion of art in the first clause—by mental and manual labor (avodah), 
work that is a necessary duty and a voluntary service—and that leads 
the maker towards the ideal, the perfection, and thus within human ex-
perience and history towards the process of perfecting of what is imper-
fect. The labor of art reflects itself into poetic, passionate, and panthe-
istic images, merging both what has fallen from the heavens like manna 
and what is produced on earth and seeks to rise above it, each after its 
own kind by natural growth. While some of these statements can be 
set within rabbinical discussions about beauty and truth, the words and 
phrases here are vague and confused in themselves. Can Dreyfus clarify 
what he means to say?
Here is what art reflects (reflète), art; here is the chaos in 
which art kneads or moulds (pétrit) the life of thought, 
in order to represent all its manifestations.
The juxtaposition of two different metaphors to describe art is at first 
disconcerting: as a process of reflecting, such as in optics and its mod-
ern developments into photography and x-rays, and as either in a baker 
kneading dough in preparation for baking bread or a potter moulding 
clay in preparation for placing it in a kiln.130 In either of these views, 
what is without form is given form through human effort, and the world 
of tohu v’bohu, the original chaos, becomes in an orderly, thoughtful se-
quence of actions the world of order and harmony.
Art has its doctrines as religions have their rules or laws, 
not that these doctrines must be immutable—to hear 
the heart beating, to set thoughts free to flow, to give life 
an energy to all human aspirations: here is the doctrine 
of art that must rule over the odious hairshirt (cilice), 
130 “At times, the reliance of the artist on specific photographs done by others may border on slavish 
imitation. This accurate rendition of a photograph was, of course, precisely what was demanded 
from an engraving artist concerning a photograph into an engraving. This was the only viable 
way for publishing photographs before the introduction of photo-mechanical printing later in the 
[nineteenth] century . . . However, especially in the case of landscapes, the engravings were often 
modified slightly; an imaginary reality was introduced to accommodate some pictorial convention 
that was not necessarily commensurable with the original photograph,” Haim Finkelstein, “Lilien 
and Zionism,” Assaph: Studies in Art History: 3 (1998), 208; online at http://www.tau.ac.il/arts/
projects; http://www.melalexenberg.com/paper.php?id=2.
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that is to say, the rule of Aristotle, Longinus’s On the 
Sublime and Boileau’s Art poétique. Method (la méthode) 
is a refuge for the sterile (stériles); for the others, she is a 
guide, a preparation for the hand of the sublime worker 
(ouvrier sublime).
The typical nineteenth-century notion that art is itself a religion de-
veloped to compensate for the secularisation of society and the break-
down of formal religions. If art is not to be seen as a religion for people 
who have lost faith in the old myths and truisms, it can at least be taken 
as a starting point for Dreyfus’s critique of classical and enlightenment 
rationalism. It is not that this new religion has no rules, but that they 
are not constrictive and deadening: they are the laws of following the 
impulses of nature and the release of ideas to grow and develop as they 
will. Method in itself is not wrong: it is a refuge, an excuse or a subter-
fuge, for the sterile soul, while for the sublime worker, it is a prepara-
tion or a training for the exalted tasks ahead. Again we watch Dreyfus 
trying for a compromise, a harmonization of seemingly incompatible 
views, and see that this is a man who thinks, perhaps without knowing 
it, within Jewish patterns of thought—even though, to be sure, those 
rabbinical themes can be found elsewhere and can be expressed often in 
a language Judaism shares with (if not bequeathed) to Christianity and 
the modern secular world coming into being.
In this little essay, for the most part, Dreyfus writes in a language of 
romantic idealism, using excessive superlatives and absolutes, so that as 
he writes he must keep adjusting his perspective, modifying his termi-
nology, and not always succeeding in this endeavour, so that he comes 
back many times to try to write the same thoughts from a slightly differ-
ent angle. This kind of style—he has no thoughts of publication in mind, 
nor does he have any partner with whom he can try out his ideas in con-
versation—is the manifestation of the inner dialogue with himself that 
he writes to Lucie about in their letters.
Art in its supreme mission must ceaselessly aspire to 
the infinite, such as to ascend the bleak and rough (âpre) 
mountain, where the Ideal flourishes. But if art some-
times lacks stamina, if, in certain epochs, it is incapable 
of reaching the highest summits, for art is the reflection 
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of each era’s soul; it always follows the truth that emerg-
es from the depths, completely naked and continuously 
shimmering.
The goal of art, its quest in some romantic mission, is to climb the 
highest mountain and retrieve the magical flower growing at its peak; 
this is a fairy tale, in which the young aspirant to marry the king’s daugh-
ter—here it is art personified in each era as a different youthful candi-
date—does not have the strength to succeed; nevertheless, in every age, 
the ideal is always the same, Truth, in all her naked and glorious beauty.
The Ideal and the Truth here are the two supreme characteristics of Art: 
those that unite the two radiant faces of Beauty, and thus able to produce 
a masterpiece. Without, however, arriving at this supreme expression of 
art, each one may be permitted to use his talents according to the nature 
of his own means, allowing one to be a scholar, the other an original, one a 
poet sure of his form, the other a pantheist who loves all that is alive, with 
no concern for higher thoughts or the mystery of creation.
These abstract hypostatised personifications do not necessarily re-
quire that each and every artist be perfected in his or her skills, and each 
may choose his or her own particular way of approaching the idealized 
goal. Just how the artist goes about the specific duty set by his own 
mind depends on many factors:
But before the hand executes [the work of art], it must 
always [be put in] place the thought that inspires it; 
the eyes and the soul fly in advance of all the others. 
Thought, this is the genius of all activity in which the 
order of art, which this thought exercises itself; thought, 
that is, God, though has no limits at all, like Jupiter’s 
eagle soaring above the world.
While this sounds like a paraphrase of a poem by Keats or Shelley or 
almost any other Romantic poet, there is also something peculiar, not 
just in the awkwardness of Dreyfus’s syntax as he attempts to soar in 
his own enthusiasm but also in his hesitations about dwelling too long 
in these platonic categories, not least the notion that God is merely the 
name for our own idealized thought (la pensée). Then the allegory con-
tinues to unfold:
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Execution, the daughter of Study, is material art, sub-
mitting to certain laws, chained to certain modalities. 
Genius is not the work (oeuvre) of chance, but the work 
(oeuvre) of thought.
The key word here is œuvre, which may mean a range of things, such 
as a product, a pew (seat in a church), or a setting (on a ring for a pre-
cious stone), or even an action (in a performance or staging of a play 
or choreographing of a ballet). As for la Génie, it is not so much either 
the Genii of the Arabian Nights or the brilliance of a unique mind so 
much as the manifestation of the power of creation, the thing produced, 
along with the force that creates and its guiding principle. It is some-
thing intellectual rather than an irrational burst of external energy. This 
rational, intellectual, and controlled operation in the process of art is 
something Dreyfus makes the otherwise hackneyed iteration of the Ro-
mantic dream mean.
Then comes an exemplary tale to animate the personifications intro-
duced and identified above.
Timanthes wished to paint a storm, He went to the 
seashore on a stormy day; he observed but he didn’t 
think. He believed that he knew how to paint a storm. 
He made a work that had neither soul nor life and broke 
his brushes. Another day, this same Timanthes entered a 
school of rhetoric; he heard them reading Homer, he felt 
his heart beating, his imagination was inflamed, he ran 
to his studio, he took out his work and painted a tempest 
which astonished [even] him (l’épouvanta lui-même).
This is a traditional exemplar on the power of art to astound through 
rational schooling of the senses and the skills of the craft. An ancient 
Greek painter, Timanthes, learns how to become an artist not when he 
studies the techniques (technē) of his craft but when he hears how to 
read—that is, to listen intelligently in a school of rhetoric—the classi-
cal verses of Homeric epic. He does not need to paint en pleine aire, as 
many of the nineteenth-century Impressionists believed, or by copying 
old masters as the teachers in the École des Beaux-Arts insisted, but by 
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doing both, by learning to order his thoughts through the discipline of 
the schools. He could then return home, take up the plank of wood upon 
which he was attempting to put down his impressions of the storm he 
had experienced on the beach, and now create a work of art, a product 
of the human mind.
On the second folio of this essay on art,131 Dreyfus moves back to a 
discussion of artistic theory, aesthetics, saying,
The search for the beautiful has occupied all philoso-
phers, as it has all artists. They are thus one or the other 
guided by genius, the ray which lights up the soul as the 
sun lights up the world.
Unlike the artist proper, who seeks to produce his objet d’art by us-
ing the material means available to him in his own time and place, the 
philosopher searched in theory for the ideal, yet both of them are direct-
ed in their search by their own genius, a ray of light from some higher 
realm. Dreyfus then turns to the debates between the various schools of 
artists and theoreticians active in his own period of history.
Also, how often do we see this in the battle of the 
schools—those of the idealists and of the realists. Ide-
alism, as I have said, would speak of Beauty in its two 
conceptions, the Ideal and the Truth. Take the example 
of a realist’s painting of a domestic interior, man in all 
his material reality; we can neither scent the perfume of 
the soul nor see the spirit of the home. The same picture, 
inspired by a thought will give us the soul do the interior 
scene, will give us mankind and not a man.
Instead of speaking, say, of the Impressionists and the Naturalists, 
or of the official painters rewarded by the Salons and those new move-
ments forced to set up their own private exhibitions to win public ap-
proval and sales, Dreyfus chooses these two more traditional ways of 
looking at art. For him, the realist painters are those who copy nature, 
who see as the ideal of art the ancient concept of mimesis, with all the 
131 Cahier 2, Folio 29, Verso, Cahiers, 73.
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mixed feelings that the classical thinkers roused in their discussions: 
whether the best painter was the one who could so reproduce the ap-
pearance of flowers or grapes that flying creatures would be fooled and 
crash into the walls upon which they were depicted, or even, like the 
Dutch and Belgian old masters, create realistic paintings of domestic 
interiors that seem to be virtual photographs of their genre scenes, or 
whether the ideal to be aimed at was that exemplified in the tale of 
Timanthes, who had to train himself in the power of rhetoric—learn 
the art of imitation in terms of enargaeia, vivid illusions of reality based 
on conventional patterns of thought. The mere illusion of reality, the 
photographic reproduction, lacks the soul that true art aims for and 
sometimes achieves.132 Otherwise the viewer cannot smell the perfume 
of the living soul nor feel the spirit of the home. The goal is not the 
individual and the instant—the impression of the artist’s neutralized 
sensorium, his or her “negative capability,” as Keats would have said—
but the universal and the eternal.133 
Idealism and Truth in its sublime concept of a humanity 
which progresses, in its Beauty; Realism is the truth of 
a single point of detail which cannot interpret humanity 
and which is false because it is only of an instant.
Although somewhat crabbed and awkwardly expressed, this contrast 
between idealism and realism continues Dreyfus’s main argument. Ide-
alism contains as a complement the sublime concept of humanity which 
progresses both according to its moral development and its natural evo-
lution towards beauty. Opposed to this view of art there stands realism, 
which lacks the ability to interpret humanity and insofar as it captures 
at best an instant in time and in the existential experience of an indi-
vidual can only be false to the ideal of beauty it claims to pursue as well. 
From this, Dreyfus draws, in a separate paragraph, the maxim that he 
underlines:
132 As Taine put it: “Photography is the art which completely reproduces with lines and tints on a flat 
surface, without possible mistake, the forms and modeling of the object imitated,” The Philosophy 
of Art, 52). It is important to note that Dreyfus does not take such a naive position, and as we shall 
see argues that the very “accuracy” of the camera is what makes it distort reality, and the human 
imagination must interfere in this false reproduction to provide both perspective and meaning.
133 Or as Dr Johnson would say, the goal was not to count the number of stripes on the petals of a rose 
but to create the essence of the rose.
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Pour voir, il faut les yeux, pour comprendre, il faut 
l’intelligence.
To see, one must have eyes, to understand, one must 
have intelligence.
Just as a natural, innocent, and unsophisticated sensory perception 
contrasts with a moral and aesthetic understanding, so do the eyes and 
the trained cognitive faculties of the mind. This leads him to explicate 
on the contrasts between approaches to seeing and understanding, re-
cording impressions and working towards interpretation:
It is only given to a few men, [this ability] to reveal 
through the phenomenon of visible beauty to invisible 
beauty, of man to humanity.
In a sense, Dreyfus is an elitist; he believes that not all people are cre-
ated equal, that there are some born with superior talents and mental 
faculties, but these differences are neither racial nor national nor social 
in the sense of fixed classes. Men and women of genius must, having 
been given superior capacities, use them in whatever ways are open to 
them by their own personal preferences and according to the cultural 
discourses provided by the times and the places they live in, seek to ex-
press through the imitation of physical nature and its beauty the secret, 
hidden dimension of supernal beauty, a beauty that, moreover, is moral 
and spiritual, raising individuals from their historical matrix into the 
purer domain of humanity—from the fallen Adam back to the original 
Adam, ha’adam hakadmon. This perfectibility of perception to moral vi-
sion provides the model for all other forms of tikkun ha’alom, kabbalistic 
rectification of the created universe: “And that is true for all those or-
ders of ideas in which human thought exercises itself.
But then where we might expect, under other circumstances, the 
argument to follow through into the Talmudic and mystical ideas they 
seem to be working towards, despite the secular, classical, and some-
times even Christian terminology Dreyfus writes in, he picks up the 
model he wrote about a few pages earlier in this second cahier:
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It is for this reason that I already said a few days ago in 
the study of Michelet: The facts have provided material 
to Michelet, to be shaped by the form of his intelligence, 
his thought, he knew how to give life back to (reviver) 
the before us, to give a soul (donner l’âme) to a people, to 
an epoch.
It is this historian who shows Dreyfus how beauty is produced and 
how to write history in a way that shapes the facts into an image of the 
meaningful life of a people and an epoch, so that what is produced has 
within it the soul that is otherwise missed in impressionistic copies and 
photographic reproduction. Beauty has nothing to do with proportion-
ate harmonies or pleasing exteriors: it is in the perceived truth that is 
expressed through a just interpretation of a higher truth.
That which is true for History is true for Literature, for 
Painting, for every order of ideas where human thought 
exercises itself. It is not sufficient to see; one must com-
prehend with the eyes of the heart, with those of the 
soul.
To place this principle of beauty and truth into a Jewish context, 
we need to consider the Hebrew terminology that lies behind Dreyfus’s 
praise of Michelet—and two other names he adds in a final short par-
agraph, Michelangelo in painting and Leonardo da Vinci in goldwork. 
This special word is hadar, ּהּדּר, a form of beauty associated with splen-
dour and glory. For example, according to Shlomo Riskin,
hiddur mitzvah is the term used to describe the perfor-
mance of a commandment on the highest possible level, 
which includes searching out the most beautiful objects 
required, as well as expending extra time, effort and 
money.134
This way of understanding beauty goes back into Talmudic authori-
ties, such as R. Abahu, who interprets
134 Shlomo Riskin, “Beauty Lasts,” Sabbath Sermon in The Jerusalem Post (24 September 1999), 23.
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hadar to also mean (in addition) to beauty the one 
who inhabits, literally referring to that particular 
fruit which lives on the branch from “generation to 
generation”(season to season) without suffering the 
natural calamities of wind, storm and rain.
Riskin extrapolates from this, along with the rabbinical tradition, 
that “true beauty is expressed by the citron’s ability to overcome the 
blasts of the elements,” meaning that it is not an appearance in this 
ethrog or any other thing that is beautiful; it is a hardiness, a capacity to 
endure in love, loyalty, and life—in other words, it is inner strength and 
character. Moreover, “hadar rises from the core of a person’s being.” For 
this reason, the Jewish notion of beauty differs radically from that set 
of principles coming from Hellenistic civilization, including both Chris-
tianity and the secular European cultures that derive from it.
The difference between Hellenism and Hebraism is that 
the former worshipped at the altar which claimed beauty 
was truth, while Hebrews affirmed the exact opposite, 
that “truth is beautiful.”
Continuing his discussion of Michelet and Beauty onto the next page 
of his workbook, Dreyfus writes:
Michelet had radiant thoughts, the concern for truth, 
the pen of an artist, so as to render this truth. Michel-
angelo had the palette of a great artist, the thoughts of 
a great genius which directed his hand. What more mar-
vellous than the birth of the human thought by the hand 
submitting to intelligence than the frescoes in the Sist-
ine Chapel in Rome?
These lines embody in two different and specific artists the principles 
laid out on the previous pages of the essay on art. Whether Dreyfus ever 
himself visited Rome and saw the Sistine Chapel is unlikely, but he prob-
ably saw pictures of it in a book, and what is most important is the idea 
of the perfected idea as the work of art.
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Then Dreyfus repeats his argument on the limitations and deficien-
cies of Impressionist art, which he now identifies with realism in the 
philosophical sense:
The Realist violates Truth by submitting to us only a 
point of detail, staring into the sun with his naked eye, 
without a soul to comprehend and grasp. It is the Ideal 
which enlightens the Truth.
A passive art, in which the painter, poet, or musician acts only as a 
vehicle through which the external world passes, makes its impression, 
and then projects that impression into the work of art, is a hollow, su-
perficial thing, an idol. This action, however, does more than set itself 
up to be a sounding board to resonate with external stimulus or a wind 
chime through which inspiration wafts to create a pleasant melody; it 
is a sexual violation of the naked truth. Paradoxically, this violation is 
itself passive, allowing oneself to engage in a self-blinding enterprise, 
staring with the naked eye into the sun. The lack of a soul, here standing 
for the active intellect well trained in the arts of the humanities, makes 
the artist more than a suicidal fool; by violating the truth, such an artist 
is a terrorist who destroys the basis of civilization. The idealist, on the 
other hand, the true artist, enlightens, actively interprets experience 
and casts the radiant beams of what is produced into the world.
Incrementally repeating what he said earlier about genius not work-
ing to dogmatic beliefs, Dreyfus mimics Lamennais’s shift from strict 
obedience of Catholic doctrine to a call for freedom, a liberal interpreta-
tion of theology, and a tolerance of other ways to the truth:
Genius does not recognize doctrines, it only recognizes 
tools (outils) to give a form to its own thought. Let us 
salute free spirits who go in search of their inspiration 
in the poetry of Homer, even in the mysterious pages 
of the Bible, those above all who seek inspiration in the 
radiant book which is called Nature.
Rules and regulations serve to train the hands and the eyes of the 
artist, whereas set rules for what constitutes a pretty or a pleasing pic-
ture or musical composition or some other work of art would stultify ge-
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nius. But libres esprits, like Timanthes, are inspired by rhetoric of great 
poetry, by the deep mysteries of Scripture, and mostly by the Book of 
Nature, the last two words in that paragraph being underlined in the 
manuscript. By this concept of nature, surely he does not mean the ru-
ral scenes and cityscapes that the painters of the late nineteenth cen-
tury went out into to find their subjects, unencumbered by neoclassical 
rules, and Dreyfus could not have been so naive about contemporary 
art as to pass over their dependence on the masters of the previous gen-
erations and the models they copied in museums in Paris and Rome to 
train themselves, even when they rejected the strictures of the Salon ju-
ries and official patrons of the state. Yet there is something bizarre and 
troubling in his conclusions here, something that makes his argument 
ring hollow, even when it has the resonance of rabbinical themes. Thus, 
the final paragraphs, beginning with this odd paean to pantheists and 
deists, is hardly comprehensible either in import or in tone, given the 
fragmented state of the words:
Pantheists or deists [three words illegible] all those who 
adhere to the cult of Beauty in these two concepts the 
Ideal and the [illegible word] Truth.
This would be a positive statement by the writer of the cahier, but 
does he really favour these forms of religious thought, pantheists per-
haps finding their most authoritative model in someone like Spinoza 
in the seventeenth century and deists in the followers of Locke in the 
eighteenth? The next sentence, separated into a new paragraph, either 
repeats or attempts to advance that thought:
Thus, pantheists or deists, it matters little, let us salute 
those who adhere to the cult of Beauty, in these two con-
cepts, the Ideal and the Truth.
Does it matter whether we call such persons pantheists or deists, 
or are they of little significance themselves, and the call to praise them 
ironic, self-mocking, because although they exalt the concepts of the 
ideal and the truth they do not have the mental or spiritual capacities 
to interpret what they see and try to reproduce in their works? What 
was Dreyfus trying to say in the words that are now illegible in the first 
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version of this statement? We will probably never know. Yet he gives a 
slight hint in the short citation from the Vulgate that follows:
Post tenebras spero lucem.
After the shadows, I hope or seek for the light.
This has been taken by Calvin and others within Protestantism to stand 
for a saying such as “After the Darkness, the Light,” referring to Christ. 
The fuller text is found in Job 17:11–13, which in the Vulgate reads:
Dies mei transierunt cogitationes meae dissipatae sunt 
torquentes cor meum noctem verterunt in diem et rursum 
post tenebras spero lucem si sustinuero infernus domus mea 
est in tenebris stravi lectulum meum
The Authorized Version in the Knox edition translates this, empha-
sizing the Protestant interpretation of the text:
My days are past, my purposes are broken off, even the 
thoughts of my heart;
They change the night into day: the light is short be-
cause of darkness.
If I wait, the grave is mine house: I have made my bed 
in the darkness.
The translation into French by Louis Segond, first published in 1873, 
from both the Hebrew and the Greek Septuaguint and thus likely to 
have been seen by Dreyfus, reads:
Quoi! Mes jours sont passés, mes projets sont anéantis, 
Les projets qui remplissaient mon cœur . . .
Et ils prétendent que la nuit c’est le jour,
Que la lumière est proche quand les ténèbres sont là!
C’est le séjour des morts que j’attends pour demeure,
C’est dans les ténèbres que je dresserai ma couche . . .
Would Dreyfus have recognized these differences in translation 
and in religious perspective, or would he only have seized upon the 
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most obvious metaphorical meaning of the text as a saying? On the 
one hand, it would be interesting to examine very closely the original 
context in the Book of Job, which we have studied in the past,135 and 
show, in collaboration with Israel David, that this Book of Wisdom has 
a special concern with breaking apart the dogmatic readings of both 
scriptural and liturgical imagery in order to forge a version of Judaism 
which, along with Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs, for instance, is 
nonmythical and that calls for philosophical as well as legal interpreta-
tions of the language through a pre-Maimonidean rationalism. On the 
other hand, paying more attention to the context of the essay on art, it 
would be useful to accept the metaphors of light and darkness in their 
non-Jewish acceptations, with only slight modifications to follow the 
argument of Dreyfus. Nevertheless, given that in this citation Dreyfus 
authorizes us to confirm his knowledge of the Bible—that mysterious 
book he places second after Homer and behind the Book of Nature, 
unless the lines quoted above were ironically conceived—it is possible 
to take the analogy between his condition on Devil’s Island and Job’s 
on the dung heap as more than an imposed juxtaposition; it can be a 
conscious identification he makes with the great man suddenly and un-
fairly brought low, despondent but roused to rage against his erstwhile 
friends who take his losses and afflictions as proof positive of his guilt, 
since the God of their religion would never do an injustice, and his de-
nials of any slight confirmation of their position as further evidence of 
why he deserves to be ruined for his arrogance and pride—and eventu-
ally alienated from God.
At first the deity seems to confirm the case against Job until, re-
markably, the voice from the whirlwind returns to proclaim that Job 
was correct to rail against his friends and young Elihu, and that, indeed, 
a man must demand accountability from the justice of Heaven and not 
accept the apparent punishment as a given. In this sense, the darkness 
would be the deaths, the losses, the illnesses, and the rejection by his 
friends, and the light would be, not Jesus coming into the world as Light 
135 Norman Simms and Israel David, “God’s Answer to Job: Revelation and Confession,” Simms, ed., 
In a Season of Hate: Selection of Papers from the Proceedings of the Tenth Biennial Waikato Jewish 
Studies Seminar (Hamilton: Outrigger Publishers, 2002), 52–56. See also “Theodicy and Job in 
Three Eighteenth-Century Novels,” Serge Soupel, ed., Crime et Châtiment dans les îles britaniques au 
dix-huitième siècle (Paris: RBC, 2001), 201–222 and “The Alienated Woman: or, Mrs. Job Suffered 
Too,” Vladimir M. Bychenkov, ed., Anonymity, Impersonality, Virtuality (Moscow: Russian and 
British Cathedra, 2002), 280–297.
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or Truth incarnate, but the very reason that interprets the illusions and 
delusions the friends and Elihu recite uncritically and irrationally. Job 
the man and Job the long dramatic or rhetorical poem are each works 
of art, beautiful because they manifest truth and truth is beautiful. 
That truth is what interpretation creates, not what is given, to be taken 
passively and on faith. Alfred Dreyfus is also still waiting and hoping 
for the truth to emerge, and although he and Lucie have said that such 
enlightenment will break into the world unexpectedly, they also know 
that such an event will happen only because they have, each in their 
own way, remained steadfast in their love and loyalty, endured the pains 
and humiliations thrown upon them by a hostile and bigoted world, and 
worked hard to produce the change in interpretation of the facts and the 
exposure of the forgeries.
The essay on art, however, concludes lamely, with a statement that 
Leonardo da Vinci “gives the supreme example” of how a great artist 
has “revealed the soul in painting the body, in chiselling the material.” 
More irony through understatement or overstatement? Indirection, as 
the rabbis often counsel, to put the censors off balance? Who knows? 
But after a brief reading of a poem by Vienne on King John,136 in which 
Queen Isabelle’s plea is rebuffed because “you are only a woman,” Drey-
fus adds a word on Henry IV:
However brave he was, when one came to say to him, 
“Here are the enemies,” it was always taken as a kind of 
canting (dévoiment), and he shut him off in raillery and 
said, “I am going to do something good for them.” 
This leads into another aphorism that might come from La Rouche-
foucauld or some other cynical thinker of the past:
Personne n’est grand pour son valet de chambre.
No one is great to his personal servant.
All three of these little comments can be seen to show that what 
you say has its effect more because of who you are than through the 
value of the remark itself. Truth is normally a social construct and 
136 Cahier 2, Folio 34, Cahiers, 74.
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does not shape words into things of beauty.
The next significant essay in cahier 2 is the one on photographic 
equipment.137 Yet having said that, the reader must not expect a highly 
technical disquisition on the mechanics of optics and the latest develop-
ments in the construction of the machinery used to fix images on plates 
or the advance towards motion pictures occurring at the time Dreyfus 
was writing this short piece. Rather, two features make it significant: 
one is that the essay concerns itself, at least in the opening paragraph, 
with the implications of this technical method of reproducing and stor-
ing images, already available for at least fifty years and known to a wide 
public, with many artists coming to understand its potential as an art 
form in itself, and the second is that for the first time in his cahiers, 
Dreyfus, under the same underlined title, swerves to a seemingly very 
different topic altogether.
Thus, of the five paragraphs in this little essay on folio 35, actually 
only two concern themselves with photography. The first announces the 
theme, perhaps taking as a starting point some article he has read in one 
of the magazines sent to him:
It is one thing amateur photographers fail to take ac-
count of. In photographic equipment, one has, according 
to circumstances, copied the fashion (la façon) of making 
man and most animals, or the fashion (la façon) of mak-
ing a fish in order to make an objective point.
In the repetition of façon, he introduces the primary ambiguity in 
his thought. Amateur photographers, who now have at their disposal 
smaller, less unwieldy apparatus that makes it possible to take their own 
pictures for whatever purposes they may choose, do not act as though 
they had total freedom to follow their own inclinations but “follow the 
fashion,” in the sense both of selecting objects to take pictures of and 
deciding how to arrange the object in a setting and in the sense of al-
ready perceiving the final product according to current styles and modes 
they have seen in galleries and illustrated magazines, that is, fashion in 
the sense of being à la mode.
The third and fourth paragraphs deal with the organic chemistry of 
137 See also the essay “Amplification des épreuves photographiques” on Cahier 2, Folio 46.
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fat and the implications for human health, and the fifth with a great 
chemist calling on his students at the polytechnic to apply their learn-
ing to public health issues. The essay therefore allows us to watch Drey-
fus’s mind working by word associations as he slides from the original 
topic, with its theoretical base and moves towards implications to an-
other subject where the same thing happens, his concern being both for 
the science that fascinates him and for the application of this technical 
knowledge in the real world for social and moral ends, his real concern 
throughout all the prison workbooks.
For most people, the amateurs, the circumstances in which they 
live have unconsciously turned the fashion, the manner in which they 
learn to operate the equipment and utilize to make pictures that they 
will enjoy looking at, showing to others, and keeping in their personal 
archives, into a style or mode of predetermined paradigms of percep-
tion, reception, and memorial value. What could be a mechanism for 
scientific exploration or artistic creation has become just another way 
for the powers who control the society to impose their tastes and social 
agenda over the broad public. These photographs of men, most animals, 
and fish confirm what the amateurs believe, because they have been so 
conditioned, man, most animals, and fish look like.
On the other hand, as the second paragraph begins to conjecture, 
what the objects in the outside world look like is beginning to change 
because the photograph does not exactly reproduce the optical mecha-
nism of the eye, and so the use of the photographic equipment has be-
gun to change the way in which we all see, think about, and recollect the 
world we live in.
When one uses spectacles, one modifies the focus of the 
lens; one does like a man and most animals do who, ad-
justing their eyes to diverse planes, vary the focal dis-
tance by changing the curvature. When, on the contrary, 
one focuses with a ratcheting device to vary distances 
between the ground-glass and the lens, which is the gen-
eral case for most equipment, one operates like fish who 
lack the facility to change the curvature of their eyes, but 
can advance or return their retina to make the focus.
This seems to be pure mechanics, the science of optics: to accom-
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modate the eye’s focus to objects at various distances, the mechanism 
can either change the focal point of the lens or move the retina back 
and forth, one is the usual form in mammalian eyes and the other in 
fish. The latest equipment for a camera oscura uses both means, what is 
natural for a human being and what is not. Dreyfus does not at all seem 
aware here of the two implications of his topic, neither of the social and 
aesthetic opportunities provided by the invention of the camera nor of 
the deeper philosophical and political implications. They are, however, 
implicit in his essay, because we may see them being opened in the es-
says already examined and will see even more in the folios to come in the 
remaining thirteen cahiers.
That is why the segue into the discussion of chemistry and health 
should be seen as significant and not merely as a random loss of attention.
Up to now, the question of organic chemistry, to know 
the transformation of fat in an organism, has remained 
more than obscure (plus qu’obscure). We certainly knew 
how we get fat, thanks to starches, but we hardly had 
any doubts about the phenomenon of getting thin. They 
used to believe that fats oxidize under the influence of 
oxygen in the air; that is false—oxygen does not oxidize 
fats. However. . . .
Before following Dreyfus in this new theme of science and technol-
ogy, it is important to note the way in which his mind is working and 
the underlying pattern of his association of ideas.138 The starting point 
for the new thought is the advance in understanding from what has 
hitherto (jusqu’ici) been assumed to be true, and the shift to negation 
of that set of truisms (c’est faux) begins with “However” (cependant), 
the announcement of the new epistemological position. This is a vari-
ation on what happened when he was talking about photography and 
the introduction into the discussion of a counterintuitive idea, that the 
machinery follows both the natural or normative fashion of focusing 
138 Whereas the recommended technique of “fantasy analysis” in psychohistory ignores all but 
the substantive and metaphorical terms in a discourse, especially rubbing out negative and 
subjunctive or conditional markers, so as to bring to the surface the unconscious dreamlike 
imagery of repressed thought, in my midrashic readings, I focus on the syntactic markers of 
process, transformation, and refocalization.
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on distant objects and an artificial fashion. What was once thought to 
be true about the oxidizing of starches proves to be false, but the new 
understanding comes because the doubts once under the surface of con-
scious thought have now broken through into moral consciousness.
What was once certain (on savait bien) was not all that secure, al-
though it was assumed to be so because the doubts, though present, 
were hardly there (on ne se doutait guère). It was clear that people got fat, 
but one didn’t know how to make them thin again because scientists 
misunderstood the process by which ingested starches are transformed 
into bodily fat. The facts don’t change; what we believe does. Our as-
sumptions therefore need to be always challenged and questioned so 
that we learn to see and understand in better ways, so that we come to 
see the truth and not a fashionable representation of a doubtful truism. 
Or we need to learn to step out of the obscurity of the old-fashioned 
camera oscura, the dark chamber of ignorance or superstition, into the 
camera lucida Tarde spoke about at the start of this chapter. This is what 
enlightenment is: not the brilliant and fixed image of truth dominating 
by a dogmatic assertion of its power but the constant challenging and 
questioning of assumptions, as Job was forced to do to rid himself of the 
persecution of his friends, with the ideals of the enlightenment, like To-
rah and Talmud, as a way of thinking and arguing towards the dynamic 
and always emerging and developing truth rather than the faithful re-
ception passively of an imposed statement of an iconic truism.
Returning to the “However” where we stopped in our reading of 
Dreyfus’s little double essay on photographic equipment and the mech-
anism of fat production in the body, what is important to see are these 
abstracted markers in his text:
However, it has been recognized . . . because we believed 
in . . . while all experiments in the laboratory demon-
strated the non-existence of these facts. Through multi-
ple experiments, an authoritative chemist arrived at the 
explanation—quite likely (assez vraisemblable). . . .
For Dreyfus, this is the ideal of science: an experimental method that 
disproves false assumptions and by many experiments (i.e., experiences 
of testing) builds up a new theory that stands as likely until it too is 
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proven false and another takes its place, and so on ad infinitum.139
Then a double conclusion. The first is the logical outcome of the pre-
ceding essay, and the second is the personal memory evoked by the dis-
cussion—one of those very rare moments when Dreyfus permits him-
self to write about his own childhood and education.
As all that makes me recall the wishful words formulated 
by Cahours, my deeply missed teacher at the Polytech-
nic, in his last books, where he exhorted chemists of [sic] 
to busy themselves with the search for a more perfect 
knowledge of the blood in order to deduce all its physi-
ological properties.
Perhaps the defective phrase marked sic by the modern editors 
should have had “chemists of the future.” What Cahours had taught 
young Dreyfus in the Polytech was more than a body of knowledge 
about chemistry, it was a scientific method: from close observation and 
experimentation through thoughtful extrapolation of general theories 
to useful application of the knowledge retrieved from nature to human 
uses. As in art, so in science, the best practice, the beauty of the method, 
lies somewhere other than in a passive observation and recording of im-
pressions. Beauty is created when it follows an active observation into 
and a rational transformation of the facts into the next stage of truth. 
Art and science are not opposites, as science and religion are not; all are 
variations on the same theme, using different approaches and according 
to the temperament, talents, and properties of each individual in the 
time and place of his or her existence.140
Can we be absolutely sure this is what Alfred Dreyfus meant here? 
No, not absolutely, but we can be tentatively comfortable with these 
speculations when we find them confirmed, refined, and challenged in 
139 Claude Bernard (1813-1878) and his Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine (1865) will 
be discussed further in the next volume in this series.
140 Interestingly, it is Taine who comes close to saying the same sort of thing about what he calls 
“the ascendancy of involuntary impressions” in art: “Study the sketches, designs, diaries, and 
correspondence of the old masters, and you will again everywhere find the same inward process. 
We may adorn it with beautiful names; we may call it genius or inspiration, which is right and 
proper; but if you wish to define it precisely you must always verify therein the vivid spontaneous 
sensation which groups together the train of accessory ideas, master, fashion, metamorphose and 
employ them in order to become manifest” (The Philosophy of Art, 80).
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subsequent entries in his cahiers. For example, immediately following 
this run of three essays on truth, beauty, and perception and their epis-
temological, moral, and practical implications, we find two short apho-
ristic remarks. The first appears in cahier 2, folio 37, and the second on 
the verso of that page.141
Happy those who carry within themselves an ideal of 
Beauty, and who obey their [sic] ideal of art or the ideal 
of science.
Aside from the awkward grammatical formulation of this statement,142 
as noted by the modern editor, the import is a clear extension of what 
has just been said about the way Dreyfus sees all knowledge systems ide-
ally operating towards the same goal of a dynamic truth through differ-
ent means of approach, not least the broad categories of art and science. 
Next comes a quotation from Pascal that Dreyfus comments on darkly:
De Pascal: “L’âme humaine a des profondeurs insondables.” Il 
eût mieux fait dire que le cœur humain avait des profondeurs 
de cruauté incommensurables.
By Pascal: “The human soul has its unfathomable 
depths.” It would be better to say that the human heart 
has depths of incomparable cruelty.
Out of the depths of his despair, from amidst the horrible nightmare 
of his torments in prison, the prisoner reverses the seventeenth-centu-
ry Christian thinker’s aphorism. This is what science cannot understand 
and what art cannot reproduce in beautiful imagery—the unspeakable 
evil of the injustices imposed on an innocent Jew. But this way of think-
ing leads to madness.
In a brief critique of Victor Hugo’s Angelo, Tyran de Padoue,143 Drey-
fus concludes that this historical play, like others in the Romantic 
school, makes a flash but then is forgotten, not because it lacks energy 
141 Cahiers, 75.
142 “Heureux ceux qui portent en eux un idéal de Beauté, et qui leurs obéissent, idéal de l’art ou idéal de a [sic] 
science.”
143 Cahier 2, Folio 38, Cahiers, 76.
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or style—it has both in abundance—but because everything has been 
written simply for artificial effect; the whole drama of life has become 
a fantasy.
This essay is followed by what seems to be a totally unrelated discus-
sion on alcoholism,144 yet as has happened before, such a scientific essay 
offers interesting insights into the character and personality of Dreyfus. 
First, there is a short description of an experiment undertaken over a 
period of six months in the tiny hut in which the prisoner is kept. He was 
trying to find an efficient means of producing commercial alcohol and 
methylated spirits: the attempt was unsuccessful. The discussion then 
veers in a slightly different direction: he asks himself why the measures 
of electrical current are named after famous men so that if one wished 
to write out one’s experiments there would be a cacophony: Ohm, Am-
père, Latinus Clark . . . Thinking about scientific laws, he is also amused 
by the words used to designate the facts: this is whimsy, and for too long 
Dreyfus has been dismissed as a humourless and dour automaton. It is 
one thing to comment on the artificiality of early nineteenth-century 
drama and poetry, another to write about alcohol and electricity—but 
there is a connection in the witty mind of the writer.
After an aborted discourse on Shakespeare’s Othello, wherein Drey-
fus goes no further than writing the title of the essay and then cross-
ing it out, he creates a line drawing of an empty stomach followed by a 
sketch of the same organ after a hefty meal. This leads into an essay on 
digestion.145 From a description of how food is absorbed into the body, 
he moves to the state of surgery on the stomach, remarking that medi-
cal science has not proceeded very far in this regard, lamenting this ne-
glect. Is there a hint here about the poor hygiene and paucity of good 
food on Devil’s Island and Dreyfus’s own troubles with indigestion and 
tropical disease? That would be reason enough to turn away from the 
Moor of Venice.
A brief notice on Madame de Staël,146 one of many essays on persons 
and events connected to the last part of the ancien régime and the com-
ing of the French Revolution and its immediate aftermath; this critique 
admires her because she participated in the progress and the perfect-
144 Cahier 2, Folio 39, Cahiers, 76–77.
145 Cahier 2, Folio 40, Cahiers, 77.
146 Cahier 2, Folio 43, Cahiers, 77.
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ability of humanity, clearly something Dreyfus wishes he could enjoy. 
Then he cites two dozen verses from Hugo’s Odes et Ballades,147 begin-
ning “Que la soirée est fraîche et douce.” (How fresh and sweet the evening 
is), a sentimental and nostalgic idyll, again perhaps attractive to Drey-
fus by its dreamy invitation from the poet to the reader to join him in 
wandering through the evening landscape together.
From this reverie, Dreyfus glides into another essay on Jules Michelet, 
this time recounting the historian’s biography, emphasizing how his life 
seemed to be marred by political events, when he was chased out of the 
Collège de France for refusing to take an oath of loyalty after the coup 
d’état, and thus going into exile, and in that exile—which Dreyfus must 
have looked on longingly as full of promise and renewal—developing 
his poetic soul. From this period of his life emerge Michelet’s most lyri-
cal, meditative books, such La Montaigne, Le Mer, L’Oiseau, L’Amour, and 
La Peuple, impressionistic meditations on nature and society in various 
forms. It is through these kinds of books, says Dreyfus, that we come 
to appreciate the beauty of the specifically historical studies Michelet is 
most famous for; a soul that teaches itself to vibrate in harmony with 
the environment is preparing itself to understand the moral life of man-
kind. And, as though comforting himself in his own despondent state, 
Dreyfus concludes by saying that out of a life defeated and wounded 
by adversity, “he returned to humanity with a stronger hope, a larger 
degree of pathos” (il revient ainsi à l’humanité avec un espoir plus fort, une 
pitié plus large).
This leads directly into one of Dreyfus’s most important statements 
about the contemporary spirit:
Taine, Renan, Darwin, here are the three great minds 
which have most influenced modern ideas, more or less, 
following they have been more or less understood. Dar-
win above all has often been poorly understood.148
These are the modern thinkers Dreyfus most admires, to which list 
he gradually adds a few more, some artists or literary people, but most 
of them scientists, philosophers, and historians. They are great but they 
147 Cahier 2, Folio 44, Cahiers, 78.
148 Cahier 2, Folio 44, Verso, Cahiers, 78.
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are misunderstood and often neglected, at least in their own lifetimes.
In the second rank behind these three, Dreyfus places John Stuart 
Mills and the two Spencers in England, Haeckel and Schopenhauer in 
Germany, and finally Nietzsche (he does not mention where he comes 
from: born in Germany and living in Switzerland). These all represent 
a trend in nineteenth-century thought towards hard-headed social, 
moral, and scientific theory. These foreigners raise the question about 
where French writers belong. They mostly are specialists who do not 
venture out of their fields and hardly ever generalize their findings into 
universal theory. All except Claude Bernard, whose introduction to the 
scientific method stands out as one of the great books of the century 
because it sets forth clearly and beautifully a theory of experimental sci-
ence.149 Yet, if France is not in the first rank of science and philosophy, 
it is certainly to be admired for its historians, who have enriched the 
literature of the age.
Out of this statement comes his next critical piece, on a poem by 
Sully Prud’homme, “Justice.”150 In this poem, Prud’homme searches for 
justice until he finds it in the human conscience, an idea Dreyfus ap-
proves of, although he might have better expressed it, from what we 
have seen in earlier essays and their affiliation with rabbinic thought, by 
indicating that the human soul finds its beauty and strength in justice, 
that is, in the law. But the poem itself, for all its admirable thoughts, is 
149 Claude Bernard, “Introduction à l’étude de la medicine expérimentale” (1865), Oeuvre, Paris: J. B. 
Baillière et Fils, 1883. After distinguishing the scientific method from that of the metaphysician, 
whose scholasticism stands a block to discovering through experimentation the laws of nature, 
Bernard speaks of “L’expérimentateur qui se trouve en face des phénomènes naturels ressemble à un 
spectateur qui observe des scènes muettes. Il est en quelque sorte le juge d’instruction de la nature; 
seulement, au lieu d’être aux prises avec des hommes qui cherchent à le tromper par des aveux mensongers 
ou par de faux témoignages, il a affaire a des phénomènes naturels qui sont pour lui des personnages 
dont il connaît ni le langage ni les mœurs, qui vivent au milieu de circonstances qui lui sont inconnues, 
et dont il veut cependant savoir les intentions” (The experimenter finds himself face to face with 
natural phenomena and so resembles a spectator who observes the examination of men who 
seek to fool him by false vows, lies or perjury, and he thus deals with natural phenomena that 
are for him like persons of whom he knows neither the language nor the manners, who live in 
the circumstances unknown to him, and whom he wishes nevertheless to know the intentions). 
In other words, a true scientist is both like an investigating magistrate trying to evaluate the 
testimony of hostile witnesses and an anthropologist who does field studies of persons who speak, 
think, and feel differently from his own norms. What Dreyfus does is, as we shall see partly in 
the next chapter but more so in subsequent books of our own, to transfer that scientific method, 
with due adjustments, to the field of historiography and recreating, inadvertently, a midrashic 
approach to philosophy, aesthetics, and morals.
150 Cahier 2, Folio 45, Cahiers, 78.
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poorly written, too intricate and scanty: “If the thought is beautiful, the 
form is weak” (Si la pensée est belle, la forme est faible), and for Dreyfus 
not only must form and content match but beauty needs to be strong—
unlike his own mind and body, which he fears will succumb to the tor-
ments of his horrible exile. Of Justice like this René Cassin has written, 
in the very words Dreyfus would have agreed with:
Centuries have passed. Judaism has, throughout unpar-
alleled trials, preserved its passion for justice and its de-
sire to contribute to the defense of the rights of men of 
all races and origins, along the lines of the very principle 
with which it was entrusted two thousand years ago. The 
Ten Commandments, the first code of the essential du-
ties of man, have suffered many an outrage in history 
and continue to suffer. Their moral authority remains 
intact.151
Dreyfus’s second essay on photography discusses the techniques for 
enlargement of prints, “Amplification des épreuves photographiques.”152 
Like the earlier essay, the discussion has both a technical dimension on 
how to make enlargements and a theoretical component on why such 
manipulation of artificial images is necessary. A mechanical reproduc-
tion of an object out in the world does not adjust itself as the human 
eye and brain would adjust it in order to give a sense of perspective and 
depth. What is implied here, but not said explicitly, is that the human 
mind is creative in its apprehension of natural facts, whereas a camera 
only records instantaneous perceptions, impressions fixed on glass or 
chemical film. Photography moves from science to art when it provides 
the means for correcting the faults of innocent reproduction and from 
fact to beauty when it gives meaning to the image produced.
Does this have anything to do with the next item in cahier 2, a cita-
tion of lines from Torquato Tasso in Italian, “Sprezzata ancella a chi fo 
piu conserva/Di questa chioma?” (What good is it to conserve, vile slave, 
my long hair?) Perhaps a whim or caprice, but also, if we examine the 
151 “From the Ten Commandments to the Rights of Man, “Shlomo Shoham, Of Law and Man: Essays 
in Honor of Haim H. Cohen (New York: Sabra Books, 1971), 25; cited by José Faur, The Horizontal 
Society, Section 2, 11.
152 Cahier 2, Folio 46, Cahiers, 78–79.
——————————————— 2. More Essays and Excursions ———————————————
 
— 285 —
last lines of this poem, a way for Dreyfus to find a strong expression 
for his deepest desires to live the heroic life of a soldier, even under the 
adverse conditions he now has to contend with and despite his tendency 
to weakness and despair:
Della battalglia, entro la turbe ostile
Animo ho bene, ho ben vigior che baste
A conduirti i cavalli, a portar l’aste.
I will follow you into the fire of battle, in the strongest 
mêlée of the enemy. I lack neither courage nor force to 
conduct your horses to carry these lances.
Courage, bravery, and determination: how Dreyfus wishes he could 
show them in battle! Does he realize the joke here, that the words he 
inscribes are spoken by a slave, a horse?
Whether he does or not, the next essay153 seems to be a kind of prose 
poem of his own, one of several he composes in the course of the cahiers. 
It is followed by a few other brief aphoristic and lyrical comments, the 
kind of mini-collection he will eventually call the mediations or random 
thoughts of the Solitary Man, the name he gives to himself or to the 
literary persona created in the workbooks. Although I will analyze these 
creative efforts more fully in my future work, it is important here, where 
we are trying to correct false impressions about Dreyfus’s character and 
personality, to spend a few moments on some of these short composi-
tions.
Lorsqu’un nuage noir menace la terre et cache sous son voile 
de sombres brouillards les sommets à la cime ambitieuse, il 
arrive souvent qu’une douce brise, s’échappant de la terre 
obscurcie [four words illegible] les vapeurs ténébreuses, et 
prévient, en les divisant, leur chute imminente.
When a black cloud threatens the earth and hides under 
its veil the sombre mists the summits of the ambitious 
peak, it often happens that a soft breeze, escaping from 
153 Cahier 2, Folio 47, Cahiers, 79.
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the darkened earth, [illegible words] the shadowy vapors, 
and prevents, by dividing them, their imminent fall.
This might come from any number of Romantic poets of the early 
nineteenth century or even some eighteenth-century landscape poems 
that only partly allegorize their depictions of natural phenomena. This 
is a rare moment of reverie for Dreyfus, one of his wished-for escapes 
from the seemingly endless nightmare of his life.
Then comes another composition somewhat more allegorical and 
tendentious, and written with a nice touch of assonance and syntactic 
harmony:
L’office du Temps est de mètre fin aux haines de détruire les 
erreurs. La gloire du Temps est de démasquer la fausseté, 
d’amener la vérité à la lumière, d’imprimer le sceau des siè-
cles sur les choses, de frapper l’injuste obscurcie [?] jusqu’à ce 
qu’il revienne au droit [six words crossed out].
The duty of Time is to put an end to hatred, to destroy 
errors. The glory of Time is to unmask Falsity, to lead 
truth to the light, to imprint the seal of the centuries on 
things, to beat down obscure injustice until it returns to 
the law.
Turlais as editor puts a question mark in square brackets after the 
phrase injustice obscurcie as though that were an unexpected or incom-
prehensible idea, when, alas, it is the very heart of the matter. Justice 
has been hidden under a cloud of ignorance and bigotry; it is the enigma 
of why against all common sense and decency, Dreyfus was convicted 
of a crime he could not possibly have committed; why the officers of 
the army and the politicians in the government should have leapt to 
such illogical conclusions and pursued their quest for punishment to 
such cruel extremes; why it is taking so very long for Lucie and Alfred’s 
brother Mathieu to bring about a revision of his court-martial; and why 
heaven and earth do not howl in protest and the voice of God does not 
break into the world to correct this horrible, unendurable error. In fact, 
with a minor few editorial changes to orthography and inserted glosses, 
the prayer to Time could read:
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It is the lawful duty of Time, as Zman, an ancient name 
for God, as the Lord of History and Eternity (Adon ha 
kol), to bring an end to all these hatreds against an in-
nocent man, to destroy the false judgments of the court 
based on judicial errors. The glory, which is both the 
honor (kavod) and beauty (hadar) of the Divine Name, 
is to unmask the treachery and duplicity of the machi-
nations against a loyal Frenchman, to bring the Truth 
into the Light, to correct the errors of the world, tikkun 
ha’olam, and to imprint the Seal of the Ages, another 
liturgical formulaic name for the Divine, on all things, 
that is, to sanctify this world and signal the beginning of 
messianic days, to beat down the most black and hateful 
Injustice that is hidden under the face of military hon-
or and duty to the Republic, so as to hasten the return 
of rule by law, the dominance and pervasiveness of the 
Law, the Torah of Israel.
Or as is read out during the regular (nonholiday) evening services of 
Sabbath:
We therefore hope in thee, O Lord our God, that we may 
speedily behold the glory of thy might, when thou wilt 
remove the abominations from the earth, and the idols 
will be utterly cut off, when the world will be perfected 
under the kingdom of the Almighty, and all the children 
of the flesh will call upon thy name, when thou wilt turn 
unto thyself all the wicked of the earth.
It would seem difficult to believe any Jew who had grown up with the 
least attention to the most common prayers of his religion could not 
have such words, phrases, and concepts resonating in his mind, particu-
larly in times of distress and pain.
Then the third composition in this series, what Dreyfus entitles “Dis-
tique funèbre,” a funeral distich, although it runs more than two lines:
La Beauté, la Vérité, la Grâce dans toute la simplicité 
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gisent, réduites en cendres.
La mort est son nid, en un cœur loyal repose dans l’éternité.
Vérité et Beauté sont ensevelies.
Qu’à cette urne se rendent les vrais et les beaux et qu’ils 
soupirent une prière.
Beauty, Truth, Grace in all their simplicity lie here re-
duced to ashes.
Death is its nest, and a loyal heart reposes in eternity.
Truth and Beauty are wrapped in a shroud.
May this urn transform them into the true and the 
beautiful and they breathe a prayer.
In what seems a classical graveyard poem, engraved on a tomb-
stone, the poet laments the passing of three key ideals in his philoso-
phy, seeing in their deaths a further stage in their perfection as divine 
thoughts.
After this melancholy lyrical excursion, Dreyfus returns to a discus-
sion of historiography,154 at first contrasting two schools of thought: the 
first, known as the descriptive school, compiles facts without comment 
and allows the student to draw his own conclusions; the second, the 
philosophical school, although Dreyfus thinks that name is foolish since 
there is neither philosophy nor science in it, has the goal of describing 
the soul of past ages, somehow, by intuition and poetic sensitivity. Un-
fortunately, Dreyfus does not elaborate on this method here, although 
he does, of course, elsewhere in the cahiers; instead, he slides into “an 
appreciation” on the old poem La Pucelle (“The Virgin”) by Chapelain. 
This contemporary verse on the enthusiastic surge of Mariology and the 
renewed nationalist interest in Joan of Arc in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, seen, on the one hand, in the commercialisation of 
shrines like that of Lourdes and Fatima and, on the other, in a populari-
zation of her figure in monarchist and other pseudomystical politics, as 
a rather bizarre conclusion to its satire.
La cabale en dit force bien.
Depuis vingt ans, on parle d’elle;
154 Cahier 2, Folio 48, Cahiers, 79–80.
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Dans six mois, on n’en dira rien.
The cabal spoke of it with strength, for twenty years one 
spoke of her, and in six months she will be heard of no 
more.
The word cabal used here to refer to the Catholic mystical movements, 
say, of the Boulangists and especially of the Jesuits, was also the term of 
abuse for the Jewish “syndic” or conspiracy. It is difficult to know what 
Dreyfus means by citing these lines, other than expressing a curiosity of 
contemporary popular politics, without being conscious of any applica-
tion to his own condition through anti-Semitic smears—although, as 
we have noted before, the censors reading his letters and notebooks, not 
being able to understand the special terms of his love and intellectual-
ism, dismissed his scribbles and his doodles as “cabalistiques.”
In another short essay on Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens,155 after 
some discussion of the use of Plutarch as a source, Dreyfus shows spe-
cial interest in the figure of a man subject to bad luck, mistreated by 
his friends, and susceptible to a cynical view of the world as a conse-
quence, a powerful variation on the Job of the Hebrew Bible. He also 
understands that the ancients paired Timon with the Cynic philosopher 
Diogenes as men who tried to put into practice their moral principles, 
Dreyfus finding in this Greek notion of matching ideas a striking image-
ry to exemplify the ideas both naive and beautiful. When he considers 
the way in which Shakespeare depicts Timon as a man thrown into mis-
anthropy by the change in his fortunes, Dreyfus objects, this negative 
view of the world not being consonant with his own ideals, despite his 
own tendency to fall into the same despair:
La vie n’est ni aix bons, ni aux méchants; les premiers ne 
reçoivent pas la recompense de leur virtu, les seconds, le châ-
timent de leurs crimes. La vie est aux indifférents, Cette mo-
rale n’est pas gaie.
Life is neither to the good, nor to the wicked; the first 
155 Cahier 2, Folio 12, Cahiers, 80. Note that this and the preceding composition on La Pucelle are on a 
sheet that seems to have been torn from the bound volume of the cahier and numbered Folio 12.
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do not receive recompense for their virtues, the second, 
punishment for their crimes. Life is to the indifferent. 
This moral is not gay.
The two troubling words here may or may not be used ironically and 
the extent of their allusiveness cannot be fully determined, and yet 
the understanding of the Shakespearian play and Dreyfus’s philosophy 
hinge on them. Those who are indifférents may be objective and disinter-
ested, and this would make them scientifically inclined, a necessary and 
virtuous character in the dispensation of justice in courts of law as well 
as in laboratories conducting experiments; but they may also be insensi-
ble, numbed to the pains and humiliations of others, and consequently 
cruel in their strict lack of human empathy, making them dangerous 
persons to deal with. As for gaie, this may signal a whimsical understat-
ed response to Shakespeare’s Timon by merely saying that his way of 
looking at the world is not a pretty or pleasant one, or the word may al-
lude to Nietszche’s essay on The Gay Science, where the German fröhliche 
plays on the gai saber or gaia sciensa of Provençal poetry, where it refers 
to the delightful and pleasurable arts of love. Nietzsche writes with a 
mordant wit, mocking the developments of science and philosophy in 
his own times, and yet suggesting a way of creatively moving towards a 




En Europe, les Juifs ont suivi une école de dix-huit siècles, 
chose que ne peut prétendre aucun autre peuple, et cela de 
telle sorte que ce n’est pas tant la communauté mais surtout 
les individus qui ont profité des expériences de cette effroyable 
période d’épreuves. En conséquence, les ressources spirituelles 
et intellectuelles des Juifs d’aujourd’hui sont extraordinaires; 
dans la détresse, ils sont, entre tous les habitants de l’Europe, 
les derniers à recourir à la bouteille ou au suicide pour échapper 
a un désarroi profond ce qui est si tentant pur quelqu’un de 
mois doué. Tout Juif trouve dans l’histoire de ses pères er de ses 
ancêtres une mine d’exemples du sang-froid et de la ténacité les 
plus inébranlables au milieu de situations terribles, des ruses 
les plus subtiles pour tromper le malheur et le hasard en en 
tirant profit; leur courage sous le couvert d’une soumission pi-
toyable, leur héroïsme dans le spernare se sperni (« mépriser 
d’être méprise ») surpassant les vertus de tous les saints.
— Friedrich Nietzsche1
In Europe, the Jews have followed a single school of 
thought for eighteen centuries, something which no 
other people can claim to have done, and have carried 
this out in such a way that it was not so much the com-
munity but individuals who have profited from the expe-
riences of this frightful period of testing. Consequently, 
the spiritual and intellectual resources of the Jews of 
today are extraordinary; in their distress, they are, out 
of all the inhabitants of Europe, the last to escape from 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Aurore, cited in Stephane Zagdanski, “Ânerie d’Arendt: Post-Scriptum a De 
l’anti semitisme” (Paris, 2005-2006) online at http://parolesdesjours.free.fr/arendt.pdf (seen 25 July 
2011). De l’antisemitisme was published by Julliard, 1995 and again in a new enlarged edition by 
Climats Flammarion, in 2006. Nietzsche’s Morgenröte – Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurteile, first 
appeared in 1881 and is now available in French as Aurore. Réflexions sur les préjugés moraux, trans. 
Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Paris: Gallimard, 1989) and in English as Dawn: Thoughts on 
the Presumptions of Morality, trans. Brittain Smith (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
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profound disorientations through recourse to the bottle 
or to suicide, which have been such temptations to any-
one less endowed. Every Jew find in the history of his 
fathers and ancestors a mine of examples of self-control 
and of the most unshakable tenacity, of the most subtle 
tricks to enable them to triumph over unhappiness and 
adversity and to profit from it; their courage under the 
cover of a pitiful submission, their heroism in the sper-
nare se sperni (“to scorn being scorned”) surpasses the 
virtue of all the saints.2
At this point, where Nietzsche in 1881 seems to pre-empt my de-
scriptions of Dreyfus under duress, in love, and asserting his intel-
lectual prowess, my preliminary excursion into showing how a careful 
reading of Dreyfus’s letters, journals and workbooks allows for a fairly 
radical re-assessment of his personality and achievements, indeed, his 
potentiality as a major thinker, must come to an end. The metaphor of 
the phantasmagoria, which is the one Dreyfus himself used—and which 
is found repeatedly in the writings of his favourite authors—becomes 
not only increasingly more apt as we study his style, conceptual frame-
work and psychological profile, but transforms itself into the contours 
of a midrash. The midrash we are talking about, however, goes beyond 
the specificities of rabbinical enhancement of sacred texts to include a 
series of strategies, conscious and unconscious, developed by Jews in 
Europe under the pressures of persecution and assimilation, to protect 
and develop their Jewish values, modes of perception, continuities of 
memory, and creative engagements with the world. These midrashings 
of experience reveal the most interesting and unexpected features of 
Dreyfus’s character and intellectual activities.
The next volumes in this series will not only continue the close-read-
ings of the cahiers begun in this opening book, providing them with an 
enhanced set of intellectual, psychological and religious contexts, but 
will probe more deeply into the special, creative relationship between 
Alfred and his wife Lucie. Though each book can be taken as a separate 
study, they also each overlap with one another, and deepen the under-
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